Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2021, New Jersey enacted the Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA), which prohibits employers from refusing to hire job applicants based on cannabis use. In 2022, a retailer rescinded a job offer to an applicant, Erick Zanetich, after he tested positive for cannabis. Zanetich filed a lawsuit claiming the retailer's action violated CREAMMA and public policy. He sought redress individually and on behalf of a putative class.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed both counts of Zanetich's complaint. The court found that CREAMMA does not imply a private remedy for violations of its employment protections and that New Jersey's public policy exception to at-will employment does not apply to job applicants. Zanetich appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Third Circuit held that CREAMMA does not imply a private remedy for job applicants who fail drug tests for cannabis. The court applied New Jersey's modified Cort test and found that CREAMMA does not confer a special benefit on job applicants, there was no legislative intent to provide a private remedy, and implying such a remedy would not advance CREAMMA's purposes. Additionally, the court held that New Jersey's public policy exception to at-will employment, as established in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., does not extend to job applicants. The court also declined to certify the state-law issues to the New Jersey Supreme Court, finding no significant uncertainty or importance warranting certification. View "Zanetich v. WalMart Stores East Inc" on Justia Law

Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. (GOH) engaged in a scheme to underpay its employees by misappropriating fringe benefits owed under the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act (PWA) and the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA). This led to two class-action lawsuits against GOH. GOH sought coverage under its insurance policy with Twin City Fire Insurance Company (Twin City), which denied coverage and sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to provide coverage. GOH and its Board of Directors counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and seeking a declaration that certain claims in the class actions were covered under the policy.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed GOH's counterclaims, concluding that the claims were not covered under the policy due to a policy exclusion for claims related to "Wage and Hour Violations." The court also granted Twin City's motion for judgment on the pleadings, affirming that Twin City had no duty to defend or indemnify GOH for the class-action claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Third Circuit agreed that the claims in question were not covered under the policy because they were related to wage and hour violations, which were explicitly excluded from coverage. The court emphasized that the exclusion applied broadly to any claims "based upon, arising from, or in any way related to" wage and hour violations, and found that the factual allegations in the class actions were indeed related to such violations. Thus, Twin City had no duty to defend or indemnify GOH under the terms of the policy. View "Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Glenn O. Hawbake, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Marla Knudsen and William Dutra, representing a class of similarly situated individuals, filed a class action lawsuit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) against MetLife Group, Inc. They alleged that MetLife, as the administrator and fiduciary of the MetLife Options & Choices Plan, misappropriated $65 million in drug rebates from 2016 to 2021. Plaintiffs claimed this misappropriation led to higher out-of-pocket costs for Plan participants, including increased insurance premiums.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the case for lack of standing. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a concrete and individualized injury. It reasoned that the plaintiffs had no legal right to the general pool of Plan assets and had not shown that they did not receive their promised benefits. The court found the plaintiffs' claims that they paid excessive out-of-pocket costs to be speculative and lacking factual support.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to establish an injury-in-fact, as their allegations of increased out-of-pocket costs were speculative and not supported by concrete facts. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not provide specific allegations showing how the misappropriated drug rebates directly caused their increased costs. The court emphasized that financial harm must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical, to satisfy Article III standing requirements. Consequently, the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their ERISA claims. View "Knudsen v. MetLife Group Inc" on Justia Law

In two separate class actions, Kenneth Hasson and Jordan Schnur alleged that FullStory, Inc. and Papa John’s International, Inc. unlawfully wiretapped their online communications using FullStory’s Session Replay Code. This code intercepts detailed user interactions on websites without user consent. Hasson, a Pennsylvania resident, claimed FullStory wiretapped him while he browsed Mattress Firm’s website. Schnur, also from Pennsylvania, alleged similar wiretapping by Papa John’s website.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed both cases for lack of personal jurisdiction. In Hasson’s case, the court found that FullStory, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia, did not have sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania. The court denied Hasson’s request for jurisdictional discovery. In Schnur’s case, the court ruled that Papa John’s, also a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia, did not expressly aim its conduct at Pennsylvania, despite operating numerous restaurants in the state.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed these dismissals. The court affirmed the dismissal in Schnur’s case, agreeing that Schnur failed to show that Papa John’s expressly aimed its conduct at Pennsylvania under the Calder “effects” test. The court noted that merely operating a website accessible in Pennsylvania does not establish personal jurisdiction.However, the court vacated the dismissal in Hasson’s case and remanded it for further consideration. The court held that the District Court should have also considered whether personal jurisdiction was proper under the traditional test as articulated in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court. This test examines whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum and whether the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. The court instructed the District Court to reassess FullStory’s contacts with Pennsylvania under this framework. View "Hasson v. Fullstory Inc" on Justia Law

The case involves Gerald Forsythe, who filed a class action lawsuit against Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd. and several of its officers. Forsythe claimed that he and others who purchased or acquired Teva securities between October 29, 2015, and August 18, 2020, suffered damages due to misstatements and omissions by Teva and its officers related to Copaxone, a drug used to treat multiple sclerosis. Teva's shares are dual listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.The District Court granted Forsythe's motion for class certification, rejecting Teva's assertion that the class definition should exclude purchasers of ordinary shares. The Court also rejected Teva's argument that Forsythe could not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.Teva sought permission to appeal the District Court’s Order granting class certification, arguing that interlocutory review is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Teva contended that the Petition presents a novel legal issue and that the District Court erred in its predominance analysis with respect to Forsythe’s proposed class-wide damages methodology.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied Teva's petition for permission to appeal. The court found that the securities issue did not directly relate to the requirements for class certification, and agreed with the District Court’s predominance analysis. The court also clarified that permission to appeal should be granted where the certification decision itself under Rule 23(a) and (b) turns on a novel or unsettled question of law, not simply where the merits of a particular case may turn on such a question. View "Forsythe v. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd" on Justia Law

The case involves Sherry and David Lewis, who sued their auto insurer, GEICO, for allegedly breaching their insurance contract when their car was totaled. The Lewises claimed that GEICO undercompensated them by applying a "condition adjustment" that artificially reduced its valuation of their car and by failing to reimburse them for taxes and fees necessary to replace the car. They sought to certify a class of similarly underpaid insureds for each instance of underpayment.The District Court certified both classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. GEICO appealed the decision, challenging the certification of the classes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the order certifying the class for the taxes-and-fees claim. However, the court found that the Lewises lacked standing to bring the condition-adjustment claim as they failed to show that GEICO caused them concrete harm when it applied the condition adjustment. Therefore, the court vacated the District Court’s order in part and remanded with instructions to dismiss the condition-adjustment claim.Regarding the taxes-and-fees claim, the court found that the Lewises met the requirements for standing as they alleged financial harm stemming from GEICO's pre-2020 practice of declining to pay taxes and fees to lessee insureds. The court also found that the class was ascertainable, meeting the requirements for class certification. View "Lewis v. GEICO" on Justia Law

In a class action suit, the plaintiffs, a group of patients, alleged that the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania (Penn), who operate the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania Health System (Penn Medicine), were in violation of Pennsylvania privacy law. The plaintiffs claimed that Penn Medicine shared sensitive health information and online activity of its patients with Facebook through its patient portal. Penn removed the case to federal court, asserting that it was "acting under" the federal government, referencing the federal-officer removal statute. However, the District Court rejected this argument and returned the case to state court.This case was primarily focused on whether Penn was "acting under" the federal government in its operation of Penn Medicine's patient portal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to remand the case back to state court. The Court of Appeals determined that Penn was not "acting under" the federal government, as it did not demonstrate that it was performing a delegated governmental task. The court declared that Penn was merely complying with federal laws and regulations, which does not qualify as "acting under" the federal government. The court noted that just because a private party has a contractual relationship with the federal government does not mean that it is "acting under" the federal authority. In conclusion, the court determined that the relationship between Penn and the federal government did not meet the requirements for Penn to be considered as "acting under" the federal government, thus the case was correctly returned to state court. View "Mohr v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the appellant, Paulette Barclift, sued Keystone Credit Services, LLC ("Keystone") for allegedly violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). Barclift claimed that Keystone unlawfully communicated her personal information to a third-party mailing vendor, RevSpring, without her consent. She sought to represent a class of similarly situated plaintiffs. The District Court dismissed her suit on the grounds that she did not allege an injury sufficient to establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution.Upon appeal, the Third Circuit agreed with the lower court that Barclift lacked standing, but modified the District Court's order so that the dismissal would be without prejudice. The court found that Barclift's alleged harm—embarrassment and distress caused by the disclosure of her personal information to a single intermediary (RevSpring)—did not bear a close relationship to a harm traditionally recognized by American courts, such as the public disclosure of private facts. Therefore, the court concluded that Barclift did not suffer a concrete injury and could not establish Article III standing. The court further held that the possibility of future harm was too speculative to establish a concrete injury. The case was dismissed without prejudice, allowing Barclift the opportunity to amend her complaint if she can allege a concrete injury. View "Barclift v. Keystone Credit Services LLC" on Justia Law

Hackers infiltrated Wawa’s payment systems and obtained the credit and bank card data of about 22,000,000 customers. Wawa announced the breach on December 19, 2019; by the next day, attorneys had identified plaintiffs and filed the first of many class action suits seeking damages for the disclosures. Nine months later, Wawa and class counsel for the consumer-plaintiffs agreed on a settlement making $9 million in gift cards and some other compensation available to customers (of which $2.9 million was claimed) and giving $3.2 million to class counsel for fees and expenses. Objections arrived.The Third Circuit vacated the fee award. The district court must consider whether the funds made available to class members rather than the amount actually claimed during the claims process is the best measure of reasonableness and whether the fee award is reasonable in light of a “clear sailing provision,” in which Wawa promised as part of the settlement not to challenge class counsel’s request for an agreed-upon attorney’s fee award. Though not an automatic bar to settlement approval, such terms deserve careful scrutiny when calculating a reasonable fee award. The court also noted a “puzzling” fee reversion, providing that any court-ordered reduction in the attorney’s fee award would be returned to Wawa—not the class. View "In re: Wawa, Inc. Data Security Litigation" on Justia Law

Huber visited Crozer doctors on four separate occasions, incurring debts to Crozer of $178, $78, $83.50, and $178. Crozer's debt collection agency, SAI, sent a form collection letter, with an “Account Summary” that provided two figures: the specific debt SAI sought to collect, entitled “Amount,” and a second figure, entitled “Various Other Acc[oun]ts Total Balance.” The fourth such letter to Huber informed Huber that she owed an “Amount” of $178, while her “Various Other Accounts Total Balance” was $517.50. Huber testified that she was confused as to how much she owed in total: Was it $695.50 or $517.50. She consulted a financial advisor.Huber filed this putative class action, asserting a “false, deceptive, or misleading” means of collecting a debt and failure to disclose the “amount of the debt” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court held, on summary judgment, that there was no actionable failure to disclose but found the letters “misleading and deceptive,” and certified the class.The Third Circuit affirmed. Huber has standing, but not under the “informational injury doctrine.” Huber did not identify omitted information to which she has entitlement but the financial harm she suffered in reliance on the letter bears a “close relationship” to the harm associated with the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation. The court remanded for determination of whether any of the class members suffered any consequences beyond confusion. View "Huber v. Simons Agency Inc" on Justia Law