Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

News broke in 2012 that Google’s Doubleclick.net cookies were bypassing Safari and Internet Explorer privacy settings and tracking internet-user information. Google settled FTC and state attorneys general lawsuits, agreeing to cease the practice and to pay $39.5 million in fines, without admitting wrongdoing. Plaintiffs' claims were consolidated into a putative class action, alleging violations of federal privacy and fraud statutes, California unfair competition and privacy statutes, the California constitution’s right to privacy, and California’s privacy tort law. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all but the California constitutional and tort claims. The parties agreed to a settlement. The district court approved certification of an FRCP 23(b)(2) class and the settlement under FRCP 23(e). Under the settlement a cy pres award would be paid to organizations the defendant approved, primarily data privacy organizations that agree to use the funds to research and promote browser privacy. It also included class counsel’s fees and costs, and incentive awards for named class representatives. One objector argued that the cy pres money belongs to the class as compensation and challenged the choice of cy pres recipients because of their pre-existing relationships with Google and class counsel. The Third Circuit vacated, stating that the “cursory certification and fairness analysis were insufficient for us to review its order certifying the class and approving the settlement. The settlement agreement’s broad release of claims for money damages and its designation of cy pres recipients are particularly concerning.” View "In Re: Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation" on Justia Law

Bergamatto began working as a longshoreman in 2000 and stopped working in 2010. In 2013, he applied for retirement benefits under his pension plan, which is covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001. The 2010 plan said that “[t]he provisions … in effect during the Participant’s last year of credited service shall be applied to determine the Participant’s right to benefits and the amount thereof.” The 2010 plan originally precluded longshoremen hired between October 1996 and September 2004 from accruing benefits for work performed before October 2004. A 2013 amendment to the 2010 plan provided that, “[e]ffective October 1, 2012, Participants hired on or after October 1, 1996 shall receive pension benefit accruals for years of credited service earned from 1996 through 2004[.]” A 2015 plan eliminated the language preventing employees hired between October 1996 and September 2004 from accruing benefits for work prior to October 2004. Bergamatto’s application for pension benefits was approved based on only the years of credited service starting in October 2004 on the basis that the 2010 plan required that benefit determinations be made based on the plan provisions in force during the participant’s last year of credited service. The fund’s Board of Trustees agreed. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding the Board of Trustees’ interpretation of the 2015 and 2010 plans “reasonably consistent” with the plans’ unambiguous language. View "Bergamatto v. Board of Trustees of NYSA-ILA Pension Fund" on Justia Law

In 2003, Cordaro and his co-defendant were elected as two of three Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania county commissioners. About 30 percent of Ackers’ business was municipal engineering, mostly for Lackawanna County. McLaine, Acker’s principal, expressed concerns to Cordaro's friend, Hughes. Hughes arranged a meeting, telling McLaine to bring a list of Acker's existing work for the county. McLaine’s list included the Lackawanna Watershed 2000 Program, a multi-year project based on a $30 million congressional grant; work on the Main Street and Gilmartin Street Bridges; work for several municipal authorities; and surveying, paving, and mapping. Cordaro stated, “I think I can let you keep that, . . . if we’re having fundraisers you’re going to have to participate and support us.” McLaine agreed. After becoming aware that Acker might lose two large contracts, McLaine called Hughes, who called Cordaro. Hughes asked, “how much money ... to give for the work.” Cordaro said, “maybe $15,000.” Hughes told McLaine that if he gave him $10,000 a month for Cordaro, Hughes could guarantee that Acker would keep its contracts and that he would lose his work if he did not pay. Payments began. In 2011, Cordaro was convicted of bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B); Hobbs Act extortion, section 1951(a); and racketeering, sections 1962(c) and (d). The court instructed the jury that those crimes required an “official act.” In 2016, the Supreme Court (McDonnell) clarified what constitutes an “official act.” The Third Circuit affirmed the rejection of Cordaro’s habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2241) because Cordaro cannot show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror properly charged under McDonnell would have convicted him. View "Cordaro v. United States" on Justia Law

The parties dispute the validity of a copyright in a full-body banana costume. The Third Circuit applied the Supreme Court's decision in Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017), and held that the banana costume's combination of colors, lines, shape, and length (i.e., its artistic features) are both separable and capable of independent existence, and thus are copyrightable. The court held that the merger doctrine did not apply in this case, because copyrighting Rasta's banana costume would not effectively monopolize the underlying idea because there are many other ways to make a costume resemble a banana. Furthermore, the scenes a faire doctrine was inapplicable. Therefore, the district court did not err when it held that Rasta was reasonably likely to prove ownership of a valid copyright. View "Silvertop Associates Inc. v. Kangaroo Manufacturing Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal involved one type of partial withdraw under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA): "bargaining out," which occurs when an employer permanently ceases to have an obligation to contribute under one or more but fewer than all collective bargaining agreements under which the employer has been obligated to contribute but continues to perform work of the type for which contributions were previously required.The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held that, under 29 U.S.C. 1385(b)(2)(A)(i), "work . . . of the type for which contributions were previously required" does not include work of the type for which contributions are still required. In this case, because CEC continues to contribute to its pension plan for engineering work at its remaining three casinos, it was not liable under section 1385(b)(2)(A)(i). View "Caesars Entertainment Corp. v. International Union of Operating Engineers Local 68 Pension Fund" on Justia Law

The law is well established that a defendant cannot relitigate the denial of a motion to suppress evidence after he enters a valid, unconditional guilty plea. The Third Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. The court held that defendant could not challenge on appeal the denial of his motion to suppress because his Fourth Amendment claims are irrelevant to his judgment of conviction, which was entered following a valid and unconditional guilty plea. View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law

Petitioners, undocumented aliens from Guatemala, have lived and worked in New York since 2008. They were traveling in a van with eight other men when Pennsylvania State Trooper Macke stopped the van for speeding. Petitioners were asleep in the back of the van. Macke approached the driver, who did not have his license with him. The van’s owner, in the front passenger seat, gave Macke his license and registration. Petitioners allege that instead of returning to his vehicle, Macke opened the side door and said to the passengers, ‘let me see your immigration papers, work permit, visa, passport and ID.’” Petitioners did not have any such documents. The government claims the Petitioners admitted that they were citizens of another country. Macke issued the driver's citations at 8:57 a.m.and ordered them to a nearby rest stop, where Macke positioned his car so that Petitioners’ van could not move. They claim that he interrogated them about their immigration status until ICE agents arrived at approximately 9:30 a.m. The government claimed that all freely stated that they had illegally entered the U.S. In removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), Petitioners moved to suppress evidence of their alienage obtained as a result of the stop, arguing that it had been discovered through a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. They claimed that Macke stopped them because of their Hispanic appearance. The BIA rejected the argument. The Third Circuit remanded, concluding that Petitioners alleged a potentially egregious Fourth Amendment violation that warrants an evidentiary hearing. View "Yoc-Us v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The ALJ who ruled on Hess’s application for social security disability benefits concluded that Hess had “moderate difficulties” in “concentration, persistence or pace,” but offered a detailed explanation for why she believed those difficulties were not serious and why Hess was capable of performing simple tasks. She found that Hess was “limited to jobs requiring understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and making only simple work-related decisions[.]” In a series of hypothetical questions meant to include Hess’s limitations, she asked a vocational expert whether there were jobs in the national economy available to someone with those limitations. The expert said there were. The ALJ decided that Hess was not disabled and rejected his claim. The district court determined that the ALJ had erred because, in her hypothetical questions to the vocational expert, she failed to include or account for her finding that Hess had “moderate” difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace.” The Third Circuit reversed, refusing to elevate “form over substance.” An ALJ’s statement of a limitation confining a person to “simple tasks” is permissible after a finding of “moderate” difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace,” if the ALJ offers a “valid explanation” for it. The explanation given by the ALJ was “valid.” View "Hess v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Crystallex, a Canadian gold mining company, invested hundreds of millions of dollars to develop gold deposits in Venezuela, which then expropriated those deposits and transferred them to its state-owned oil company, PDVSA. To seek redress, Crystallex invoked a bilateral investment treaty between Canada and Venezuela to file for arbitration before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. The arbitration occurred in Washington, D.C., and the panel awarded Crystallex $1.2 billion, plus interest. The district court confirmed that award and issued a $1.4 billion federal judgment. Unable to identify Venezuelan-held commercial assets in the U.S. that it could lawfully seize, Crystallex sought to attach PDVSA’s shares in PDVH, its wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary. PDVH is the holding company for CITGO, a Delaware Corporation. The attachment suit is governed by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602–1611. Under federal common law, a judgment creditor of a foreign sovereign may look to the sovereign’s instrumentality for satisfaction when it is “so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created.” The district court concluded and the Third Circuit affirmed that Venezuela’s control over PDVSA was sufficient to allow Crystallex to attach PDVSA’s shares of PDVH. The court rejected jurisdictional and equitable objections and a claim that PDVSA’s “tangential role” in the dispute precludes execution. View "Crystallex International Corp v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the U.S. without permission in 2002. He was charged as removable in 2013 and sought cancellation of removal. Petitioner admitted to paying $8,000 to an individual to help his brother and daughters unlawfully enter the U.S. in 2015 and 2016, after he was served with a notice to appear. The IJ determined Petitioner had engaged in alien smuggling, was not a person of good moral character, 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(3), 1182(a)(6)(E), and was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA rejected Petitioner's argument that events occurring after the service of a notice to appear could not be used to evaluate his good moral character under the stop-time rule, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1). Aliens who are ordered removed may apply for cancellation of removal if they have maintained a continuous physical presence in the U.S. for at least 10 years and have been a person of good moral character for such period. Under the “stop-time rule,” the physical presence period ends when DHS serves the notice to appear so that aliens cannot continue to accrue physical presence time during the pendency of lengthy removal proceedings. The Third Circuit denied his petition for review. The stop-time rule does not truncate the good moral character window. The relevant time period for evaluating an alien’s good moral character is the 10-year period before the final administrative decision on an alien’s application for cancellation of removal. View "Mejia-Castanon v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law