Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Sampson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court denied his motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court denied his subsequent 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, finding his claims waived or meritless. Sampson filed a 28 U.S.C. 2244 and 2255(h) motion seeking permission to file a second or successive 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.The Third Circuit denied the application, concluding that there was no new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Sampson cited the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” holding that the government must prove that a defendant charged with violating section 922(g) knew both that he possessed a firearm and that he belonged to the relevant class of persons barred from possessing a firearm. Rehaif did not state a rule of constitutional law but only addressed what the statutes require for a conviction and the rule has not been made retroactive. Sampson was informed that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sampson knowingly possessed a firearm and pled guilty. View "In re: Sampson" on Justia Law

The Inganamorts docked their 65-foot fishing vessel behind their part-time Boca Raton, Florida residence. In 2011, while they were at their New Jersey home, the ship sank enough to sustain serious damage. They reported the loss to their insurer, Chartis, with whom they had an all-risk policy. Chartis sent a claims specialist, who reported three inches of standing water in the starboard forward cabin bilge and multiple potential sources of water ingress, including a hole in the hull the size of a screw. He found that the electrical breakers were severely rust-stained and blackened from an electrical failure; subsequent testing revealed obvious water intrusion. The final review confirmed the initial findings and identified that the battery charger was not working; without a source of power, the ship’s bilge pumps had ceased functioning.Chartis sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for the damage and claimed that the Inganamorts were liable for misrepresentation. The Inganmorts neither filed a statement of facts nor opposed Chartis’s statement of undisputed facts. The district court treated Chartis’s statement of facts as undisputed and granted Chartic summary judgment, finding that the Inganamorts “ha[d] no evidence to demonstrate a fortuitous loss[.]” The Third Circuit affirmed. An insured bears the burden of proving fortuity; the Inganamorts did not meet that burden. View "Chartis Property Casualty Co. v. Inganamort" on Justia Law

James’s 10-year-old nephew found a loaded handgun in a drawer. The gun fired accidentally, wounding the boy’s six-year-old sister. She recovered. James pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), to possession of a firearm by one convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of incarceration. The PSR recommended 84-105 months' imprisonment, with two criminal history points for a 2011 conviction for “loitering and prowling at night time,” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5506, a third-degree misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year of incarceration. James had been sentenced to 60 days’ probation. Probation violations resulted in a nine-month sentence of incarceration. James argued that the sentence for “[l]oitering” and for all offenses “similar to” it should be excluded from his criminal-history score under U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(c)(2), which would result in a guidelines range of 70-87 months.The Third Circuit affirmed a 105-month sentence. Although section 5506 and its application to James are similar to the offenses that comprise loitering simpliciter, excluded by U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(c)(2), the court noted section 5506’s one-year maximum term of imprisonment. Section 5506’s mens rea requirement categorically distinguishes it from the “[l]oitering” offense listed in section 4A1.2(c)(2). Pennsylvania courts have construed section 5506, which refers to acting “maliciously” to contain a mens rea element akin to the Model Penal Code’s term “purposely.” View "United States v. James" on Justia Law

Care Alternatives provides hospice care to New Jersey patients, employing “interdisciplinary teams” of registered nurses, chaplains, social workers, home health aides, and therapists working alongside independent physicians who serve as hospice medical directors. Former Alternatives employees filed suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729–3733 alleging that Alternatives admitted patients who were ineligible for hospice care and directed its employees to improperly alter those patients’ Medicare certifications to reflect eligibility. They retained an expert, who opined in his report that, based on the records of the 47 patients he examined, the patients were inappropriately certified for hospice care 35 percent of the time. Alternatives’ expert testified that a reasonable physician would have found all of those patients hospice-eligible. The district court determined that a mere difference of opinion between experts regarding the accuracy of the prognosis was insufficient to create a triable dispute of fact as to the element of falsity and required that the plaintiffs provide evidence of an objective falsehood. Upon finding they had not adduced such evidence, the court granted Alternatives summary judgment. The Third Circuit vacated, rejecting the objective falsehood requirement for FCA falsity. The plaintiffs’ expert testimony created a genuine dispute of material fact as to falsity. View "Druding v. Care Alternatives" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, drivers who use Uber’s mobile phone application to provide limousine services (UberBLACK) in Philadelphia, claimed violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, and Pennsylvania laws. Plaintiffs each own and operate independent transportation companies (ITCs) as required to drive for UberBLACK. Each ITC’s agreement with Uber includes a Software License and outlines the relationships between ITCs, Uber riders, Uber, and Uber drivers. It describes driver requirements, vehicle requirements, financial terms, and contains an arbitration clause. A mandatory agreement between the ITC and the for-hire driver allows a driver to receive services through Uber’s app and outlines driver requirements, insurance requirements, dispute resolution. Some UberBLACK providers operate under Uber’s Philadelphia certificate of convenience; others hold their own certificates; approximately 75% of UberBLACK drivers use Uber’s automobile insurance. Plaintiffs claim that they are employees and allege that time spent online on the Uber App qualifies as FLSA compensable time. Uber argued that Plaintiffs are not restricted from working for other companies, pay their own expenses, can engage workers for their own ITCs, can use UberBLACK as little or as much as they want, and have no restrictions on personal activities while online.The Third Circuit vacated summary judgment. A reasonable fact-finder could rule in favor of Plaintiffs. Disputed facts include whether Plaintiffs are operating within Uber’s system and under Uber’s rules; whether Plaintiffs or their corporations contracted directly with Uber; and whether Uber exercises control over drivers. View "Razak v. Uber Technologies Inc" on Justia Law

The Nicaraguan government has a “de facto concentration of power in a single party,” the Sandinistas. According to human rights observers, police generally protect or give preferential treatment to pro-government [Sandinista] demonstrations while disrupting or denying registration for opposition groups and “did not protect opposition protesters when pro-government supporters harassed or attacked them.” Herrera described violent attacks against the Liberal Party and testified that she was subjected to a pattern of threatening words and conduct that rose to the level of persecution. Herrera concluded she would be killed for her Liberal Party leadership role if she stayed. After she left, Sandinistas repeatedly visited her family’s home demanding to know where she had gone. Herrera arrived in the U.S. and sought political asylum. The government did not dispute that she was targeted on account of her political opinion, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42), or by members of the ruling Sandinista Party. The IJ concluded that Herrera’s experiences did not “rise to the level of past persecution” because she “was never physically harmed,” “never arrested or imprisoned,” and “[n]ever threatened by a government official.” The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit vacated, noting that Herrera’s home was burned down, a convoy in which she was traveling came under gunfire, and a political meeting she was organizing was robbed at gunpoint. View "Herrera-Reyes v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Guadalupe entered the U.S. in 1998. In 2003, he married Torres, a U.S. citizen; he was granted conditional permanent resident status. The couple divorced in 2006. Guadalupe applied for the removal of the conditional basis of his permanent resident status. Torres claimed that Guadalupe married her for immigration purposes. USCIS concluded that Guadalupe’s marriage had not been in good faith and terminated Guadalupe’s status. He was placed in removal proceedings. In 2007, DHS sent him a Notice to Appear (NTA) that omitted the date and time for the removal hearing. Four days later, the Immigration Court mailed Guadalupe a Notice of Hearing that contained the date and time. Guadalupe, with counsel, attended the hearing. The IJ denied Guadalupe relief from removal. The BIA affirmed. Guadalupe failed to depart.In 2018, the Supreme Court decided, in "Pereira," that where an NTA does not contain the date or time for the hearing, the noncitizen continues to accrue time toward the 10 years of continuous residence required to apply for cancellation of removal. Guadalupe moved to reopen his case, arguing that he had accrued the 10 years of continuous residency required to apply for cancellation of removal. The BIA denied the motion, reasoning that the Notice of Hearing cured the defective NTA. The Third Circuit vacated the removal order, holding that Pereira abrogated its precedent. DHS may no longer rely on a Notice of Hearing to cure a defective NTA. View "Guadalupe v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Diaz was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute drugs. His five co-defendants pled guilty. Albert-Heise, assigned to represent Diaz, accepted a new position. Dissatisfied with his newly-appointed attorney, O’Brien, Diaz requested new counsel, stating that O’Brien pressured him to plead guilty, did not accept Diaz’s advice on pretrial motions, and failed to share discovery. The district court then appointed Kalinowski. Diaz subsequently complained about Kalinowski’s failure to communicate with him. Kalinowski never complied with a court order to respond to Diaz. Diaz again requested new counsel. The court did not inquire further or schedule any hearing and granted a continuance without commenting on Diaz’s request for new counsel. Diaz and Kalinowski appeared together for a pretrial conference; neither raised any issue related to the representation. Twice more, Diaz wrote to the court complaining of Kalinowski. The case proceeded to trial with Kalinowski representing Diaz.The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction, despite expressing concern that the district court “may not have been as attentive to Diaz’s complaints regarding his counsel as it should have been,” and that certain testimony by a government witness violated Rule 701 (lay opinion testimony). The improper testimony did not prejudice Diaz so as to affect his substantial rights. The court did not clearly err when it attributed more than 20 grams of heroin to Diaz at sentencing. View "United States v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Customs and Border Protection K-9 Officer Lopez was working at the airport in St. Thomas and took his certified canine, Bo, into a cargo plane to inspect incoming mail. Bo alerted to a package, indicating the presence of drugs. The package purportedly had been sent by Price, whose address was in South Carolina, and had been mailed to Meade in St. Thomas. Kouns removed it from the plane, opened the box and brought out a piece of clothing that smelled strongly of marijuana, although no drugs were found. When Kouns returned the item to the box, a magazine and round of ammunition fell to the floor. The officers discovered the unassembled parts of a gun. Days later, a postal inspector contacted Customs regarding another package, bearing the same names and addresses. Lopez and Kouns responded. Because of the addresses and the package's weight, Kouns suspected it might contain another gun. An x-ray revealed items an apparent gun and ammunition. Kouns opened the package and discovered a gun and ammunition. Homeland Security arranged a controlled delivery of the packages. Authorities apprehended Baxter as the sender of the packages; he was charged with two counts of illegal transport of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(5). The District Court of the Virgin Islands granted his motion to suppress. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that Customs permissibly conducted the searches pursuant to the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Baxter" on Justia Law

Walgreen sells Remicade, a drug used to treat autoimmune diseases that is marketed and manufactured by Janssen. Walgreen procures Remicade from the Wholesaler, which acquires Remicade pursuant to a Distribution Agreement with JOM, a Janssen affiliate. Only Wholesaler and JOM are identified as parties to the Distribution Agreement. New Jersey law governs the Distribution Agreement, which contains an Anti-Assignment Provision, stating that “neither party may assign, directly or indirectly, this agreement or any of its rights or obligations under this agreement … without the prior written consent of the other party.” In 2018, Wholesaler assigned to Walgreen “all of its rights, title and interest in and to” its claims against Janssen “under the antitrust laws of the United States or of any State arising out of or relating to [Wholesaler]’s purchase of Remicade[.]” Walgreen filed suit against Janssen, asserting various federal antitrust claims relating to Remicade, citing exclusive contracts and anticompetitive bundling agreements with health insurers that suppressed generic competition to Remicade, which allowed Janssen to sell Remicade at supra-competitive prices. If the Anti-Assignment Provision prevented the assignment, then, under Supreme Court precedent, Walgreen, an “indirect” Remicade purchaser, would lack antitrust standing to assert claims against Janssen. The district court granted Janssen summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed. The antitrust claims are a product of federal statute and thus are extrinsic to, and not rights “under,” a commercial agreement. View "Walgreen Co. v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law