Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In April 2020, a Pennsylvania district court ordered the release of 22 immigration detainees because of the COVID-192 pandemic, by granting a temporary restraining order without affording the government an opportunity to be heard. The Petitioners had filed a joint petition, alleging they were at risk of serious harm from COVID-19, although they vary in age from 28-69, have divergent health conditions, have unique criminal histories, and have diverse home and family situations.The Third Circuit vacated those orders, stating that exigent circumstances do not empower a court to jettison fundamental principles of due process or the rules of procedure. Considering all the responsive measures implemented to detect and to prevent the spread of the virus, the challenges of facility administration during an unprecedented situation, and the purposes served by detention, the petitioners did not show a substantial likelihood of success on their claim that the conditions of their confinement constitute unconstitutional punishment and did not establish that the government was deliberately indifferent toward their medical needs. The court too readily accepted the all-or-nothing request for immediate release and erred in not considering as part of the balancing of harm practical difficulties involved in locating and re-detaining the petitioners should the government ultimately prevail or should a petitioner abscond, commit a crime, or violate another term of release. View "Hope v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

In 2004, Starnes, an Allegheny County Probation Officer, met Doerr, the President Judge of the Butler County Court. Doerr repeatedly called Starnes to ask her to meet him at his chambers. Starnes eventually visited his chambers after hours. Doerr insisted on having sex, telling Starnes that it would be a ‘business relationship.’” Doerr exercised authority over hiring probation officers. Starnes wished to return to Butler, her hometown; Doerr made sure she was hired. After Starnes started working in Butler County, Doerr began summoning her to his chambers for sexual relations. After their sexual relationship ended in 2009, Doerr continued asking her to film herself performing sexual acts, flirting with her from the bench, and threatening to "help her return to her previous job.” In 2010, Starnes began dating the man she later married, another Probation Officer. He was harassed and pushed into retirement. Starnes was denied her own office, overtime, training, and other opportunities she alleges her male counterparts had. Within days of telling her supervisors of her intention to file EEOC charges, Starnes was placed on a “performance improvement plan.” Weeks earlier, Starnes had received a positive evaluation with no noted performance issues.The Third Circuit held that accepting her allegations as true, Starnes stated plausible claims for sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and that Doerr violated her First Amendment freedom of expression and right to petition the government. Because the law is clearly established that this conduct is actionable discrimination, the district court did not err in denying Doerr qualified immunity. The court reversed the denial of qualified immunity on Starnes’s intimate association claim. View "Starnes v. Butler County Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

Abdulla was born in Yemen in 1976. His father became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Abdulla’s parents divorced. Abdulla and his brother, Fawaz, joined their father in the U.S. Abdulla became a lawful permanent resident in 1990. Fawaz received proof of citizenship in 1995, Abdulla claims that his application was never processed. In 2014, Abdulla was convicted of food stamp and wire fraud. DHS served a notice to appear (NTA) in removal proceeding on Abdulla, providing that the hearing date and time remained to be set. Abdulla’s counsel argued that Abdulla had acquired derivative citizenship and that DHS had failed to establish that Abdulla’s convictions were aggravated felonies. He did not argue that the NTA was improper for failure to provide the date and time or that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction, given Abdulla’s derivative citizenship.An IJ denied Abdulla’s motion to terminate. Abdulla’s counsel petitioned for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, citing Yemen's civil war. On October 4, 2018, the IJ denied Abdulla’s petition and ordered removal. Abdulla’s BIA appeal was due on November 5, 2018, but was filed on December 21, 2018, by new counsel. Abdulla contended that his failure to timely file occurred for reasons that were beyond his control and exceptional because he reasonably expected his prior counsel to preserve his appeal rights and that upon learning that counsel had failed to do so, he acted with “speed, diligence, and zeal.” The BIA dismissed his appeal. The Third Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to self-certify the late-filed appeal or Abdulla’s unexhausted merits claim and non-colorable due process claim. View "Abdulla v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

In 2004, Abreu was convicted in Pennsylvania of 22 drug-related counts and was sentenced to 27-54 years’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to a federal sentence Abreu was already serving. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. Abreu later unsuccessfully sought relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). In 2015, Abreu filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that his PCRA counsel’s assistance was ineffective in failing to assert that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The district court rejected his claims.The Third Circuit granted a certificate of appealability as to claims that trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to challenge the admission of grand jury testimony and by failing to seek to strike a police officer’s testimony recounting statements made by others. While Abreu’s appeal was pending, he was released on early parole, subject to a federal removal order, and then removed to the Dominican Republic. His federal conviction (not at issue) permanently bars his reentry. The Third Circuit directed the district court to dismiss Abreu’s petition as moot. Without a collateral consequence of Abreu’s state conviction that can be redressed by a favorable decision on his petition, there is no case or controversy under Article III. View "Abreu v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI" on Justia Law

Six Delaware statutory Trusts acquired student loans, issued notes for the acquisitions, and pledged the student loans as collateral for the notes. This “securitization” works well when the students do not default. The Trusts initially did not provide for servicing delinquent loans; under a subsequent “Special Servicing Agreement,” U.S. Bank became the Indenture Trustee and the “Special Servicer” but allegedly failed to collect hundreds of millions of dollars in delinquent loans. The holders of the Trusts’ equity ownership interests hired an additional loan servicer, Odyssey, and submitted invoices from Odyssey for payment from the trust estate.The district court held that the Trust documents were not violated by hiring Odyssey and Odyssey’s invoices were payable. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Several provisions of the Odyssey Agreement violate the Trust documents by impermissibly transferring to the Owners of the Trusts rights reserved for the Indenture Trustee. The Odyssey Agreement supplements and modifies several provisions of the Trust documents, requiring consent not obtained from the Indenture Trustee. The court remanded for a determination of whether the Odyssey invoices are nonetheless payable, which may include reconsideration os a self-dealing issue. View "In re: National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts" on Justia Law

Seibert pleaded guilty to production and possession of child pornography following a raid in which agents recovered approximately 1,500 images. The Probation Office recommended enhancements under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(5), which applies “[i]f the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor,” and 4B1.5(b)(1), which applies if “the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct,” resulting in a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. After applying the two enhancements and weighing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, the court sentenced Seibert to 360 months’ imprisonment.The Third Circuit affirmed. The Guidelines allow for the simultaneous application of both enhancements to the same conduct; there was no procedural error. The court rejected an argument that application of the section 3553(a) factors led to an unduly harsh sentence because it did not place enough weight on Seibert's personal circumstances, including the mental health, medical, and learning challenges. Seibert submitted a psychological evaluation concluding that he “has the libido of an adult but the mind of a small child and does not have the capacity to use rationality to control his impulses.” The district court acknowledged that evidence but concluded that Seibert’s “family struggles” are not “unusually severe.” View "United States v. Seibert" on Justia Law

Argentine citizen Cabeda, a lawful U.S. permanent resident, was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of having involuntary deviate sexual intercourse at age 34 with a 15-year-old boy. Immigration authorities found her removable for having committed a state-law offense qualifying as an “aggravated felony,” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), specifically the “sexual abuse of a minor.”The Third Circuit granted her petition for review. Notwithstanding her actual, admitted sexual abuse of a minor, she cannot be removed because the Pennsylvania statute under which she was convicted could conceivably be violated by conduct that falls short of satisfying all the elements of the federally defined crime of sexual abuse of a minor. The categorical approach mandates ignoring what she actually did and focusing instead on what someone else, in a hypothetical world, could have done. The court called this “a surpassingly strange result but required by controlling law.” View "Cabeda v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

A four-year-old stated that Heinrich had pulled her pants down and taken pictures. Pennsylvania state police conducted a consensual search of Heinrich’s electronic devices and found sexually explicit images of two children. Heinrich was charged with 15 counts of using or inducing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), and one count of possessing material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor, section 2252(a)(4)(B). Heinrich admitted to taking the pictures and that they depicted sexually explicit conduct but planned to defend himself against the production charges, claiming he lacked the requisite specific intent.Heinrich proffered an expert witness, a psychologist. The government moved to exclude that evidence as inadmissible because the charged offenses were general intent crimes and under Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, 702, or 704(b). After a hearing on the applicability of Rule 704(b), the judge’s law clerk conducted a telephonic status conference, stating that the court intended to grant the government’s motions based on Rules 403 and 704(b). No opinion or order was docketed. The judge did not participate in the conference, which was unrecorded and not transcribed. Heinrich entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed.The Third Circuit vacated without addressing the merits of the ruling, noting the “impossible position” of attempting “to review an adjunct-presented non-ruling that caused the Defendant to plead guilty.” District courts must articulate their Rule 403 reasoning on the record. View "United States v. Heinrich" on Justia Law

Savage's North Philadelphia regional drug trafficking operation, KSO, distributed large quantities of controlled substances and fiercely protected its network and territory, using guns and violence. Early in KSO’s operation, Savage took care of threats against KSO himself. As his power grew, his enforcers did his bidding. While detained on criminal charges, Savage continued to manage KSO’s affairs. He retaliated against those who cooperated with government agents and arranged for the murder of the prosecution’s main witness in a murder case and, in a later case, orchestrated the firebombing of the home of another cooperating witness, ensuring no one would survive. Savage was convicted of conspiracy to participate in a racketeering (RICO) enterprise, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d); 12 counts of violent crime in aid of racketeering (VICAR) murder, section 1959(a)(1); VICAR conspiracy to commit murder, section 1959(a)(5); retaliating against a witness, section 1513; and using fire to commit a felony, section 844(h)(1).The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions and the imposition of the death penalty, rejecting several challenges to the selection of the jury. If any gaps exist in the record, they do not entitle Savage to relief. Savage was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the court waited until days before voir dire began to substitute new lead counsel. The district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent. The court rejected six challenges relating to the penalty phase proceedings. View "United States v. Savage" on Justia Law

Premier sued UPMC under the federal antitrust and state unfair competition laws. Several months after the deadline the district court set in a scheduling order, Premier learned, in a deposition, about an illegal bid-rigging agreement with another party. Premier moved to amend its complaint and add a party, citing the liberal standard of Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court denied the motion, reasoning that because the deadline had passed, Rule 16(b)(4) required Premier to show good cause.The Third Circuit affirmed. Rule 16(b)(4) applies once a scheduling-order deadline has passed, and Premier did not show good cause. The district court had noted Premier failed “to even discuss due diligence, relying instead on Rule 15(a).” View "Premier Comp Solutions LLC v. UPMC" on Justia Law