Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mohammad M. Qatanani, a Palestinian and citizen of Jordan, was admitted to the United States in 1996 on a work visa. In 1999, he applied to adjust his status to that of a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR). An Immigration Judge (IJ) twice granted his application, in 2008 and 2020, after finding in his favor on fact and credibility determinations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed the 2008 order, leading the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to vacate and remand the case. The IJ's 2020 order became final when DHS did not appeal within 30 days.The BIA later invoked an agency regulation to self-certify an appeal of the IJ’s 2020 order eleven months after it was issued, ultimately reversing the IJ’s decision and ordering Qatanani removed from the United States. Qatanani petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for review of the BIA’s decision.The Third Circuit held that the BIA exceeded its authority by using an agency regulation to undo Qatanani’s adjustment to LPR status in a manner inconsistent with the procedures set out by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The court emphasized that once the 30-day appeal period lapsed without an appeal, Qatanani’s adjustment to LPR status became final by operation of law. The court vacated the BIA’s order, reaffirming that the Attorney General must follow the statutory recission process if seeking to revoke LPR status. The court granted Qatanani’s petition for review and vacated the BIA’s order of removal. View "Qatanani v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Robert Lanoue, a Canadian citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to submitting false claims to the government under 18 U.S.C. § 287. He operated a scuba school that was part of a government program funded by the post-9/11 GI Bill, which reimbursed him for teaching veterans. Lanoue admitted to submitting false and fraudulent claims, resulting in a loss of over $3 million to the Department of Veterans' Affairs. Following his conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his crime was an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit with losses exceeding $10,000.The Immigration Judge found that Lanoue's crime met the criteria for an aggravated felony and denied his request for a waiver of inadmissibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld this decision, leading Lanoue to petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that Lanoue's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 287 categorically involved deceit, as the statute requires knowingly submitting false claims to the government. The court also found that the government had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the loss exceeded $10,000, based on Lanoue's stipulation and plea agreement indicating losses between $1.5 and $3.5 million.Lanoue's argument for a retroactive waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) was rejected. The court noted that to qualify for such a waiver, a lawful permanent resident must have been convicted or admitted to the crime at the time of reentry, which was not the case for Lanoue.The Third Circuit held that filing false claims under 18 U.S.C. § 287 is an aggravated felony involving deceit, and the government sufficiently proved the loss amount. Consequently, Lanoue is removable and ineligible for a waiver. The court denied his petition for review. View "Lanoue v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Hector David Tipan Lopez, a native of Ecuador, suffered persecution by a local gang, the Lobos, due to his efforts to encourage young drug addicts to stop using drugs after converting to Evangelical Christianity. The gang targeted him multiple times, robbing, beating, and threatening him, and he did not seek medical care or report these incidents to the police due to distrust. Fearing for his life, he entered the United States in February 2023 and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings after his arrest for domestic violence. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him credible but denied his applications, ruling that his religion, race, and political opinions were not central reasons for his persecution. The IJ also concluded that Ecuadorian authorities would not acquiesce to his torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard by using a subordination-based test and an animus-based test for determining the nexus between Tipan Lopez's persecution and his religion. The court remanded the religious-nexus question to the BIA with instructions not to apply these tests. The court also remanded the CAT claim for the BIA to determine whether Ecuador can protect Tipan Lopez from torture, as the BIA did not make this determination. The court denied the petition for review regarding the BIA's findings on race and political opinion. View "Lopez v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Jathursan Thankarasa, a Tamil citizen of Sri Lanka, participated in a protest supporting Tamil rights and was subsequently arrested, beaten, and interrogated by the police. After his release, he faced continued harassment and threats, leading him to leave Sri Lanka with the help of a smuggler. He traveled through several European countries using a Sri Lankan passport provided by the smuggler but did not seek asylum in any of those countries. Before entering the United States, the smuggler gave him a genuine French passport belonging to another person, which he used to attempt entry. Upon arrival, he admitted the passport was not his and stated his intention to seek asylum.The Immigration Judge (IJ) granted Thankarasa’s application for withholding of removal but denied his asylum application, citing his fraudulent use of the French passport as an egregious factor outweighing his fear of persecution. The IJ reconsidered the asylum denial, as required by regulations, but again denied it, emphasizing the lack of family reunification concerns since Thankarasa had no immediate family eligible for derivative asylum benefits. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that the fraudulent entry was sufficiently egregious to outweigh his fear of persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. The court found that the IJ properly considered the totality of the circumstances, including the egregiousness of the immigration fraud and the lack of family reunification concerns. The court concluded that the IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying the asylum application and denied Thankarasa’s petition for review. View "Thankarasa v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Krishna Kishore Geda and Chaya Durga Sruthi Keerthi Nunna, married Indian nationals residing in the U.S. on employment-based nonimmigrant visas, filed I-485 applications for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residents. After waiting nearly eight years, they were informed that their applications were on hold due to the unavailability of the required immigrant visa. Frustrated by the delay, they sued the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its Director, claiming unlawful withholding and unreasonable delay under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed their claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, stating that the Adjudication Hold Policy is a discretionary decision shielded from judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that the decision to delay adjudication of the Gedas' applications under the Adjudication Hold Policy is a discretionary action specified under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), which grants the Secretary of Homeland Security broad discretion over the adjustment of status process. Consequently, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which precludes judicial review of discretionary decisions by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The court concluded that only the executive and legislative branches could provide the relief sought by the Gedas. View "Geda v. Director United States Citizenship and Immigration" on Justia Law

A Kenyan national, lawfully admitted to the United States, was convicted in 2014 and 2019 of felony vehicular fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing police officer under Pennsylvania law. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with removability based on these convictions, arguing they constituted crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the removal orders.In 2017, DHS charged the petitioner with removability based on his 2014 fleeing-or-eluding conviction and 2016 simple assault convictions. The Immigration Judge found that simple assault did not constitute a CIMT and terminated the proceedings. However, the judge noted that the fleeing-or-eluding conviction could be a CIMT if combined with another CIMT. In 2019, after the petitioner’s second fleeing-or-eluding conviction, DHS again charged him with removability. The Immigration Judge rejected the petitioner’s res judicata defense and concluded that both fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs, sustaining the charge of removability. The BIA affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA misapplied the categorical approach by relying on a realistic-probability analysis to determine that the fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs. The court held that the Pennsylvania statute under which the petitioner was convicted is divisible and that one of the felony subsections does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, concluding that the petitioner’s convictions did not qualify as CIMTs under the categorical approach, and thus, he was not removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). View "Ndungu v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Gary Lall, born in Trinidad and Tobago, applied for a Certificate of Citizenship in 1990 through his adoptive parents, who were naturalized U.S. citizens. The government erroneously approved his application after he turned eighteen, issuing a certificate stating he "became a citizen." However, Lall had not met the statutory requirements for citizenship. The error was discovered shortly after issuance, but the government waited twenty-one years to cancel the certificate. Lall, incarcerated at the time, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking recognition of his citizenship.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed Lall's declaratory judgment action, finding he never obtained citizenship. Concurrently, the government initiated removal proceedings, and an Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered Lall's removal, rejecting his claim to citizenship. Lall appealed both the District Court's dismissal and the IJ's removal order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Lall never satisfied the statutory requirements for citizenship under the relevant sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as they existed in 1991. The court emphasized that a Certificate of Citizenship is only prima facie evidence of citizenship and does not confer citizenship if statutory requirements are unmet. The court also ruled that equitable estoppel could not be used to confer citizenship, as courts lack the power to grant citizenship contrary to statutory requirements. Consequently, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of Lall's declaratory judgment action and denied his petition for review of the IJ's removal order. View "Lall v. USICE" on Justia Law

Elfido Gonzalez Castillo, a Mexican citizen, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1989. In 2009, he applied for naturalization but failed to disclose pending criminal charges for sexually abusing his niece. He was naturalized in October 2009 and later pled guilty to third-degree sexual assault. In 2019, the government sought to revoke his naturalization, which was granted in 2022. Subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) for removal proceedings, charging Castillo with removability for a child abuse conviction. The NTA was filed in the Cleveland Immigration Court, and hearings were conducted remotely.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Castillo’s application for cancellation of removal. Castillo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing he was not removable because he was a U.S. citizen at the time of his conviction. The BIA applied Sixth Circuit law, as the NTA was filed in Cleveland, and dismissed the appeal. Castillo filed three petitions for review in the Third Circuit, asserting that venue was proper there because the IJ completed the proceedings while he was detained in Pennsylvania.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case to determine the proper venue for Castillo’s petitions. The court concluded that the IJ completed the proceedings in Cleveland, Ohio, where the NTA was filed and administrative venue vested. Therefore, venue did not lie in the Third Circuit but in the Sixth Circuit. The Third Circuit held that it had the inherent power to transfer the case to the appropriate venue and decided to transfer Castillo’s petitions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. View "Castillo v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Hugo Abraham Aguilar, a native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without inspection in 2001 and has three U.S. citizen children. In January 2014, he was arrested in New Jersey for allegedly sexually assaulting his stepdaughter and remained in pretrial detention for 1,332 days due to his inability to afford bail. In May 2017, Aguilar pled guilty to a reduced charge of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child and was sentenced to 1,332 days in prison, with credit for time served. Shortly after his sentencing, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Aguilar statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal, citing his inability to demonstrate "good moral character" due to his confinement for more than 180 days as a result of his conviction. The IJ also denied his request for a continuance to challenge his conviction in state court. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Aguilar's appeal, agreeing with the IJ's findings and concluding that the IJ acted within his discretion in denying the continuance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that pre-conviction detention credited toward a defendant's sentence is considered confinement "as a result of conviction" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Consequently, Aguilar's 1,332 days of pre-conviction detention, credited as time served, precluded him from establishing the required good moral character for cancellation of removal. The court also denied as moot Aguilar's challenge to the BIA's decision dismissing his appeal from the IJ's denial of a continuance, as his state post-conviction relief efforts had concluded unsuccessfully. The Third Circuit denied Aguilar's petition for review. View "Aguilar v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The case involves Carlos Inestroza-Tosta, a native and citizen of Honduras, who illegally entered the United States multiple times and was removed on each occasion. After his third illegal entry, he was apprehended following an arrest for aggravated assault. His prior order of removal was reinstated, but he claimed a fear of returning to Honduras and sought withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. His requests were denied by the Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), leading to his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The BIA dismissed Inestroza-Tosta's appeal, affirming the IJ's denial of his motion for administrative closure and his applications for statutory withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA held that Inestroza-Tosta had not established that any harm he experienced or feared was connected to a protected ground, and his proposed particular social group, "gang violence recipients," was not recognized by law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the 30-day deadline for a would-be immigrant to seek judicial review of a "final order of removal" is nonjurisdictional. The court also held that an order of removal is not final until a decision has been made on the alien’s request for withholding of removal. Applying these conclusions to this case, the court ruled that Inestroza-Tosta timely sought review of the BIA’s denial of his requests for statutory withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. However, his petition failed on the merits. Although he suffered persecution in the past, he could not demonstrate a clear probability of future harm based on a protected status or trait. Therefore, while his petition for review was timely, it was denied. View "Inestroza-Tosta v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law