Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Freeman was convicted, along with Miller and Collier, of second-degree murder. The jury had heard the confession of Miller, a non-testifying codefendant, with redactions that replaced the names of Collier and Freeman, with the substitutes “the first guy” and “the second guy.” The court gave a limiting instruction that the statement was to be considered only as to Miller, not as to the other defendants, in order to protect Freeman’s Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him. Freeman’s objection was overruled and rejected on appeal in state court.The district court concluded that a “Bruton” violation occurred and that the violation was not harmless, and granted Freeman habeas relief. The Third Circuit reversed. A Bruton violation occurred. When a statement is redacted— whether by substituting the codefendant’s name with a neutral pronoun, a blank space, or a symbol—in such a manner that “[a] juror … need only lift his eyes to [the codefendant], sitting at counsel table” to understand who is being implicated, the introduction of that statement is a Sixth Amendment violation. However, there was ample other evidence against Freeman, and the violative statement was largely duplicative of other evidence; there is no “grave doubt about whether [the error] had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” The error was harmless. View "Freeman v. Superintendent Fayette SCI" on Justia Law

Rivera, a Newark police officer from 1993-2018, collected $78,941 in bribes from three brothel owners in exchange for protecting the owners from arrest, using law enforcement resources to assist them, and making things difficult for competing brothels. Rivera did not report the income from the bribes, for which he should have paid $17,408 in federal taxes. He was indicted on 14 counts. Rivera pleaded guilty to accepting corrupt payments with the intent to be influenced and rewarded, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B)–(2), and aiding and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). The government agreed to dismiss the remaining counts if Rivera pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 46 months. The plea agreement included an appellate waiver that Rivera attested he read and fully understood.Nine months after the court “conditionally” accepted his plea, Rivera moved to withdraw his plea, claiming the court had deferred acceptance of it until the sentencing, which had not occurred. He argued Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d) permitted him to withdraw his plea “for any reason or no reason.” The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Rivera’s motion. The district court stated that while it had deferred acceptance of the plea agreement, it had accepted the plea itself, which could not be withdrawn absent “a fair and just reason.” The Third Circuit enforce the waiver of Rivera’s right to appeal. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

In 2013, three armed men in ski masks entered a Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Cracker Barrel restaurant, robbed the victims at gunpoint, and stashed $8,000 in a bag. A victim hiding in the bathroom called 911. The robbers fled but were arrested nearby. Police discovered a loaded handgun approximately 10 feet from where Stoney was found. The cash and two other guns were also recovered.Stoney admitted his involvement and identified his co-defendants. Stoney was charged with Hobbs Act robbery and the Use of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence, 18 U.S.C. 2; 1951; 924(c)(1)(A). The firearm charge referenced the Hobbs Act robbery as the predicate offense, based on two theories of liability: Pinkerton and aiding and abetting. The indictment did not specify a completed Hobbs Act robbery but Stoney pled guilty, admitting to a completed gunpoint robbery.The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Stoney’s successive motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255, rejecting arguments that his conviction should be treated as an attempted Hobbs Act robbery, which fails to qualify as a 924(c)(3)(A) predicate crime of violence or that his conviction, based on Pinkerton liability and aiding and abetting, does not qualify as a crime of violence. There is no question that Stoney personally committed a completed Hobbs Act robbery View "United States v. Stoney" on Justia Law

In 1990, Brow was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and cocaine. The PSR determined that Brow was responsible for 492 grams of crack cocaine and 67 grams of marijuana and was subject to a maximum term of life imprisonment and a minimum term of 10 years’ imprisonment. Brow had two prior Virgin Islands convictions for third-degree assault and one for third-degree robbery. The PSR found that those convictions constituted crimes of violence. Brow, classified as a career offender, was sentenced to 30 years. In an unrelated 1994 decision, in the Northern District of Georgia, Brow was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to 10 years, “consecutively" to sentences previously imposed.Brow moved for an unspecified reduction of his term of incarceration under the First Step Act. The district court denied the motion, concluding that, for sentencing purposes, Brow remained a career offender with his Guidelines determination unchanged, and that applying the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, no sentence reduction was appropriate. The court specifically rejected Brow’s arguments about his age and likelihood of recidivism and that his crime did not involve violence or firearms.The Third Circuit affirmed, noting Brow’s “intriguing” effort. Although the incarceration portion of his drug conviction sentence is complete, he sought First Step Act relief that would lower the incarceration period of his unrelated, consecutive sentence. View "United States v. Brow" on Justia Law

In 2005, Brasby was convicted in state court of aggravated assault, a second-degree felony, for recklessly causing serious bodily injury to another person by shooting the person four times in the back. The New Jersey statute provided: A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . [a]ttempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such injury.” In 2019, police arrested Brasby after they observed him selling drugs. A search incident to the arrest found suspected controlled substances and a loaded stolen handgun.Brasby, indicted for illegal possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), entered into a plea agreement. The parties did not agree on whether Brasby’s 2005 conviction was for a crime of violence. The Third Circuit had previously held that a conviction for reckless conduct is insufficient to qualify as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines’ elements clause.The Third Circuit to affirmed his 57-month sentence based on a 57-71 month Guidelines range. Without the "crime of violence" enhancement, the range would have been 30-37 months. Brasby’s aggravated assault conviction qualified as a felony conviction for a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) because the federal generic definition of aggravated assault—and therefore the Guidelines’ definition—includes the same mens rea of heightened recklessness as the New Jersey statute. View "United States v. Brasby" on Justia Law

Before the 2016 Democratic National Convention, the Secret Service announced that access to certain areas would be restricted. Graber, a paramedic, joined political protests outside the Restricted Area. Protestors breached the gated perimeter. The Philadelphia Police Department apprehended those within the Restricted Area. Graber was one of seven individuals taken into custody; the police did not prepare any arrest paperwork for Graber. Special Agent Boresky was charged with serving as an affiant for a criminal complaint against the arrestees. Another agent e-mailed Boresky a synopsis of the events and photographs. Boresky appeared before a Magistrate and signed an affidavit identifying Graber as having been arrested inside the Restricted Area, based upon his “personal knowledge,” “information developed during the course of this investigation,” and information 'imparted by other officers. Boresky was not present at the arrest, did not view any video evidence, and did not write the affidavit. Graber was detained overnight. Graber’s counsel provided news video clips confirming that Graber never passed through the fence. The charges against Graber were dismissed.Citing “Bivens,” in which the Supreme Court held that a cause of action existed against federal agents who violated the Fourth Amendment, Graber sued Boresky for false arrest, unlawful detention, and false charges. Denying a motion to dismiss, the district court held that a Bivens claim could be brought against Boresky. The court later dismissed Boresky’s qualified immunity summary judgment motion. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction; the Bivens ruling is not a final decision and is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. View "Graber v. Boresky" on Justia Law

In 2012, Lewis was convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana under N.J. Stat. 2C:35-5. In 2020, Lewis pleaded guilty in federal court to unlawful possession of a firearm 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Section 922(g) carries an increased base offense level for a defendant convicted of a prior “controlled substance offense,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), under federal or state law. Lewis argued that only a conviction related to a substance listed in the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801, qualified as a “controlled substance offense.” The CSA at the time of Lewis’s federal sentencing defined marijuana more narrowly than did New Jersey law at the time of his state conviction. In 2018, Congress amended the CSA’s definition of “marihuana” to exclude hemp. In 2019, New Jersey followed suit. The government argued that substances regulated by state law are controlled substances under the Guidelines, even if they are not regulated by federal law. The district court agreed with Lewis.The Third Circuit vacated. The meaning of “controlled substance” in U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b)’s definition of “controlled substance offense” includes drugs regulated by state law at the time of the predicate state conviction, even if they are not federally regulated or are no longer regulated by the state at the time of the federal sentencing. Marijuana, including hemp, was regulated by New Jersey at the time of Lewis’s predicate state conviction; the district court erred in declining to apply the 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) enhancement. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Philadelphia officers Kling and Nestel stopped Gallman for running a stop sign and recovered a firearm from Gallman’s passenger. Officer Rosinski moved Gallman to the patrol car. Kling discovered a firearm near Gallman's driver’s seat. Gallman, previously convicted of first-degree robbery, was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, and unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. During the hearing, the government informed the court that there was an open Internal Affairs Division (IAD) investigation about Rosinski’s failure to call a supervisor to a traffic stop. The government also supplied an IAD memorandum regarding a racial profiling complaint against Rosinski and Stout, who was also present at the Gallman stop. That matter was closed before Gallman’s arrest; the allegation was unfounded.Following COVID-19 protocol, Gallman's trial was conducted in one courtroom and video-streamed to another where the public and Gallman’s family were seated. Outside the presence of the jury, the court asked Gallman whether he wanted to stipulate his prior conviction and discussed the pending Rosinski IAD investigation.The Third Circuit affirmed Gallman’s conviction. Closing the video stream during the sessions away from the jury did not constitute reversible error; it was not “clear under current law” that the Sixth Amendment public-trial right applied to those proceedings. The closures here were brief and resulted from pandemic protocol challenges rather than any substantive decision. Some of the topics discussed were also discussed in open court. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Gallman’s prior conviction. View "United States v. Gallman" on Justia Law

Heinrich undressed two preschool girls, manipulated them into positions, and took pictures of their genitals. When the girls reported the incident, police found the photos and video of the girls as well as the other child pornography on Heinrich’s electronic devices, although Heinrich had tried to delete the images of the girls. He admitted that he had taken the pictures. Charged with 15 counts of producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), and one count of possessing child pornography, section 2252(a)(4)(B). Heinrich argued that he lacked the mental state required by 2251(a) because he was trying to show beauty and innocence, not “sexually explicit conduct.” Heinrich tried to present an expert psychological report that concluded, his “painful history as a ‘damaged’ child led him to capture on film what he inappropriately saw as images of beauty, purity, and innocence.”The Third Circuit affirmed his convictions. The report is inadmissible because, under the statute, his reason for taking the pictures is irrelevant; punishes those who orchestrate objectively sexually explicit conduct involving a minor in order to take pictures of that conduct. Heinrich did that. Defining the crime that way is constitutional: trying to expose children’s genitals is in itself usually blameworthy. View "United States v. Heinrich" on Justia Law

Kwasnik was an estate-planning attorney who convinced clients to open irrevocable family trusts in order to avoid federal and state taxes and to ensure that they earned interest on the funds. Kwasnik named himself as a trustee, with authority to move assets into and out of the trust accounts. He received the account statements. In reality, Kwasnik moved the funds from his clients’ trust accounts to accounts of entities that he controlled. Within days, the funds were depleted. Clients were defrauded of approximately $13 million.Kwasnik pleaded guilty to money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), then moved to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion and sentenced him. Kwasnik then filed a notice of appeal. He later filed three more post-appeal motions in the district court concerning his guilty plea. The court denied them. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to the denial of the first motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Kwasnik did not have “newly discovered” evidence. The court declined to consider the others. A party must file a new or amended notice of appeal when he seeks appellate review of orders entered by a district court after he filed his original appeal, Fed.R.App.P. 4(b). View "United States v. Kwasnik" on Justia Law