Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hendrickson was a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections. During a routine pat-down, a guard found a cell phone in Hendrickson’s pocket. When the phone was activated, it displayed an AT&T logo and asked for a password. The phone was missing its SIM card, a removable chip that allows the phone to connect to a cellular network. Without the SIM card, the phone was unable to receive calls and could make calls only to 911. Hendrickson stated that he had been using the phone to play music. Because the phone was password-protected, the government did not search it for text messages, emails, or other data. Hendrickson was convicted of possession of prison contraband, 18 U.S.C. 1791(a)(2). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that no reasonable juror could find that the phone was a “prohibited object” or that Hendrickson was “an inmate of a prison” Hendrickson possessed a “phone” within the meaning of section 1791(d)(1)(F); an electronics technician confirmed that the device was “definitely” a phone. The U.S.Marshalls contract with the Virgin Islands to house prisoners at Hendrickson’s facility, so Hendrickson was an inmate of a facility where persons were held “in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the Attorney General.” View "United States v. Hendrickson" on Justia Law

Fishoff began trading securities in the 1990s. By 2009, he had earned enough money to establish his own firm, with one full-time employee and several independent contractors. Fishoff had no formal training in securities markets, regulations, or compliance. Nor did he hold any professional license. He operated without expert advice. Fishoff engaged in short-selling stock in anticipation of the issuer making a secondary offering. Secondary offerings are confidential but a company, through its underwriter, may contact potential buyers to assess interest. When a salesperson provides confidential information, such as the issuer's name, the recipient is barred by SEC Rule 10b-5-2, from trading the issuer’s securities or disclosing the information before the offering is publicly announced. Fishoff’s associates opened accounts at investment banking firms in order to receive solicitations to invest in secondary offerings. They agreed to keep the information confidential but shared it with Fishoff, who would short-sell the company’s shares.Fishoff pled guilty to securities fraud (15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 78ff; 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (Rule 10b-5); 18 U.S.C. 2), stipulating that he and his associates made $1.5 to $3.5 million by short-selling Synergy stock based on confidential information. Fishoff unsuccessfully claimed that he had no knowledge of Rule 10b5-2 and was entitled to the affirmative defense against imprisonment under Securities Exchange Act Section 32, as a person who violated a Rule having “no knowledge of such rule or regulation”. The Third Circuit affirmed his 30-month sentence. Fishoff adequately presented his defense. The court’s ruling was sufficient; the government never agreed that the non-imprisonment defense applied. Fishoff did not establish a lack of knowledge. His attempts to conceal his scheme suggests that he was aware that it was wrong. View "United States v. Fishoff" on Justia Law

Rosa, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was admitted to the U.S. as a legal permanent resident in 1992, as a child. In 2004, he pled guilty to possession and sale of a controlled substance (cocaine) within 1,000 feet of school property under the New Jersey School Zone Statute. Eleven years later, Rosa was charged as removable for the conviction of a controlled substances offense and of an “aggravated felony” for a “drug trafficking crime.” Rosa denied removability for the aggravated felony, which would have precluded him from being eligible for cancellation of removal.The IJ applied the “categorical approach” and compared the New Jersey School Zone Statute with the federal statute for distribution “in or near schools and colleges” and concluded that the state statute swept more broadly than its federal counterpart in both proscribed conduct and its definition of “school property,” so that Rosa’s state conviction was not an “aggravated felony” under federal law. The IJ granted cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals held that Rosa’s state conviction could be compared to the federal statute generally prohibiting the distribution of a controlled substance as a lesser included offense of the Federal School Zone Statute and ordered Rosa removed. The Third Circuit remanded. The categorical approach, which compares the elements of prior convictions with the elements of crimes under federal law, does not permit comparison with any federal crime but only with the “most similar” one. View "Rosa v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Johnman signed a plea agreement admitting to: use of an interstate facility to entice a minor to engage in sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); distribution of child pornography, section 2252(a)(2); and possession of child pornography, section 2252(a)(4). Each count and the corresponding maximum penalty appeared in an individual subparagraph and stated, “and a $5,000 special victims assessment.” A separate subparagraph aggregates all the maximum and mandatory minimum penalties in the three counts, including “an additional $15,000 special victims assessment.” Another provision stipulates that “[Johnman] agrees to pay the special victims and court assessments in the amount of $15,300 before the time of sentencing or at a time directed by this Court.” The court explained the $15,000 assessment at Johnman’s plea hearing. Johnman offered no objections.Johnman was sentenced to 368 months of incarceration, a lifetime of supervised release, $1,000 restitution, and $15,300 in special assessments. The plea agreement waived Johnson’s right to appeal or collaterally attack his convictions or sentence but permitted an appeal if “the defendant’s sentence on any count of conviction exceeds the statutory maximum for that count.” The Third Circuit affirmed. The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. 3014, applies to each conviction, not to the case as a whole. The text and context indicate that where a defendant is nonindigent, a separate $5,000 assessment applies to every qualifying count of conviction View "United States v. Johnman" on Justia Law

In 1992, Dohou came from Benin to the U.S. on a visitor’s visa. He became a lawful permanent resident. More than a decade later, he was convicted of conspiring to traffic marijuana, an aggravated felony. DHS served him with a notice to appear at a date and time to be set later. After a hearing, the IJ ordered Dohou removed. He never appealed to the BIA or sought review. Agents repeatedly tried to take Dohou to the airport for removal. He resisted. Dohou unsuccessfully moved to dismiss his indictment for hindering his removal, 8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(1)(A)–(C), asserting that the absence of a date and time on the notice to appear deprived the IJ of authority to order removal and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court reasoned that Dohou had been convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C), which stripped it of jurisdiction over his collateral attack on the removal order.The Third Circuit vacated. A removal order that was never reviewed by an Article III judge remains subject to collateral attack in a hindering-removal prosecution based on that order; the original removal order was not “judicially decided,” 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(7)(A). It is not enough that Dohou could have sought judicial review; section 1252(a)(2)(C), which sometimes strips jurisdiction over direct review of removal orders, does not apply to collateral attacks. Dohou’s ineffective-assistance claim requires fact-finding and the district court must decide whether a statutory- or prudential-exhaustion doctrine bars relief. View "United States v. Dohou" on Justia Law

Da Silva, a two-year-old native of Brazil, was admitted to the U.S. in 1994 with a B-2 visa. She has never left the U.S. Da Silva married a U.S. citizen, Leach, a member of the armed services, who subjected Da Silva to abuse and engaged in extramarital affairs, including with L.N. During a confrontation, Da Silva punched L.N. in the nose twice. Da Silva pleaded guilty to assault, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(4) and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment.In removal hearings, the IJ recognized that Da Silva had “been provoked.” She unsuccessfully sought cancellation of removal for battered spouses under the Violence Against Women Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2)(A). Da Silva could not satisfy the “good moral character” requirement because of her imprisonment for her assault conviction. She argued that she qualifies for the exception because the “act or conviction was connected to the alien’s having been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty.” The IJ found that Leach had threatened to take away Silva’s children due to her undocumented status, was consistently unfaithful, verbally and physically abused her and her daughter, and refused to allow her to seek immigration status, and found that her removal would result in extreme hardship but that the assault convictions were not “connected to” the cruelty. The Third Circuit vacated; “connected to” is unambiguous and means “having a causal or logical relationship.” Da Silva’s convictions are connected to Leach's extreme cruelty. View "Da Silva v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

During the 2009-2010 term, James was a senator in the Virgin Islands Legislature. The Legislature maintained a fund for Legislature-related expenses. James used a large portion of the checks issued to him by the fund for personal expenses and his re-election campaign. James obtained these checks by presenting invoices purportedly associated with work on a historical project. In 2015, James was charged with two counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and one count of federal program embezzlement, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(A). The Third Circuit affirmed his convictions, upholding a ruling that allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of acts outside the limitations period, 18 U.S.C. 3282(a), and the substitution of an excused juror with an alternate after the jury had been polled. The court rejected a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecution calling two witnesses concerning an eviction dispute. The court had instructed the government not to discuss the eviction case in its opening; neither witness testified about the eviction case. The Third Circuit also upheld a ruling that permitted the use of a chart as a demonstrative aid to accompany the case agent’s testimony, with an instruction that the jury that it should consider the chart as a guide for testimony, not as substantive evidence. View "United States v. James" on Justia Law

After the plaintiffs’ disability claims were denied by ALJs employed by the Social Security Administration (SSA), the Supreme Court held in Lucia v. SEC (2018), that ALJs in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercised “significant discretion” in carrying out “important functions” and were required, under the Appointments Clause, to be appointed by the President, a court of law, or the head of a department. Because the SEC ALJs were not so appointed, the petitioner there was entitled to a new hearing. When Lucia was decided, the plaintiffs were already in the process of challenging the SSA’s denial of their claims in the district court and demanded new hearings on the ground that the SSA ALJs were unconstitutionally appointed. The Acting Commissioner of SSA quickly reappointed the administrative judges but argued that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because they had not previously presented their Appointments Clause challenges to their ALJs or the Appeals Council and had not exhausted those claims before the agency. The district court declined to require exhaustion, vacated the agency’s decisions, and remanded for new hearings. The Third Circuit affirmed. Both the characteristics of the SSA review process and the rights protected by the Appointments Clause favor resolution of these claims on the merits, so exhaustion is not required in this context. View "Cirko v. Commissioner Social Security" on Justia Law

The Paperas sued the Company. The court sent the case to mediation. In May 2016, the Paperas reported that the parties had settled and asked for “a sixty (60) day Order of Dismissal,” to be followed by an agreement for the court’s approval. The May 2016 Order stated that the case was dismissed and the parties had 60 days to finalize the settlement. The order’s minute entry stated the dismissal was “without prejudice”; to reinstate the action if a settlement was not consummated, a party would have to show good cause within 60 days. The court never got a settlement agreement. After the 60-day period elapsed, the court did not dismiss with prejudice. In September 2016, the Paperas asked for a conference call. On that call, the court reportedly stated that “it no longer had jurisdiction” and that it had administratively closed the case. A month later, the Paperas filed a new complaint. It was assigned to the same judge, who granted summary judgment based on claim preclusion and declined to reopen the May 2016 Order. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. Because the order dismissing the first suit did not clearly say that the dismissal was involuntary or with prejudice, it did not preclude the second suit. For a dismissal to preclude claims, it must be with prejudice. View "Papera v. Pennsylvania Quarried Blueston Co." on Justia Law

Hodge was charged with three counts of using, carrying, or possessing a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) after he shot two armored-vehicle workers and stole $33,500. A jury convicted Hodge of two counts. In 2015, the District Court of the Virgin Islands sentenced Hodge to an aggregate 420 months imprisonment on the two counts—the then-mandatory minimum for first-time 924(c) offenders convicted of two counts involving discharging a firearm—plus another 310 months on other counts. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the federal counts but remanded the territorial charges with instructions to vacate two territorial counts and to conduct the “requisite resentencing.” Before resentencing took place, the First Step Act became law, amending section 924(c) so that first-time offenders convicted of two counts involving discharging a firearm and stemming from the same indictment now face a 240-month mandatory minimum. The district court declined to disturb Hodge’s federal sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed. The post–First Step Act modification of Hodge’s territorial sentence does not permit Hodge to invoke the reduced section 924(c) mandatory minimum. View "United States v. Hodge" on Justia Law