Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Durham, a prisoner with lumbar stenosis, received epidural steroid injections for pain and was prescribed a walking cane. In 2020, Durham was sent to a quarantine unit without his cane. For 10 days, Durham repeatedly, unsuccessfully requested his cane because he was in severe pain. His requests to see a doctor and to use a shower chair were ignored. Durham fell in the shower. Durham filed suit, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act (RA).The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Durham’s claims for money damages against the defendants in their capacity as state officials barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; Durham failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim, having failed to plausibly allege that the prison officials were “subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm”; and Durham failed to state ADA and RA claims, having failed to show that he is a qualifying individual with a disability. The Third Circuit vacated. Durham is a “qualified individual” and the provision of showers in prison is an activity that must be made accessible to people with disabilities. Durham sufficiently pleaded that the defendants had knowledge that his federally protected ADA right was substantially likely to be violated. A state program that accepts federal funds waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity to RA claims. Durham adequately alleged deliberate indifference. View "Durham v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Three men joined in a shootout, but only Rogers was convicted of murdering a bystander caught in their crossfire. At his trial, Rogers’s attorney did not object while the trial judge admonished a trial witness (Singleton) about perjury after that witness gave testimony favorable to Rogers. The attorney offered no arguments when Singleton changed his testimony and did not cross-examine Singleton about the change. The Third Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief. Counsel’s failure to object to the trial judge’s admonishment, conduct he “did not think” was problematic, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under “Strickland” as did counsel’s later failure to cross-examine Singleton regarding his changed testimony. Counsel characterized Singleton as “a liar, trying to help his buddy out,” whose testimony would not be “determinative of the outcome of this case,” but Singleton was the only witness to ever claim Rogers shot first—the ultimate issue in the case. Had Rogers’s counsel objected to the trial judge’s admonishment of Singleton and cross-examined Singleton about his changed testimony, “a reasonable probability” exists that “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Without Singleton’s testimony against Rogers, the prosecution’s remaining evidence was negligible. View "Rogers v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law

Philadelphia Police obtained a search warrant for the house where Dennis resided, suspecting that it was being used for drug activity. Dennis was not home. Six officers performing surveillance were in plain clothes “to maintain an advantage.” They spotted Dennis driving near his house and decided to stop his car. The ensuing events were captured by a nearby surveillance camera. The plainclothes officers in unmarked police cars surrounded Dennis’s vehicle at an intersection. For 48 seconds, Dennis attempted to free his car, bumping into the police vehicles. When Dennis’s car appeared to have stopped, Officer Nicoletti shot Dennis, who was unarmed, three times through the driver’s window. Dennis died at the scene.In the ensuing lawsuit (42 U.S.C. 1983), the court found open questions of fact concerning excessive force claims against Philadelphia and Nicoletti, regarding whether Dennis posed a threat to the officers or public safety. The court denied Nicoletti qualified immunity, reasoning that his conduct: “sho[oting] at an unarmed driver attempting to escape at slow speed who had hit a car,” and/or “using deadly force against an individual driving a car” when “the driver did not pose a threat to the safety of the officer or others,” violated clearly established law. The Third Circuit affirmed, declining to consider Nicoletti’s factual arguments and rejecting any arguments that could be construed as a legal challenge to the holding that his conduct violated clearly established law. View "Rush v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Mercado filed weekly fraudulent Pandemic Unemployment Assistance claims, collecting a total of $37,555 in benefits. He pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. His plea agreement endorsed the possibility of a downward adjustment (U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a)) if Mercado could “adequately demonstrate recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility.” At the plea hearing, Mercado apologized. The court continued his bail pending sentencing, including several conditions, requiring that Mercado refrain from using narcotic drugs or other controlled substances, submit to substance abuse testing, complete substance abuse evaluation and treatment if deemed appropriate, and get medical and psychiatric treatment as directed by pretrial services.On the day he pleaded guilty, Mercado tested positive for cocaine. Probation referred him for intensive outpatient treatment, but he never reported. Mercado subsequently admitted to using cocaine again, and two months later, refused to take a drug test. When he finally submitted to testing, he again tested positive. His PSR calculated a Guideline range of 10-16 months’ imprisonment. A two-point downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility would have produced a Guideline range of 6-12 months but the PSR recommended against it. At sentencing, Mercado again expressed remorse. The court declined the two-point adjustment, citing his ongoing drug use, and imposed a 10-month sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed. U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a) does not preclude consideration of post-plea conduct “unrelated” to the pled-out offense. The commentary to this provision lists “appropriate considerations,” several of which expressly reference post-plea conduct. View "United States v. Mercado" on Justia Law

Officers swarmed a New Jersey hotel room to execute an arrest warrant for Montalvo-Flores in connection with his suspected involvement in a robbery. They found car keys during a search incident to arrest. Although Montalvo-Flores exclaimed that those were his car keys, he did not have a valid driver’s license. Upon locating the car in the parking lot, officers discovered that its registered owner was the Enterprise. Officers called Enterprise’s regional risk manager to obtain permission to search the car, stating that Montalvo-Flores was operating the vehicle while involved in criminal activity. The manager, noting Montalvo-Flores was not listed on the rental agreement (his girlfriend, Pisciotta, was) gave officers consent to search the vehicle. In that search, officers found 304 grams of cocaine inside the trunk.Montalvo-Flores, charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), moved to suppress, arguing that he, with his girlfriend’s permission, lawfully possessed and controlled the car. The district court denied Montalvo-Flores’s motion, holding that he lacked standing because he failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. The Third Circuit reversed. Montalvo-Flores had dominion and control of the car with his girlfriend’s permission and had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. View "United States v. Montalvo-Flores" on Justia Law

Federal Protective Service, within DHS, hires Protective Service Officers for federal property and can secure contracts for private security. FPS contracted with a private security company, to provide security for the Philadelphia Social Security Administration (SSA) office. Smith and Bell were assigned to that office. In 2020, Washington was told that he could deliver certain paperwork to that office. He found the door locked. Bell explained that the office was open, with modified operations because of the coronavirus pandemic. Bell directed Washington to a drop box where he could deposit his paperwork. Washington insisted that he be allowed to visit the person with whom he spoke on the phone and forced his way into the building. Smith and Bell eventually subdued and handcuffed Washington.Washington was charged with two violations of 18 U.S.C. 111. The indictment alleges that Washington “forcibly assaulted, resisted, opposed, impeded, intimidated and interfered with an officer of the United States, as designated in [18 U.S.C. 1114], that is, [the victim], a Protective Services Officer,” while the victim was performing official duties. Weeks before trial, the government stated that Smith and Bell were contract officers but contended that they were designated under section 1114 because they were assisting the FPS in securing the SSA office. The Third Circuit reversed Washington's conviction. The indictment was flawed. It alleged that Washington assaulted federal officers when his victims could be protected only if designated as persons assisting federal officers or employees. The government’s evidence did not prove that modification. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Titus’s solo medical practice, in its last 13 months, earned $1.1 million by distributing more than 20,000 prescriptions for Schedule II drugs. Titus often did only cursory physical examinations before prescribing opioids. He kept prescribing drugs despite signs that his patients were diverting or abusing them. At least two of Titus’s patients overdosed. Other doctors filed professional complaints. Titus closed his practice. Federal agents raided the homes of Titus and two of his employees and found thousands of patient files. Titus was indicted on 14 counts of unlawfully dispensing and distributing controlled substances (based on 14 prescriptions) and maintaining drug-involved premises, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 856(a)(1).The government's statistician, using the Prescription Monitoring Program, identified 1,142 patients for whom Titus had prescribed controlled drugs, drew a random sample of 300 patients, and extrapolated to conclude that Titus had provided 29,323 controlled substance prescriptions to 948 patients with at least one inconsistent drug test and 1,552 such prescriptions to 352 patients he had already discharged from his practice. The government’s medical expert reviewed 24 of those files and determined that Titus had written illegal prescriptions for 18 of the patients.The district court held Titus responsible for at least 30,000 kilos, citing “general trial evidence” and extrapolating from the 24-file sample. The Third Circuit affirmed Titus’s convictions but vacated his 240-month sentence. The government failed to prove that extrapolating from a small sample satisfied its burden to prove the drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. View "United States v. Titus" on Justia Law

Police stopped Henderson for a traffic violation, searched his vehicle, and found a loaded semiautomatic firearm with an obliterated serial number and 13 rounds of ammunition. Henderson pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He had a prior state robbery conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3701(a)(1)(ii).The court applied the U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4) sentencing enhancement based on Henderson’s robbery conviction, reasoning that section 3701(a) is divisible and Henderson was convicted of violating subsection (ii), which qualified as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a). Subsection (ii) provides that a person is guilty of robbery if he “threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury,” which means a violation of the subsection necessarily “requires the purposeful use or threat of physical force against another.” With an enhancement for possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(B), and a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. 3E1.1, his Guideline range was 57-71 months’ imprisonment.The Third Circuit affirmed Henderson’s 60-month sentence, applying the “modified categorical approach,” and concluding that subsection (ii) involves the requisite force and mens rea to qualify as a crime of violence under 4B1.2’s elements clause. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Porat, the Dean of the Fox School of Business at Temple University, was “almost obsessed with rankings.” To manipulate Fox’s U.S. New and World Report rankings, he submitted false information about students taking the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT), offers of admission, student debt, and average undergraduate GPA. Partly because of these deceptions, With Porat’s knowledge and involvement, Fox aggressively marketed its false high rankings. At trial, former students testified that they chose Fox because of its rankings or that they believed employers hire students from schools with the best “brand” and that Fox’s high rankings would help them “compete in the marketplace.” The government estimated that Fox gained nearly $40 million in tuition from the additional students who enrolled during 2014–2018. In 2018, Porat’s scheme was exposed. Fox administrators disclosed the false GMAT data to U.S. News, which announced Fox’s “misreported data.” As Fox’s rankings fell, its enrollment fell.The Third Circuit affirmed Porat’s convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, and wire fraud, section 1343. The government proved by sufficient evidence that he sought to deprive his victims of money, that he sought to personally obtain money, or that the party he deceived was the same party he defrauded of money (“convergence” View "United States v. Porat" on Justia Law

In 1985, Clark and Devose assaulted and kidnapped a postal worker at gunpoint, stripped him of his uniform, and restrained him in his truck. Disguised in the uniform, Devose gained entry to a banker’s home, where they held the banker’s 85-year-old mother-in-law and 19-year-old daughter at gunpoint and called the banker to demand ransom. Clark raped the girl. They saw police outside and fled. Devose pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against Clark.In 1990, Clark was convicted of two conspiracy offenses, attempted extortion, assault of a postal worker, kidnapping, theft of a postal vehicle, and using a firearm during a crime of violence--kidnapping (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). Clark was sentenced to life imprisonment plus five years for the firearm count, to be served consecutively, as section 924 required. The Sentencing Guidelines did not then apply. Clark filed an unsuccessful appeal and numerous unsuccessful collateral attacks. In 2019, the Supreme Court held that part of section 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” is unconstitutionally vague.In Clark’s successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, the parties agreed that kidnapping does not qualify as a section 924(c) crime of violence. The district court vacated Clark’s 924 conviction but declined to conduct a full resentencing. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. As a matter of first impression, the court held that a certificate of appealability is required for a prisoner in federal custody to appeal a district court’s choice of remedy in a 28 U.S.C. 2255 proceeding. View "Clark v. United States" on Justia Law