Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Robert Lanoue, a Canadian citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to submitting false claims to the government under 18 U.S.C. § 287. He operated a scuba school that was part of a government program funded by the post-9/11 GI Bill, which reimbursed him for teaching veterans. Lanoue admitted to submitting false and fraudulent claims, resulting in a loss of over $3 million to the Department of Veterans' Affairs. Following his conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his crime was an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit with losses exceeding $10,000.The Immigration Judge found that Lanoue's crime met the criteria for an aggravated felony and denied his request for a waiver of inadmissibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld this decision, leading Lanoue to petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that Lanoue's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 287 categorically involved deceit, as the statute requires knowingly submitting false claims to the government. The court also found that the government had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the loss exceeded $10,000, based on Lanoue's stipulation and plea agreement indicating losses between $1.5 and $3.5 million.Lanoue's argument for a retroactive waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) was rejected. The court noted that to qualify for such a waiver, a lawful permanent resident must have been convicted or admitted to the crime at the time of reentry, which was not the case for Lanoue.The Third Circuit held that filing false claims under 18 U.S.C. § 287 is an aggravated felony involving deceit, and the government sufficiently proved the loss amount. Consequently, Lanoue is removable and ineligible for a waiver. The court denied his petition for review. View "Lanoue v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Kelvin Rosa, a state prisoner, sought federal habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial for burglarizing a check-cashing store and shooting a responding police officer. Rosa was captured after a high-speed chase, during which he and others threw burglary tools and a stolen gun out of their car. The state presented extensive prior-bad-acts evidence, including details of other burglaries Rosa allegedly committed, to link him to the gun used in the check-cashing store burglary.The state habeas court denied Rosa's claim, concluding that his counsel was effective and that any deficiencies did not prejudice him. Rosa then filed a pro se petition for federal habeas relief, raising the same ineffective-assistance claim. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted habeas relief, finding that the state habeas court had unreasonably applied the Strickland v. Washington standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court. The Third Circuit held that Rosa's trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to the extensive prior-bad-acts evidence and for not requesting timely and specific limiting instructions to mitigate its prejudicial impact. The court found that the state habeas court's conclusion that counsel was effective was unreasonable, as it did not consider whether counsel should have taken further action during the trial.The Third Circuit also found that the state habeas court unreasonably concluded that Rosa was not prejudiced by his counsel's deficiencies. The court noted that the evidence against Rosa was not overwhelming, and the extensive prior-bad-acts evidence likely influenced the jury's verdict. The court affirmed the District Court's grant of habeas relief, concluding that Rosa's trial was unfair due to his counsel's ineffective assistance. View "Rosa v. Administrator East Jersey State Prison" on Justia Law

On December 31, 2020, four plainclothes police officers in unmarked cars patrolled a high-crime area in Newark. Detective Marc Castro observed a parked Audi with its engine running, sunroof open, and heavily tinted windows. As Castro approached, he smelled burning marijuana and decided to conduct a vehicle stop. Upon approaching the vehicle, Castro saw smoke emanating from the driver's side window and detected a stronger smell of marijuana. The driver, Abdul Outlaw, provided his documents without any suspicious behavior. Castro asked Outlaw to step out of the vehicle and conducted a pat-down, finding a firearm and a prescription bottle with raw marijuana on Outlaw's person. Outlaw was arrested, and the officers issued motor vehicle summonses and charged him with various offenses.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reviewed the case. Outlaw moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. After an evidentiary hearing and supplemental briefing, the District Court granted Outlaw’s motion, reasoning that while the vehicle stop was lawful, Castro did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search Outlaw’s person.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that while the smell of marijuana can create probable cause to search a vehicle, it does not necessarily create probable cause to arrest an individual without additional facts connecting the smell to that person. The court found that Castro’s observations did not establish probable cause to arrest Outlaw, as there were no signs that Outlaw was under the influence or had been smoking marijuana. The court affirmed the District Court’s order suppressing the evidence obtained from the unlawful search. View "United States v. Outlaw" on Justia Law

Shakira Martinez was convicted by a jury in the District of Delaware for multiple money laundering offenses related to a drug trafficking operation run by her husband, Omar Morales Colon. The District Court sentenced her to 108 months of imprisonment. After her sentencing, the United States Sentencing Commission enacted a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, allowing certain offenders with no criminal history a two-point reduction in their total offense level. Martinez argued that the appellate court should vacate her sentence and remand for resentencing in light of this amendment.The District Court determined Martinez’s total offense level to be 30, with a criminal history category of I, resulting in a recommended sentencing range of 97 to 121 months. Martinez requested a downward variance due to psychological disorders, but the court denied this request and sentenced her to 108 months. Martinez appealed, and during the appeal process, the Sentencing Commission made amendments to the Guidelines retroactive. Martinez then sought to have her sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing under the new Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it has the discretionary authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing in light of a retroactive Guidelines amendment. The court found that granting this relief would promote judicial economy and serve the interest of justice. Therefore, the court vacated Martinez’s sentence and remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing consistent with the retroactive Guidelines amendment. View "USA v. Martinez" on Justia Law

A cheesesteak restaurant owner, Nicholas Lucidonio, was involved in a payroll tax fraud scheme at Tony Luke’s, where he avoided employment taxes by issuing paychecks for “on-the-books” wages, requiring employees to sign back their paychecks, and then paying them in cash for both “on-the-books” and “off-the-books” wages. This led to the filing of false employer tax returns that underreported wages and underpaid employment taxes. Employees, aware of the scheme, received Form W-2s listing only “on-the-books” wages, resulting in underreported income on their personal tax returns. The conspiracy spanned ten years and involved systemic underreporting of wages for 30 to 40 employees at any given time.Lucidonio pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the IRS (Klein conspiracy) under 18 U.S.C. § 371. He did not appeal his conviction but challenged his sentence, specifically the application of a United States Sentencing Guideline that increased his offense level by two points. The enhancement applies when conduct is intended to encourage others to violate internal revenue laws or impede the IRS’s collection of revenue. Lucidonio argued that the enhancement was misapplied because it required explicit direction to others to violate the IRS Code, which he claimed did not occur, and that his employees were co-conspirators, not additional persons encouraged to violate the law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court disagreed with Lucidonio’s interpretation that the enhancement required explicit direction. However, it found that the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Lucidonio encouraged anyone other than co-conspirators, as the employees were aware of and participated in the scheme. Consequently, the court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the enhancement. View "United States v. Lucidonio" on Justia Law

Patrick Barkers-Woode and Nana Mensah were involved in a conspiracy to defraud Sprint Corporation by exploiting a sales promotion that offered smartphones to new customers at no upfront cost. Conspirators in Ghana obtained personal information of unsuspecting individuals and used it to sign them up as new Sprint customers, arranging for the smartphones to be sent to vacant homes. Barkers-Woode, Mensah, and others tracked, retrieved, and delivered the smartphones to a buyer. The conspiracy was responsible for 274 orders of 833 smartphones, resulting in $357,565.92 in actual loss and $595,399.76 in intended loss. A jury convicted both defendants of mail fraud, aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy to commit these offenses.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania sentenced Barkers-Woode to 111 months’ imprisonment and Mensah to 99 months’ imprisonment. Both defendants appealed, challenging their sentences and, in Barkers-Woode’s case, the admission of certain evidence during the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the District Court erred in applying a 14-point enhancement based on intended loss rather than actual loss, as required by the court's decision in United States v. Banks. This error affected the defendants' substantial rights, leading the court to reverse and remand for resentencing based on actual loss. The court also upheld the District Court's application of a 2-point enhancement for the number of victims, recognizing that victims of identity theft are included within the definition of "victim" under the Sentencing Guidelines.Additionally, the court affirmed the District Court's decision to admit testimony about a related fraud against Walmart, as it directly proved the conspiratorial agreement. The court also upheld the decision to require Barkers-Woode to proceed pro se after his sixth attorney withdrew, citing his extremely dilatory conduct. Finally, the court rejected Mensah's argument that sentencing enhancements should be based on facts charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, reaffirming the precedent set in United States v. Grier. View "USA v. Barkers-Woode" on Justia Law

David Payo pled guilty to two bank robberies in 2017. The District Court applied a career-offender enhancement to his sentence based on three prior robbery convictions: a 2001 federal conviction, a 2008 Pennsylvania conviction, and a 2010 Pennsylvania conviction. Payo argued that the 2008 and 2010 convictions did not involve crimes of violence, but the District Court disagreed, relying on a state-court docket sheet and an argument not advanced by the Government.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that Payo's 2008 conviction was under § 3701(a)(1)(ii) and his 2010 conviction under § 3701(a)(1)(iv) qualified as a crime of violence under the enumerated-offenses clause. Payo appealed, arguing that the District Court improperly relied on a non-Shepard document (the docket sheet) and advanced an argument the Government had not made.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court erred in relying on the state-court docket sheet, which was not a Shepard document, and in advancing an argument the Government had not made regarding the 2010 conviction. The Third Circuit vacated Payo's sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the District Court to determine whether Payo's 2008 conviction was under § 3701(a)(1)(i) or (ii) using only the Shepard documents produced by the Government initially. If the conviction was under subsection (ii), the enhancement stands; otherwise, it does not. View "USA v. Payo" on Justia Law

Randal Wise was convicted of possessing child pornography, attempting to entice a minor, and attempting to transfer obscene matter to a minor. Wise used the Grindr app to contact undercover police officers posing as minors, sending explicit photos and attempting to arrange meetings for sexual activities. He was arrested while holding an iPhone that contained sexual chats and child pornography.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied Wise's motion to sever the charges, and the jury convicted him on all counts. The judge sentenced him to 288 months in prison. Wise appealed, arguing that the charges should not have been joined and that the District Court should have severed them. He also raised several sentencing claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the charges were properly joined as they involved the sexual exploitation of minors. The court found no abuse of discretion in the District Court's decision to deny severance, as there was little risk of spillover prejudice, and the jury was instructed to consider each charge separately.The Third Circuit also upheld Wise's sentence. The court found that the District Court properly applied a five-level enhancement for a pattern of sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor and another five-level enhancement for repeated sex crimes against minors. The court also held that an iPhone qualifies as a computer under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6), thus justifying the two-level enhancement for using a computer in the crime.Finally, the court declined to address Wise's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, suggesting it be raised in a collateral review. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment. View "USA v. Wise" on Justia Law

Ronald Vines and his two adult sons attempted to rob a bank at gunpoint. They gathered weapons and other equipment, set up a tarp outside the bank, and waited for the tellers to arrive. One of Vines's sons, wearing a mask and armed with a revolver, forced a teller inside at gunpoint. However, another employee saw them and raised the alarm, causing Vines to signal his son to flee. They were apprehended by the police shortly after.Vines pleaded guilty to attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d) & 2 and brandishing a gun while committing a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) & 2. He did not initially challenge his § 924(c) charge, so he had to do so collaterally under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied his motion but granted a certificate of appealability. On appeal, Vines was allowed to argue that his plea lawyer was ineffective for not asserting that attempted armed bank robbery is not a crime of violence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) is a crime of violence because it requires the use of force, violence, or intimidation. The court also found that adding a dangerous weapon to the attempted bank robbery does not make the crime less violent. Therefore, Vines's conviction under § 924(c) was upheld. The court also concluded that Vines's counsel was not ineffective, as the argument that attempted armed bank robbery is not a crime of violence would have been meritless. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's order denying Vines's collateral attack. View "USA v. Vines" on Justia Law

Anthony Brookins was found guilty by a jury in May 2009 of a firearm offense and a drug trafficking charge. He was sentenced to 120 months and 240 months, respectively, to be served concurrently, along with three- and ten-year periods of supervised release. The District Court later reduced his drug trafficking sentence to 180 months. After his release from prison in December 2019, Brookins began his supervised release. In May 2023, his probation officer filed a petition alleging five violations of his supervised release, including charges of simple assault and harassment, positive drug tests for cocaine, and failure to participate in a substance abuse program. A supplemental petition added a sixth violation related to another domestic incident.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held a revocation hearing where Brookins admitted to failing to comply with the substance abuse treatment program (violation number 5). The government withdrew the other five alleged violations. The District Court found Brookins guilty of the Grade C violation and sentenced him to 14 months of imprisonment, followed by supervised release with conditions including participation in an intensive drug treatment program and no contact with the alleged victim of the domestic incidents.Brookins filed a pro se notice of appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Brookins's appellate counsel filed an inadequate Anders brief, failing to provide a thorough examination of the record or address the specific issues raised by Brookins. The Third Circuit discharged the counsel and directed the Clerk of Court to appoint new counsel for Brookins, emphasizing the need for diligent and thorough representation in compliance with Anders v. California. View "USA v. Brookins" on Justia Law