Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Figueroa, a citizen of Honduras, entered the U.S. unlawfully. He told an asylum officer, Figueroa stated that his father, uncle, and cousins were killed in Honduras and that he feared their killers would also kill him; he referred to rivals seeking to seize his father’s land and to his father reporting his sister’s rape by gang members. After his removal, Figueroa reentered the U.S. in 2012. DHS reinstated Figueroa’s prior removal order. This time Figueroa attributed the deaths of his family members to the gang responsible for raping his sister. He claimed that his father was involved in anti-gang political activities, that the gang once beat him, and that the gang continued to threaten him and his family. He produced police reports and testified that those reports never resulted in arrests. The IJ denied found that Figueroa faced a clear probability of future harm in Honduras due to his membership in a particular social group (his family) but that such harm from private actors would not constitute persecution or torture. The BIA determined that Figueroa did not establish either that the Honduran government was “unable or unwilling to control” the gang, or that the government “condoned the private actions or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect [him].”The Third Circuit denied relief, noting that Figueroa might be a fugitive disentitled to relief. In denying his application for statutory withholding of removal, the agency did not err in treating the unable-or-unwilling-to-control test and the condone-or-complete helplessness test as legal equivalents. Figueroa did not demonstrate the requisite connection between the gang’s acts and the government. Substantial evidence supports the BIA conclusion, in denying CAT protection, that Honduran police would investigate reports from Figueroa, so he failed to establish governmental acquiescence to torture. View "Figueroa v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

In 1999, Holland was charged with drug and conspiracy crimes and using a gun to murder someone during those crimes. Count Three charged him with using a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime and with aiding and abetting that crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Holland’s customer, Stewart, testified that she regularly bought crack cocaine from him and had once traded a gun to Holland for cash and drugs. Based on that exchange, the jury found that the gun had been used during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. Holland was convicted on all charges, except the murder count. The court imposed two life sentences plus a five-year consecutive term on Count Three.After an unsuccessful direct appeal, he unsuccessfully sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2007, the Supreme Court held, in “Watson,” that a person does not “use” a gun under section 924(c) when he trades away drugs for a gun. Holland sought habeas relief under section 2241. The district court dismissed, reasoning that he should have filed under 2255.The district court dismissed two more identical 2241 petitions as successive under section 2244(a). The Third Circuit affirmed. Holland's fourth 2241 petition based on Watson was not treated as successive. The court found that the petition was properly filed under 2241 since a 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of Holland’s detention but denied Holland’s petition on the merits. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that neither Holland nor his trading partner appears to have violated section 924(c), so he may be actually innocent. View "Holland v. Warden Canaan USP" on Justia Law

Doe became a TCNJ tenure-track Assistant Professor in 2016, after giving birth to her third child. She alleges that the Dean and the Department Chair suggested that they were relieved that she would not need pregnancy-related accommodations in the future. Doe received positive reviews for 2017. Doe claims that after she became pregnant again, she was reassigned to a less desirable class. After Doe had her fourth child, the Dean, the Chair, and others, repeatedly asked whether she was done having children. She notified TCNJ that she was pregnant again. In 2018, a TCNJ professor attended the same class that the professor had positively reviewed in 2017 but entered a negative review; Doe claims there were no material changes. The Chair reported “non-material deficiencies” after having given her a positive review in 2017. Doe complained to the Provost, who allegedly “placed a record of discipline” in Doe’s personnel file for the Reappointment Committee. She claims she “suffered emotional trauma, became depressed, and had a miscarriage,” and that she was falsely accused of canceling classes, supported by “doctored” student comments. Doe was not reappointed.She filed suit, alleging gender, national origin, and pregnancy discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of her motion to proceed anonymously. Doe’s case does not merit appellate review under the collateral order doctrine. Nothing indicated that Doe’s interest in anonymity outweighs the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings. View "Doe v. The College of New Jersey" on Justia Law

Thayalan, a citizen of Sri Lanka, was apprehended near the U.S.– Mexico border after making an illegal entry. Thayalan expressed a fear of returning to Sri Lanka. The asylum officer found that Thayalan had demonstrated a credible fear of persecution Thayalan testified that in 2007, when he was about 16 years old, he was kidnapped and blindfolded by members of the Sri Lankan army. While he was detained, soldiers hit his head against a wall and punched him in the stomach. He also described 2019 incidents, when members of the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) tried to extort money from him because of the EPDP’s false belief that he financially supported a rival political party.Thayalan was ordered removed based on findings that the army’s mistreatment of Thayalan did not rise to the level of persecution and the EPDP members targeted Thayalan for extortion because they wanted his money, not because of disapproval of any political opinion. Thayalan failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a ground protected by statute and was ineligible for both asylum and withholding of removal. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting arguments that the past-persecution determination contravened its precedents and that substantial evidence did not support the agency’s determination about what motivated the EPDP’s extortion efforts.. View "Thayalan v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

In 1997, Romero, a citizen of Guatemala, was granted voluntary departure, having entered the U.S. without documentation. In 2011, Romero was removed. He returned almost immediately. When he was taken into custody, DHS notified Romero of its intent to reinstate his prior removal order. Romero expressed a fear of returning to Guatemala and was referred to an asylum officer, 8 C.F.R. 208.31(b). Finding that Romero had “a reasonable fear of persecution,” the asylum officer referred the matter to an IJ.The Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge provided the place of the hearing, noting that the date and time were “To Be Determined.” Romero subsequently received a Notice of Withdrawal-Only Hearing that included the date, time, and place. The IJ denied withholding of removal. Before the BIA, Romero cited the Supreme Court’s 2018 “Pereira” decision, and argued that “[a] notice of referral to [an] immigration judge is an analogous document to a notice to appear and must contain a location and a date and time for a removal hearing in order to create jurisdiction for an immigration court.”The BIA rejected Romero’s jurisdictional challenge, reasoning that it lacked the authority to grant the relief Mejia Romero sought – termination of the proceedings – in a withholding proceeding. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Romero’s Notice of Withholding-Only Hearing included the information required by the regulations. Pereira’s holding is not readily transferable to 8 C.F.R. 1003.14. View "Romero v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

In 2002, at the age of seven, Sanchez, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection. In 2012, he obtained Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status; DHS periodically granted him renewals. In 2019, Sanchez was charged in New Jersey with sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child. USCIS revoked Sanchez’s DACA status. DHS took him into custody and charged him as being present without having been admitted or paroled, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii).Sanchez applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and for relief under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ denied asylum, finding that Sanchez failed to meet the one-year filing deadline or show extraordinary circumstances; denied withholding of removal, finding the proposed social group was not cognizable; and denied his CAT claim, finding he did not demonstrate at least a 50 percent chance he would be tortured upon his return to Mexico. Two weeks after the IJ ordered Sanchez’s removal, his state criminal charges were dismissed.The BIA denied remand, citing then-Attorney General Sessions’ 2018 Castro-Tum holding that, under the regulations governing the Executive Office of Immigration Review, IJs and the BIA do not have the general authority to indefinitely suspend immigration proceedings by administrative closure unless a regulation or a previous judicially approved settlement expressly authorizes such an action. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. The relevant regulations confer the general authority to administratively close cases to IJs and the BIA. View "Sanchez v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

In 1994, K.A., a citizen of Nigeria, entered the U.S. without documentation. In 1997, he married a U.S. citizen. He subsequently committed second-degree robbery (N.J. Stat. 2C:15-1) and received a 10-year sentence, and committed third-degree possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school (2C:35-7), resulting in a five-year sentence. K.A. was paroled in 2008. During removal proceedings, K.A. was stopped for DUI and was charged with using inmates’ personal information to submit fraudulent tax returns. K.A. unsuccessfully sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The Third Circuit denied K.A.’s petition for review.In 2014, Nigeria criminalized same-sex sexual relationships. K.A. had begun a sexual relationship with his male cellmate. K.A. realized that his “identity as a bisexual man [was] permanent” and moved to reopen his immigration proceedings, arguing changed country conditions in Nigeria. He asserted that his New Jersey drug conviction no longer qualified as an aggravated felony and expressed fear that he would be subjected to persecution as a member of the LGBT community. The BIA denied K.A.’s motion. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The 2000 New Jersey robbery conviction constitutes an aggravated felony “theft offense” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), which constitutes a “particularly serious crime,” sections 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B), and disqualifies an alien from seeking asylum. A conviction for a particularly serious crime coupled with a prison sentence of at least five years bars withholding of removal. View "K. A. v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The defendants each pled guilty to their respective crimes, possession of a firearm by a felon, and wire fraud-identity theft. As part of their plea agreements, each agreed not to argue for a sentence outside the range recommended by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The government contends that both defendants breached their plea agreements by in fact seeking sentences below the guidelines-recommended ranges. One defense attorney stated” “I would hope Your Honor would consider probation, house arrest, community service, anything other than jail time.” In that case, the sentence roughly a third of the time called for by the sentencing range. The other defendant argued that the defendant’s co-conspirator had received a lower sentence.The Third Circuit vacated the sentences, finding the government’s contentions well-founded. In both cases, defense counsel went beyond presenting facts and advocated for a below-Guidelines sentence. The court rejected one defendant’s argument that evidence discovered during the traffic stop leading to his arrest should have been suppressed because the stop violated the Fourth Amendment; the police officer was justified in stopping his vehicle and did not impermissibly extend the duration of the stop. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In 2017, Kirschner earned $30,105 by importing counterfeit coins and bullion and then, posing as a federal law enforcement agent, selling them as genuine articles to unsuspecting customers. Searching his home and interdicting packages, agents seized thousands of counterfeit coins and bullion that, according to the government’s expert, would have been worth approximately $46.5 million if genuine. Kirschner pleaded guilty to impersonating an officer acting under the authority of the United States, 18 U.S.C. 912, and importing counterfeit coins and bars with intent to defraud, 18 U.S.C. 485. The court applied a two-level sentencing enhancement because Kirschner’s fraud used sophisticated means; another two-level enhancement because Kirschner abused a position of public trust to facilitate his crimes; and a 22-level enhancement because the “loss” attributable to his scheme was greater than $25 million but less than $65 million.The Third Circuit vacated Kirschner’s 126-month sentence. While the district court was within its discretion to apply the abuse-of-trust and use-of-sophisticated-means enhancements, it clearly erred in applying the 22-level enhancement for loss, and the error was not harmless. While the court focused on what Kirschner intended to do with the high-value counterfeits, it never found that the government proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Kirschner intended to sell the coins as counterfeits (not replicas) for the prices the government claimed. View "United States v. Kirschner" on Justia Law

Shulick, an attorney, owned and operated DVHS, a for-profit business that provided alternative education to at-risk students. The School District of Philadelphia contracted with DVHS to operate Southwest School for the 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 school years. DVHS was to provide six teachers at a cost of $45,000 each; benefits for the staff at a total cost of $170,000 annually; four security workers totaling $130,000 annually; and a trained counselor and two psychology externs totaling $110,000 annually. The agreement was not flexible as to budgeted items. Shulick failed to employ the required dedicated security personnel, hired fewer teachers, provided fewer benefits, and paid his educators far less than required. Shulick had represented to the District that he would spend $850,000 on salary and benefits annually but spent about $396,000 in 2010-11 and $356,000 in 2011-12. Shulick directed the unspent funds to co-conspirator Fattah, the son of a former U.S. Representative, to pay off liabilities incurred across Shulick’s business ventures, keeping a cut for himself.Shulick was convicted of conspiring with Fattah to embezzle from a program receiving federal funds (18 U.S.C. 371), embezzling funds from a federally funded program (18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(A)), bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344), making a false statement to a bank (18 U.S.C. 1014), and three counts of filing false tax returns (26 U.S.C. 7206(1)). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments ranging from speedy trial violations to errors in evidentiary rulings, faulty jury instructions, and sentencing miscalculations. View "United States v. Shulick" on Justia Law