Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Porter was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1986. Since then, he has been incarcerated in solitary confinement on death row. In 2003, the district court granted, in part, Porter’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, determining that his penalty phase verdict form was unconstitutional. The order vacated Porter’s death sentence. Appeals from the order were held in abeyance pending the Pennsylvania courts' ruling on another petition and remain in abeyance.Porter then claimed violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments rights by continuing to confine him on death row even though his death sentence had been vacated. Porter alleged that his solitary confinement has caused “irreversible damage” to his mental health. The district court held that Porter does not have a procedural due process interest in avoiding solitary confinement because Porter’s death sentence remains active; Porter has not offered evidence of actual injury or deliberate indifference so he cannot succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim; and Porter cannot make a substantive due process claim based on the same allegations at issue in his Eighth Amendment claim.The Third Circuit reversed in part. The existence of the stay does not extinguish procedural due process rights. While 33 years of solitary confinement may violate the Eighth Amendment, the claimed Eighth Amendment right has not been clearly established so representatives of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Porter v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

In 2018, New Jersey made it illegal to possess a magazine capable of holding more than 10 rounds of ammunition. N.J. Stat. 2C:39-1(y), 2C:39-3(j). Prior to that, it had been illegal in New Jersey to possess magazines capable of holding more than 15 rounds of ammunition. Owners of large-capacity magazines (LCMs) could modify their LCMs, render firearms with LCMs or the LCM itself inoperable, register firearms with LCMs that could not be modified; transfer the firearm or LCM to an individual or entity entitled to own or possess it; or surrender the firearm or LCM to law enforcement.The Third Circuit previously affirmed an order denying a preliminary injunction and directly addressed the merits of the constitutionality of the Act. The court held that the Act did not violate the Second, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments. On remand, the district court ruled on summary judgment that it was bound by that decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Act. The opponents of the law appealed again, arguing that the district court erred in treating the prior panel’s opinion as binding. The Third Circuit rejected that argument and affirmed. View "Association of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law

Harvard gave Mazzetti (a stranger) a ride home because Mazzetti was afraid of her boyfriend (Sutton). Upon their arrival, Sutton made threats, tried to get Mazzetti out of the vehicle, and used racial slurs against Harvard, a Black male. Harvard called 911 and proceeded to leave with Mazzetti. Sutton jumped onto the hood of Harvard’s moving vehicle, making death threats. Harvard believed Sutton had a firearm and a knife. Harvard informed the 911 operator of the situation and drove onto the highway. The operator instructed Harvard to take a specific exit.At the police roadblock, Trooper Cesnalis did not respond to Harvard’s explanation, made no effort to locate the knife or the firearm, and asked Harvard to take a Breathalyzer test. Harvard agreed. After six tries, Harvard completed the test, which indicated that his blood alcohol content was below the legal limit. Cesnalis nonetheless inferred that Harvard was under the influence because he was sweaty, speaking rapidly, and not directly answering questions. Harvard was handcuffed and taken to the police station. Cesnalis was aware that Sutton had a criminal record but accepted Sutton’s explanation that Harvard had hit him with his vehicle. Sutton was not charged. Mazzetti corroborated Harvard’s statements. Despite negative results from additional testing, Cesnalis charged Harvard with DUI, recklessly endangering another person, reckless driving, simple assault, aggravated assault, and disorderly conduct, referring to Sutton as “the victim.” He omitted several exculpatory facts from the affidavit and referred to Harvard’s criminal history, although there was no evidence that Harvard had a criminal history.Harvard, exonerated, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment for Cesnalis as to false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and Equal Protection but affirmed as to the remaining claims and as to another officer. View "Harvard v. Cesnalis" on Justia Law

In February 2019, Harris filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, which was recharacterized as a motion for compassionate release. The district court concluded that Harris had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. A prisoner may file a motion for compassionate release with the sentencing court “after [he or she] has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier,” 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The court concluded that because the Warden denied Harris’s request within 30 days, he was required to completely exhaust the administrative remedy process.The Third Circuit vacated, noting that the government concedes that its argument regarding exhaustion was in error. The statute states that the defendant may file the motion 30 days after the warden receives his request. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

In reliance on a Pennsylvania statute and the Supreme Court’s 1977 “Abood” decision, the unions collected “fair-share fees” from the plaintiffs over the plaintiffs’ objections. The plaintiffs did not join the unions but were represented by the unions, which served as the exclusive bargaining agents for their bargaining units. In 2018, the Supreme Court overruled Abood in Janus v. AFSCME, holding that state legislation condoning public-sector fair-share fees was unconstitutional.The plaintiffs filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuits seeking reimbursement of the sums they were required to pay. The district courts, joining a consensus of federal courts across the country, dismissed the claims for monetary relief, ruling that because the unions collected the fair-share fees in good faith reliance on a governing state statute and Supreme Court precedent, they are entitled to, and have successfully made out, a good faith defense to monetary liability under section 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed. The good faith defense to section 1983 liability is “narrow” and “only rarely will a party successfully claim to have relied substantially and in good faith on both a state statute and unambiguous Supreme Court precedent validating that statute.” View "Diamond v. Pennsylvania State Education Association" on Justia Law

PSBA is a non-profit association created by Pennsylvania’s school districts. Campbell energetically used Pennsylvania's Right to Know Law (RTKL) to obtain records from PSBA’s constituent school districts. In 2017, Campell sent RTKL requests to public school agencies, seeking contact information for district employees and union representatives. PSBA’s attorney advised member districts that they were required to release publicly-available information, but they did not have to provide private data and that they could simply make the results “available for pickup.” When Campbell received copies of PSBA’s legal guidance, he established a web page entitled “PSBA Horror,” mocking PSBA's Executive Director. PSBA’s counsel threatened to sue Campbell for defamation. Campbell submitted another, 17-page, RTKL request, seeking 27 types of documentation regarding the districts' relationship with PSBA.PSBA sued Campbell, alleging defamation, tortious interference with contractual relations, and abuse of process. Campbell then filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, alleging that PSBA’s state suit was motivated by an improper desire to retaliate against him for proper RTKL requests, violating his First Amendment rights. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Campell’s suit. Campbell’s RTKL requests and PSBA’s state tort claims were both protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which shields constitutionally-protected conduct from civil liability, absent certain exceptions. The district court erred in requiring a heightened burden of proof on PSBA’s motives in bringing its state court tort claims but Campbell’s civil rights claim would fail under any standard of proof. View "Campbell v. Pennsylvania School Boards Association" on Justia Law

Sierra Club sought review of the EPA’s approval of new Pennsylvania National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) to govern pollution output at coal-burning power plants, as required by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7408(a). Sierra Club argued that the standards wrongly claim to reduce pollution output at Pennsylvania’s most advanced plants while simply rubber-stamping an average of current pollution output as its supposed new gold standard and criticized the proposal’s minimum temperature threshold—a measure that allows plants to nearly quintuple their pollution output when operating below 600 degrees Fahrenheit—as unsupported and unsupportable given the technical record before the agency. Sierra Club claims that the approved standards lack enforceable reporting regulations.The Third Circuit remanded to the EPA, finding that “the regulatory regime which springs forth from these three defining characteristics is neither supported by adequate facts nor by reasoning found in the administrative record.” Given the EPA’s concession that technological advances may allow for a more environmentally friendly standard than the one approved, reliance on a study that is more than 25 years old is neither a persuasive nor reasonable basis for adopting the standard it approved. The EPA is able neither to offer a reasonable justification for failing to require a stricter standard nor to justify the standard it endorsed. View "Sierra Club v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

In 2001, Rosen stabbed his wife to death in their home, then called the police and claimed that home invaders had stabbed his wife. Within hours, he confessed to the stabbing but claimed it was an unintentional response to his wife swinging a knife at him. The prosecution requested a psychiatric exam of Rosen in preparation for his first murder trial, where he raised a diminished capacity defense. After his first conviction was overturned, he abandoned his diminished capacity defense. In his federal habeas corpus petition, Rosen argued that the second trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when it ruled that his statements from the court-ordered psychiatric exam were admissible to impeach Rosen if he chose to testify at his second trial. Electing not to testify, Rosen was again convicted of murder.The Third Circuit affirmed the district court in denying relief. Rosen cannot demonstrate that using his statements to the psychiatric expert at the second trial for the limited purpose of impeachment would violate clearly established Fifth Amendment law. Rosen both initiated an evaluation and introduced psychiatric evidence at his first criminal trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could reasonably find that the Fifth Amendment waiver triggered by Rosen’s mental health defense at his first trial extended to his second trial, at least with respect to the issues raised by his own expert. View "Rosen v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI" on Justia Law

In Tribune’s reorganization bankruptcy plan, Senior Noteholders were assigned their own class (1E) of unsecured creditors. When they did not accept the Plan but other classes did, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed it under the cramdown provision.The provision at issue, 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(1), provides: Notwithstanding section 510(a) … [making subordination agreements enforceable in bankruptcy to the extent they would be in nonbankruptcy law], if all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this section [1129] other than paragraph (8) [which requires that each class of claims has accepted the plan] are met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan notwithstanding the requirements of such paragraph [8] if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.The Third Circuit agreed with the district court that the text of section 1129(b)(1) supplants strict enforcement of subordination agreements. When “cramdown plans play with subordinated sums, the comparison of similarly situated creditors is tested through a more flexible unfair discrimination standard.” Subsection 1129(b)(1) does not require subordination agreements to be enforced strictly. The difference in the Senior Noteholders’ recovery is not material. Although the Plan discriminates, it is not presumptively unfair. View "In re: Tribune Co." on Justia Law

Romero, a citizen of Mexico, sought admission to the U.S. at a Houston airport in 2011. Relying on a fraudulent passport, he claimed to be a U.S. citizen. Romero was removed to Mexico. In 2013, Romero re-entered and was again removed. In 2013, Romero re-entered and evaded officials for six years. An alien subject to reinstatement of a removal order may seek withholding of removal if the alien has a reasonable fear of persecution based on his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion and may seek relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). During a “reasonable fear” interview, Romero, represented by counsel, testified that he is afraid to return to Mexico because Valencia, the father of Romero’s wife’s daughter and an alleged cartel member, will harm him. He stated that he has never been harmed, nor does he fear harm in Mexico based on his race, religion, sex, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Romero had been threatened by Valencia by phone but Valencia never acted on the threats. Romero did not report the threats to the police.An IJ affirmed the asylum officer’s determination that Romero did not have a reasonable fear of torture as required for CAT relief or reasonable fear of persecution as required for withholding of removal. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review, concluding that the findings were supported by substantial evidence. View "Romero v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law