Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A four-year-old stated that Heinrich had pulled her pants down and taken pictures. Pennsylvania state police conducted a consensual search of Heinrich’s electronic devices and found sexually explicit images of two children. Heinrich was charged with 15 counts of using or inducing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), and one count of possessing material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor, section 2252(a)(4)(B). Heinrich admitted to taking the pictures and that they depicted sexually explicit conduct but planned to defend himself against the production charges, claiming he lacked the requisite specific intent.Heinrich proffered an expert witness, a psychologist. The government moved to exclude that evidence as inadmissible because the charged offenses were general intent crimes and under Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, 702, or 704(b). After a hearing on the applicability of Rule 704(b), the judge’s law clerk conducted a telephonic status conference, stating that the court intended to grant the government’s motions based on Rules 403 and 704(b). No opinion or order was docketed. The judge did not participate in the conference, which was unrecorded and not transcribed. Heinrich entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed.The Third Circuit vacated without addressing the merits of the ruling, noting the “impossible position” of attempting “to review an adjunct-presented non-ruling that caused the Defendant to plead guilty.” District courts must articulate their Rule 403 reasoning on the record. View "United States v. Heinrich" on Justia Law

Savage's North Philadelphia regional drug trafficking operation, KSO, distributed large quantities of controlled substances and fiercely protected its network and territory, using guns and violence. Early in KSO’s operation, Savage took care of threats against KSO himself. As his power grew, his enforcers did his bidding. While detained on criminal charges, Savage continued to manage KSO’s affairs. He retaliated against those who cooperated with government agents and arranged for the murder of the prosecution’s main witness in a murder case and, in a later case, orchestrated the firebombing of the home of another cooperating witness, ensuring no one would survive. Savage was convicted of conspiracy to participate in a racketeering (RICO) enterprise, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d); 12 counts of violent crime in aid of racketeering (VICAR) murder, section 1959(a)(1); VICAR conspiracy to commit murder, section 1959(a)(5); retaliating against a witness, section 1513; and using fire to commit a felony, section 844(h)(1).The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions and the imposition of the death penalty, rejecting several challenges to the selection of the jury. If any gaps exist in the record, they do not entitle Savage to relief. Savage was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the court waited until days before voir dire began to substitute new lead counsel. The district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent. The court rejected six challenges relating to the penalty phase proceedings. View "United States v. Savage" on Justia Law

Premier sued UPMC under the federal antitrust and state unfair competition laws. Several months after the deadline the district court set in a scheduling order, Premier learned, in a deposition, about an illegal bid-rigging agreement with another party. Premier moved to amend its complaint and add a party, citing the liberal standard of Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court denied the motion, reasoning that because the deadline had passed, Rule 16(b)(4) required Premier to show good cause.The Third Circuit affirmed. Rule 16(b)(4) applies once a scheduling-order deadline has passed, and Premier did not show good cause. The district court had noted Premier failed “to even discuss due diligence, relying instead on Rule 15(a).” View "Premier Comp Solutions LLC v. UPMC" on Justia Law

Following a 2016 altercation with a correctional officer at the U.S. Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Bullock pleaded guilty to knowingly and intentionally forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, and interfering with a correctional officer, 18 U.S.C. 111(a) and (b). Bullock had two prior convictions for robbery in North Carolina. that corresponded to generic robbery under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2). The district court found that Bullock qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, with a Guidelines range of 151-188 months’ imprisonment, but gave Bullock a substantial downward variance, imposing a sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment.Bullock argued his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 111 was not categorically a crime of violence for purposes of the sentencing enhancement. The Third Circuit affirmed. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court looked to the record of conviction and determined that a defendant who violates section 111(b) has used physical force against the person of another, either through employing a deadly or dangerous weapon or by inflicting bodily injury. View "United States v. Bullock" on Justia Law

Sharkey worked as a special educator and assistant principal at Susquehanna Township High School in 2013. He and M.S., a 16-year-old female student, began a sexual relationship. Weeks later, students began spreading rumors. The District launched an investigation, which included numerous interviews with M.S., Sharkey, and others; review of Sharkey’s telephone records, and examinations of texts, emails, and photos on M.S.’s telephone and on Sharkey’s district-issued telephone. M.S. and Sharkey denied the rumors. Not finding any evidence of wrongdoing, the superintendent ended the investigation.At the beginning of the next school year, the rumors resurfaced. The District contacted the police and placed Sharkey on administrative leave. M.S. still denied having a sexual relationship with Sharkey but officers informed her that they planned to get a search warrant for her phone. The next day, M.S. and her parents met with the police; M.S. provided details about her relationship with Sharkey. Sharkey was criminally charged. The District informed Sharkey that it intended to terminate his employment and obtained his resignation.M.S. sued the District, alleging a hostile educational environment in violation of Title IX, violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, and state-law claims. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the District. Sharkey’s knowledge of his own wrongdoing is irrelevant to the District’s actual knowledge of the sexual harassment. No other appropriate person at the District had actual knowledge of the sexual relationship until days before Sharkey resigned. View "M. S. v. Susquehanna Township School District" on Justia Law

C.S., age 17, made threatening statements to a confidential informant in an online chatroom dedicated to discussing terroristic attacks. Law enforcement searched C.S.’s home and cell phone. In his home, agents discovered assault rifles, ammunition, a crossbow, a headscarf, smoke bombs, grenade casings, military-style ammunition vest and gear, and a long-bladed knife. His cell phone revealed Internet searches, literature about making explosives, Islamic Jihadi propaganda videos depicting beheadings, and photos of C.S. posing with his assault rifle while wearing military gear and headscarf. C.S. was adjudicated delinquent, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). During several conversations, C.S. made threats against a local church. Although juvenile proceedings are usually sealed, the court permitted the government to notify the church that it was the subject of a threat and that the party who communicated the threat had been prosecuted. The order did not identify C.S.The Third Circuit affirmed. C.S.’s statements qualified as threats under section 875(c). A rational factfinder could find that a reasonable person could consider C.S.’s statements to be “a serious expression of an intent to inflict bodily injury.” The court did not violate the confidentiality provisions of the Juvenile and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. 5031-5038), in allowing the government to notify the church of the threats and acted well within its discretion in issuing the notification order. View "United States v. C.S." on Justia Law

Mack, a practicing Muslim, was an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Loretto, Pennsylvania, and worked for pay at the prison’s commissary. Mack alleges that he was harassed, based on his religion, by correctional officers Roberts and Venslosky, who supervised the inmates working in the commissary. Mack alleges that he raised these issues with their supervisor, Stephens; that upon overhearing Mack’s oral complaint to Stephens, Roberts told Mack, “[y]ou are not going to be here long”; and that Venslosky fired Mack less than two weeks later. The district court denied the government’s motion for summary judgment on Mack’s First Amendment retaliation claim.The Third Circuit reversed. The court noted that no statute provides a damages remedy for constitutional claims brought against federal officials. Although the Supreme Court recognized an implied damages action for such claims under the Fourth Amendment in 1971 (Bivens), the Court has since recognized an implied damages remedy in only two other instances. In 2017, the Supreme Court cautioned against creating additional implied damages remedies and explicitly declared expansion of Bivens a “disfavored judicial activity.” The Third Circuit declined to expand Bivens to create a damages remedy for Mack’s First Amendment retaliation claim. View "Mack v. Yost" on Justia Law

Artesanias recorded its $900,000 judgment as a lien on Wilton’s warehouse. Artesanias learned that Wilton was insolvent and that its previous owner and North Mill, another creditor had plotted with Wilton’s law firm, Leisawitz, to plunder the company’s remaining assets. They had engineered a sale of Wilton’s non-real estate assets; allowed North Mill to file inflated judgments against Wilton; and paid Leisawitz future legal fees. North Mill tried to foreclose on the warehouse. Artesanias sued North Mill and Leisawitz, alleging they had hindered Artesanias’ ability to enforce and collect Wilton’s obligations.Wilton filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The automatic stay stopped the warehouse foreclosure. The trustee entered settlements, agreeing to split the warehouse sale proceeds between North Mill and Artesanias, release the estate’s claims against North Mill, and not interfere with Artesanias’s claims against North Mill and others. All agreed that nothing in the settlements would “affect [Artesanias’s] litigation” against North Mill. After selling the warehouse, Wilton’s bankruptcy estate had few assets. Among them were legal claims against those who had allegedly plundered the company. Rather than spend the estate’s remaining assets pursuing those claims, the bankruptcy court let the trustee abandon all but professional-liability claims against Leisawitz.Artesanias’s claims against North Mill were dismissed for lack of standing. The Third Circuit vacated. Chapter 7 trustees can relinquish the statutory authority to pursue a claim back to a creditor. View "In re: Wilton Armetale Inc" on Justia Law

Downey has long struggled with glaucoma, which can lead to blindness if left uncontrolled. His condition worsened while he was imprisoned at the State Correctional Institution at Waymart, Pennsylvania. Doctors recommended that Downey have surgery expeditiously to save his eyesight. Nothing happened for almost a year, although he repeatedly reached out to prison staff. Surgery came too late; Downey is now blind. Downey sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1999. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment, concluding that he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a)..The Third Circuit reversed in part. Downey’s claims for monetary relief are not procedurally defaulted. Under the prison’s procedures, a prisoner dealing with an emergency or an urgent situation is not bound by the ordinary procedures specified in the grievance policy; he only needs to alert the closest staff person. The court rejected the prison’s “efforts to downplay the urgency” of Downey’s situation and found that Downey complied with the policy. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the Department of Corrections and its officials on state sovereign immunity grounds, although that defense was not raised before the district court. View "Downey v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Two counties sued Sherwin-Williams in state court, seeking abatement of the public nuisance caused by lead-based paint. Anticipating suits by other counties, Sherwin-Williams sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Sherwin-Williams claimed that “[i]t is likely that the fee agreement between [Delaware County] and the outside trial lawyers [is] or will be substantively similar to an agreement struck by the same attorneys and Lehigh County to pursue what appears to be identical litigation” and that “the Count[y] ha[s] effectively and impermissibly delegated [its] exercise of police power to the private trial attorneys” by vesting the prosecutorial function in someone who has a financial interest in using the government’s police power to hold a defendant liable. The complaint pleaded a First Amendment violation, citing the company’s membership in trade associations, Sherwin-Williams’ purported petitioning of federal, state, and local governments, and its commercial speech. The complaint also argued that the public nuisance theory would seek to impose liability “that is grossly disproportionate,” arbitrary, retroactive, vague, and “after an unexplainable, prejudicial, and extraordinarily long delay, in violation of the Due Process Clause.”The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sherwin-Williams failed to plead an injury in fact or a ripe case or controversy because the alleged harms hinged on the County actually filing suit. View "Sherwin Williams Co. v. County of Delaware" on Justia Law