Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Education Law
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The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dealt with two consolidated cases involving two New Jersey parents, who claimed they were retaliated against for protesting school policies related to mandatory masking during the COVID-19 pandemic. One parent, George Falcone, was issued a summons for defiant trespass after refusing to wear a mask at a school board meeting, while another parent, Gwyneth Murray-Nolan, was arrested under similar circumstances. Falcone claimed retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, while Murray-Nolan argued the same and also claimed she was deprived of substantive due process. The district court dismissed both cases. On appeal, the court found that Falcone had standing to sue, reversing and remanding the lower court's decision. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Murray-Nolan's case, concluding that refusing to wear a mask during a pandemic was not protected conduct under the First Amendment. View "Murray-Nolan v. Rubin" on Justia Law

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In the case at hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims brought by a group of students and Children’s Health Defense, Inc. against Rutgers University. The plaintiffs challenged the university's COVID-19 vaccination policy, which required in-person students to be vaccinated or else enroll in online programs or seek exemptions for medical or religious reasons. The court found that the university's policy did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional or statutory rights.The court held that there is no fundamental right to refuse vaccination. It applied the rational basis review and concluded that Rutgers University had a rational basis for its policy given the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the policy was ultra vires under New Jersey law, determining that Rutgers was authorized to require COVID-19 vaccinations under state law. Furthermore, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, concluding that Rutgers had a rational basis for its differential treatment of students and staff, as well as vaccinated and unvaccinated students. View "Children's Health Defense Inc. v. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey" on Justia Law

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The universities, Pitt and Temple, offer traditional, on-campus educational programs. Temple also offers fully online distance-learning programs, which are separately advertised and priced. Students who enrolled in the Universities’ traditional on-campus programs for the Spring 2020 semester were required to pay tuition and mandatory fees and to sign a Financial Responsibility Agreement (FRA). On March 11, 2020, then-Governor Wolf ordered a temporary closure of all non-life-sustaining businesses, citing the rising number of COVID-19 cases. The Universities closed campus buildings, canceled all on-campus student events, announced that classes would be conducted online for the remainder of the semester, and urged students not to return to campus housing. Neither university offered any reduction in tuition or mandatory fees. Temple issued pro-rata housing and dining refunds. Pitt did so only for students who moved out by April 3, 2020.Students sued for breach of contract, or, alternatively, unjust enrichment, citing the Universities’ “website[s], academic catalogs, student handbooks, marketing materials, and other circulars, bulletins, and publications,” which described the benefits of campus life, and the reduced pricing for online courses.The Third Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissals of both suits. There is no express contract precluding the implied contract or unjust enrichment claims. The FRAs function as promissory notes, not integrated contracts. The students adequately pleaded their implied contract claims as to tuition in exchange for in-person education, Pitt’s mandatory fees, and Temple’s university services fee—but not as to Pitt’s housing and dining fees. The students also adequately pleaded unjust enrichment. View "Hickey v. University of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

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Porat, the Dean of the Fox School of Business at Temple University, was “almost obsessed with rankings.” To manipulate Fox’s U.S. New and World Report rankings, he submitted false information about students taking the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT), offers of admission, student debt, and average undergraduate GPA. Partly because of these deceptions, With Porat’s knowledge and involvement, Fox aggressively marketed its false high rankings. At trial, former students testified that they chose Fox because of its rankings or that they believed employers hire students from schools with the best “brand” and that Fox’s high rankings would help them “compete in the marketplace.” The government estimated that Fox gained nearly $40 million in tuition from the additional students who enrolled during 2014–2018. In 2018, Porat’s scheme was exposed. Fox administrators disclosed the false GMAT data to U.S. News, which announced Fox’s “misreported data.” As Fox’s rankings fell, its enrollment fell.The Third Circuit affirmed Porat’s convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, and wire fraud, section 1343. The government proved by sufficient evidence that he sought to deprive his victims of money, that he sought to personally obtain money, or that the party he deceived was the same party he defrauded of money (“convergence” View "United States v. Porat" on Justia Law

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Student H.P.-B. resides with her adult cousin Q.T. within the geographical boundaries of Pottsgrove. H.P.-B. enrolled in Pottsgrove during the 2014–2015 school year. Q.T. does not have legal custody of H.P.-B—an August 2008 order grants primary physical and legal custody to H.P.-B.’s grandmother, E.E. Q.T. filed an IDEA due process complaint on H.P.-B’s behalf. The district court held that a straightforward application of C.F.R. 34 Section 300.30 (b)(2) “dictates that Q.T. does not qualify as H.P.-B.’s ‘parent’ for purposes of the IDEA.” Q.T., E.E., and F.P. appealed the district court’s order. Appellants argued that the district court erred by holding that Q.T. does not qualify as H.P.-B.’s parent for purposes of the IDEA and, thus that Q.T. is unable to file a due process complaint on H.P.-B.’s behalf.   The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained the district court erred in finding that Q.T. did not qualify as H.P.-B.’s parent and thus lacked standing to file a due process complaint on H.P.-B.’s behalf. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded with instructions to vacate the hearing officer’s order dismissing Q.T.’s due process complaint. The court explained there is ample evidence in the record that Q.T. was acting in the place of H.P.-B.’s natural parent, satisfying the third definition of “parent.” The record shows Q.T. affirmed that she was supporting H.P.- B. assumed all personal obligations related to school requirements for H.P.-B. and intended to keep and support H.P.-B. continuously, and not merely through the school year. View "Q. T. v. Pottsgrove School District" on Justia Law

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Kean University implements New Jersey’s Policy Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace through its Affirmative Action Office, which conducts an investigation and prepares a report. Kean’s Chief of Staff reviews the report and makes a final determination. A final determination by the Chief of Staff may be appealed to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission. In 2016, adjunct professor Borowski was accused of making insensitive in-class statements about gender, immigration status, ethnicity, and religion. The Chief of Staff ruled against her. Borowski’s teaching assignment was terminated.Borowski appealed to the Commission, which recognized that material facts were in dispute, and referred the matter to an ALJ. Before a decision on the ensuing hearing, Kean alerted the ALJ of an intervening Commission decision, holding that adjunct professors were not civil service employees entitled to appeal final determinations of Policy violations. The ALJ dismissed Borowski’s appeal; the Commission affirmed.Instead of appealing in the state-court system, Borowski sued in federal court. The district court relied on Younger abstention to dismiss the case. The Third Circuit vacated. Younger abstention prevents federal court interference with only certain types of state proceedings, such as quasi-criminal civil enforcement actions. An appeal to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission is neither quasi-criminal nor within another category of Younger-eligible proceedings. Another prerequisite for Younger abstention is that the state proceeding must be ongoing; the Commission’s dismissal was final. View "Borowski v. Kean University" on Justia Law

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In February 2016, C.M. was six years old and in first grade, when he exhibited behavioral problems. The school district determined that he was ineligible for special education and related services because he was not disabled and did not need them. The child’s parents disagreed and sought redress under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In their administrative grievance, they asserted that the school district violated its statutory obligation to identify, locate, and evaluate children with disabilities, thereby denying their child his statutory right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The parents’ claims did not succeed at the administrative level or in the district court. In April 2017, C.M. was diagnosed with autism. The school developed an individualized education program, which his parents agreed to in August 2017, shortly before their son entered third grade. In July 2019, C.M. enrolled in a private school.The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the school district; the district did not violate its “child find” obligations nor deprive C.M. of a FAPE before April 2017. The parents have not exhausted administrative remedies on their claim for tuition reimbursement. View "J. M. v. Summit City Board of Education" on Justia Law

Posted in: Education Law
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John and Jane attended Princeton University where they began a volatile relationship, including physical altercations. When they broke up Jane spread rumors about John on campus and threatened John: “take a year off and nothing will happen to you.” John complained that he did not “feel safe.” The Director of Student Life recommended mental health services and did not recommend a Title IX complaint. Jane told Princeton’s Director of Gender Equity and Title IX Administration, that she was a victim of “Intimate Relationship Violence” but that she was not interested in pursuing further action. She was advised to press charges. Despite a no-contact order, Jane approached John on campus. Princeton told Jane not to let it happen again. Princeton barred John—but not Jane—from campus during its investigation. John accidentally “liked” one of Jane’s social media posts and self-reported the mistake. Princeton launched another disciplinary process. Princeton expressed no interest in pursuing John's counterclaims and ultimately found evidence to support Jane's allegations of physical abuse but nothing to confirm John’s claims, resulting in John’s expulsion. Jane tweeted about “boy problems that were never real problems just things I created.”The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal of John’s Title IX discrimination complaint. On a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” View "Doe v. Princeton University" on Justia Law

Posted in: Education Law
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Keles was admitted into Rutgers’s Civil and Environmental Engineering (CEE) Department’s graduate program and received his M.S. degree in 2014. While pursuing this degree, Keles expressed his interest in continuing his studies as a Ph.D. student. To continue their studies as Ph.D. students, M.S. students in the CEE Department must submit a “Change-in-Status” form, identifying advisors and describing their research plans. At the end of the M.S. program, Keles submitted an incomplete Change-in-Status form. Keles disputed that he needed to submit a completed Change-in-Status form due to his claimed enrollment as an M.S.-Ph.D. student. Members of the CEE Department and the University’s administration informed him that he needed to satisfy the admission prerequisites. Keles neither found an advisor nor submitted a completed form but sought to register for classes in 2015. Rutgers’s Administration informed Keles that his lack of academic standing prevented him from registering.Keles sued, alleging contract, tort, statutory, and due process claims. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit, finding that Rutgers adhered to its own policies and did not act in bad faith. All M.S. students were subject to the same departmental requirements. Rutgers afforded Keles sufficient process and did not venture “beyond the pale of reasoned academic decisionmaking.” View "Keles v. Bender" on Justia Law

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The parents of M.W., a minor eligible for services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), filed a Petition for Due Process against the Board of Education. Before a scheduled hearing, the ALJ met with counsel, M.W.’s parent, and a Board representative. The terms of a purported settlement were read into the record. In a “Decision Approving Settlement,” the ALJ made specific findings and ordered, “that the parties comply with the settlement terms.” The parents later contacted the Board, repudiating the agreement, and moved the ALJ to “set aside the settlement.” They filed suit, seeking relief under the IDEA.The district court questioned whether the ALJ’s bare findings that the settlement was entered into voluntarily and resolved all disputes satisfied the IDEA's jurisdictional requirements, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, citing IDEA provisions for the enforceability of settlement agreements (20 U.S.C. 1415(e), 1415(f)(1)(B)), and held that the ALJ’s decision was not based on “substantive grounds,” under 1415(f). The Third Circuit reversed. The entry of a “Decision Approving Settlement” in an IDEA dispute satisfies section 1415(I)'s jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal of an administrative IDEA determination. If a prevailing party may enforce a settlement agreement embodied in an administrative consent order as an “aggrieved party” under 1415(i)(2), then a party seeking to challenge such an order as improperly entered must likewise be able to bring a challenge in federal court. View "G W v. Ringwood Board of Education" on Justia Law