Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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In November 2013, three men robbed a Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania bank. A bank employee, Kane, later admitted to assisting them. The next morning, the three were pulled over in North Carolina. Wilson stated they were driving to Georgia and admitted that they had a lot of cash in the car. The officer, suspecting that they were going to buy drugs in Atlanta, searched the car, found the stolen cash, turned it over to federal agents, then released the men. A week later, three men robbed a Phoenixville, Pennsylvania bank. The police got a tip from Howell, whom Wilson had tried to recruit for the heists. Howell provided Wilson's cell phone number. Police pulled his cell-site location data, which put him at the Bala Cynwyd bank right before the first robbery and showed five calls and 17 text messages to Kane that day. Howell identified Wilson and Moore from a video of the robbery.Kane and Foster took plea bargains. Wilson and Moore were tried for bank robbery, conspiracy, and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Moore was sentenced to 385 months’ imprisonment. Wilson received 519 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. Counsel’s stipulation that the banks were federally insured did not violate the Sixth Amendment, which does not categorically forbid stipulating to a crime’s jurisdictional element without the defendant’s consent or over the defendant’s objection. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

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Hardy entered the Correctional Institute in urgent need of medical care: he had previously had part of his leg amputated due to diabetes and had developed an infected open wound. He was taken immediately to the infirmary. He was not given the inmate handbook but was told it would be in his prison block. Hardy signed a form acknowledging receipt of the handbook. When Hardy arrived at his block, the handbook was not there. Hardy’s efforts to obtain the handbook or the Inmate Grievance System Policy manual issued to Pennsylvania Corrections staff were unavailing. Hardy did not know that exhausting that grievance process requires two levels of appeals.Hardy’s wound festered; he filed a grievance explaining that a medical provider refused to give him bandages and antibiotic ointment. That grievance was rejected because it was not presented in a courteous manner.” Hardy 's next grievance was rejected as lacking “information that there were any issues not addressed during [Hardy’s] sick call visit.” Hardy filed a grievance detailing the medical staff’s failure to properly treat his leg wound, including declining to follow a doctor’s recommendation to transfer him to a medical facility, and his fear that more of his leg would need to be amputated. The grievance coordinator read the rules to require separate grievances for mental and physical harms. Hardy asked his counselor how he should respond. His counselor told him to “fill out another one.” Unaware of the appeal requirement, Hardy submitted eight new grievances, which were rejected as time-barred. Hardy's last grievance; requesting transfer to a medical facility, was deemed “[f]rivolous.” More of Hardy’s leg was amputated. The Third Circuit reinstated Hardy’s civil rights claim. Under these circumstances, the counselor’s misrepresentation rendered the grievance process “unavailable” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). View "Hardy v. Shaikh" on Justia Law

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Reyes-Romero was prosecuted for unlawful reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326. The district court dismissed the indictment, finding that irregularities in Reyes-Romero’s removal proceeding constituted fundamental errors that caused him prejudice. The court stated that the government’s subjective motivation for its motion to dismiss was a desire to rely on the 2011 removal order in future immigration proceedings, which“taint[ed]” the Government’s effort. The court then awarded Reyes-Romero fees pursuant to the Hyde Amendment, under which a prevailing defendant in a federal criminal prosecution can apply to have his attorney’s fees and costs covered by the government if the defendant shows that “the position of the United States” in the prosecution “was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith,” 18 U.S.C. 3006A.The Third Circuit reversed. “Although assuredly born of good intentions and understandable frustration with faulty processes in the underlying removal proceeding,” the award was not based on the type of pervasive prosecutorial misconduct with which the Amendment is concerned. Reyes-Romero’s 2011 expedited removal proceeding deviated from the required ordered, sensible process and reasonable minds may differ about how the prosecution should have reacted once those issues became apparent. Where reasonable minds may differ, however, and where the government made objectively reasonable and defensible choices, there can be no Hyde Amendment liability. View "United States v. Reyes-Romero" on Justia Law

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Wayne challenged the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC)’s authority to regulate its proposed fracking activities. Riverkeeper, an environmental group, was permitted to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Three Pennsylvania State Senators also sought to intervene, on the side of Wayne, in their official capacities. The Senators asserted that the “DRBC is nullifying the General Assembly’s lawmaking power by effectively countermanding the directives of duly enacted laws that permit” fracking-related activities. They did not specify the relief they sought. Riverkeeper contended that the Senators lacked standing to intervene. The district court denied the Senators’ motion without discussing standing, holding that the Senators had failed to establish the conditions necessary for Rule 24(a) intervention of right. The court later granted DRBC’s motion to dismiss. On remand from the Third Circuit, the Senators again sought to intervene, requesting that the court “invalidate the de facto moratorium and enjoin its further enforcement,” as exceeding the DRBC’s scope of authority, or, alternatively, that the DRBC “provide just compensation." The district court denied the motion because the Senators had not shown a “significantly protectable interest in th[e] litigation.”The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, reasoning that the Senators appear to be seeking relief different from that sought by the plaintiff. The district court erred in ruling on the merits of the Rule 24 motion before considering whether the Senators need to establish Article III standing for either of their proposed claims. View "Wayne Land and Mineral Group LLC v. Delaware River Basin Commission" on Justia Law

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Six U.S. plaintiffs rented cars from Payless. Each signed a one-page agreement, itemizing charges, below the final paragraph, which provides: “I agree the charges listed above are estimates and that I have reviewed & agreed to all notices & terms here and in the rental jacket.” After they signed their agreements, the rental associate folded the agreement, placed it a “rental jacket,” and handed it back. The rental jacket bears the title “Rental Terms and Conditions” and contains 31 paragraphs. The word “jacket” appears in only the second paragraph. The twenty-eighth paragraph requires arbitration. The rental associates said nothing about the rental jacket. Lee rented a car in Costa Rica, using a two-sided document. The front side contains the details of the transaction. The back is titled “Rental Agreement” and includes pre-printed terms, including an arbitration clause. Both sides have signature lines but Lee signed the only front.Plaintiffs brought a putative class action, alleging violations of New Jersey, Florida, and Nevada consumer protection statutes, unjust enrichment, and conversion, alleging that they were charged for products and services that they had not authorized. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. The rental jackets were not adequately incorporated into the U.S. Agreements; the U.S. Plaintiffs did not assent to the arbitration provision. A genuine dispute exists over whether Lee was on reasonable notice of the arbitration provision on the backside of the Costa Rica Agreement. View "Bacon v. Avis Budget Group Inc" on Justia Law

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Pennsylvania Trooper Johnson stopped Bradley for speeding. Bradley admitted that his license was suspended. Johnson took Bradley to talk in the squad car. With a friendly demeanor, Johnson coaxed Bradley into admitting that he had just been sentenced to two and a half years in prison for “drugs.” After about 10 minutes, Johnson stated that he was going to give Bradley a warning ticket. Johnson later acknowledged that he would not have let Bradley leave and had, from the beginning, suspected criminal activity. Corporal Hoye arrived. Johnson asked Bradley whether there were any guns, marijuana, large sums of U.S. currency, heroin, or cocaine in the car. Bradley denied having those items. Johnson asked again, with Hoye standing next to Bradley. Flanked by state troopers, Bradley admitted he had cocaine. Johnson then recited the Miranda warnings. Johnson believed he had probable cause to search the vehicle. Bradley stated that “a lot” of cocaine was in the trunk. About a kilo of cocaine in a backpack was lying in the trunk. Bradley successfully moved to suppress his confession and the physical evidence.The Third Circuit vacated in part and remanded for the district court to decide whether supplementation of the record is needed to decide whether the cocaine would have been inevitably discovered during an inventory search, and, if so, whether police department policy sufficiently cabined the scope of the officer’s discretion in conducting the inventory search such that the search of the backpack, a closed container, would have been lawful. View "United States v. Bradley" on Justia Law

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Francisco, a citizen of Guatemala, obtained lawful U.S. permanent resident status in 1989. In 2012, Francisco pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny in the second degree in New York; Francisco had obtained a stolen laptop and contacted the laptop’s owner and demanded money. During this exchange, Francisco sent the laptop’s owner sexually explicit pictures that Francisco had found on the laptop. The owner contacted the police. Francisco was sentenced to five years of probation. In 2018, Francisco returned from a trip abroad and sought admission as a returning lawful permanent resident. Instead, Francisco was classified as an arriving alien and was deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Francisco filed an unsuccessful application for discretionary relief of cancellation of removal. The BIA dismissed Francisco’s appeal, citing Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga (2016), in which the BIA promulgated a broader standard for determining whether a larceny offense constituted a categorical CIMT and holding that New York’s second-degree grand larceny statute defines a categorical CIMT because it requires the accused to take or withhold property with the intent to permanently or virtually permanently appropriate it or deprive the rightful owner of its use.The Third Circuit vacated, joining other circuits in ruling that the BIA should not have retroactively applied Diaz-Lizarraga. An alien defendant’s decision about whether to plead guilty, implicate distinctively weighty reliance interests; there is no discernable BIA uniformity interest in retroactively applying Diaz-Lizarraga. The BIA uniformly applied the prior standard for more than seven decades before changing course. View "Francisco-Lopez v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

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The district courts dismissed two cases, concluding that faxes soliciting participation by the recipients in market research surveys in exchange for monetary payments are not advertisements within the meaning of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227 (b)(1)(C) (TCPA), which prohibits the transmission of unsolicited fax advertisements. In a consolidated appeal, the Third Circuit reversed.. Solicitations to buy products, goods, or services can be advertisements under the TCPA. The solicitations for participation in the surveys in exchange for $200.00 by one sender and $150.00 by the other sender were for services within the TCPA. An offer of payment in exchange for participation in a market survey is a commercial transaction, so a fax highlighting the availability of that transaction is an advertisement under the TCPA. View "Fischbein v. Olson Research Group Inc" on Justia Law

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MHS, a private, non-denominational school, hired the Darringtons as full-time houseparents for student housing. The Union represents full-time MHS houseparents. The collective bargaining agreement arbitration provision covers “any dispute arising out of [its] terms and conditions,” including the “discipline or discharge” of Union members. A grievance includes “any dispute alleging discrimination against any [Union members].” The Union, on behalf of itself and any allegedly aggrieved Union members, waived any right to a private lawsuit alleging employment discrimination regarding matters encompassed within the grievance procedure. If aggrieved Union members are unsatisfied with the resolution of their disputes after discussions with MHS officials, “the Union [may seek] further consideration” by submitting the grievance to arbitration on their behalf.The Darringtons filed unsuccessful reports with the local state agency for children and youth services, concerning MHS's mandatory religious programming. They then filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission alleging discrimination based on religion. Two months later, MHS fired the Darringtons, who filed additional charges. After receiving right-to-sue letters, the Darringtons filed a complaint, alleging discrimination and retaliation, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court denied MHS’s motion to compel arbitration. The Third Circuit reversed. The CBA clearly and unmistakably waives a judicial forum for the statutory discrimination claims. View "Darrington v. Milton Hershey School" on Justia Law

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VOG billed itself as an advocacy group helping victims of timeshare fraud get out of their timeshare debts. A jury determined that VOG had actually defrauded its customers and that three individual defendants (including Lacerda) were each knowing participants in that fraud. Lacerda was sentenced to 324 months’ imprisonment for his leading role in the fraudulent enterprise.The Third Circuit affirmed the respective convictions and sentences. The court rejected a claim of impermissible “overview testimony” by an FBI agent; an officer who is familiar with an investigation or was personally involved may tell the story of that investigation—how the investigation began, who was involved, and what techniques were used, and, with a proper foundation, may offer lay opinion testimony and testify about matters within his personal knowledge. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it disqualified defense counsel based on a conflict of interest; when it denied replacement counsel’s motion for a continuance; when it excluded from evidence, as hearsay, an email sent by Lacerda to VOG’s former CFO; in exercising its sentencing discretion; or by ordering the forfeiture of all VOG’s gross proceeds. View "United States v. Lacerda" on Justia Law