Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kelvin Rosa, a state prisoner, sought federal habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial for burglarizing a check-cashing store and shooting a responding police officer. Rosa was captured after a high-speed chase, during which he and others threw burglary tools and a stolen gun out of their car. The state presented extensive prior-bad-acts evidence, including details of other burglaries Rosa allegedly committed, to link him to the gun used in the check-cashing store burglary.The state habeas court denied Rosa's claim, concluding that his counsel was effective and that any deficiencies did not prejudice him. Rosa then filed a pro se petition for federal habeas relief, raising the same ineffective-assistance claim. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted habeas relief, finding that the state habeas court had unreasonably applied the Strickland v. Washington standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court. The Third Circuit held that Rosa's trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to the extensive prior-bad-acts evidence and for not requesting timely and specific limiting instructions to mitigate its prejudicial impact. The court found that the state habeas court's conclusion that counsel was effective was unreasonable, as it did not consider whether counsel should have taken further action during the trial.The Third Circuit also found that the state habeas court unreasonably concluded that Rosa was not prejudiced by his counsel's deficiencies. The court noted that the evidence against Rosa was not overwhelming, and the extensive prior-bad-acts evidence likely influenced the jury's verdict. The court affirmed the District Court's grant of habeas relief, concluding that Rosa's trial was unfair due to his counsel's ineffective assistance. View "Rosa v. Administrator East Jersey State Prison" on Justia Law

Hector David Tipan Lopez, a native of Ecuador, suffered persecution by a local gang, the Lobos, due to his efforts to encourage young drug addicts to stop using drugs after converting to Evangelical Christianity. The gang targeted him multiple times, robbing, beating, and threatening him, and he did not seek medical care or report these incidents to the police due to distrust. Fearing for his life, he entered the United States in February 2023 and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings after his arrest for domestic violence. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him credible but denied his applications, ruling that his religion, race, and political opinions were not central reasons for his persecution. The IJ also concluded that Ecuadorian authorities would not acquiesce to his torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard by using a subordination-based test and an animus-based test for determining the nexus between Tipan Lopez's persecution and his religion. The court remanded the religious-nexus question to the BIA with instructions not to apply these tests. The court also remanded the CAT claim for the BIA to determine whether Ecuador can protect Tipan Lopez from torture, as the BIA did not make this determination. The court denied the petition for review regarding the BIA's findings on race and political opinion. View "Lopez v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

A data breach occurred at Wawa convenience stores, affecting customers' payment information. Wawa discovered the breach in December 2019 and contained it within days. The breach led to a class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, consolidating 15 actions into three tracks: financial institution, employee, and consumer. The consumer track, which is the focus of this case, alleged negligence, breach of implied contract, and violations of state consumer protection laws, seeking both damages and injunctive relief.The District Court preliminarily approved a settlement that included compensation through Wawa gift cards and cash for out-of-pocket losses, as well as injunctive relief to improve Wawa's data security. Class member Theodore Frank objected, arguing that the settlement's attorney's fees were excessive and that the settlement included a clear sailing agreement and a fee reversion clause. The District Court approved the settlement and the attorney's fees, but Frank appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the fee award and remanded the case, instructing the District Court to scrutinize the reasonableness of the attorney's fees and the presence of any side agreements. On remand, the District Court found no clear sailing agreement or collusion and determined that the fee reversion was unintentional. The court reaffirmed the attorney's fee award based on the funds made available to the class, considering the benefits provided, including the injunctive relief.The Third Circuit reviewed the District Court's findings and affirmed the judgment, holding that the attorney's fee award was reasonable and that the settlement process was free of collusion or improper side agreements. The court emphasized the meaningful benefits provided to the class members and the appropriateness of the fee award based on the amount made available rather than the amount claimed. View "In re: Wawa, Inc. Data Security Litigation" on Justia Law

Miller Plastic Products Inc. fired Ronald Vincer in March 2020, during the early weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic. Vincer had expressed concerns about the company's pandemic protocols and its operating status, believing it was not an essential business. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determined that Vincer’s termination violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because it was motivated, at least in part, by his protected concerted activity.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Vincer’s conduct was protected under the NLRA and that his termination was motivated by his protected activity. The ALJ also disallowed testimony regarding after-acquired evidence at the liability stage of the proceeding. Miller Plastic petitioned for review of the Board’s order, and the Board cross-applied for enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that Vincer’s conduct was protected under the NLRA and was a motivating factor for his termination. The court also agreed with the ALJ’s decision to disallow testimony regarding after-acquired evidence at the liability stage, noting that such evidence is typically considered during compliance proceedings.However, the court found that the NLRB failed to adequately address certain evidence related to Miller Plastic’s affirmative defense that it would have fired Vincer even absent his protected conduct. The court remanded the case to the Board to address the significance of that evidence. The court denied Miller Plastic’s petition for review in part and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement in part, affirming the finding that Vincer was terminated because of his concerted activity. View "Miller Plastic Products Inc v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In the spring of 2020, a woman with a history of severe mental illness was detained at the Bucks County Correctional Facility after an altercation with a neighbor. While in custody, she was allegedly subjected to repeated uses of force by corrections officers, including being pepper sprayed, handcuffed, and placed in a restraint chair on multiple occasions. The complaint asserts that these actions were taken as punishment for her inability to comply with directives due to her mental illness, and that she did not pose a threat to staff or other inmates. Her condition deteriorated significantly during her detention, leading to her eventual transfer to a mental hospital, by which time she was reportedly catatonic and unresponsive.Her parents, acting on her behalf, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Bucks County and various corrections officers, alleging violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The court reasoned that the complaint was not detailed enough to determine whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct, and that further factual development was necessary.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit held that when a complaint plausibly alleges a constitutional violation but lacks sufficient detail to assess whether the right was clearly established, qualified immunity cannot be granted at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The court concluded that the defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity was not apparent from the face of the complaint and remanded the case for limited discovery to develop the facts necessary for a proper qualified immunity analysis. View "Stringer v. County of Bucks" on Justia Law

The State of New Jersey sued the Dow Chemical Company in state court for the design, manufacture, marketing, and sale of 1,4-dioxane, a substance alleged to be highly toxic and a likely human carcinogen. Dow used 1,4-dioxane to inhibit 1,1,1-trichloroethane (TCA) to create a cleaning agent for metal. New Jersey claims that Dow’s products containing 1,4-dioxane caused substantial environmental harm. The case centers on whether the lawsuit should be heard in state or federal court.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey remanded the case to state court. The District Court found that Dow was not acting under the United States Government when it produced and sold 1,4-dioxane inhibited TCA. Dow had argued that it acted under the federal government’s direction, citing the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). However, the District Court concluded that Dow’s relationship with the government did not meet the criteria for federal-officer removal, as Dow had independently produced and sold the product before any relevant federal regulations were implemented.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit held that Dow did not satisfy the “acting under” requirement of the federal-officer removal statute. The court explained that Dow’s production and sale of 1,4-dioxane inhibited TCA were not directed, guided, or controlled by the federal government. Dow’s actions were independent and predated the government’s product specifications. Therefore, the case was properly remanded to state court, as Dow could not litigate under the federal-officer removal statute. View "Attorney General New Jersey v. Dow Chemical Company" on Justia Law

Amgen Inc., a biotechnology company, holds patents in the U.S. and South Korea for denosumab, a drug used in treating certain bone cancers. Amgen filed patent infringement suits against Celltrion Inc. (Celltrion Korea) in both countries. To support its case, Amgen sought discovery from Celltrion Korea’s subsidiary, Celltrion USA, located in New Jersey. Amgen filed an application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in the District of New Jersey to subpoena Celltrion USA for documents and testimony related to Celltrion Korea’s denosumab products.The Magistrate Judge granted Amgen’s § 1782 application, rejecting Celltrion USA’s argument that § 1782 cannot compel it to produce information held by its foreign parent company. The Judge also found the request not unduly burdensome and ordered the parties to meet and confer to agree on a confidentiality agreement. The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s order, leading Celltrion USA to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case to determine if the order under § 1782 was final and thus appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Court concluded that the order was not final because the scope of permissible discovery had not been conclusively defined. The Court emphasized that without a definite scope of discovery, it could not properly review whether the District Court had abused its discretion. Consequently, the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order granting discovery under § 1782 but leaving the scope of discovery unresolved is not a final order under § 1291. View "Amgen Inc v. Celltrion USA Inc" on Justia Law

Alexander Smith, a Christian firefighter in Atlantic City, was prohibited from growing a beard due to the city's grooming policy, which he claimed violated his religious beliefs. Smith sued the city, alleging violations of the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and Title VII’s accommodation and anti-retaliation provisions. The District Court denied his motion for a preliminary injunction and later granted summary judgment for the city on all claims.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially denied Smith's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that his claims were unlikely to succeed on the merits. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on all four claims, leading Smith to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the District Court’s judgment regarding Smith’s Title VII accommodation claim and his free exercise claim, finding that the city's grooming policy was not generally applicable and failed strict scrutiny. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment on the equal protection claim and the Title VII retaliation claim, concluding that Smith did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Additionally, the court reversed the denial of Smith’s motion for a preliminary injunction, recognizing a likelihood of success on the merits and the irreparable harm caused by the loss of First Amendment freedoms. View "Smith v. City of Atlantic City" on Justia Law

A private fencing coach alleged that during a flight, a university’s assistant fencing coach sexually harassed and assaulted her. She reported the incident to the university’s head coach, who discouraged her from reporting it further and, along with the assistant coach, allegedly retaliated against her within the fencing community. The university later investigated and confirmed the harassment but found no policy violation. The coach sued the university, the two coaches, and the Title IX coordinator, claiming violations of Title IX and state-law torts.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina transferred the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania due to improper venue and judicial efficiency. After the transfer, the plaintiff amended her complaint, and the defendants moved to dismiss. The transferee court dismissed the entire suit, holding that the plaintiff, as neither a student nor an employee, was outside the zone of interests protected by Title IX. It also dismissed the state-law tort claims as untimely or implausible.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the zone-of-interests test applies to Title IX claims and that the plaintiff’s claims related to her exclusion from university-hosted fencing events and retaliation manifesting on campus were within that zone. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state-law tort claims against the university and its employees, except for the claims against the assistant coach, which were not time-barred under North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations. The case was vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oldham v. Penn State University" on Justia Law

On December 31, 2020, four plainclothes police officers in unmarked cars patrolled a high-crime area in Newark. Detective Marc Castro observed a parked Audi with its engine running, sunroof open, and heavily tinted windows. As Castro approached, he smelled burning marijuana and decided to conduct a vehicle stop. Upon approaching the vehicle, Castro saw smoke emanating from the driver's side window and detected a stronger smell of marijuana. The driver, Abdul Outlaw, provided his documents without any suspicious behavior. Castro asked Outlaw to step out of the vehicle and conducted a pat-down, finding a firearm and a prescription bottle with raw marijuana on Outlaw's person. Outlaw was arrested, and the officers issued motor vehicle summonses and charged him with various offenses.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reviewed the case. Outlaw moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. After an evidentiary hearing and supplemental briefing, the District Court granted Outlaw’s motion, reasoning that while the vehicle stop was lawful, Castro did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search Outlaw’s person.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that while the smell of marijuana can create probable cause to search a vehicle, it does not necessarily create probable cause to arrest an individual without additional facts connecting the smell to that person. The court found that Castro’s observations did not establish probable cause to arrest Outlaw, as there were no signs that Outlaw was under the influence or had been smoking marijuana. The court affirmed the District Court’s order suppressing the evidence obtained from the unlawful search. View "United States v. Outlaw" on Justia Law