Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1986 Munchinski was convicted of two counts of first-degree homicide and two counts of second-degree homicide arising out of a pair of murders that occurred in 1977 in Bear Rocks, Pennsylvania. Munchinski later discovered that prosecutors had withheld from his counsel almost a dozen articles of exculpatory evidence. After unsuccessfully petitioning for post-conviction relief several times in state and federal court, Munchinski filed a second or successive habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244 & 2254(d), arguing that the Pennsylvania Superior Court unreasonably applied Brady, when it declined to grant Munchinski post-conviction relief. The district court granted habeas relief. The court equitably tolled the statute of limitations for some untimely claims; excused certain procedural defaults, finding that applying the procedural default doctrine would effect a fundamental miscarriage of justice; and agreed that the state court had unreasonably applied Brady. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the scope of the Brady violations was “staggering.” Munchinski demonstrated actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. View "Munchinski v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Roye, a 58-year-old native of Jamaica, was admitted to the U.S. in 1984 as the spouse of a citizen. In 1992, he pled guilty to aggravated assault and endangering the welfare of a child by having sexual intercourse with his eight-month old daughter. The trial judge sentenced Roye to six to 20 years’ imprisonment but strongly recommended transfer into a psychiatric facility. Fourteen years later, DHS charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An Immigration Judge found that Roye granted for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ emphasized testimony indicating “that mentally ill detainees and prisoners are often sexually and physically assaulted in the Jamaican prison system because of the nature of their mental illness” and that Roye will be homeless in Jamaica due to a lack of family ties. The BIA ordered immediate removal. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the BIA must review the conclusion that the evidence demonstrates that Roye’s persecutors will physically and sexually abuse him in a manner that rises to the level of torture under the CAT, and decide whether Jamaican public officials will consent to or acquiesce in such abuse. View "Roye v. Atty Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

In 1980 Pacific purchased a certificate of reinsurance from a predecessor of Global. The Certificate included a sentence that reads, “As a condition precedent, the Company [i.e., Pacific] shall promptly provide the Reinsurer [i.e., Global] with a definitive statement of loss on any claim or occurrence reported to the Company and brought under this Certificate which involves a death, serious injury or lawsuit.” In the early 1990s, claimants began inundating Buffalo Forge with asbestos-related lawsuits. It notified Pacific, its excess carrier, of these claims in April 2001. By 2004, its primary policy was exhausted. In 2005, Pacific instructed its broker to keep its reinsurers informed about developments in the Buffalo Forge matter. The district court applied Pennsylvania law. Under New York law, when a reinsurance contract expressly requires a reinsured to provide its reinsurer with prompt notice of a claim or occurrence as a condition precedent to coverage and the reinsured fails to do so, that failure excuses the reinsurer from its duty to perform, regardless whether the reinsurer suffered prejudice as a result of the late notice. The Third Circuit reversed and applied New York law and concluded that the agreement is fairly susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation. View "Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am." on Justia Law

In 2005 Anderson was charged with federal tax evasion (26 U.S.C. 7201) for tax years 1995 through 1999, while Anderson was an entrepreneur and venture capitalist involved in operating several international companies, including G & A, which generated hundreds of millions of dollars of income. The government alleged that because G & A was a “controlled foreign corporation,” he was required to recognize a share of its income on his tax return; that he fraudulently failed to do so; and thatAnderson had fraudulently underpaid his taxes by $184 million, 99% of which stemmed from G & A. He pleaded guilty with respect to two years and was sentenced to 108 months imprisonment. In 2007 Anderson filed a petition to redetermine his tax deficiencies, 26 U.S.C. 6213(a). The Tax Court granted partial summary judgment to the IRS. The Third Circuit affirmed. Anderson’s conviction for tax evasion in 1998 and 1999 precludes him, by virtue of collateral estoppel, from contesting in civil fraud proceedings that G & A income was taxable to him in those years. The IRS’s concession of all deficiency and penalty issues for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 has no preclusive effect on those issues for 1998 and 1999. View "Anderson v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Martinez, a native of Nicaragua, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1985. In 1989, he married a citizen, had a daughter, and began adjusting his status to lawful permanent resident. In 1990, Martinez pleaded guilty to sexual assault of his eight-year-old stepdaughter. In 1991, prior to sentencing, Martinez traveled to Nicaragua to complete the immigrant visa application process. The consulate approved his application. Martinez was admitted to the U.S.as a permanent resident the following day. He was later sentenced to four years in prison. Martinez was released on parole in 1992. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal in 2009. Martinez argued that he was eligible for adjustment of status under former INA Section 212(c), which waived the bar against status adjustment for convicted aggravated felons who had at least seven years unrelinquished residence, at least five years as an LPR, and had not served more than five years in prison. The IJ found Martinez statutorily ineligible for relief. The BIA agreed that he had “never been lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” The Third Circuit denied review. A person accorded status as “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” upon physical entry, who did not substantively qualify for such status, is barred from relief. View "Martinez v. Atty Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

In 2002 Glover entered into a mortgage with WaMu. After being injured Glover fell behind on her mortgage in 2005 and requested a work-out agreement to reduce her payments. WaMu initially threatened to foreclose, but subsequently agreed to postpone her payments until the request had been evaluated. Eventually, WaMu denied the request. Murray, an attorney with Udren Law Offices, called Glover and informed her that she owed WaMu missed payments, attorney’s fees and costs, totaling $3,397.28. WaMu then filed a foreclosure complaint. After communications between Glover and WaMu‘s assignee, Wells Fargo, Glover entered into a loan modification agreement with Wells Fargo. Glover filed a putative class-action against WaMu, Wells Fargo, and the Udren firm, alleging violations of the Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, premised on violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. An FDCPA claim was not timely because Glover’s amended pleadings did not provide the fair notice required for relatation back to her original filing View "Glover v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

In 2002 Murray pleaded guilty, in New Jersey, to traveling interstate to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor. Later that year, in a Pennsylvania district court, he pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 95 months’ imprisonment, followed by concurrent three-year terms of supervised release. Both sentencing judges imposed special conditions of release that, for example, required him to register as a sex offender and to submit to unannounced searches of his computer. After Murray was released from prison in 2010, he moved to the Western District of Pennsylvania, which assumed jurisdiction for the remainder of his term of supervised release. Though Murray had not violated his existing supervised release conditions, the probation office sought to modify them to bring them in line with the conditions of release that are typically used in that district. The court granted the request and imposed several new, more stringent conditions, including a prohibition on possession of sexually-oriented material and a requirement to submit to workplace searches. The Third Circuit remanded the new conditions for an explanation of why they are no greater than necessary to satisfy the section 3553(a) sentencing factors. View "United States v. Murray" on Justia Law

Martorano was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole after pleading guilty, in 1984, to 19 counts related to the wholesale distribution of drugs. He appealed the sentence, arguing that the district court imposed an illegal general sentence; and that his undifferentiated sentence for conspiring to distribute drugs (21 U.S.C. 846) and supervising a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (21 U.S.C. 848) violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Third Circuit rejected the arguments and affirmed, noting that, since 1988, the sentence has been reviewed by various district court judges and Third Circuit panels. View "United States v. Martorano" on Justia Law

Duran, a native of the Dominican Republic, was admitted to the U.S. as a legal permanent resident in 1981. He married in 1988 and fathered two children. In 1997 he applied for naturalization. He completed his examination under oath. When a final decision did not come in the mail, Duran made repeated calls to the agency, attempting to be scheduled to take the Oath. Nearly ten years later, he pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess narcotics and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and was sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment. The government instituted removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) and 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Although he did not challenge the convictions, he argued that he was not removable because his 1997 naturalization application had been finalized. He also argued that he should not be removed because the government’s loss of his file precluded him from taking the Oath and thereby prevented his naturalization and citizenship. Meanwhile, the government denied his naturalization based on his 2008 convictions The Immigration Judge ordered him removed to the Dominican Republic. The BIA dismissed Duran’s appeal. The Third Circuit denied appeal. View "Duran-Pichardo v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

Powell’s cousin, Lassiter, testified that he and Powell engaged in robberies of college students and drug dealers in North Philadelphia in 2008. They decided their crimes were attracting too much attention and determined instead to rob business owners by following them from their stores to their homes. They targeted immigrant business owners in the belief that “Chinese people” would keep business proceeds at home because they did not use banks. They cased Star Wigs, owned by Y.B., a female Korean immigrant. The store sold merchandise from multiple out-of-state suppliers. They followed Y.B. to her home, invaded the house, beat the occupants, took credit cards, a handgun, jewelry, handbags, heirlooms, cash that belonged to Y.B.’s husband, receipts and petty cash from the business, and personal electronics. During a subsequent, similar robbery, the victim’s daughter called police, who were able to follow and arrest defendants in possession of stolen items. Powell was convicted under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, for both robberies and sentenced to 697 months’ imprisonment and restitution of $20,762.55. The Third Circuit affirmed. The critical jurisdictional question under the Hobbs Act is the robbery’s effect on interstate commerce; where the robbery occurs is but one factor. View "United States v. Powell" on Justia Law