Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Palisade sought to build a 150-bed for-profit assisted living facility, which would provide supportive services to memory care patients 0n a 4.96-acre parcel located partially in the city and partially in the borough. The city opposes its construction because the property is in a “one-family residence” zoning district. Palisade argued that the zoning ordinance discriminated on its face against individuals with disabilities by not permitting assisted living facilities as of right in the single-family district and by explicitly allowing them in only one zoning district. The district court granted Palisade a preliminary injunction.The Third Circuit vacated. The zoning ordinance, by failing to include “assisted living facilities” among its permitted uses in the single-family district, but explicitly allowing them in a different district, does not facially discriminate against the disabled in violation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604. Failure to permit a land use as of right is not tantamount to an express prohibition. There is no indication that disabled status, rather than the building size or the commercial character of the development, is the dispositive trait, singled out for different treatment. The court noted that Palisade did not seek a variance. View "431 East Palisade Avenue Real Estate LLC v. City of Englewood" on Justia Law

Mirambeaux, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1999. In 2008, Mirambeaux pled guilty to the distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. In 2018, he was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), for that conviction, and under 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an aggravated felon. Mirambeaux applied for withholding of removal but declined to seek protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Mirambeaux argued that he fears returning to the Dominican Republic, citing the murders of three friends over the last 10 years. He was not able to identify a specific person or group he feared, and referenced “[c]rime in general.” Mirambeaux sought a continuance to gather support documents. The IJ denied the motion, stating “he’s been detained for several months now. . . The Court does not see good cause why those documents have not been obtained.” The IJ concluded that Mirambeaux’s aggravated felony conviction left him statutorily ineligible for asylum, for withholding of removal, and under CAT, noting that Mirambeaux could not specify who harmed his friends or why, nor was he able to establish that the government would not be able to protect him. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit dismissed a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. Mirambeaux failed to state a colorable constitutional claim or question of law within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D). View "Mirambeaux v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Hernandez-Morales, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. illegally in 1995. He shares custody of his daughters, who are U.S. citizens. During the week, the daughters live with their father in a well-regarded school district. He has a successful career as a chef, working at the same restaurant for 15 years. Hernandez-Morales was convicted of simple assault on his wife and of driving under the influence. Hernandez-Morales unsuccessfully sought cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C.1229b; the IJ found his removal would not cause his daughters “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” and he would not merit relief because of his criminal convictions. The BIA dismissed the "hardship" appeal and did not reach his criminal record.The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal, reasoning that it lacks jurisdiction to review discretionary denials of relief under section 1229b and whether hardship is “exceptional and extremely unusual” “is a "quintessential discretionary judgment.” While the court retains jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law, Hernandez-Morales did not assert a constitutional claim but only challenged the IJ’s finding that his wife could take over his lease and keep their daughters in their current school and weighing of his moral character. “A party may not dress up a claim with legal clothing to invoke” jurisdiction. View "Hernandez-Morales v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

AndroGel is a testosterone replacement therapy that generated billions of dollars in sales. The Federal Trade Commission sued under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, alleging that AndroGel’s patent owners filed sham patent infringement suits against Teva and Perrigo and entered into an anticompetitive reverse-payment agreement with Teva. The FTC accused the patent owners of trying to monopolize and restrain trade over AndroGel. The District Court dismissed the FTC’s claims to the extent they relied on a reverse-payment theory but found the owners liable for monopolization on a sham-litigation theory and ordered disgorgement of $448 million in ill-gotten profits. The court denied the FTC’s request for an injunction.The Third Circuit reversed in part, holding that the district court erred by rejecting the reverse-payment theory and in concluding the owners’ litigation against Teva was a sham. The court erred by ordering disgorgement because that remedy is unavailable under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act. The court affirmed in part. The district court correctly concluded that the Perrigo litigation was a sham and that the owners had monopoly power in the relevant market but did not show the monopolization entitles the FTC to any remedy. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying injunctive relief. View "Federal Trade Commission v. AbbVie Inc" on Justia Law

An individual arrested in Philadelphia typically is brought before an Arraignment Court Magistrate for a preliminary arraignment. If an arrestee seeks review of the magistrate’s decision, an emergency municipal court judge is available to conduct an immediate review by telephone. The hearings are open to the public, but transcripts of the hearings are not made and audio recordings are not available to the public. Following a hearing, the public may obtain copies of court documents, including the bail bond, the criminal complaint, the bail hearing subpoena, and a bail appeal report if applicable. Those documents do not include the parties’ arguments or the magistrate’s reasoning. Bail Fund sends volunteers into Philadelphia bail hearings to observe and report on the proceedings and produces reports to educate Philadelphia citizens and officials. Bail Fund sought permission to create its own audio recordings, and later filed suit raising an as-applied First Amendment challenge to Pennsylvania Rules: Criminal Procedure 112(C); Judicial Administration 1910(B); and Philadelphia Municipal Court Arraignment Court Magistrate 7.09.4 The district court granted Bail Fund summary judgment.The Third Circuit reversed, declining to extend the First Amendment right of access to the courts into a right to make or require the creation of audio recordings. Bail Fund can attend bail hearings and take handwritten notes; that its volunteers may not be able to capture every word does not meaningfully interfere with the public’s ability to inform itself of the proceedings. View "Reed v. Devlin" on Justia Law

A union representing healthcare network employees learned that the network was being sold to another entity and that the sale agreement contained information bearing on the terms and conditions of its members’ employment. The union asked for a full copy of the agreement for “effects bargaining.” The employer, asserting that the agreement was confidential and not relevant to collective bargaining, refused to provide any of it. The union filed unfair labor charges with the National Labor Relations Board, which found that at least part of the agreement was relevant and that the employer violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151. The Board ordered the employer to provide a complete, unredacted copy.The Third Circuit affirmed in part. Substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that the employer violated the NLRA. The duty to bargain in good faith includes the general obligation of an employer to provide information that is needed by the bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties. The Board abused its broad remedial discretion in ordering the employer to disclose the entire agreement; the Union never established the relevance of the entire agreement. When a union requests relevant, yet confidential information, the Board is required to balance a union’s need for the information against any legitimate and substantial confidentiality interests established by the employer. View "Crozer-Chester Medical Center v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Tyson handed his gun to Powell and waited in the getaway car while Powell shot and killed two men in a stopped van. A Monroe County, Pennsylvania jury convicted Tyson of two counts of first-degree murder as an accomplice. In seeking post-conviction relief in state court, Tyson claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the court’s erroneous instruction, which he argued allowed the jury to find him guilty without finding he possessed the requisite intent to kill.In federal habeas proceedings, the district court held the state court reasonably applied federal law in finding his trial counsel was not ineffective and denied relief. The Third Circuit reversed, finding a strong likelihood the jury convicted Tyson as an accomplice to first-degree murder without finding he possessed the specific intent to kill. There was no language in the instruction that would lead the jury to connect the requisite intent to kill to the role of an accomplice. In light of the instruction’s “profound impropriety,” the court concluded that trial counsel acted unreasonably in failing to object. Counsel’s failure to object to the court’s instruction led to the likelihood that the jury interpreted the law in a way that lessened the Commonwealth’s burden of proof. View "Tyson v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI" on Justia Law

DLJ brought a debt and foreclosure action against the Sheridans and the IRS. At the close of DLJ’s case-in-chief, the district court granted judgment in favor of DLJ under FRCP 52(c), concluding that DLJ satisfied all elements of its claim. The Third Circuit affirmed. Sheridan was “fully heard” prior to judgment. At the close of its case-in-chief, DLJ moved for judgment based on partial findings. Sheridan did not object to the consideration of the motion. The parties made their respective arguments as to whether DLJ met its burden of providing evidence sufficient to establish its debt and foreclosure claims and whether DLJ had standing. Sheridan could have only challenged the validity of the loan documents through cross-examination of DLJ’s witness, Holmes, which he was given the opportunity to do, or through his own testimony, to the extent he had any personal knowledge. Sheridan has not indicated what additional admissible evidence he intended to present to contest DLJ’s standing. The court heard and considered Sheridan’s arguments concerning the transfer of the note and the validity of the assignment. He was fully heard with regard to DLJ’s standing to foreclose. Sheridan’s original answer asserted boilerplate affirmative defenses, none of which contained any allegations of fraud or violations of the Truth in Lending Act; Sheridan’s motion to amend was untimely, and the late assertion of fraud would have prejudiced DLJ. View "DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc. v. Sheridan" on Justia Law

Alita, her son, and her stepfather died in a fire that engulfed their Philadelphia apartment. With the building already burning, Alita had called 911. A fire department operator instructed her to remain inside, promising help was on the way. Firefighters initially drove to the wrong location and, at the scene, never learned that the family was waiting. The firefighters extinguished the blaze without a search, leaving all three trapped in their home where they perished from smoke inhalation. Days passed before firefighters returned and discovered their bodies. Their estates sued the city and two fire department employees.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The state-created danger theory does not apply. The dispatcher did not act affirmatively to create the danger, but only failed to communicate the family’s location, and the operator’s behavior did not shock the conscience. The employees neglected to relay the information through error, omission, or oversight. There is no plausible allegation that the city was deliberately indifferent to anyone’s substantive due process rights. Rejecting a negligence argument based on the history of problems at the residence, and failure to fix the building’s fire hazards, the court reasoned that the city was immune from these claims because it had insufficient control over the building. View "Johnson v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Three Pennsylvania teachers who obtained tenure contracts under the state’s Public School Code brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Scranton School District deprived them of rights under the Contracts Clause when it applied a Pennsylvania law, Act 2017-55, to suspend them from employment. Act 55 amended the Public School Code to authorize the suspension of tenured teachers for economic reasons. Act 55 took effect after the plaintiffs entered into tenure contracts; they claimed the change in the law allowing for their suspensions based on economic reasons amounted to a substantial impairment of their tenure contract rights and that the suspensions were not a necessary or reasonable way to address the District’s financial problems.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claim. The teachers failed to state a section 1983 claim premised on the Contracts Clause because their complaint and its exhibits show that the suspensions were necessary and reasonable measures to advance the significant and legitimate public purpose of combatting the budget shortage. View "Watters v. Board of School Directors of the City of Scranton" on Justia Law