Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A woman sued her father, alleging childhood sexual abuse, and supported her claims with expert testimony on the accuracy of "recovered" memories. The abuse allegedly began when she was three years old and stopped in 1992. By 1995, she no longer recalled the abuse but began to develop confusing memories eighteen years later. These memories eventually led to her filing a lawsuit against her father for human trafficking, sexual abuse, assault, emotional distress, false imprisonment, and incest under federal and state law. She claimed her lawsuit was timely because she had repressed the memories of the abuse.In the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, the court allowed Dr. James Hopper to testify as an expert on repressed and recovered memories, despite objections from the defendant, Ronald A. Cohen. The court aimed to balance the testimony of Dr. Hopper with that of Dr. Deryn Strange, who testified that there is no scientific support for the theory that trauma victims can repress and later recover memories with clarity. The jury returned a mixed verdict, finding for the plaintiff on five state law counts and awarding her $1.5 million in damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to properly analyze Dr. Hopper's qualifications and the reliability and fit of his testimony. The appellate court concluded that Dr. Hopper's testimony lacked the necessary scientific support and relevance to the case. The court determined that the admission of this testimony was prejudicial and affected the jury's verdict. Consequently, the Third Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Cohen v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Angela Reading, a mother and former school board member, alleged that federal and local government officials violated her First Amendment rights by censoring and retaliating against her after she posted comments on Facebook. The controversy began when Reading criticized a poster at her child's elementary school that featured various sexual identities. Her post drew significant attention and backlash from military personnel at a nearby base, leading to a series of communications and actions by local and federal officials, including heightened security at a school board meeting and referrals to counter-terrorism authorities.Reading sought a preliminary injunction to prevent further interference with her free speech rights. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied her motion, concluding that she failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether Reading had standing to seek a preliminary injunction. The court found that the bulk of the alleged unlawful conduct occurred during a brief period and had significantly subsided by the time Reading filed her lawsuit. The court determined that Reading did not show a substantial risk of future harm or a likelihood of future injury traceable to the defendants. Consequently, the court held that Reading lacked standing to seek a preliminary injunction and affirmed the District Court's order denying her motion. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Reading v. North Hanover Township" on Justia Law

In this case, Bayer U.S. LLC, a pharmaceutical company, recalled millions of dollars’ worth of Lotrimin and Tinactin spray products in October 2021 after discovering benzene contamination in products dating back to 2018. The plaintiffs, who purchased these products during the recall period, did not allege physical injuries but sought compensation for economic losses, claiming the contaminated products were worth less than uncontaminated ones.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege economic loss or harm from increased risk of future physical injury. The court found the plaintiffs' allegations too conclusory and lacking in specific facts to support their claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court concluded that the District Court erred in applying a heightened standard for standing. The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged economic injury under the benefit-of-the-bargain theory, as the contaminated products were unusable and therefore worth less than the uncontaminated products they had bargained for. The court noted that the plaintiffs need not show that all products in the recall were contaminated but must plausibly allege that their specific products were contaminated.The Third Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of standing as to some plaintiffs and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The appellate court emphasized that the plaintiffs' allegations, supported by the recall and additional testing data, were sufficient to establish standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage. View "Huertas v. Bayer US LLC" on Justia Law

Eric Gilbert filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing his interest in retirement accounts worth approximately $1.7 million. The issue was whether these accounts could be accessed by creditors due to alleged violations of federal law governing retirement plans. The Bankruptcy Court ruled that the accounts were protected from creditors, and the District Court affirmed this decision.The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the trustee John McDonnell's complaint, which sought to include the retirement accounts in the bankruptcy estate, arguing that the accounts violated ERISA and the IRC. The court found that the accounts were excluded from the estate under § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, which protects interests in trusts with enforceable anti-alienation provisions under applicable nonbankruptcy law. The District Court upheld this ruling, agreeing that ERISA's anti-alienation provision applied regardless of the alleged violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the retirement accounts were excluded from the bankruptcy estate under § 541(c)(2) because ERISA's anti-alienation provision was enforceable, even if the accounts did not comply with ERISA and the IRC. The court also dismissed McDonnell's claims regarding preferential transfers and fraudulent conveyances, as the transactions in question did not involve Gilbert parting with his property. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the Bankruptcy Court's decisions to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, shorten the time for briefing, and strike certain items from the appellate record. View "In re: Gilbert" on Justia Law

Two employees of a publicly traded company raised concerns internally that the company had overstated its earnings by not accounting for slower-than-expected drilling speeds. Subsequently, an article in The Wall Street Journal reported similar allegations, and within three months, the company terminated both employees. The employees then filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, claiming their termination violated whistleblower protections under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). An administrative proceeding resulted in a preliminary order for their reinstatement, which the company ignored.The employees sought to enforce the reinstatement order in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, interpreting the relevant statute as not granting it the power to enforce the preliminary order. The employees appealed this decision.While the appeal was pending, the employees chose to abandon the administrative process and filed a separate civil action in federal court. Consequently, the administrative proceedings were terminated. The company then moved to dismiss the appeal on mootness grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the employees' request to enforce the preliminary reinstatement order no longer satisfied the redressability requirement for Article III standing. The preliminary order was extinguished with the dismissal of the administrative proceedings, and a federal court cannot enforce a non-existent order. Therefore, the employees lost Article III standing during the litigation, and no exception to mootness applied. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it on mootness grounds. View "Gulden v. Exxon Mobil Corp" on Justia Law

Ephriam Rodriquez, a bus operator, was terminated by the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) after accumulating excessive negative attendance points under his union’s Collective Bargaining Agreement. His final absence on June 8, 2018, was due to a migraine headache. Following an informal hearing on June 26, where his discharge was recommended, Rodriquez applied for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and sought medical documentation to support his claim. Despite this, SEPTA held a formal hearing and approved his termination.Rodriquez filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging FMLA retaliation and interference. The jury found in favor of Rodriquez on the interference claim, awarding him $20,000 in economic damages, but ruled in favor of SEPTA on the retaliation claim. SEPTA then moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Rodriquez did not have a “serious health condition” under the FMLA at the time of his absence. The District Court granted SEPTA’s motion, leading to Rodriquez’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, holding that Rodriquez failed to demonstrate that his migraines constituted a “chronic serious health condition” as defined by the FMLA. Specifically, Rodriquez did not provide evidence of periodic visits to a healthcare provider for his migraines before his termination, which is a requirement under the FMLA regulations. The court concluded that there was no legally sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Rodriquez had a qualifying serious health condition at the time of his June 8 absence. View "Rodriquez v. SEPTA" on Justia Law

William Webb, an inmate at James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (JTVCC) in Delaware, sued prison officials for failing to schedule court-ordered visits with his daughter. A Delaware family court had granted Webb visitation rights in October 2020, but since then, only one visit occurred in 2021, lasting fifteen minutes and concluding without incident. Webb filed a grievance through the prison’s internal process, which was returned unprocessed. He then wrote to three prison officials but received inadequate responses. Webb, representing himself, filed a lawsuit alleging that prison officials violated his constitutional right to reunification with his daughter.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed Webb’s complaint under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B). The court held that Webb failed to exhaust JTVCC’s internal grievance process and did not state a valid constitutional claim. The court also determined that allowing Webb to amend his complaint would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed the timeliness of Webb’s appeal, applying the prison mailbox rule to JTVCC’s electronic filing system. The court held that Webb’s notice of appeal was timely filed when he placed it in the designated mailbox on November 22, 2022. On the merits, the court found that Webb’s complaint did not definitively show a failure to exhaust administrative remedies and plausibly alleged a constitutional claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Webb v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Quintez Talley, an incarcerated individual, sought in forma pauperis (IFP) status to appeal without prepaying filing fees. The appellees argued that the "three strikes" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) barred Talley from proceeding IFP, claiming that three of his previous cases were dismissed on grounds that qualify as strikes under the PLRA. Talley contended that only one of these cases constituted a strike.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed Talley's federal claim for failure to state a claim and his medical malpractice claim for not complying with Pennsylvania procedural rules. The court did not dismiss the entire action on strike-qualifying grounds, so this case did not count as a strike. In another case, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed Talley's complaint for failure to state a claim but granted him leave to amend. Talley did not amend within the deadline, but the court did not formally close the case before Talley filed his notice of appeal, so this case also did not count as a strike. In a third case, the same court dismissed Talley's claims for failure to state a claim and noted his failure to file a certificate of merit for his medical malpractice claim. This dismissal was on strike-qualifying grounds, making it a strike.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that only one of Talley's previous cases constituted a strike. The court held that the dismissal of the medical malpractice claim for procedural non-compliance did not qualify as a strike, and the case where Talley was given leave to amend but did not do so was not formally closed, thus not a strike. The court granted Talley's motion to proceed IFP, allowing him to appeal without prepaying filing fees. View "Talley v. Pillai" on Justia Law

Levi Werley was seriously injured while riding an uninsured dirt bike. After the insurance of the driver who struck him did not fully compensate for his injuries, Levi’s parents sought underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under their own automobile insurance policies. Their insurer, Mid-Century Insurance Company, paid $250,000 under one policy but denied an additional $250,000 under another policy, citing a household vehicle exclusion. The Werleys argued that this exclusion was invalid and unenforceable.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania agreed with the Werleys, ruling that the household vehicle exclusion was invalid under Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). The court held that the exclusion acted as a de facto waiver of stacking, which is not permissible under the MVFRL. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Werleys, entitling them to the additional UIM benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the District Court’s order. The Third Circuit held that the household vehicle exclusion in the Multi-Vehicle Policy was valid and enforceable. The court distinguished this case from precedents like Gallagher v. GEICO Indemnification Co. and Donovan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., noting that the Werleys had never paid premiums for UIM coverage on the dirt bike. The court emphasized that exclusions limiting UIM coverage are generally enforceable unless they act as impermissible de facto waivers of stacking, which was not the case here. The Third Circuit remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Mid-Century. View "Mid-Century Insurance Co v. Werley" on Justia Law

In two separate class actions, Kenneth Hasson and Jordan Schnur alleged that FullStory, Inc. and Papa John’s International, Inc. unlawfully wiretapped their online communications using FullStory’s Session Replay Code. This code intercepts detailed user interactions on websites without user consent. Hasson, a Pennsylvania resident, claimed FullStory wiretapped him while he browsed Mattress Firm’s website. Schnur, also from Pennsylvania, alleged similar wiretapping by Papa John’s website.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed both cases for lack of personal jurisdiction. In Hasson’s case, the court found that FullStory, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia, did not have sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania. The court denied Hasson’s request for jurisdictional discovery. In Schnur’s case, the court ruled that Papa John’s, also a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia, did not expressly aim its conduct at Pennsylvania, despite operating numerous restaurants in the state.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed these dismissals. The court affirmed the dismissal in Schnur’s case, agreeing that Schnur failed to show that Papa John’s expressly aimed its conduct at Pennsylvania under the Calder “effects” test. The court noted that merely operating a website accessible in Pennsylvania does not establish personal jurisdiction.However, the court vacated the dismissal in Hasson’s case and remanded it for further consideration. The court held that the District Court should have also considered whether personal jurisdiction was proper under the traditional test as articulated in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court. This test examines whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum and whether the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. The court instructed the District Court to reassess FullStory’s contacts with Pennsylvania under this framework. View "Hasson v. Fullstory Inc" on Justia Law