Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two individuals, who were patients of a regional healthcare provider, filed a class action lawsuit alleging that the provider’s website used tracking software to intercept and share users’ personally identifiable health information with a third-party technology company. This software, known as Meta Pixel, collected data such as IP addresses, device identifiers, and details about users’ interactions with the website, transmitting this information to the technology company, which then used it for commercial purposes, including targeted advertising. The healthcare provider also received data analysis from the technology company and was paid for allowing access to this information. The plaintiffs claimed they did not consent to this sharing of their health information.After the claims against the technology company were transferred to another district, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reviewed several amended complaints against the healthcare provider. The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint with prejudice, concluding that the allegations did not sufficiently specify what personal health information was actually shared and that further amendment would be futile. When the plaintiffs sought reconsideration and submitted a proposed third amended complaint, the District Court denied the motion, citing undue delay because the plaintiffs could have included the new details earlier and had been clearly informed of the deficiencies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed both orders of the District Court. The Third Circuit held that, although plaintiffs had Article III standing, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the second amended complaint with prejudice or in denying the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court concluded that plaintiffs had sufficient notice of the complaint’s deficiencies after oral argument and did not act promptly to address them, justifying denial of further amendment. View "Santoro v. Tower Health" on Justia Law

Two individuals, citizens of Ecuador and Brazil, respectively, entered the United States without inspection in 2001 and 2014. In late 2025 and early 2026, each was arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and detained, without the possibility of bond, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). This marked a change in government practice, as similar noncitizens had previously been detained or released under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows for discretionary bond if the person is not a danger or flight risk. In 2025, the government began applying § 1225(b)(2)(A) to noncitizens already present in the United States who entered without inspection, resulting in mandatory detention without bond.Both individuals filed habeas petitions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, arguing their detentions violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The district courts granted their petitions, finding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) did not apply to them and that their continued detention without bond violated the INA. One district court also held that such detention violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Both petitioners were subsequently released, and the government appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the statutory language and structure of the INA and considered relevant precedent. The court held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are both “applicants for admission” and “seeking admission,” meaning those engaged in a present or ongoing attempt to gain lawful entry into the United States. The court concluded that noncitizens already present in the United States who are not actively seeking admission are not subject to mandatory detention under this provision and should be considered under § 1226(a), which allows for bond. The Third Circuit also held that detaining such individuals without a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause. The court affirmed the district courts’ orders directing the release of the petitioners. View "Morocho v. Warden Philadelphia FDC" on Justia Law

A member of Congress from New Jersey was charged with three counts of violating federal law after allegedly physically interfering with federal officials during an oversight visit to a federal immigration detention facility in Newark. During the visit, the Congresswoman and other Representatives encountered Newark’s Mayor, who was ordered to leave the premises by federal agents. When federal agents attempted to arrest the Mayor, the Congresswoman allegedly placed herself between the Mayor and an agent, forcibly made contact with the agent, and later pushed past another federal officer to reenter the facility. The charges stem from these physical altercations and the Congresswoman’s efforts to impede the Mayor’s arrest.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the Congresswoman’s motions to dismiss the indictment. The court found that her conduct was not protected by legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause, concluding it was non-legislative in nature. The court also rejected her arguments based on the separation of powers doctrine, distinguishing between Presidential and legislative immunities. Additionally, the court ruled against her selective and vindictive prosecution claims, finding she failed to demonstrate discriminatory effect or personal animus by the prosecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decisions. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of legislative immunity for Counts One and Two, holding that prosecution of those charges would not require the Congresswoman to answer for any legislative acts. The court vacated and remanded with respect to Count Three for further consideration as to whether legislative immunity might apply. The court dismissed the remainder of her appeal, including claims of selective and vindictive prosecution, for lack of jurisdiction. View "USA v. McIver" on Justia Law

On June 6, 2014, the defendant armed himself and traveled from New York to Pennsylvania, where he attacked his ex-girlfriend (Victim 1), forcibly abducted her, and then drove her across state lines to New Jersey. During this ordeal, he threatened and physically assaulted her, then sexually assaulted her at a rest stop. After Victim 1 managed to escape, the defendant assaulted a National Park Service maintenance worker (Victim 2) and stole his vehicle, then proceeded to commit arson at a business owned by his former partners. He was apprehended after a police chase in New York.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially indicted the defendant on six counts, including kidnapping, aggravated sexual abuse, firearm offenses, assault of a federal employee, and arson. Over nearly eight years, the case was continued multiple times due to plea negotiations, questions of competency, and the defendant’s own motions and changes in counsel. The defendant entered into a plea agreement, pled guilty to several charges, and waived certain statute of limitations defenses, but later moved to withdraw his plea, claiming innocence and coercion. The District Court accepted the withdrawal. The government subsequently filed superseding indictments, and the defendant continued to challenge the timeliness of certain charges and raised speedy trial concerns, but the District Court denied these motions. At trial, the defendant pled guilty to two counts and was found guilty on the remaining charges by a jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed several claims, including whether the statute of limitations waiver in the earlier plea agreement remained enforceable after the plea was withdrawn, whether the District Court erred in its jury instructions regarding the elements of kidnapping and the status of the assaulted federal employee, and whether the lengthy pretrial delay violated the defendant’s speedy trial rights. The Third Circuit held that the statute of limitations waiver survived the plea withdrawal due to the language of the agreement, and that the guilty plea to one count barred a statute of limitations challenge to that conviction. The court found any jury instruction errors harmless in light of overwhelming evidence, and concluded that, under the Barker v. Wingo factors, the delay did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. View "USA v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

A citizen of El Salvador entered the United States illegally in 2015 and later applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He settled near Baltimore, worked in construction, started a family, but encountered legal trouble, including a conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The government initiated removal proceedings, and he conceded removability. He argued that, due to his tattoos, criminal history, and a Salvadoran indictment linking him to gang activity, he would face torture in El Salvador, either from the government or gangs, and thus sought CAT relief.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner not credible, denied all forms of relief, and ordered removal. The judge concluded that the poor prison conditions in El Salvador did not amount to torture and found insufficient evidence that the petitioner would be singled out for torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, and the petitioner challenged only the denial of CAT relief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. While his petition was pending, the Third Circuit lifted a stay of removal, resulting in his deportation to El Salvador, where he was detained.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed the petition as moot. The court held that, because the petitioner had already been removed and was incarcerated abroad, there was no longer any removal to defer, and thus no effectual relief could be provided. The court further concluded that the collateral consequences of removal, such as a bar on reentry, were not redressable by granting CAT relief, since CAT relief does not disturb the underlying removal order. The court also found that the government’s policy of facilitating returns did not apply to the petitioner’s circumstances. View "Mejia-Henriquez v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Two individuals associated with a Russian nonprofit registered the domain name waronfakes.com through a Russian registrar in March 2022. This domain hosted content focused on Russian political issues. In August 2024, the United States government seized the domain and others, alleging violations of the international money laundering statute and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The government claimed the domain was used to promote Russian disinformation on behalf of sanctioned individuals and entities, and that the purchase of the domain involved funds transferred for the benefit of a blocked person under U.S. sanctions. Five days after the seizure, the nonprofit and its director were added to the U.S. Treasury’s blocked persons list, which prohibits the transfer or dealing in their U.S.-based property without a license.The applicants, Timofey V and ANO Dialog, moved in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for the return of the domain under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). The government opposed the motion, arguing that the applicants were not lawfully entitled to possess the property as they were now blocked persons under U.S. sanctions and lacked the required license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The District Court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the applicants could not lawfully receive the domain.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that although the applicants had standing due to a sufficient possessory interest, they failed to establish lawful entitlement to the property because transfer to them was blocked by sanctions and no OFAC license had been obtained. The court further found no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing, as the legal impediment to transfer was undisputed. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Timofey V v. USA" on Justia Law

Six landowners in Western Pennsylvania, believing that XTO Energy, Inc. was underpaying royalties owed under oil and gas leases, brought a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. None of the named plaintiffs’ leases included arbitration clauses, but the proposed class definitions were broad enough to cover leaseholders whose leases did contain arbitration clauses. The plaintiffs sought damages on behalf of themselves and similarly situated landowners.After the suit was filed, the District Court oversaw extensive class discovery and certified classes that included some members whose leases had arbitration clauses. XTO did not assert arbitration as a defense in its answers or move to compel arbitration before class certification or before the expiration of the class opt-out period. It only moved to compel arbitration against those unnamed class members with arbitration clauses after the opt-out period closed. Relying in part on the then-controlling district court decision in Valli v. Avis Budget Rental Car Group, LLC, a Magistrate Judge found that XTO had waived its right to arbitrate by demonstrating a preference for litigation over arbitration, and the District Court adopted that ruling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s waiver determination de novo as to legal conclusions and for clear error as to factual findings. The Third Circuit held that, under its intervening precedential decision in Valli v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., a defendant does not waive its right to compel arbitration against unnamed class members with arbitration clauses in their leases merely by litigating prior to class certification, where none of the named plaintiffs are subject to arbitration. The court found XTO’s conduct did not constitute an implied waiver. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order denying XTO’s motion to compel arbitration and remanded for further proceedings. View "Salvatora v. XTO Energy Inc" on Justia Law

Two foreign nationals from the United Kingdom rented vehicles from a car rental company during separate visits to the United States. Each used a third-party website to reserve vehicles and selected a package that included supplemental liability insurance. Upon arriving at the rental location, they signed rental forms and received a “rental jacket” that contained additional terms, including a statement that supplemental liability insurance would be provided via an excess automobile policy and an arbitration clause requiring most disputes to be resolved through arbitration.Later, the customers believed the company did not actually secure the promised insurance policy but intended to pay claims from its own funds. They filed a putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, asserting breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and a violation of Florida’s consumer protection law. The District Court dismissed the fraud and statutory claims but allowed the contract claim to proceed. The defendants, Budget and its parent company, reserved their right to arbitrate and pursued discovery. After deposing the plaintiffs, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing the plaintiffs were aware of the arbitration clause when they received the rental jackets.The District Court denied the motion, finding that by litigating into discovery before moving to compel arbitration, the defendants had impliedly waived their right to arbitrate. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the waiver determination de novo. The Third Circuit held that the defendants did not impliedly waive their right to arbitrate. Because factual development was necessary to determine arbitrability under a prior circuit decision, the defendants’ conduct—reserving their arbitration right and moving to compel after depositions—was not inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings on the motion to compel arbitration. View "Parkin v. Avis Rent a Car System LLC" on Justia Law

A woman was arrested in Delaware for selling drugs from a motel room, and police recovered heroin and fentanyl in labeled packets from her possession. After her arrest, she cooperated with police and identified her supplier as a man who would be delivering more drugs to the motel. Police surveilled the motel and, after a series of monitored calls, arrested Philip Epps when he arrived in a white SUV, matching the description provided. Evidence seized included two iPhones (one linked to the supplier), large amounts of cash, firearms, and more drugs with the same identifying labels. Forensic evidence further tied Epps to the operation, and the government presented this at trial. Epps offered no evidence in his defense.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware conducted the jury trial. After deliberating for a few hours, the jury indicated it was deadlocked. The court provided a supplemental instruction, which incorrectly stated, “you have to” reach a unanimous verdict. Neither party objected at the time. The jury subsequently returned guilty verdicts on all counts. Two weeks later, Epps moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, arguing the supplemental instruction was unduly coercive. The District Court initially denied the motion, but upon reconsideration, it granted a new trial, concluding that justice required it due to the problematic instruction. The government appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. It held that while the District Court’s supplemental instruction misstated the law by suggesting the jury was required to reach a verdict, this error, when considered in the context of the entire jury charge, was not unduly coercive and did not prejudice Epps. Therefore, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s order granting a new trial and remanded for further proceedings. View "USA v. Epps" on Justia Law

Police officers in Blakely, Pennsylvania, stopped a car with a cracked windshield and expired registration. The car had two occupants: the driver, who lacked a valid insurance card and was unsure about his recent whereabouts, and Christopher Essameddin Birry, the passenger. When the officers discovered that the driver had an outstanding arrest warrant, they detained him and announced that the car would be towed. While processing the scene, the officers asked Birry for identification and questioned him about his relationship with the driver. After several requests for Birry to keep his hands visible, one officer asked for consent to search Birry, which Birry granted. During the pat-down, officers found drugs, a loaded firearm, and other contraband in Birry’s pantleg. Birry was indicted on several counts, including possession with intent to distribute controlled substances and firearm offenses.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held an evidentiary hearing on Birry’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the stop. Birry argued that the officers unlawfully prolonged the stop and exceeded the scope of his consent during the search. The District Court denied the motion, finding both the duration of the stop and the scope of the search constitutionally permissible. Birry entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court concluded that the officers’ questioning and actions were within the permissible bounds of a traffic stop and that the search did not exceed the scope of Birry’s consent. Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of Birry’s motion to suppress, holding that both the stop and search were constitutional. View "USA v. Birry" on Justia Law