Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the spring of 2020, a woman with a history of severe mental illness was detained at the Bucks County Correctional Facility after an altercation with a neighbor. While in custody, she was allegedly subjected to repeated uses of force by corrections officers, including being pepper sprayed, handcuffed, and placed in a restraint chair on multiple occasions. The complaint asserts that these actions were taken as punishment for her inability to comply with directives due to her mental illness, and that she did not pose a threat to staff or other inmates. Her condition deteriorated significantly during her detention, leading to her eventual transfer to a mental hospital, by which time she was reportedly catatonic and unresponsive.Her parents, acting on her behalf, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Bucks County and various corrections officers, alleging violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The court reasoned that the complaint was not detailed enough to determine whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct, and that further factual development was necessary.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit held that when a complaint plausibly alleges a constitutional violation but lacks sufficient detail to assess whether the right was clearly established, qualified immunity cannot be granted at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The court concluded that the defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity was not apparent from the face of the complaint and remanded the case for limited discovery to develop the facts necessary for a proper qualified immunity analysis. View "Stringer v. County of Bucks" on Justia Law

The State of New Jersey sued the Dow Chemical Company in state court for the design, manufacture, marketing, and sale of 1,4-dioxane, a substance alleged to be highly toxic and a likely human carcinogen. Dow used 1,4-dioxane to inhibit 1,1,1-trichloroethane (TCA) to create a cleaning agent for metal. New Jersey claims that Dow’s products containing 1,4-dioxane caused substantial environmental harm. The case centers on whether the lawsuit should be heard in state or federal court.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey remanded the case to state court. The District Court found that Dow was not acting under the United States Government when it produced and sold 1,4-dioxane inhibited TCA. Dow had argued that it acted under the federal government’s direction, citing the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). However, the District Court concluded that Dow’s relationship with the government did not meet the criteria for federal-officer removal, as Dow had independently produced and sold the product before any relevant federal regulations were implemented.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit held that Dow did not satisfy the “acting under” requirement of the federal-officer removal statute. The court explained that Dow’s production and sale of 1,4-dioxane inhibited TCA were not directed, guided, or controlled by the federal government. Dow’s actions were independent and predated the government’s product specifications. Therefore, the case was properly remanded to state court, as Dow could not litigate under the federal-officer removal statute. View "Attorney General New Jersey v. Dow Chemical Company" on Justia Law

Amgen Inc., a biotechnology company, holds patents in the U.S. and South Korea for denosumab, a drug used in treating certain bone cancers. Amgen filed patent infringement suits against Celltrion Inc. (Celltrion Korea) in both countries. To support its case, Amgen sought discovery from Celltrion Korea’s subsidiary, Celltrion USA, located in New Jersey. Amgen filed an application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in the District of New Jersey to subpoena Celltrion USA for documents and testimony related to Celltrion Korea’s denosumab products.The Magistrate Judge granted Amgen’s § 1782 application, rejecting Celltrion USA’s argument that § 1782 cannot compel it to produce information held by its foreign parent company. The Judge also found the request not unduly burdensome and ordered the parties to meet and confer to agree on a confidentiality agreement. The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s order, leading Celltrion USA to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case to determine if the order under § 1782 was final and thus appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Court concluded that the order was not final because the scope of permissible discovery had not been conclusively defined. The Court emphasized that without a definite scope of discovery, it could not properly review whether the District Court had abused its discretion. Consequently, the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order granting discovery under § 1782 but leaving the scope of discovery unresolved is not a final order under § 1291. View "Amgen Inc v. Celltrion USA Inc" on Justia Law

Alexander Smith, a Christian firefighter in Atlantic City, was prohibited from growing a beard due to the city's grooming policy, which he claimed violated his religious beliefs. Smith sued the city, alleging violations of the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and Title VII’s accommodation and anti-retaliation provisions. The District Court denied his motion for a preliminary injunction and later granted summary judgment for the city on all claims.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially denied Smith's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that his claims were unlikely to succeed on the merits. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on all four claims, leading Smith to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the District Court’s judgment regarding Smith’s Title VII accommodation claim and his free exercise claim, finding that the city's grooming policy was not generally applicable and failed strict scrutiny. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment on the equal protection claim and the Title VII retaliation claim, concluding that Smith did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Additionally, the court reversed the denial of Smith’s motion for a preliminary injunction, recognizing a likelihood of success on the merits and the irreparable harm caused by the loss of First Amendment freedoms. View "Smith v. City of Atlantic City" on Justia Law

A private fencing coach alleged that during a flight, a university’s assistant fencing coach sexually harassed and assaulted her. She reported the incident to the university’s head coach, who discouraged her from reporting it further and, along with the assistant coach, allegedly retaliated against her within the fencing community. The university later investigated and confirmed the harassment but found no policy violation. The coach sued the university, the two coaches, and the Title IX coordinator, claiming violations of Title IX and state-law torts.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina transferred the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania due to improper venue and judicial efficiency. After the transfer, the plaintiff amended her complaint, and the defendants moved to dismiss. The transferee court dismissed the entire suit, holding that the plaintiff, as neither a student nor an employee, was outside the zone of interests protected by Title IX. It also dismissed the state-law tort claims as untimely or implausible.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the zone-of-interests test applies to Title IX claims and that the plaintiff’s claims related to her exclusion from university-hosted fencing events and retaliation manifesting on campus were within that zone. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state-law tort claims against the university and its employees, except for the claims against the assistant coach, which were not time-barred under North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations. The case was vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oldham v. Penn State University" on Justia Law

On December 31, 2020, four plainclothes police officers in unmarked cars patrolled a high-crime area in Newark. Detective Marc Castro observed a parked Audi with its engine running, sunroof open, and heavily tinted windows. As Castro approached, he smelled burning marijuana and decided to conduct a vehicle stop. Upon approaching the vehicle, Castro saw smoke emanating from the driver's side window and detected a stronger smell of marijuana. The driver, Abdul Outlaw, provided his documents without any suspicious behavior. Castro asked Outlaw to step out of the vehicle and conducted a pat-down, finding a firearm and a prescription bottle with raw marijuana on Outlaw's person. Outlaw was arrested, and the officers issued motor vehicle summonses and charged him with various offenses.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reviewed the case. Outlaw moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. After an evidentiary hearing and supplemental briefing, the District Court granted Outlaw’s motion, reasoning that while the vehicle stop was lawful, Castro did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search Outlaw’s person.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that while the smell of marijuana can create probable cause to search a vehicle, it does not necessarily create probable cause to arrest an individual without additional facts connecting the smell to that person. The court found that Castro’s observations did not establish probable cause to arrest Outlaw, as there were no signs that Outlaw was under the influence or had been smoking marijuana. The court affirmed the District Court’s order suppressing the evidence obtained from the unlawful search. View "United States v. Outlaw" on Justia Law

Shakira Martinez was convicted by a jury in the District of Delaware for multiple money laundering offenses related to a drug trafficking operation run by her husband, Omar Morales Colon. The District Court sentenced her to 108 months of imprisonment. After her sentencing, the United States Sentencing Commission enacted a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, allowing certain offenders with no criminal history a two-point reduction in their total offense level. Martinez argued that the appellate court should vacate her sentence and remand for resentencing in light of this amendment.The District Court determined Martinez’s total offense level to be 30, with a criminal history category of I, resulting in a recommended sentencing range of 97 to 121 months. Martinez requested a downward variance due to psychological disorders, but the court denied this request and sentenced her to 108 months. Martinez appealed, and during the appeal process, the Sentencing Commission made amendments to the Guidelines retroactive. Martinez then sought to have her sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing under the new Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it has the discretionary authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing in light of a retroactive Guidelines amendment. The court found that granting this relief would promote judicial economy and serve the interest of justice. Therefore, the court vacated Martinez’s sentence and remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing consistent with the retroactive Guidelines amendment. View "USA v. Martinez" on Justia Law

A cheesesteak restaurant owner, Nicholas Lucidonio, was involved in a payroll tax fraud scheme at Tony Luke’s, where he avoided employment taxes by issuing paychecks for “on-the-books” wages, requiring employees to sign back their paychecks, and then paying them in cash for both “on-the-books” and “off-the-books” wages. This led to the filing of false employer tax returns that underreported wages and underpaid employment taxes. Employees, aware of the scheme, received Form W-2s listing only “on-the-books” wages, resulting in underreported income on their personal tax returns. The conspiracy spanned ten years and involved systemic underreporting of wages for 30 to 40 employees at any given time.Lucidonio pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the IRS (Klein conspiracy) under 18 U.S.C. § 371. He did not appeal his conviction but challenged his sentence, specifically the application of a United States Sentencing Guideline that increased his offense level by two points. The enhancement applies when conduct is intended to encourage others to violate internal revenue laws or impede the IRS’s collection of revenue. Lucidonio argued that the enhancement was misapplied because it required explicit direction to others to violate the IRS Code, which he claimed did not occur, and that his employees were co-conspirators, not additional persons encouraged to violate the law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court disagreed with Lucidonio’s interpretation that the enhancement required explicit direction. However, it found that the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Lucidonio encouraged anyone other than co-conspirators, as the employees were aware of and participated in the scheme. Consequently, the court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the enhancement. View "United States v. Lucidonio" on Justia Law

The case involves the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) and Delaware BSA, LLC, which filed for bankruptcy in 2020 due to numerous sexual abuse claims. The bankruptcy plan, confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court, includes the creation of a Settlement Trust funded by the sale of certain assets and contributions from BSA and other nondebtors to pay abuse claimants. The plan also includes nonconsensual third-party releases, which release claims against nondebtors without the claimants' consent.The District Court for the District of Delaware affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's confirmation order, and the plan became effective in April 2023. Four groups of appellants, including abuse claimants and insurers, appealed the decision. The Lujan and Dumas & Vaughn (D&V) Claimants, representing 140 abuse victims, sought to reverse the confirmation order and invalidate the plan, arguing that the nonconsensual third-party releases are impermissible under the Bankruptcy Code. The Certain Insurers and Allianz Insurers sought narrower relief, requesting modifications to the plan to preserve their rights and defenses under their insurance policies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the Lujan and D&V Claimants' appeals as statutorily moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m), which protects good-faith purchasers of estate assets from reversal or modification on appeal if the sale was not stayed. The court found that the nonconsensual third-party releases were integral to the insurance policy buyback, and reversing the confirmation order would affect the validity of the sale.The court also considered the appeals of the Certain Insurers and Allianz Insurers. It concluded that the Certain Insurers' rights and defenses under their insurance policies were adequately preserved by the plan and confirmation order. However, the court found that the judgment reduction clause in the confirmation order impermissibly released the Allianz Insurers' claims without their consent, violating the Supreme Court's decision in Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Harrington. The court reversed the District Court's judgment regarding the Allianz Insurers' claims and remanded for further proceedings to modify the judgment reduction clause. View "In re: Boy Scouts of America and Delaware BSA LLC" on Justia Law

Micayla Augustyn, a student at Wall High School, received special education services under an individualized education plan (IEP). As she neared the end of her fourth year, a dispute arose between her mother and the Wall Township Board of Education regarding her graduation. The Board wanted her to graduate, while her mother believed she needed another year due to the Board's failure to implement required accommodations. Mediation failed, and Augustyn filed a Petition for Due Process before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), claiming the Board failed to provide a free and appropriate education (FAPE) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).The ALJ dismissed her grade revision claim, stating it was not suitable for a special education due process hearing. Augustyn appealed to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which ruled in her favor, stating that a due process hearing was the appropriate venue for her grade revision claim. The District Court remanded the matter for further proceedings and awarded Augustyn attorneys' fees as a prevailing party under the IDEA, but significantly reduced the fee amount.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed that Augustyn was a prevailing party entitled to attorneys' fees, as she successfully vindicated her statutory right to a due process hearing. However, the court found that the District Court erred in reducing the fee award based on improper considerations, such as the Board's financial ability to pay and the procedural nature of Augustyn's victory. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court's order and remanded for a recalculation of the appropriate lodestar reductions. View "Augustyn v. Wall Township Board of Education" on Justia Law