Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rejecting a challenge to Pennsylvania’s ballot laws under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the district court concluded that enforcing the signature requirement, in combination with the Governor’s Orders issued to address the COVID-19 pandemic, imposed only a moderate burden. The court found that the plaintiffs had sufficient time and means to meet the signature requirements under Pennsylvania law, which were reduced by more than 90% in a 2018 suit and that the August 3 deadline for collecting signatures did not constitute a “severe burden” requiring strict scrutiny.The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly applied the Supreme Court’s balancing test and the law survives intermediate scrutiny because it serves the Commonwealth’s legitimate and sufficiently important interests in “avoiding ballot clustering, ensuring viable candidates, and the orderly and efficient administration of elections.” View "Libertarian Party of Pennsylvania v. Governor of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The New Jersey Business Employment Incentive Program provides cash grants for companies willing to relocate or expand to New Jersey. A company receiving the grant must maintain a minimum number of employees and remain at the new location for a certain time period but there are no restrictions on how the company can use the grant, which is calculated as a percentage of state income taxes withheld from the wages of the company’s employees at the new location. In 2011, Garban’s offices in the World Trade Center were destroyed, and First Brokers’ nearby offices were rendered uninhabitable. Both companies, subsidiaries of BrokerTec, entered into agreements for 10-year Incentive Program grants. From about 2004-2013, the state paid BrokerTec about $170 million, which was used to purchase stock to expand into other trading markets.In 2010-2013, the companies' consolidated tax returns excluded $56 million in grant payments as non-taxable, non-shareholder contributions to capital under 26 U.S.C. 118. The IRS issued a deficiency notice. The Tax Court held that the grants were capital contributions. The Third Circuit reversed. Because the state did not restrict how BrokerTec could use the cash and because the grants were calculated based on the amount of income tax revenue that the new jobs would generate—the grants were taxable income, not contributions to capital. View "Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Brokertec Holdings Inc" on Justia Law

Reckitt developed Suboxone tablets, a prescription drug used to treat opioid addiction. Toward the end of its seven-year period of exclusivity in which other manufacturers could not introduce generic versions, Reckitt developed an under-the-tongue film version of Suboxone, which would enjoy its own exclusivity period. Generic versions of Suboxone tablets would not be rated as equivalent to the name-brand Suboxone film, so state substitution laws would not require pharmacists to substitute generic Suboxone tablets if a patient were prescribed Suboxone film.Purchasers filed suit, alleging that Reckitt’s transition to Suboxone film was coupled with efforts to eliminate the demand for Suboxone tablets and to coerce prescribers to prefer film in order to maintain monopoly power, in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2. The Purchasers submitted an expert report indicating that, due to Reckitt’s allegedly-anticompetitive conduct, the proposed class paid more for brand Suboxone products. The district court certified a class of “[a]ll persons or entities . . . who purchased branded Suboxone tablets directly from Reckitt” during a specified period. The Third Circuit affirmed. Common evidence exists to prove the Purchasers’ antitrust theory and the resulting injury. Although allocating the damages among class members may be necessary after judgment, such individual questions do not ordinarily preclude the use of the class action device; the court correctly found that common issues predominate. View "In re: Suboxone Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Navient sells student loans to borrowers and services and collects on student loans. Its “subprime loans,” which had high variable interest rates and origination fees, benefited schools by maximizing enrollment. Student borrowers were not informed that the loans had a high likelihood of default. In 2000-2007, 68-87% of Navient’s high-risk loans defaulted. Navient allegedly steered borrowers into consecutive forbearances after they had demonstrated a long-term inability to repay their loans. Navient would sometimes place borrowers in forbearance even though they would have qualified for $0 per month payments in an Income-Driven Repayment (IDR) plan. In 2011-2015, more than 60% of Navient’s borrowers who enrolled in IDR plans failed timely to renew their enrollment, allegedly because of deficient notifications. Navient also allegedly made misrepresentations concerning releases for cosigners and misapplied payments, resulting in borrowers and cosigners being improperly charged late fees and increased interest.Pennsylvania sued Navient under the Consumer Financial Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. 5552, and the state’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. Nine months earlier, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the states of Illinois and Washington had filed similar lawsuits. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss. The federal Act permits concurrent action. The Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1001, preempts state law claims based on failures to disclose required information but does not preempt claims based on affirmative misrepresentations. View "Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp" on Justia Law

Pawlowski was convicted of federal program bribery, Travel Act bribery, attempted Hobbs Act extortion, wire and mail fraud, honest services fraud, making false statements to the FBI, and conspiracy. As the mayor of Allentown, Pennsylvania, he had steered city contracts and provided other favors in exchange for campaign contributions. In May 2020, 19 months into his 15-year sentence, Pawlowski sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1). He suffers from hypertensive heart disease, COPD, shortness of breath, sleep apnea, and has only one lung; those conditions place him at a higher risk of serious illness and death from COVID-19. As of June 19, 2020, at the Danbury, Connecticut facility where he is incarcerated, 98 inmates had tested positive for the virus, one had died and 91 had recovered; 61 staff members had tested positive. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. While Pawlowski’s conditions placed him at increased risk should he contract COVID-19, the district court reasonably concluded that the sentencing factors set out at 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) did not weigh in favor of release. The court noted the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, and afford adequate deterrence. View "United States v. Pawlowski" on Justia Law

A York, Pennsylvania officer reported a shooting and said the suspects fled in a vehicle. Other officers pursued the vehicle, which crashed. Officers pursued the driver and a passenger on foot. An officer found a spent .38 caliber shell casing inside the vehicle. Officers observed Williams and Scott running and ordered them to get on the ground. Scott complied but Williams ran and was eventually apprehended. Williams claims the officers were very rough with her and disregarded her complaints. According to three officers, Williams “was kicking, flailing around, being disorderly, and yelling.” At one point, she tripped on an unidentified officer’s foot. She was transported to City Hall where she continued to refuse to cooperate. Williams claims that an unidentified officer “approached her, twisted her arm, threw her against the wall, and threatened if she did not give him her arm, he would break it.”Williams, found not guilty of disorderly conduct, sued the city and the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the officers qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. A plaintiff alleging that one or more officers engaged in unconstitutional conduct must establish the personal involvement of each named defendant to survive summary judgment and district courts must specify those material facts that are and are not subject to genuine dispute and explain their materiality. Reviewing the actions attributable to identified officers, the court concluded that the officers did not violate clearly established law. View "Williams v. City of York" on Justia Law

Blanco, a citizen of Honduras, is a member of Honduras’s Liberty and Refoundation anti-corruption political party that opposes the current Honduran president. After participating in six political marches, he was abducted by the Honduran police and beaten, on and off, for 12 hours. He was released but received death threats over the next several months until he fled to the U.S. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial of all relief.The Third Circuit vacated. The BIA misapplied precedent by requiring Blanco to show severe physical harm in order to establish past persecution; by requiring the death threats to be imminent; and by considering the beating and death threats separately. On remand, the BIA must consider the other elements of asylum eligibility: whether the persecution was on account of a statutorily protected ground and whether it was committed by the government or forces the government was unable or unwilling to control. As for the CAT claim, before requiring corroborating evidence, an IJ must identify the facts for which ‘it is reasonable to expect corroboration, ask whether the applicant has corroborated them, and if not, consider whether the applicant has adequately explained his failure to do so. View "Blanco v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, husband and wife, are citizens of El Salvador. They entered the U.S. without inspection or admission in 1997 and again in 1998. Following a series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001, the plaintiffs applied for and received Temporary Protected Status (TPS), 8 U.S.C. 1254a. Over the next several years, the Attorney General periodically extended TPS eligibility for El Salvadoran nationals, which enabled the plaintiffs to remain in the U.S. In 2014, they applied to become lawful permanent residents under section 1255. USCIS denied their applications, explaining that the husband was “statutorily ineligible” for adjustment of status because he had not been admitted into the U.S. The wife’s application depended on the success of his application.The district court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment, holding a grant of TPS met section 1255(a)’s requirement that an alien must be “inspected and admitted or paroled” to be eligible for adjustment of status. The Third Circuit reversed. Congress did not intend a grant of TPS to serve as an admission for those who entered the United States illegally. View "Sanchez v. Secretary United States Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

In 1998, Pennsylvania and 45 other states entered into a settlement agreement with certain cigarette manufacturers, who agreed to disburse funding to the states to cover tobacco-related healthcare costs. Pennsylvania’s 2001 Tobacco Settlement Act established the "EE Program" to reimburse participating hospitals for “extraordinary expenses” incurred for treating uninsured patients according to a formula. The Department of Human Services (DHS) determines the eligibility of each hospital for EE Program payments. The Pennsylvania Auditor General reported that for Fiscal Years 2008-2012, some participating hospitals received disbursements for unqualified claims, and recommended that DHS claw back funds from overpaid hospitals and redistribute the money to hospitals that had been underpaid. DHS followed that recommendation for fiscal years prior to 2010 but discovered methodological discrepancies and discontinued the process for Fiscal Years 2010-2012.Plaintiffs, on behalf of all “underpaid” hospitals, sued an allegedly overpaid hospital, alleging conspiracy to defraud the EE Program in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1961–1964. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants submitted fraudulent claims for reimbursement, in violation of the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1343 (a RICO predicate offense). The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claims, finding that the theory of liability adequately alleges proximate causation. No independent factors that accounted for the plaintiffs’ injury and no more immediate victim was better situated to sue. View "St. Lukes Health Network, Inc. v. Lancaster General Hospital" on Justia Law

Seighman pleaded guilty to a counterfeiting conspiracy, a Class D felony carrying a maximum prison term of 60 months. He was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment followed by 36 months of supervised release. After his release, Seighman bought heroin, tested positive for opiates, and failed to comply with drug treatment. The court revoked Seighman’s supervision and sentenced him to another 24 months’ imprisonment plus 12 months of supervised release. After his second release from prison, Seighman transitioned to Renewal, a residential reentry center. The Probation Office petitioned the court to issue a warrant for Seighman because he brought heroin into Renewal. The Probation Office calculated Seighman’s revocation sentencing range as 21–27 months. Seighman objected, arguing that because his counterfeiting conviction permitted a maximum of 60 months' imprisonment, he could be sentenced to no more than six months (having served 54 months). The Third Circuit affirmed his 24-month sentence. In its 2019 decision, “Haymond,” the Supreme Court found subsection (k) of the supervised release statute (18 U.S.C. 3583) unconstitutional in requiring a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of ‘‘not less than 5 years’’ upon a judge’s finding that a defendant ‘‘commit[ted] any’’ listed ‘‘criminal offense,’’ without granting a defendant the rights that accompany a new criminal prosecution. Subsection (g), which Seighman challenged, applies to other offenses and does not limit the judge’s discretion in the same “manner” as subsection (k). View "United States v. Seighman" on Justia Law