Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

America Can! Cars for Kids and Kars 4 Kids are charities that sell donated vehicles to fund children’s programs. America began receiving donations in the late 1980s and, in the early 1990s, began using the mark “Cars for Kids” in advertising campaigns. Kars first used flyers and bumper stickers, then distributed nationwide mailers. In the early 2000s, Kars began other advertising. In 2003, America noticed Kars’ advertisements in Texas and sent a cease and desist letter. America did not notice Kars’ advertisements in Texas for several years. Kars, however, kept advertising, including in Texas, and procured the URL www.carsforkids.com. In 2013, America sent Kars another cease and desist letter. Kars sued in 2014, bringing federal and state trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution claims, and seeking equitable relief. America filed suit in 2015, asserting the same claims and seeking cancelation of Kars’ trademark for 1-877- KARS-4-KIDS under 15 U.S.C. 1119, financial compensation, and a nationwide injunction prohibiting Kars from using the mark.The Third Circuit held that America did not preserve its challenge to the denial of summary judgment on its trademark cancelation claims; America was first to use its mark in Texas and Kars waived any challenge to the validity of America’s marks; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award enhanced monetary relief or prejudgment interest. The court remanded for reexamination of the court’s conclusions on laches and disgorgement. View "Kars 4 Kids Inc. v. America Can! Cars For Kids." on Justia Law

Three decades ago, Vogt and McClearn were part of a group who took Landry to a quarry, forced Landry off a cliff into the water, then rolled a “huge rock” in behind him. Landry suffered blunt force trauma and drowned. McClearn pleaded guilty to third-degree murder. McClearn’s testimony linked Vogt to Landry’s death. A jury convicted Vogt of first-degree murder. He was sentenced to life without parole. McClearn sent a letter to Vogt dated October 2016, recanting his testimony. McClearn wrote that he had a different partner in crime that night; Vogt was “passed out in the car” and did not have “anything to do with” Landry’s murder. The prison’s policy is to reject mail lacking a return address, so it rejected the letter. Six months later, Vogt contacted a Postal Service reclamation center looking for a different mailing. The Post Office returned several items, including McClearn’s letter. By then, McClearn was dead.Vogt filed a grievance about the letter’s rejection. The prison denied it as untimely. In Pennsylvania post-conviction proceedings, he challenged his guilty verdict and argued the letter supported his actual innocence. The court dismissed his petition as untimely. In a subsequent pro se federal complaint, Vogt claimed the rejection of the mail without notice violated his right to procedural due process and claimed his First Amendment right to access the courts was violated. He sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Meanwhile, the state court vacated the dismissal of Vogt’s post-conviction petition. The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal of Vogt’s section 1983 complaint. Under Supreme Court precedent, prisons must notify inmates when their incoming mail is rejected. View "Vogt v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

The New Jersey Attorney General issued Law Enforcement Directive 2018-6, the Immigrant Trust Directive. Concluding “that individuals are less likely to report a crime if they fear that the responding officer will turn them over to immigration authorities,” the Directive barred counties and local law enforcement from assisting federal immigration authorities by providing any non-public personally-identifying information regarding any individual; providing access to any state, county, or local law enforcement equipment, office space, database, or property not available to the general public; providing access to a detained individual for an interview unless the detainee signs a written consent; or providing notice of a detained individual’s upcoming release from custody. The Directive prohibited “any agreement to exercise federal immigration authority” and required local law enforcement to “notify a detained individual” when federal immigration authorities requested to interview the person, to have the person detained past his release date, or to be informed of the person’s upcoming release.Plaintiffs cited 8 U.S.C. 1373 and 1644, which bar government officials and entities from prohibiting or restricting, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from federal immigration authorities “information regarding the citizenship or immigration status . . . of any individual.” The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Federal law does not preempt the Directive; every form of preemption is based on a federal law that regulates the conduct of private actors, not the states. View "Ocean County Board of Commissioners v. Attorney General of New Jersey" on Justia Law

In 1995, Rosado shot and killed Nguyen. Rosado was almost eighteen and a half years old. He pleaded guilty in Pennsylvania state court to first-degree murder and was sentenced to mandatory life without parole. He collaterally attacked his conviction in state and federal court, unsuccessfully claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court subsequently decided, in Miller v. Alabama, that the Eighth Amendment bars mandatory life-without-parole sentences for criminals who were under eighteen when they committed their crimes. Four years later, the Court held that Miller’s rule applies retroactively.Rosado brought another state habeas petition arguing that Miller’s rule applies to his case. State courts dismissed his petition as time-barred and then affirmed that dismissal. In 2018, he sought permission to file a second federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Though the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act normally bars second petitions, Rosado claimed to fall within an exception because he relied on Miller’s new, retroactive rule. The Third Circuit denied relief. Rosado waited more than six years after Miller to bring his challenge, past AEDPA’s one-year deadline for asserting newly recognized rights. Miller is limited to prisoners who were under 18 when they committed their crime, so his claim does not rely on Miller’s new rule. View "In re: Rosado" on Justia Law

Kengerski, a Captain at the Allegheny County Jail, made a written complaint to the jail Warden alleging that a colleague had called his biracial grand-niece a “monkey” and then sent him a series of text messages with racially offensive comments about his coworkers. Seven months later, Kengerski was fired. He contends the firing was retaliation for reporting his colleague’s behavior and sued t under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a). The district court granted the defendant summary judgment, holding that Kengerski, who is white, could not maintain a claim for Title VII retaliation.The Third Circuit vacated. Title VII protects all employees from retaliation when they reasonably believe that behavior at their work violates the statute and they make a good-faith complaint. Harassment against an employee because he associates with a person of another race, such as a family member, may violate Title VII by creating a hostile work environment. A reasonable person could believe that the Allegheny County Jail was a hostile work environment for Kengerski. Kengerski may not ultimately succeed on his retaliation claim or even survive summary judgment on remand. The county claims that it fired him for an unrelated reason that is unquestionably serious: mishandling a sexual harassment claim. View "Kengerski v. Harper" on Justia Law

The Borough brought misdemeanor criminal charges against the owner for abandoning inoperable vehicles, appliances, and other trash on his property, in violation of ordinances and statutes. During a status conference, the judge stated that, after the expiration of 20 days, the Borough could enter and start the clean-up; 21 days after the hearing, the Borough began cleaning the property without the owners’ permission or a warrant. Believing some of the removed items to be valuable, the owners sent a cease-and-desist letter and eventually filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 with state law claims for conversion and trespass.The district court that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction over appeals from state court judgments. Meanwhile, the owner was convicted of the public nuisance charge. The Third Circuit reversed. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is narrow and defeats federal subject-matter jurisdiction only under limited circumstances. There is a precise four-pronged inquiry. When even one of the four prongs is not satisfied, it is not proper to dismiss on Rooker-Feldman grounds. This case does not satisfy all four prongs. Any injury the owners suffered was not “caused by” a state court judgment; even if the Borough lacked independent authority to seize the property, the state court “acquiesced in” or “ratified” the Borough’s seizure of the property rather than having “produced” it. The owners did not challenge the state court judgment but brought independent constitutional claims. View "Vuyanich v. Borough of Smithton" on Justia Law

Over a six-month period in 2017, Perez sold firearms and controlled substances to various confidential informants and undercover officers. On March 9, 2017, he sold two firearms to an undercover officer. During the transaction, the officer observed drugs, drug packaging materials, and drug paraphernalia in the same room as the two guns. Perez was later charged in three separate indictments involving sales of guns or drugs. One indictment concerned the March 9th transaction. Perez ultimately pled guilty to all three indictments. The Sentencing Guidelines range was 121-151 months, including a four-level enhancement per U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which applies when the defendant “used or possessed any firearm . . . in connection with another felony offense,” concerning the March 9th transaction. The court concluded that the enhancement applied because the guns “were in close proximity to drugs and . . . drug material” and sentenced Perez to 121 months’ imprisonment.The Third Circuit vacated. Mere physical proximity between guns and drugs is not enough to justify the significant increase in Perez’s Guidelines range. The Commentary to the Guidelines, on which the district court relied, creates a rebuttable presumption, rather than a bright-line rule, that the enhancement should apply when a defendant possesses guns and drugs together. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Dondero served as the Lower Milford Township Chief of Police from 2006-2016. Dondero’s relationship with the Township Supervisors was rocky. While on duty in 2015, Dondero, then the only active member of the police department, suffered temporary “serious and debilitating injuries” from entering a burning building. While incapacitated, Dondero received disability benefits under Pennsylvania’s Heart and Lung Act (HLA). He went more than two months without contacting his boss, Koplin. In 2016, Koplin requested updated medical documents to verify his continued qualification for HLA benefits. Weeks later, citing financial concerns, the Supervisors passed a resolution to disband the Township police department. From the date of Dondero’s injury through the elimination of the police department (more than nine months) the Pennsylvania State Police provided Township residents full-time police coverage at no extra cost to the Township taxpayers.Dondero filed suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation, violations of substantive and procedural due process, unlawful conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, municipal liability based on discriminatory Township policies, and a violation of the Pennsylvania state constitution. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Township on all counts. No pre-termination hearing was required when the Township eliminated its police department and Dondero’s other claims lack merit. View "Dondero v. Lower Milford Township" on Justia Law

In 2002, Randolph was arraigned on two counts of first-degree murder, attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and five counts of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. The government sought the death penalty. Welch was appointed to Randolph’s defense and a trial date was set. Randolph’s relationship with Welch deteriorated immediately. Randolph expressed his dissatisfaction in court. Welch assured the court that he was committed to Randolph’s defense. The court twice delayed the trial. Randolph continued to complain about Welch and to ask about proceeding pro se, ultimately deciding against it. Randolph later secured the funds necessary to replace Welch with his choice of counsel, Stretton. Stretton, on the Wednesday before the Monday on which trial was to begin, entered his appearance and sought a delay. Welch supported Randolph’s desire to switch lawyers.Citing previous delays and the proximity to trial, the trial court denied a continuance and declined to delay Monday morning’s jury selection by three hours so that Stretton could attend a previously scheduled, mandatory engagement. When Stretton did not appear for jury selection, the court rejected his entry of appearance. Randolph had to proceed to trial represented by Welch, was convicted, and was sentenced to death. On federal habeas review, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, warranting de novo review of Randolph’s Sixth Amendment right to the counsel of his choice claim. View "Randolph v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departmartment of Corrections" on Justia Law

S.B., a 12-year-old boy with Down Syndrome, requires special education. In 2014, S.B. and his parents moved from New York to Lakewood, New Jersey. S.B.’s parents requested an individualized education program (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 20 U.S.C. 140, from the Lakewood Township School District. Lakewood determined it could not provide S.B. an IDEA-mandated free appropriate public education (FAPE) at its own public schools. It crafted an IEP that placed S.B. at the private School for Children with Hidden Intelligence (SCHI) and reimbursed the costs. In November 2016, the family moved homes and transferred S.B. from Lakewood to the Howell School District. Howell’s staff reviewed the Lakewood IEP, met with the family, and indicated “that [S.B.’s] IEP can be implemented in [Howell’s special education] class at Memorial Elementary School where [S.B.] will receive a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment.” His parents continued to send S.B. to SCHI. In February 2017, Howell terminated S.B.’s enrollment.After a due process hearing, an ALJ ruled for Howell. The district court granted Howell summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed. While section 1415(j), the “stay-put” provision, provides generally that eligible students must remain in their current educational settings during certain procedures, section 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I), the intrastate transfer provision, says that schools need only provide eligible transfer students comparable services to those they were previously receiving. View "Y.B. v. Howell Township Board of Education" on Justia Law