Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Aqudre Quailes and Ayinda Harper were separately charged with being felons in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Harper was on Pennsylvania state probation and parole when his probation officer discovered photographs of him holding firearms on social media. During a home visit, officers found a semiautomatic pistol in his residence. Harper had thirteen prior felony convictions. Quailes, on parole for one of his six prior felony convictions, was arrested for absconding from parole. Authorities found firearms and ammunition in his girlfriend’s apartment, where he had been staying.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed both indictments, ruling that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that the defendants' status as parolees or probationers did not negate their Second Amendment rights. The Government appealed, arguing that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to state parolees and probationers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Quailes and Harper because neither had completed their criminal sentences. The court referenced its en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General, which held that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional for a felon who had completed his sentence, and United States v. Moore, which upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) for felons still serving their sentences. The court concluded that historical practices support disarming convicts who are still serving their sentences, including those on state parole or probation. Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s orders and remanded the cases for further proceedings. View "USA v. Quailes" on Justia Law

Dwayne Sherman was indicted for several offenses related to drug trafficking in Central Pennsylvania, including six counts of money laundering, one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, and one count of conspiracy to launder money. The charges stemmed from activities between 2012 and 2018. Evidence presented at trial included testimony from a drug dealer, Paul Alston, who bought cocaine from Sherman, and FBI informant Ruben Martin, who received large sums of cash from Sherman intended for Mexico. Sherman admitted to selling cocaine and making money drops but claimed ignorance of the money's criminal origins.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied Sherman’s motion for a new trial but vacated three of his money-laundering convictions, finding they were separate means of committing a single offense. At sentencing, the court applied a dangerous-weapon enhancement based on Sherman’s testimony about having access to handguns while storing drug proceeds at home, resulting in a 262-month imprisonment sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Sherman argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, the government’s proof of the drug conspiracy varied from the indictment, and the district court erred in applying the dangerous-weapon enhancement. The Third Circuit found that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, including Sherman’s knowledge and intent regarding the money laundering and drug conspiracy charges. The court also found no impermissible variance between the indictment and the trial evidence and upheld the district court’s application of the dangerous-weapon enhancement. Consequently, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Sherman" on Justia Law

Jorge Rivera-Guadalupe was living in a rooming house in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, when he was mugged and robbed. His friend, Christopher Valkosak, came to stay with him for protection. The next evening, Valkosak was shot by a stranger in the hallway outside Rivera-Guadalupe’s room. Detective Jacob Pierce investigated the incident, interviewed a neighbor who described the shooter as a tall Black male, and obtained a search warrant for Rivera-Guadalupe’s room. The search yielded marijuana, a knife, and IDs but no gun. Rivera-Guadalupe was arrested and charged with multiple offenses, including attempted homicide and possession of marijuana. He was acquitted of all charges after being incarcerated for over eighteen months.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed claims against other defendants but allowed the malicious prosecution claim against Det. Pierce to proceed. Det. Pierce sought dismissal based on qualified immunity, arguing that probable cause for some charges precluded a malicious prosecution claim. The District Court, referencing Johnson v. Knorr, held that probable cause for one charge does not insulate officers from liability for malicious prosecution on other charges lacking probable cause. Det. Pierce’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied, and he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the right to be prosecuted only on charges supported by probable cause was not clearly established at the time of Rivera-Guadalupe’s prosecution due to conflicting precedents within the circuit and among other circuits. The court reversed the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity for Det. Pierce and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss on that basis. The court clarified that the any-crime rule applies to false arrest claims but not to malicious prosecution claims. View "Rivera-Guadalupe v. Pierce" on Justia Law

A Kenyan national, lawfully admitted to the United States, was convicted in 2014 and 2019 of felony vehicular fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing police officer under Pennsylvania law. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with removability based on these convictions, arguing they constituted crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the removal orders.In 2017, DHS charged the petitioner with removability based on his 2014 fleeing-or-eluding conviction and 2016 simple assault convictions. The Immigration Judge found that simple assault did not constitute a CIMT and terminated the proceedings. However, the judge noted that the fleeing-or-eluding conviction could be a CIMT if combined with another CIMT. In 2019, after the petitioner’s second fleeing-or-eluding conviction, DHS again charged him with removability. The Immigration Judge rejected the petitioner’s res judicata defense and concluded that both fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs, sustaining the charge of removability. The BIA affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA misapplied the categorical approach by relying on a realistic-probability analysis to determine that the fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs. The court held that the Pennsylvania statute under which the petitioner was convicted is divisible and that one of the felony subsections does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, concluding that the petitioner’s convictions did not qualify as CIMTs under the categorical approach, and thus, he was not removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). View "Ndungu v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Nahsiem McIntosh was involved in a burglary at a sporting goods store in Newark, Delaware, where he and a co-defendant stole various firearms, including an AR-15-style weapon. The next day, McIntosh was apprehended by law enforcement, who found a loaded semiautomatic pistol in a trashcan that McIntosh had discarded. McIntosh was subsequently arrested and indicted on three counts, pleading guilty to two: theft of firearms from a federal firearm licensee and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The District Court for the District of Delaware applied two sentencing enhancements based on the Sentencing Guidelines: one for possession of a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine and another for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense. McIntosh objected to these enhancements, arguing that the commentary interpreting these guidelines was not entitled to deference. The District Court overruled his objections and sentenced him to 100 months for each count, to run concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Sentencing Commission's commentary on the guidelines was entitled to deference. The court found that the term "large capacity magazine" was genuinely ambiguous and that the Commission's interpretation, defining it as a magazine capable of accepting more than 15 rounds, was reasonable and within the Commission's expertise. Similarly, the court upheld the enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense, finding that the commentary reasonably interpreted the guideline to include possession of a firearm during the course of a burglary. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's application of both sentencing enhancements. View "USA v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

Henry Washington, a state prisoner, alleged that prison guard T.S. Oswald sexually assaulted him twice, once in 2013 and again in 2015. During the first incident, Washington claimed that Oswald and another guard handcuffed him, fondled him, and attempted to insert a nightstick into his rectum, causing him to bleed. In the second incident, Oswald allegedly fondled Washington and attempted to insert his finger into Washington's rectum while escorting him back to his cell.Washington sued Oswald under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for cruel and unusual punishment. The jury found in favor of Washington, awarding him $20,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages for the 2013 assault, and $20,000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages for the 2015 assault. Oswald moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and excessive punitive damages. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied these motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Oswald liable for both assaults. The court also upheld the punitive damages, finding them not excessive under the Due Process Clause. The court noted that Oswald's actions were highly reprehensible, the punitive damages were proportionate to the harm caused, and the awards were consistent with those in comparable cases. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, maintaining the jury's awards. View "Washington v. Gilmore" on Justia Law

Jose Soto was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit bank robbery, two counts of bank robbery, and two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. At sentencing, the District Court set his offense level at 29 and sentenced him to 289 months in federal prison, including two mandatory and consecutive seven-year terms. The offense level included a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on allegations that Soto improperly interacted with jurors, a witness's brother, and victims.The District Court for the District of New Jersey imposed the obstruction of justice enhancement based on three incidents: Soto stepping onto an elevator with jurors and asking one to press a button, interacting with a testifying witness's brother, and greeting victims at the courthouse. Soto's counsel argued that these interactions were not intended to obstruct justice and that Soto had not been instructed to avoid such interactions. The District Court, however, focused on the consequences of Soto's conduct rather than his intent, leading to the enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court's application of the obstruction of justice enhancement was not supported by adequate evidence. The appellate court noted that the District Court did not explicitly adopt the findings of the presentence report and that the record lacked sufficient evidence to support the allegations of obstruction. The court emphasized that the enhancement requires a willful intent to obstruct justice, which was not demonstrated by Soto's actions. Consequently, the Third Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the obstruction of justice enhancement. View "USA v. Soto" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellants, DeAndre Jackson and Quintel Martins, challenged the denial of their motions to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. The incident occurred around 1:10 AM on October 2, 2019, when Officer Thayer McCauley, patrolling with an unarmed trainee, noticed a car with a broken taillight, a damaged license plate, and an expired registration. Suspecting the car might be stolen, he attempted to stop it, but the driver evaded him. About forty minutes later, McCauley spotted the car again and, after a brief pursuit, conducted a "felony stop" in a dark, secluded area. The occupants were ordered out at gunpoint, handcuffed, and frisked. A gun magazine was found on Jackson, who then admitted to having a gun in the car. A subsequent search revealed more evidence, including another firearm and items linked to recent robberies.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the motions to suppress, finding the stop and search lawful. The court determined that the officers' actions were justified by the circumstances, including the time of night, the high-crime area, and the suspects' evasive behavior. The court also found that the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle based on Jackson's admission about the firearm and the smell of marijuana.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that the officers' actions during the stop were reasonable given the totality of the circumstances. The court emphasized that the officers were justified in taking safety precautions due to the potential danger posed by the suspects' behavior and the environment. The court concluded that the measures taken, including the use of firearms and handcuffs, were appropriate to ensure officer safety and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Daniel Rutherford sought a reduction of his 42.5-year sentence for two armed robberies, arguing that he is eligible for compassionate release due to changes in sentencing laws under the First Step Act. This Act, among other things, reduced mandatory minimum sentences for certain crimes but did not make these changes retroactive. Rutherford contended that if sentenced today, his sentence would be significantly shorter due to these changes.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied Rutherford's motion, citing the Third Circuit's precedent in United States v. Andrews. In Andrews, the court held that nonretroactive changes to sentencing laws, such as those in the First Step Act, cannot be considered "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for compassionate release. The District Court concluded that this precedent barred Rutherford's argument.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit reiterated its holding in Andrews, stating that the nonretroactive changes to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) under the First Step Act cannot be considered as a basis for compassionate release. The court emphasized that allowing such changes to be considered would conflict with Congress's explicit decision to make these changes nonretroactive. The court also noted that while the Sentencing Commission's amended policy statement allows for consideration of nonretroactive changes in certain circumstances, this policy cannot override the clear intent of Congress as interpreted in Andrews.Thus, the Third Circuit held that the First Step Act's changes to § 924(c) cannot be considered in determining eligibility for compassionate release, affirming the District Court's denial of Rutherford's motion. View "USA v. Rutherford" on Justia Law

Kay Ellison, co-founder of a charter airline, was convicted of federal wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy. The airline, Direct Air, faced cash flow issues and Ellison siphoned millions from an escrow account through fictitious reservations and falsified records. She was charged alongside Judy Tull and chose not to testify or present a defense at trial. The jury convicted her on all counts, and she was sentenced to ninety-four months in prison and ordered to pay over $19 million in restitution. Her convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.Ellison filed a motion to vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. She argued her attorney incorrectly advised her that if she did not testify, she could not present other evidence, which she claimed prejudiced her defense. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied her motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that even if her counsel was ineffective, she could not show prejudice because there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted her if she had testified or presented other witnesses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit applied the Strickland v. Washington standard, which requires showing a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for the attorney's errors. The court found that Ellison failed to demonstrate such a probability, as her proposed testimony and that of her witnesses would not have likely changed the jury's verdict given the strong evidence against her. Thus, the denial of her habeas corpus petition was upheld. View "Ellison v. USA" on Justia Law