Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Yellow Corporation, a major trucking company, ceased operations and filed for bankruptcy in 2023. As a result, it withdrew from several multiemployer pension plans, triggering withdrawal liability—an amount owed to the pension plans to cover unfunded vested benefits for employees. The pension plans, which had received substantial federal funds under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA) to stabilize their finances, filed claims against Yellow’s bankruptcy estate for withdrawal liability. The dispute centered on how much of the ARPA funds should be counted as plan assets when calculating Yellow’s liability, as well as whether certain contractual terms could require Yellow to pay a higher withdrawal liability than statutory minimums.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware reviewed the claims. It upheld two regulations issued by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC): the Phase-In Regulation, which requires ARPA funds to be counted as plan assets gradually over time, and the No-Receivables Regulation, which bars plans from counting ARPA funds as assets before they are actually received. The Bankruptcy Court found these regulations to be valid exercises of PBGC’s authority and not arbitrary or capricious. It also ruled that two pension plans could enforce a contractual provision requiring Yellow to pay withdrawal liability at a higher, agreed-upon rate, rather than the rate based solely on its actual contributions.On direct appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order. The Third Circuit held that the PBGC’s regulations were valid under ARPA and ERISA, as Congress had expressly delegated authority to the PBGC to set reasonable conditions on the allocation of plan assets and withdrawal liability. The court also held that pension plans could enforce contractual terms requiring higher withdrawal liability, as the statutory scheme sets a floor, not a ceiling, for such liability. View "In re: Yellow Corporation" on Justia Law

Two business compliance companies entered into a partnership to develop a software product, with one company providing “white-label” services to the other. The partnership was formalized in a written agreement, but disputes arose over performance, payment for out-of-scope work, and the functionality of the software integration. As the relationship deteriorated, the company that had sought the services began developing its own infrastructure, ultimately terminating the partnership and launching a competing product. The service provider alleged that its trade secrets and proprietary information were misappropriated in the process.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania presided over a jury trial in which the service provider brought claims for breach of contract, trade secret misappropriation under both state and federal law, and unfair competition. The jury found in favor of the service provider, awarding compensatory and punitive damages across the claims. The jury specifically found that six of eight alleged trade secrets were misappropriated. The defendant company filed post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, and remittitur, arguing insufficient evidence, improper expert testimony, and duplicative damages. The District Court denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s rulings. The Third Circuit held that the defendant had forfeited its argument regarding the protectability of the trade secrets by not raising it with sufficient specificity at trial, and thus assumed protectability for purposes of appeal. The court found sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of misappropriation by use, and that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The court also found no reversible error in the admission of expert testimony. However, the Third Circuit determined that the damages awarded for trade secret misappropriation and unfair competition were duplicative, and conditionally remanded for remittitur of $11,068,044, allowing the plaintiff to accept the reduced award or seek a new trial on damages. View "Harbor Business Compliance Corp v. Firstbase IO Inc" on Justia Law

Two employees of a debt-collection firm, one of whom was out sick with COVID-19, collaborated to resolve an urgent licensing issue for their employer. The employee at home, unable to access her work computer, asked her colleague to log in using her credentials and retrieve a spreadsheet containing passwords for various company systems. The colleague, with express permission, accessed the computer and emailed the spreadsheet to the employee’s personal and work email accounts. Both actions violated the employer’s internal computer-use policies. Separately, the employee at home had, over several years, moved accounts into her workgroup to receive performance bonuses, believing she was eligible for them. Both employees also alleged persistent sexual harassment at work, which led to internal complaints, one employee’s resignation, and the other’s termination.After these events, the employer, National Recovery Agency (NRA), sued both employees in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), federal and state trade secrets laws, civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. The employees counterclaimed for sexual harassment and related employment claims. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court entered judgment for the employees on all claims brought by NRA, finding no violations of the CFAA or trade secrets laws, and stayed the employees’ harassment claims pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s judgment in full. The Third Circuit held, first, that the CFAA does not criminalize violations of workplace computer-use policies by employees with authorized access, absent evidence of hacking or code-based circumvention. Second, it held that passwords protecting proprietary business information do not, by themselves, constitute trade secrets under federal or Pennsylvania law. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the state-law tort claims. View "NRA Group LLC v. Durenleau" on Justia Law

In this case, Robert Z. Maigetter and Barbara J. Berot jointly owned a co-op apartment in Washington, D.C., which Berot's son, Alexis Kyriakopoulos, used. After Berot was diagnosed with terminal cancer, she and Maigetter executed parallel wills, with Berot expressing her wish for the co-op to pass to Kyriakopoulos. Berot passed away in May 2020, and Maigetter sought advice from their attorney, Sarah A. Eastburn, resulting in several email exchanges. Kyriakopoulos sued Maigetter to enforce an alleged contract to will the co-op to him, claiming Maigetter agreed to this arrangement before Berot's death.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and, after an in-camera review, ordered the production of twelve emails between Maigetter and Eastburn, finding them probative of Berot's intentions and subject to the testamentary exception to the attorney-client privilege. The District Court certified a narrow question for appeal regarding the scope of the testamentary exception, specifically whether it applies only to communications made by the deceased or also to communications made by others discussing the deceased's statements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the District Court's application of the testamentary exception exceeded its traditional bounds. The Third Circuit held that the testamentary exception applies only to communications between the deceased client and their attorney, not to third-party communications made after the client's death. The court emphasized that the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client and can only be waived by the client or through an implied waiver in specific circumstances, which did not apply here. Consequently, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court's order compelling the production of the emails and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kyriakopoulos v. Maigetter" on Justia Law

Dyax Corporation performed research for Ares Trading S.A. and licensed patents to Ares, including some held by Cambridge Antibody Technology (CAT Patents). Ares used Dyax’s research to develop a cancer drug, Bavencio, and agreed to pay royalties to Dyax based on the drug’s sales. The royalty obligation outlasted the lifespan of the CAT Patents. The District Court held that Ares’ royalty obligation was not unenforceable under Brulotte v. Thys Co., which prohibits royalties that extend beyond a patent’s expiration.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware found that Ares’ royalty obligation did not violate Brulotte because it was not calculated based on activity requiring the use of inventions covered by the CAT Patents after their expiration. The court characterized the royalties as deferred compensation for Dyax’s pre-expiration research. Additionally, the court noted that Ares’ royalty obligation could run until the latest-running patent covered in the agreement expired, which included patents other than the CAT Patents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit held that Ares’ royalty obligation was not calculated based on activity requiring post-expiration use of the CAT Patents, and thus, Brulotte did not apply. The court emphasized that the royalties were based on sales of Bavencio, which did not require the use of the CAT Patents after their expiration. The court also rejected Ares’ argument that Dyax violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, noting that Ares received all the benefits promised under the agreement. The court concluded that Dyax did not breach any obligations under the agreement, and Ares’ royalty obligation remained enforceable. View "Ares Trading SA v. Dyax Corp" on Justia Law

Rose McAvoy, an undergraduate student at Dickinson College, alleged that the college violated Title IX and breached its contract by failing to respond adequately to her sexual assault claim. McAvoy reported that she was sexually assaulted by a fellow student, TS, in October 2017. She initially did not disclose TS's name but later requested a formal Title IX investigation in December 2017. Dickinson initiated an investigation, issued a no-contact directive, and provided McAvoy with various accommodations and support services.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of Dickinson College. The court found that McAvoy failed to produce sufficient evidence that Dickinson acted with deliberate indifference under Title IX and did not show sufficient evidence of breach of contract damages. The court noted that Dickinson's response, including the investigation and accommodations provided, was not clearly unreasonable under the circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that Dickinson's actions, including the thorough investigation and the support provided to McAvoy, did not constitute deliberate indifference. The court emphasized that the investigation's length, while longer than the college's sixty-day objective, was justified by the need for thoroughness and fairness. Additionally, the court found no evidence that the lack of written notice about the investigation's delay caused McAvoy's claimed injuries, such as encountering TS on campus or delaying her graduation.The Third Circuit concluded that Dickinson's response to McAvoy's assault claim was not clearly unreasonable and that McAvoy did not establish a causal connection between the alleged breach of contract and her damages. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Dickinson College. View "McAvoy v. Dickinson College" on Justia Law

A motor vehicle manufacturer, General Motors LLC (GM), sought to terminate its franchise agreement with Mall Chevrolet, Inc., a successful car dealership in New Jersey, after discovering that the dealership had submitted false warranty claims for vehicle repairs. GM also intended to recoup the amounts it paid in disputed warranty claims through a chargeback process. In response, Mall Chevrolet sued GM under the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act to prevent the termination of the franchise agreement and the chargebacks. However, the dealership's claims did not survive summary judgment.The District Court found that there was no genuine dispute of material fact – the dealership did submit false claims for warranty repairs – and GM was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the appealed claims. The dealership then appealed the District Court’s summary-judgment rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The court found that GM had good cause to terminate the franchise agreement because Mall Chevrolet had materially breached the contract by submitting false claims for warranty work. The court also found that the dealership's remaining statutory claims were barred by the defense provided in the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act, which allows a franchisor to avoid liability for any claim under the Act if the franchisee has not substantially complied with the franchise agreement. View "Mall Chevrolet Inc v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC and Mallinckrodt PLC. Sanofi sold its rights in a drug to Mallinckrodt for $100,000 and a perpetual annual royalty. The drug was successful, but Mallinckrodt filed for bankruptcy and sought to convert Sanofi's right to royalties into an unsecured claim. Mallinckrodt aimed to discharge all future royalty payments and continue selling the drug without paying royalties, leaving Sanofi with only an unsecured claim.The bankruptcy court approved Mallinckrodt's discharge, ruling that since Sanofi had fully transferred ownership years ago, the contract was not executory. It also held that Sanofi's remaining contractual right to future royalties was an unsecured, contingent claim, which Mallinckrodt could discharge. The District Court affirmed these rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed these rulings de novo. The court held that Sanofi's right to payment arose before Mallinckrodt filed for bankruptcy, making its royalties dischargeable in bankruptcy. The court rejected Sanofi's argument that the future royalties were too indefinite to be a claim, stating that the Bankruptcy Code allows for claims that are both contingent and unliquidated. The court also disagreed with Sanofi's assertion that bankruptcy cannot resolve its royalties claim because it will not exist until Mallinckrodt hits the sales trigger each year. The court ruled that a claim can arise before it is triggered, and most contract claims arise when the parties sign the contract. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that Sanofi's contingent claim arose before Mallinckrodt went bankrupt and is therefore dischargeable in bankruptcy. View "In re Mallinckrodt PLC" on Justia Law

Epsilon, an Ohio corporation with a principal place of business in Texas, entered into Joint Operating Agreements (JOAs) with companies, including Chesapeake, an LLC whose sole member is an Oklahoma citizen, to develop natural gas in Pennsylvania. The JOAs require Chesapeake to “have full control of all operations on the Contract Area.” Chesapeake can be removed as Operator for good cause by a vote of the other JOA parties. The JOAs allow the “Non-Operator parties” to propose new well sites. The others have 30 days to decide whether to participate. The work is then ordinarily performed by Chesapeake. If Chesapeake does not approve the project, the Consenting Parties designate a Consenting Party as Operator. Chesapeake opposed wells proposed by Epsilon, then blocked Epsilon from operating the proposed project unilaterally.Epsilon sought a declaration to drill without Chesapeake’s participation. Chesapeake moved to dismiss the suit for failure to join the other JOA co-signatories. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Third Circuit remanded. The other contracting parties are required (Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)). A declaratory judgment interpreting the JOAs to authorize a single Consenting Party to propose the drilling of a new well would affect all their interests. However, other Absent JOA Parties are citizens of Texas who cannot be feasibly joined without defeating diversity and destroying subject matter jurisdiction. Deciding whether to proceed without them requires findings by the trial judge. View "Epsilon Energy USA Inc. v. Chesapeake Appalachia LLC" on Justia Law

The universities, Pitt and Temple, offer traditional, on-campus educational programs. Temple also offers fully online distance-learning programs, which are separately advertised and priced. Students who enrolled in the Universities’ traditional on-campus programs for the Spring 2020 semester were required to pay tuition and mandatory fees and to sign a Financial Responsibility Agreement (FRA). On March 11, 2020, then-Governor Wolf ordered a temporary closure of all non-life-sustaining businesses, citing the rising number of COVID-19 cases. The Universities closed campus buildings, canceled all on-campus student events, announced that classes would be conducted online for the remainder of the semester, and urged students not to return to campus housing. Neither university offered any reduction in tuition or mandatory fees. Temple issued pro-rata housing and dining refunds. Pitt did so only for students who moved out by April 3, 2020.Students sued for breach of contract, or, alternatively, unjust enrichment, citing the Universities’ “website[s], academic catalogs, student handbooks, marketing materials, and other circulars, bulletins, and publications,” which described the benefits of campus life, and the reduced pricing for online courses.The Third Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissals of both suits. There is no express contract precluding the implied contract or unjust enrichment claims. The FRAs function as promissory notes, not integrated contracts. The students adequately pleaded their implied contract claims as to tuition in exchange for in-person education, Pitt’s mandatory fees, and Temple’s university services fee—but not as to Pitt’s housing and dining fees. The students also adequately pleaded unjust enrichment. View "Hickey v. University of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law