Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Beginning around 1915, NPRC operated a Jersey City chemical plant, turning chromite ore into chromium chemicals for dyeing cloth and tanning leather. The process generated hazardous chemical waste that eventually seeped into the soil and groundwater. During both World Wars, the production of chromium chemicals was regulated. During World War II, the government designated chromium chemicals as “critical” war materials and implemented controls concerning labor conditions, supplies, subsidies, and pricing. In 1944, the Chemicals Bureau officially recommended that producers switch to a quicker, more wasteful process. Government orders did not direct how the ores were to be processed, how the chemicals were to be made, or how waste should be handled. PPG purchased the site in 1954 and processed chromium chemicals there until 1963, using essentially the same processes as NPRC, including stockpiling the waste outdoors. PPG has spent $367 million to remediate the site and other contaminated areas.PPG sued under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607, seeking recovery and contribution for costs associated with cleanup. After four years of discovery, the district court granted the government summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed. Governmental involvement with the plant during the wars did not make it an “operator” liable for the cleanup costs associated with the waste. Governmental actions in relation to the plant were consistent with general wartime influence over the industry and did not extend to control over pollution-related activities. View "PPG Industries Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Huber stole confidential information from his employer AFS (a manufacturer of hydraulic systems) for an AFS competitor, Livingston, and later for a company he created, INSYSMA, to compete against both AFS and Livingston. AFS eventually sued, alleging trade secret misappropriation claims under the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act. On summary judgment, the district court held as a matter of law that Huber and INSYSMA were liable under the Trade Secrets Act for misappropriating AFS’s trade secrets. Following a bench trial, the court held Livingston and two of its employees jointly and severally liable with Huber and INSYSMA for that misappropriation, and held all defendants except a Livingston employee and INSYSMA liable for breach of fiduciary duty or aiding and abetting that breach, and awarded compensatory damages, exemplary damages, and punitive damages from various defendants.The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that AFS does not “own” the purported trade secrets at issue; that the claimed trade secrets are not actually protectable under the Trade Secrets Act, that the Livingston Parties were prejudiced by their counsel’s conduct at and following the trial, and that the damages awards were unwarranted. The Act only requires that a plaintiff lawfully possess the trade secrets it wishes to vindicate. View "Advanced Fluid Systems Inc v. Huber" on Justia Law

The Coalition, an association of franchised New Jersey new car dealerships, filed suit under the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act on behalf of 16 Mazda dealer-members. Mazda had an incentive program for its franchised dealers (MBEP), which provides incentives, per-vehicle discounts or rebates on the dealers’ purchases of vehicles from Mazda, to dealers who make certain investments in their physical facilities that highlight their sale of Mazda vehicles or dedicate their dealerships exclusively to the sale of Mazda vehicles. The incentives come in different tiers, with the highest tier available to dealers who have exclusive Mazda facilities and a dedicated, exclusive Mazda general manager. Mazda dealers also earn incentives if they meet customer experience metrics. Mazda dealers who sell other brands of vehicles as well as Mazdas, do not receive incentives for brand commitment. Only three of the 16 Mazda dealers in the Coalition qualified for the highest tier; eight others qualified for some tier of incentives. The complaint alleged that the MBEP creates unfair competitive advantages for dealers who qualify for incentives under the MBEP at the expense of those dealers who do not, and even among incentivized dealers through different tiers.The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of the case, rejecting as too narrow the district court’s rationale--that the Coalition lacked standing because only five of the 16 Mazda dealers would benefit from the lawsuit, so the Coalition cannot possibly be protecting the interests of its members. View "New Jersey Coalition of Automotive Retailers, Inc. v. Mazda Motor of America Inc" on Justia Law

Sims, as a member of the “Black P-Stones,” an interstate gang that trafficked drugs and women, prostituted women online, provided them security while they worked, then collected their money and supplied the women with drugs. Sims and his fellow gang members used force and coercion to trap women in a vicious cycle of drug addiction and prostitution. Sims pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, 18 U.S.C. 1594(c). The PSR assigned Sims a base offense level of 34 for the conspiracy offense. Sims requested a base offense level of 14, which the Ninth Circuit had applied to the same crime in 2016. The district court applied a base level of 34, opining that the Ninth Circuit’s decision “defies the written words of the Guidelines. It defies logic.” The court imposed a sentence at the bottom of the resulting advisory Guidelines range of 151–188 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. When a conspiracy offense (like Sims’s conviction under section 1594(c)) is not covered by a specific Guidelines section, then Guidelines section 2X1.1 applies and requires courts to apply the base offense level for the substantive offense underlying the conspiracy. The substantive offenses underlying Sims’s conspiracy conviction were 18 U.S.C. 1591(a) and (b)(1), so Guidelines 2G1.1(a)(1) mandated a base offense level of 34. View "United States v. Sims" on Justia Law

In 2002, Dooley was tried for five counts of attempted murder, five counts of aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of a crime, and reckless endangerment. A jury found him guilty but mentally ill (GBMI). Dooley filed grievances requesting the “D Stability Code” designation, which would have entitled him to greater mental health resources. A Department of Corrections (DOC) official told Dooley that after the GBMI verdict, the judge ordered a psychiatric evaluation and the report "did not support the GBMI designation and it was deleted from the final order.” The district court dismissed Dooley’s section 1983 complaint without leave to amend and declared that the dismissal constituted a “strike” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C.1915(g).The Third Circuit vacated. On these facts, Dooley’s contention that he retained the GBMI designation, at least to some extent, is not baseless. If, as the DOC contends, a jury found Dooley GBMI and a sentencing judge concluded that Dooley was not severely mentally disabled, that would not have eliminated his GBMI status. Under current DOC policy, it would have placed him in Category II of GBMI inmates, which would have required that he be placed on the D Roster and receive regular psychiatric evaluations. Even if the sentencing judge found him not severely mentally disabled, his GBMI verdict did not disappear or lose all significance. View "Dooley v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

Calderon-Rosas, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. in 2001. He and his wife lack lawful immigration status. Their three children are U.S. citizens. Calderon-Rosas was a successful contractor for 11 years. In 2018, Calderon-Rosas was charged with DUI. Those charges were later dismissed. The government initiated removal proceedings. Calderon-Rosas hired attorney Grannan, who would soon be disbarred for “multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct in seven separate client matters” in a “troubling pattern of neglect.” Calderon-Rosas sought asylum (8 U.S.C. 1158) and cancellation of removal (section 1229b(b). Although Calderon-Rosas spent over $7000 on Grannan’s services, Grannan never visited him, never discussed his case by phone, and never explained to Calderon-Rosas the requirements for the relief he sought. Grannan failed to meaningfully pursue Calderon-Rosas’s asylum application and did not obtain adequate medical records of Calderon-Rosas’s children to support Calderon-Rosas’s cancellation of removal application.The IJ denied relief, finding the asylum application abandoned and that the children's suffering would not amount to “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to qualify Calderon-Rosas for cancellation. With new counsel before the BIA, Calderon-Rosa argued ineffective assistance and submitted new evidence, including medical records for his three children, which demonstrated multiple medical conditions. The BIA dismissed Calderon-Rosas’s appeal. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, first holding that it had jurisdiction although Calderon-Rosas, sought only discretionary relief. Calderon-Rosas plainly presented a meritorious ineffective-assistance claim. View "Calderon-Rosas v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

GSK’s patent to an anti-epilepsy drug, Lamictal, was to expire in 2009. Teva sought to market a generic version of Lamictal, lamotrigine, before GSK’s patent expired. Teva submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application. GSK sued for infringement. After Teva received a favorable ruling with respect to one claim in 2005, the parties settled. Teva would begin selling lamotrigine six months before it could have had GSK won but later than if it had succeeded in litigation. GSK promised not to launch an authorized generic (AG) version of Lamictal. Had the parties not settled and had Teva succeeded in litigation, it would have been entitled to a 180-day exclusivity period as the generic first filer but GSK could have launched an AG.Companies that directly purchased Lamictal or lamotrigine (Direct Purchasers) sued, claiming the settlement violated the antitrust laws because GSK “paid” Teva to stay out of the market by promising not to launch an AG, resulting in Direct Purchasers paying more than they would have otherwise.The district court certified a class of all companies that purchased Lamictal from GSK or lamotrigine from Teva. The Third Circuit vacated. The district court certified the class without undertaking the required “rigorous” analysis, failing to resolve key factual disputes, assess competing evidence, and weigh conflicting expert testimony, all of which bear heavily on the predominance requirement, and confused injury with damages. View "In re: Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Ali, a non-practicing Muslim of Egyptian descent, was a non-tenured high school teacher. His supervisor received complaints about Ali’s instruction on the Holocaust. One English teacher reported that her students were questioning historical accounts of the Holocaust, opining that Hitler didn’t hate the Jews and that the death counts were exaggerated. Students’ written assignments confirmed those accounts. Ali also presented a lesson on the September 11 terrorist attacks, requiring students to read online articles translated by the Middle Eastern Media Research Institute (MEMRI). Ali posted links to the articles on a school-sponsored website: “U.S. Planned, Carried Out 9/11 Attacks—But Blames Others” and “U.S. Planning 9/11 Style Attack Using ISIS in Early 2015.” The MEMRI articles also contained links to other articles, such as “The Jews are Like a Cancer, Woe to the World if they Become Strong.” A reporter questioned Principal Lottman and Superintendent Zega. Lottman directed Ali to remove the MEMRI links from the school’s website. The following morning, Ali met with Zega and Lottman; his employment was terminated.Ali sued under New Jersey law and 42 U.S.C. 1981, claiming that Lottman referred to him as “Mufasa,” asked Ali if “they had computers in Egypt,” and remarked on his ethnicity during the meetings that resulted in Ali’s termination. He alleged discrimination, hostile work environment, free speech and academic freedom violations, and defamation. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Ali cannot show that his termination for teaching anti-Semitic views was a pretext for discrimination. View "Ali v. Woodbridge Township School District" on Justia Law

On April 3, 2020, 20 immigration detainees filed a habeas petition (28 U.S.C. 2241), seeking immediate release, claiming that due to underlying health conditions, their continued detention during the COVID-19 pandemic puts them at imminent risk of death or serious injury. The district court found that the petitioners face irreparable harm and are likely to succeed on the merits, that the government would “face very little potential harm” from their immediate release, and that “the public interest strongly encourages Petitioners’ release.” Without waiting for a response from the government, the court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring the release. The government moved for reconsideration, submitting a declaration describing conditions at the facilities, with details of the petitioners’ criminal histories. The court denied reconsideration, stating that the government had failed to demonstrate a change in controlling law, provide previously unavailable evidence, or show a clear error of law or the need to prevent manifest injustice. The court extended the release period until the COVID-19 state of emergency is lifted but attached conditions to the petitioners’ release. The government reports that 19 petitioners were released; none have been re-detained.The Third Circuit granted an immediate appeal, stating that the order cannot evade prompt appellate review simply by virtue of the label “TRO.” A purportedly non-appealable TRO that goes beyond preservation of the status quo and mandates affirmative relief may be immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). View "Hope v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

Stephens called 911 and reported that Gibbons hit her and had a gun in his truck. The police responded. Stephens obtained a temporary restraining order, prohibiting Gibbons from possessing firearms and from returning to Stephens’s house. The next day, Gibbons went to Stephens’s house. Stephens was talking on the phone; the friend called the police. Gibbons left Stephens’s house. Trooper Conza arrived. Stephens stated that Gibbons had waved a gun throughout their argument. Conza told Stephens to go to the police barracks and reported over the radio that Gibbons had brandished a firearm. Conza, with Troopers Bartelt and Korejko, visited the nearby home of Gibbons’s mother, James. James stated that she did not know where Gibbons was and that he might be off his schizophrenia medication. While driving to the barracks, Stephens saw Gibbons walking alongside the road and called 911. The Troopers responded. Bartelt parked his car and, exiting, observed that Gibbons was pointing a gun at his own head. Bartelt drew his weapon, stood behind his car door, and twice told Gibbons to drop his weapon. Gibbons did not comply. Bartelt shot Gibbons twice within seconds of stopping his car. Gibbons died that night.In James’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Third Circuit held that Bartelt is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate Gibbons’s clearly established rights. Bartelt’s pre-standoff knowledge of Gibbons differs from that of officers involved in cited cases. Bartelt could reasonably conclude that Gibbons posed a threat to others. View "James v. New Jersey State Police" on Justia Law