Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Valarezo-Tirado, an Ecuadorian citizen, entered the U.S. illegally in 2017. In 2020, DHS reinstated a 2015 removal order and conducted a reasonable fear interview. Valarezo-Tirado was twice informed of his right to postpone the interview to procure an attorney and was provided with a list of pro bono attorneys. He proceeded without an attorney. Valarezo-Tirado described his interactions with police concerning a conflict with a neighbor who was involved in drug trafficking and his fear for his family’s safety, The asylum officer found that Valarezo-Tirado was “credible,” but that he did not establish a reasonable fear of persecution or torture if removed to Ecuador, stating that the verbal threats of unspecified harm did not rise to the level of severe physical or mental pain. Valarezo-Tirado failed to provide specific and persuasive evidence to establish a reasonable possibility that a public official would acquiesce to his future harm. On appeal, he again declined to seek legal representation. The IJ found that the situation amounted to “a personal matter.”The Third Circuit remanded. The IJ did not adequately explain the reasons for her decision. On remand, if the IJ concludes Valarezo-Tirado must come forth with corroborating evidence, she must reopen the proceedings, inform Valarezo-Tirado of the evidence that requires corroboration, and must give Valarezo-Tirado an opportunity to furnish such information or provide an explanation for its absence. The court rejected Valarezo-Tirado’s argument that he was denied his right to counsel. View "Valarezo-Tirado v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

In 2002, Farfield contracted with SEPTA for improvements on Philadelphia-area railroad tracks. The federal government partially funded the project. Work concluded in 2007. As required by federal regulation, Department of Labor (DOL) prevailing wage determinations were incorporated into the contract. Farfield was required to submit to SEPTA for transmission to the Federal Transit Administration a copy of Farfield’s certified payroll, setting out all the information required under the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. 3142(a), with a “Statement of Compliance” averring that the information in the payroll was correct and complete and that each worker was paid not less than the applicable wage rates and benefits for the classification of work performed, as specified in the applicable wage determination. Falsification of a payroll certification could subject Farfield to criminal penalties or civil liability under the False Claims Act (FCA).A union business manager suspected that Farfield had won government contracts with low bids by intending to pay less-skilled workers to perform certain work that would otherwise have been the bailiwick of higher-skilled, higher-paid workers. Ultimately, the union filed a qui tam FCA complaint. The United States declined to intervene. The court entered a $1,055,320.62 judgment against Farfield: $738,724.43 to the government and $316,596.19 to the union, plus $1,229,927.55 in attorney fees and $203,226.45 in costs. The Third Circuit affirmed. In view of the totality of the circumstances, Farfield’s Davis-Bacon violations were not minor or insubstantial. View "International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Farfield Co" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against the School District, claiming that shortcomings in the District’s translation and interpretation services violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400.The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the District, based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A “systemic exception” to IDEA’s administrative exhaustion requirement applies where plaintiffs “allege systemic legal deficiencies and, correspondingly, request system-wide relief" that cannot be addressed through the administrative process. The fact that a complaint is structured as a class action seeking injunctive relief, without more, does not excuse exhaustion; the systemic exception applies when plaintiffs challenge policies that threaten basic IDEA goals, not mere components of special education programs. Both named plaintiffs could bring the same IDEA claim from their complaint before a hearing officer who could then order that the District provide each parent with translated individualized education plans, more qualified or consistent interpretation services, or whatever process would ensure meaningful participation for that parent. Both the claim and the relief would be individualized, even if the relief could create spillover benefits for other parents. View "T.R. v. School District of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

The Company operates an electrical system from a central “control room” where 16 system operators and 15 dispatchers manage electrical transmission and facilitate fieldwork. Outside the control room, the Company deploys about 300 field employees. System operators oversee and remotely control the transmission system and prioritize work needs and resources. Field supervisors select crews to undertake the work and prepare and communicate switching instructions for field employees.The Union petitioned for an election to determine whether system operators would join an existing bargaining unit. The Company argued that they were supervisors, not “employee[s]” and not “entitled to the Act’s protections [or] includable in a bargaining unit.” The Board’s Regional Director found that system operators were not supervisors and directed the Company to conduct a self-determination election. In a second election, the system operators voted to join the bargaining unit. The Board upheld the Regional Director’s decision concerning whether system operators have the authority, using independent judgment, to assign employees to places or responsibly to direct employees.The Board found that the Company’s subsequent refusal to bargain violated the Act. The Third Circuit affirmed. Substantial evidence established that system operators lack the authority to assign employees to a place under 29 U.S.C. 152; system operators cannot assign field employees to times. The Board permissibly concluded that system operators’ purported direction of field employees does not require independent judgment. View "Atlantic City Electric Co v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Pennsylvania State Police received a tip about suspicious eBay activity and discovered several messages, seeking to buy children’s used underwear and posing as a child looking for photos of other children in their undergarments. The username was registered to “Robert Caesar” of Oxford, PA. Other information corroborated Caesar’s connection to the eBay account. While the investigation was ongoing, Officer Gallina received information that Caesar had sexually abused two adolescent brothers. After interviewing the boys, Gallina applied for warrants to search for evidence of aggravated indecent assault of a minor, seeking physical evidence of the alleged sexual abuse, consisting of “[s]emen and bodily fluid,” and images of child pornography stored on personal electronic devices. Although the supporting affidavit included no express allegations that Caesar possessed child pornography, it stated that child abusers “routinely keep” such images. During the ensuing search, officers seized electronic equipment. A third warrant authorized the search of those devices, which contained child pornography.The Third Circuit reversed, in part, the suppression of thousands of images of child pornography and of Caesar’s sexual abuse victims. Whether they were enough to satisfy probable cause, the allegations about Caesar’s prolonged sexual abuse of the brothers and his interest in photos of undressed children supported the reasonableness of the officers’ belief that probable cause existed. Gallina’s reliance on the initial warrant and his conduct securing the warrant did not approach the gross negligence required to trigger the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Caesar" on Justia Law

For much of his life, Wallace has suffered from severe mental illness, including bipolar disorder with psychotic features, chronic depression, ADHD, and major affective disorder. On February 28, 2000, Wallace, during a severe psychotic episode, got into bed with his wife, Eileen, and used the knife to stab Eileen to death. Wallace then dressed, stowed the knife in a drawer, and locked the house, leaving Eileen’s body behind. Wallace took a train to Philadelphia where he planned to commit suicide. Police were waiting for him; his mother had disclosed his whereabouts. Wallace admitted to stabbing Eileen, acting on a belief that death would set her spirit free. Wallace pleaded guilty but mentally ill to third-degree murder and related crimes. He missed the January 2002 deadline for a federal habeas corpus petition and filed in September 2015, arguing that his mental illness so hampered his ability to think clearly that he could not reasonably have been expected to file earlier.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition, concluding that Wallace was not entitled to equitable tolling to extend the filing deadline. Although Wallace claimed that his prescribed use of the drug Ritalin may have exacerbated his psychosis, rendering him involuntarily intoxicated or legally insane at the time of his crime such that he could not form the mens rea necessary for murder, the court declined to employ the “actual innocence gateway,” to excuse him from the deadline. View "Wallace v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI" on Justia Law

The hospital, located in Philadelphia, received a reclassification into the New York City area, which would sizably increase the hospital’s Medicare reimbursements due to that area’s higher wage index, 42 U.S.C. 1395ww(d). Although a statute makes such reclassifications effective for three fiscal years, the agency updated the geographical boundaries for the New York City area before the close of that period and reassigned the hospital to an area in New Jersey with an appreciably lower wage index. The hospital successfully sued three agency officials in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for dismissal. The Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395oo(f)(1), channels reimbursement disputes through administrative adjudication as a near-absolute prerequisite to judicial review. The hospital did not pursue its claim through administrative adjudication before suing in federal court. By not following the statutory channeling requirement, the hospital has no valid basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Temple University Hospital, Inc. v. Secretary United States Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

Following two fires at its steel plant, U.S. Steel polluted the air. Because that pollution violated its Clean Air Act permits and regulations, it reported the incidents to the local officials who enforce that Act, the Allegheny County Health Department. The Clean Air Council, an environmental watchdog, sued, arguing that under CERCLA, U.S. Steel should have reported the pollution to the federal government too. CERCLA (the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act) exempts from reporting any “federally permitted” emissions, 42 U.S.C. 9603, including emissions “subject to” certain Clean Air Act permits and regulations. The Council argued that “subject to” means “obedient to” so that an emission cannot be “subject to” a permit or regulation that it violates.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. In context, “subject to” means “governed or affected by.” Since U.S. Steel’s emissions were governed by a Clean Air Act permit, that means they were “federally permitted” under CERCLA and exempt from federal reporting. View "Clean Air Council v. United States Steel Corp." on Justia Law

The Third Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the BIA's decision denying petitioner's motion to reopen immigration proceedings after the IJ denied petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In this case, the IJ sustained charges of removeability against petitioner, who is a native and citizen of Jamaica living in the United States, after she pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud.The court concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision declining to reopen petitioner's proceedings sua sponte, but the court has jurisdiction over the remaining issues in the petition under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a). The court concluded that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reopen in part because it contained no evidence to warrant reconsideration of the conclusion that petitioner had failed to establish official acquiescence. The court emphasized that petitioner's motion to reopen fails not because it contained unconvincing evidence of official acquiescence, but because it contained no such evidence. Petitioner fails the materiality requirement—and falls short of the procedural hurdle—because she presented no evidence addressing a core deficiency of her application. The court explained that, had she produced such evidence, the BIA could then move to the substantive hurdle and evaluate whether the evidence established a reasonable likelihood that she can establish that she is entitled to relief. Finally, the court rejected petitioner's due process claims, concluding that petitioner has no protectible expectation of entitlement of relief. In any event, the court was confident that the BIA reviewed the evidence petitioner presented and applied the presumption of regularity to its determination. View "Darby v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

Valeant develops and manufactures generic pharmaceuticals. Appellants purchased stock in Valeant after Valeant changed its business model to focus more on acquiring new drugs from other companies rather than developing its own. Valeant made promising representations about its financial performance based on its new business model. The price of Valeant stock skyrocketed nearly 350% in 2015. Before the district court addressed class certification in a putative class action on behalf of investors who purchased Valeant stock in 2015, alleging that the price was artificially inflated as a result of deceptive practices, the Appellants filed an “opt-out” complaint bringing the same claims in their individual capacities. The district court dismissed that complaint as untimely under the two-year limitations period.The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal. Putative class members may recover as part of the class or seek individual recourse. Members may initially proceed as part of a class, but certification may be denied later or members may discover that their individual claims are more valuable than the class claims and decide to pursue an opt-out complaint even if certification is likely. In either case, members are generally allowed to initiate an individual action. When a class complaint is filed, the limitations period governing the individual claims of putative members is tolled to protect the rights of putative members while avoiding needless identical lawsuits. Nothing further, such as a certification denial, is required to benefit from tolling. View "Aly v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc." on Justia Law