Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Pennsylvania Attorney General (OAG) charged Walker with forgery and computer crimes. The prosecutor and the lead investigator requested that Penn State produce Walker’s emails from her employee account. At Penn’s request, they obtained a subpoena. The subpoena was missing information regarding the date, time or place where the testimony or evidence would be produced, or which party was requesting the evidence. The subpoena was incomplete and unenforceable. The prosecutor offered the subpoena to Penn’s Assistant General Counsel, who instructed an employee to assist. After the OAG obtained Walker’s emails, the pending criminal charges were dismissed with prejudice. Walker filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, citing qualified immunity because Walker did not have a clearly established right to privacy in her work emails. A Third Circuit panel affirmed, reasoning that Penn produced the emails voluntarily, rather than under coercion resulting from the invalid subpoena and was acting within its legal authority and through counsel.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Walker's amended complaint, alleging violations of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701 (SCA). The SCA is inapplicable because Penn does not provide electronic communication services to the public. Penn acted within its rights as Walker’s employer in voluntarily disclosing her work emails. Penn’s search of its server to produce Walker’s emails is not prohibited by the SCA, regardless of whether its counsel was induced by deceit or knowingly cooperative. It is the law of the case that Penn consented to disclose Walker’s emails. View "Walker v. Coffey" on Justia Law

Doreen Proctor reported drug activity in her neighborhood and cooperated with law enforcement. She was murdered. Tyler was acquitted of her murder in state court. A federal grand jury thereafter charged Tyler with witness tampering by murder, 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(1)(C) and witness tampering by intimidation, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(3). Because legal errors resulted in overturned verdicts, Tyler was tried and found guilty three times. The district court set aside the third guilty verdict, concluding that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Tyler had the intent to murder or intimidate Proctor to prevent her from communicating with a qualifying officer.The Third Circuit reversed and directed the district court to reinstate the guilty verdict. The district court erred in ruling that the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision, Fowler v. United States, applies only to situations where a defendant does not know the identity of a specific law enforcement officer to whom the witness would have communicated. There was sufficient evidence upon which a rational juror could conclude that Tyler acted with intent to prevent Proctor from communicating with law enforcement, and there was a “reasonable likelihood” that she would have communicated with a qualifying law enforcement officer had she not been murdered. View "United States v. Tyler" on Justia Law

During the 2016 presidential campaign, C.M., not yet 12 years old, publicly endorsed Donald Trump and released videos seen by thousands. A video in which C.M. called Hillary Clinton “deplorable” attracted more than 325,000 views on Facebook alone. C.M. stated: The people I talk about in these posts really have it coming. In 2018, Newsweek published an article, “Trump’s Mini-Mes,” that featured a photo of C.M. holding up a Trump campaign sign; it referred to Trump supporters recruiting children as spokespeople and to children “being weaponized” to defend “raw racism and sexual abuse.”The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of C.M.'s false light and defamation suit. The article contained derogatory opinions based only on disclosed facts, which are not enough to show defamation or false light. Every contested statement is an opinion, label, or speculation based on disclosed facts and alleges no specific wrongdoing; derogatory characterizations without more are not defamatory. C.M. is a limited-purpose public figure. He voluntarily injected himself into the political controversies and enjoys significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication than his peers. C.M. did not plead facts showing actual malice, which the First Amendment requires of those who step into the political spotlight. View "McCafferty v. Newsweek Media Group Ltd" on Justia Law

In 1992 Ricketts pled guilty to embezzlement and transporting a minor in interstate commerce with the intent to engage in sexual activity. The government maintained that Ricketts was a citizen of Jamaica. Ricketts argued that he was a U.S. citizen. The IJ rejected that claim; the BIA dismissed his appeal. While his petition for review was pending, Ricketts was removed to Jamaica. His petition and motion were “procedurally terminated without judicial action” in 2000. Ricketts persuaded the Jamaican Constabulary Force to investigate his citizenship; they agreed with him and he was returned to the U.S. in 2003. In 2005, while Ricketts was in state custody for a criminal theft conviction, DHS reinstated his order of removal. Based on the Jamaican report stating that he is an American citizen, he moved to reopen his removal proceedings. The BIA dismissed his motions, citing the post-departure bar.The Eastern District of New York rejected Ricketts's claim that he was born in Brooklyn in 1964 as Paul Miles and changed his name for religious reasons. He had submitted various official records, including a birth certificate, with Miles's name crossed out and “Junior Mohammed Ricketts” written above it. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Third Circuit then rejected his petition for review from the BIA dismissal. Ricketts’s citizenship claim is the only basis on which he says he is entitled to relief from the order of removal and he cannot now rely on that claim. View "Ricketts v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

Folk was convicted of distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, two counts of using a firearm to further a drug trafficking offense, and of felon in possession of a firearm. The PSR deemed Folk a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 because he had prior felony convictions for “crimes of violence” and recommended enhancing Folk’s Guidelines range from 384-465 months to between 420 months and life imprisonment. The district court discussed Folk’s previous convictions: two robberies in 2001, simple assault in 2003, and terroristic threats in 2003, and adopted the PSR’s recommended range but sentenced Folk to 264 months’ imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed; Folk did not challenge his sentence or his career-offender designation.A subsequent 28 U.S.C 2255 motion argued that Folk's career-offender designation was invalid because the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” decision rendered section 4B1.2(a) void. The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. A challenge to an incorrect career-offender designation under the Guidelines is not an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure and is not cognizable under section 2255. An incorrect designation that results in a sentence within the statutory maximum is not a fundamental defect inherently resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. The court denied Folk’s motion to expand the certificate of appealability because he does not satisfy the standard for a second 2255 motion. View "United States v. Folk" on Justia Law

While running for office in Hoboken, New Jersey, Raia directed campaign volunteers to bribe voters with $50 payments to vote for him by absentee ballot and support a measure he favored. Convicted of conspiring to use the mails to promote unlawful activity, Raia was sentenced to three months imprisonment. With the government’s appeal of the sentence pending, Raia reported to the federal correctional institute. Shortly thereafter, he asked the Bureau of Prisons to move for compassionate release on his behalf. Before BOP responded, and before 30 days passed, Raia filed his own motion for compassionate release given the COVID-19 pandemic. Raia claimed he faces heightened risks because he is 68-years old and suffers from Parkinson’s Disease, diabetes, and heart issues.The district court denied the motion, concluding that the pending appeal divested it of jurisdiction. Raia then asked the Third Circuit to decide his compassionate-release motion or to return jurisdiction to the district court by dismissing the government’s appeal. The Third Circuit rejected the motion. The First Step Act empowers criminal defendants to request compassionate release for “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” 18 U.S.C 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), but those defendants must first ask the BOP to do so on their behalf, give BOP 30 days to respond, and exhaust available administrative appeals before submitting their motion to “the [sentencing] court.” View "United States v. Raia" on Justia Law

Sumaila was born in Accra, Ghana. At age 26, when his sexual orientation became known, Sumaila was attacked by his father and his neighbors. He went into hiding and eventually entered the United States without authorization. Sumaila sought asylum and withholding of removal and protection from removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) because he fears being persecuted or tortured on account of his sexual orientation if returned to Ghana. Ghana criminalizes same-sex relationships and has no track record of combatting widespread anti-gay violence, harassment, and discrimination. While finding Sumaila credible, the Immigration Judge ordered his removal. The BIA affirmed.The Third Circuit vacated the denial of relief. Sumaila has demonstrated that he was targeted on account of his membership in a statutorily protected group; the attack and death threats Sumaila suffered were serious enough to rise to the level of persecution. He is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of a “well-founded fear of future persecution.” Sumaila also demonstrated that his experience was not a random or isolated act of private violence, but part of a pattern or practice of persecution against the LGBTI community in Ghana more generally. View "Sumaila v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

At Savage’s sentencing hearing for his 2005 drug, money laundering, and witness tampering convictions, the judge stated that the $5,000 fine was “due immediately.” The judge “recommended” participation in the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, under which the Bureau periodically takes money from an inmate’s prison trust account and forwards it to the court. Savage was subsequently charged with directing several killings from the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center. He was transferred to a Colorado federal super-maximum-security prison, where he is not permitted to work and earn money. Savage moved to modify the payment schedule under 18 U.S.C. 3572(d)(3), which provides that a court can modify a judgment that “permits payments in installments.”The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The sentencing court never permitted payment in installments but required immediate payment. Section 3572(d)(3) does not apply where the fine is due immediately. While the court “recommended” that Savage “participate in” the Program, nothing in section 3572(d) precludes the Bureau from setting a payment schedule to satisfy a fine that was due immediately. The court’s recommendation did not transform his fine payable immediately into one subject to installments. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Savage may object to the Bureau’s collection mechanism and seek an alternate payment schedule by filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241. View "United States v. Savage" on Justia Law

Riccio fell behind on payments to M-Shell. Sentry Credit bought the debt and sought to collect it, sending Riccio a letter containing a notification that described how to contact Sentry by phone, mail, or email. Riccio sued, alleging the letter violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(3) by providing a debtor with multiple options for contacting Sentry rather than explicitly requiring any dispute be in writing. Sentry agreed that it had to require Riccio to dispute the debt in writing but viewed its letter as complying with that requirement. The district court granted Sentry judgment on the pleadings. The Third Circuit affirmed, overruling its own precedent. Debt collection notices sent under section 1692g need not require that disputes be expressed in writing. Sentry’s notice perfectly tracked sect 1692g’s text. View "Riccio v. Sentry Credit Inc" on Justia Law

Dr. Martinez, who worked for PHI, met with Cephalon representatives to discuss Cephalon drugs. Cephalon representatives asked Martinez if they could follow up with him and “send [him] things,” after which faxes were sometimes then sent. Martinez never told Cephalon or its representatives to stop sending faxes. One 2009 fax, addressed to Martinez, was an invitation to a dinner meeting program on a drug called AMRIX®; another was an invitation to a promotional product lunch on FENTORA®. Both are drugs that Martinez had discussed with Cephalon representatives previously. Neither fax included opt-out language. PHI provided its fax number to Cephalon via business cards. PHI filed a putative class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, seeking actual monetary losses or statutory damages, because Cephalon sent unsolicited faxes that failed to contain opt-out notices. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Cephalon. The faxes were solicited and the Act does not require solicited faxes to contain opt-out notices. The voluntary provision of a fax number constitutes express consent, invitation, and permission. View "Physicians Healthsource Inc v. Cephalon Inc" on Justia Law