Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Three clients filed separate discrimination cases, which were consolidated for discovery. The defendants obtained summary judgment. The clients filed a notice of appeal, then hired Paddick, who entered into a contingency fee agreement with each client, providing that Paddick would serve as counsel on remand and promising Paddick a 40 percent fee of any trial or settlement proceeds. Paddick prevailed in the appeal, then took 24 depositions, presented two oral arguments, attended two settlement conferences, and filed nine substantive motions or responses. When it came time to retain an expert witness, Paddick was unable to advance the necessary funds. The clients terminated their relationship with Paddick and retained Thompson to pursue their claims for a 35 percent contingent fee. Paddick informed Thompson of his work, noting that “fees remain due.” Thompson did not respond. The case settled for $380,000; Thompson’s share was $133,000. The district court acknowledged the settlements and dismissed the cases.A month later, Paddick successfully moved to intervene to enforce an attorney’s charging lien against the settlement proceeds. The Third Circuit affirmed an order that Thompson pay Paddick $54,562.73 from Thompson’s portion of the recovery. The district court had ancillary enforcement jurisdiction to resolve Paddick’s lien motion. The clients did not produce clear and convincing evidence of duress; imperfect representation does not necessarily bar Paddick from recovery. A client “should never be made to pay twice.” View "Butt v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America" on Justia Law

Oakwood hired Dr. Thanoo in 1997. As Oakwood's Senior Scientist, he signed confidentiality agreements. Thanoo designed Oakwood’s microsphere process technology. Oakwood invested more than $130 million and two decades in its Microsphere Project and developed the “Leuprolide Products,” which are bioequivalent to Lupron Depot®. Aurobindo contacted Oakwood to discuss collaboration. Some of Oakwood’s trade secret information was shared under a confidentiality agreement. Negotiations failed. Aurobindo hired Thanoo six months later and began developing microsphere-based injectable products that Oakwood alleges are “substantially similar to and competitive with Oakwood’s Microsphere Project." Oakwood asserts that the product could not have been developed within the rapid timeframe without Thanoo’s assistance and the use of Oakwood’s trade secret information.The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal of Oakwood's suit, asserting trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract, and tortious interference with contractual relations. Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1836(b), Oakwood sufficiently identified its trade secrets and sufficiently alleged that the defendants misappropriated those trade secrets. The “use” of a trade secret encompasses all the ways one can take advantage of trade secret information to obtain an economic benefit, competitive advantage, or other commercial value, or for an exploitative purpose, such as research or development. A trade secret plaintiff need not allege that its information was the only source by which a defendant might develop its product. Aurobindo's avoidance of substantial research and development costs that Oakwood has invested is recognized as "harm" in the DTSA. View "Oakwood Laboratories LLC v. Thanoo" on Justia Law

Brown was shot and killed at a Philadelphia playground. Several witness accounts implicated Baxter and McBride as the shooters. Baxter was convicted of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy to engage in murder, and first-degree possession of an instrument of a crime with intent to employ it criminally.The trial judge had described the Commonwealth’s burden of proof, “beyond a reasonable doubt,” “the highest standard,” stating that the Commonwealth “is not required to meet some mathematical certainty” or “to demonstrate the complete impossibility of innocence.” A “doubt that would cause a reasonably careful and sensible person to pause, to hesitate, to refrain from acting upon a matter of the highest importance to your own affairs or to your own interests” "If you were advised by your loved one’s physician that that loved one had a life-threatening illness and that the only protocol was a surgery, very likely you would ask for a second opinion.... You’d probably start researching the illness ... if you’re like me, call everybody you know in medicine... At some moment, however, you’re going to be called upon to make a decision.... If you go forward, it’s because you have moved beyond all reasonable doubt. "[R]easonable doubt must be a real doubt” and “may not be a doubt that is imagined or manufactured to avoid carrying out an unpleasant responsibility.”Baxter's federal habeas corpus petition argued for the first time that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the reasonable doubt instruction. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The reasonable doubt instruction did not prejudice Baxter, given the evidence of his guilt. View "Baxter v. Superintendent Coal Township SCI" on Justia Law

An Oklahoma court ordered Boyd to stay away from his ex-wife and his son, surrender his firearms, and undergo a mental health evaluation. After his arrest in Pennsylvania with a loaded handgun, Boyd was convicted of possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic violence protective order, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8).The Third Circuit affirmed. After Boyd’s trial, the Supreme Court issued “Rehaif,” requiring that the government show both that a defendant was subject to a qualifying protective order at the time he possessed a gun and that he knew about the protective order. The district court had not instructed the jury on this knowledge element, but the error was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of Boyd’s knowledge, including his own admissions in a letter to the court. The admission into evidence of statements that Boyd made about harming the Trump family did not contribute to the verdict, leaving any error harmless. Statements in the prosecution’s closing argument that accused the defense of “misleading” the jury, were also harmless given the context, jury instructions, and weight of the evidence.Section 922(g)(8) does not violate the Second Amendment as applied to Boyd and others whose protective orders were issued without an explicit finding that they pose a credible threat to their intimate partners or their children. The application of section 922(g)(8) survives heightened scrutiny; the statute is substantially related to the goal of reducing domestic violence, an indisputably important state interest. View "United States v. Boyd" on Justia Law

In 2009, Murphy was convicted of distribution and possession with the intent to distribute heroin and 50 grams or more of cocaine base and conspiracy to do the same. The jury specifically found that the weight of the cocaine base attributable to Murphy was 50 grams or more, triggering the highest mandatory minimum sentence (10 years). With a career-offender designation, Murphy’s Guidelines sentencing range was 360 months to life. He was sentenced to 360 months.In 2019, Murphy sought resentencing under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act. A PSR addendum preserved the drug amounts and the career-offender designation and decreased Murphy’s sentencing range to 262–327 months. Murphy objected to the drug amounts and the career-offender designation, arguing that the jury had only specifically found that he was responsible for 50 grams of cocaine base instead of the 595 grams in the PSR and that his Maryland second-degree assault convictions were no longer career-offender status predicates. The district court concluded that the First Step Act did not permit reconsideration of either factor and sentenced Murphy to 210 months’ imprisonment—the high end of the range without the career-offender designation.The Third Circuit vacated. The district court correctly refused to reconsider Murphy’s attributable drug amounts but Murphy was entitled to an accurate calculation of the Guidelines range at the time of resentencing, including whether he qualified for the career-offender enhancement based on the law at the time of resentencing. View "United States v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Venoco operated a drilling rig off the coast of Santa Barbara, transporting oil and gas to its Onshore Facility for processing. Venoco did not own the Offshore Facility but leased it from the California Lands Commission. Venoco owned the Onshore Facility with air permits to use it. Following a 2015 pipeline rupture, Venoco filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and abandoned its leases, relinquishing all rights in the Offshore Facility.Concerned about public safety and environmental risks, the Commission took over decommissioning the rig and plugging the wells, paying Venoco $1.1 million per month to continue operating the Offshore and Onshore Facilities. After a third-party contractor took over operations, the Commission agreed to pay for use of the Onshore Facility. The Commission, as Venoco’s creditor, filed a $130 million claim for reimbursement of plugging and decommissioning costs. Before the confirmation of the liquidation plan, Venoco and the Commission unsuccessfully negotiated a potential sale of the Onshore Facility to the Commission. The Commission stopped making payments, arguing it could continue using the Onshore Facility without payment under its police power.After the estates’ assets were transferred to a liquidation trust, the Trustee filed an adversary proceeding, claiming inverse condemnation, against California. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rejection of California's assertion of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed. By ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, states waived their sovereign immunity defense in proceedings that further a bankruptcy court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over the debtor's and the estate's property. View "In re Venoco, LLC" on Justia Law

Cohen entered into a work-for-hire agreement with SLP, a special purpose entity formed by TWC to make the film, Silver Linings Playbook. Cohen was to receive $250,000 in fixed initial compensation and contingent future compensation of roughly 5% of the movie’s net profits. The movie was released to critical acclaim in 2012. TWC purports to own all the rights pertaining to the movie, including the Cohen Agreement.In 2017, following a flood of sexual misconduct allegations against its co-founder, Harvey Weinstein, TWC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court approved TWC’s Asset Purchase Agreement with Spyglass, 11 U.S.C. 363. Spyglass sought a declaratory judgment that the Cohen Agreement and had been sold to Spyglass. If the Cohen Agreement were an executory contract, assumed and assigned under section 365, Spyglass would be responsible for approximately $400,000 in previously unpaid contingent compensation. If Spyglass instead purchased the Cohen Agreement as a non-executory contract, Spyglass would be responsible only for obligations on a go-forward basis. Other writers, producers, and actors with similar works-made-for-hire contracts made similar arguments.The bankruptcy court granted Spyglass summary judgment. The district court and Third Circuit affirmed. Cohen’s remaining obligations under the Agreement are not material and the parties did not clearly avoid New York’s substantial performance rule; the Cohen Agreement is not an executory contract. View "The Weinstein Co. Holdings, LLC v. Spyglass Media Group, LLC." on Justia Law

In March 2018, following sexual misconduct allegations against TWC’s co-founder Harvey Weinstein, TWC sought bankruptcy protection. TWC and Spyglass signed the Asset Purchase Agreement (APA). The sale closed in July 2018. Spyglass paid $287 million. Spyglass agreed to assume all liabilities associated with the Purchased Assets, including some “Contracts.” The APA identifies “Assumed Contracts,” as those Contracts that Spyglass would designate in writing, by November 2018.In May 2018, TWC filed an Assumed Contracts Schedule, with a disclaimer that the inclusion of a contract did not constitute an admission that such contract is executory or unexpired. A June 2018 Contract Notice, listed eight Investment Agreements as “non-executory contracts that are being removed from the Assumed Contracts Schedule.” The Investment Agreements, between TWC and Investors, had provided funding for TWC films in exchange for shares of future profits. Spyglass’s November 2018 Contract Notice listed nine Investment Agreements as “Excluded Contracts,”In January 2019, the Investors requested payments from Spyglass--their asserted share of a film’s profits. The Bankruptcy Court rejected the Investors’ claim that Spyglass bought all the Investment Agreements under the APA. The district court and Third Circuit affirmed. The Investment Agreements are not “Purchased Assets” and the associated obligations are not “Assumed Liabilities.” The Investment Agreements are not executory contracts under the Bankruptcy Code. View "The Weinstein Co. Holdings, LLC v. Y Movie, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, Figueroa, a citizen of Honduras, entered the U.S. unlawfully. He told an asylum officer, Figueroa stated that his father, uncle, and cousins were killed in Honduras and that he feared their killers would also kill him; he referred to rivals seeking to seize his father’s land and to his father reporting his sister’s rape by gang members. After his removal, Figueroa reentered the U.S. in 2012. DHS reinstated Figueroa’s prior removal order. This time Figueroa attributed the deaths of his family members to the gang responsible for raping his sister. He claimed that his father was involved in anti-gang political activities, that the gang once beat him, and that the gang continued to threaten him and his family. He produced police reports and testified that those reports never resulted in arrests. The IJ denied found that Figueroa faced a clear probability of future harm in Honduras due to his membership in a particular social group (his family) but that such harm from private actors would not constitute persecution or torture. The BIA determined that Figueroa did not establish either that the Honduran government was “unable or unwilling to control” the gang, or that the government “condoned the private actions or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect [him].”The Third Circuit denied relief, noting that Figueroa might be a fugitive disentitled to relief. In denying his application for statutory withholding of removal, the agency did not err in treating the unable-or-unwilling-to-control test and the condone-or-complete helplessness test as legal equivalents. Figueroa did not demonstrate the requisite connection between the gang’s acts and the government. Substantial evidence supports the BIA conclusion, in denying CAT protection, that Honduran police would investigate reports from Figueroa, so he failed to establish governmental acquiescence to torture. View "Figueroa v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

In 1999, Holland was charged with drug and conspiracy crimes and using a gun to murder someone during those crimes. Count Three charged him with using a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime and with aiding and abetting that crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Holland’s customer, Stewart, testified that she regularly bought crack cocaine from him and had once traded a gun to Holland for cash and drugs. Based on that exchange, the jury found that the gun had been used during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. Holland was convicted on all charges, except the murder count. The court imposed two life sentences plus a five-year consecutive term on Count Three.After an unsuccessful direct appeal, he unsuccessfully sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2007, the Supreme Court held, in “Watson,” that a person does not “use” a gun under section 924(c) when he trades away drugs for a gun. Holland sought habeas relief under section 2241. The district court dismissed, reasoning that he should have filed under 2255.The district court dismissed two more identical 2241 petitions as successive under section 2244(a). The Third Circuit affirmed. Holland's fourth 2241 petition based on Watson was not treated as successive. The court found that the petition was properly filed under 2241 since a 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of Holland’s detention but denied Holland’s petition on the merits. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that neither Holland nor his trading partner appears to have violated section 924(c), so he may be actually innocent. View "Holland v. Warden Canaan USP" on Justia Law