Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Julio Suarez participated in a scheme to file false federal income tax returns from March 2009 to September 2016. His role involved negotiating the sale of refund checks to check-cashing businesses and providing these checks to his co-conspirators. In April 2018, Suarez was charged with conspiracy to defraud the government, theft of government money, and aggravated identity theft. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the government and aggravated identity theft in August 2019.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania sentenced Suarez to seventy months in prison, which was at the top of his Guidelines range. During his sentence, the Sentencing Guidelines were amended, resulting in a lower Guidelines range for offenders with zero criminal history points. Suarez filed a motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which the District Court denied, despite acknowledging his eligibility for a reduction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Suarez argued that the District Court abused its discretion by improperly applying the Section 3553(a) factors and failing to justify an upward variance from the amended Sentencing Guidelines. The Third Circuit found that the District Court had adequately considered the Section 3553(a) factors, including the nature and circumstances of Suarez’s offenses, the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, and the need to protect the public. The Court also noted that the District Court had acknowledged Suarez’s rehabilitative efforts but determined they did not warrant a sentence reduction.The Third Circuit held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Suarez’s motion for a sentence reduction and affirmed the judgment of the District Court. View "United States v. Suarez" on Justia Law

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Lidia Gomez-Gabriel, a Guatemalan native and citizen, along with her son, sought review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Gomez-Gabriel testified that Guatemalan gang members harassed her for money on multiple occasions and threatened her with a weapon once. After this incident, she avoided the area and had no further interactions with the gang. Fearing for their safety, she and her son fled to the United States in November 2015. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and after being detained for twelve days, they were informed about the one-year deadline to file an asylum application. They filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in August 2017.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their application, determining that the asylum application was time-barred and that the asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT applications were without merit. The Petitioners appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ's decision without opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the government that the Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies regarding their asylum and CAT claims, as they did not raise these issues before the BIA. However, the court found that the Petitioners adequately challenged their withholding of removal claim.On the merits, the court held that substantial evidence supported the IJ's determination that Gomez-Gabriel's membership in a protected group was not a central reason for her persecution. The court found that the gang's motivation was financial gain rather than animus towards her group membership. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review. View "A. G.-G. v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

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CoreCivic, Inc. has contracted with the federal government since 1996 to operate a private immigration detention center in Elizabeth, New Jersey. In 2023, CoreCivic planned to renew its contract, but New Jersey passed a law (AB 5207) prohibiting new, expanded, or renewed contracts for civil immigration detention. CoreCivic sued, arguing that the law violates the Supremacy Clause by infringing on intergovernmental immunity and being preempted by federal law. The United States supported CoreCivic, emphasizing the detention center's critical role in federal immigration enforcement.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judgment in favor of CoreCivic. The court found that AB 5207 interferes with the federal government's discretion in detaining aliens, violating intergovernmental immunity and being preempted by federal law. New Jersey appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that AB 5207 directly regulates the federal government by effectively banning contracts for immigration detention, a core federal function. The court emphasized that the law's impact on federal operations is substantial, as it would cripple ICE's ability to detain and remove aliens efficiently. The court concluded that New Jersey's law violates intergovernmental immunity and is unconstitutional as applied to CoreCivic. View "CoreCivic, Inc. v. Governor of New Jersey" on Justia Law

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Adam Urda attended a gathering where he attempted to start a bonfire with motor oil and racecar fuel, resulting in an explosion that injured him, another adult, and a four-year-old girl. The girl was severely injured and required extensive medical treatment. Trooper Jeffrey Sokso investigated the incident, interviewed witnesses, and filed a criminal complaint against Urda for aggravated assault, risking a catastrophe, and recklessly endangering another person. The charges were approved by an assistant district attorney. However, a magistrate judge dismissed the first two charges, and the Court of Common Pleas dismissed the third charge, finding no probable cause.Urda then sued Sokso in federal court for unlawful seizure, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment for Sokso on the abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims but denied it on the remaining claims, rejecting Sokso's qualified immunity defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and held that qualified immunity protects Sokso. The court found that Urda did not provide any precedent showing that Sokso's actions violated clearly established law. The court emphasized that qualified immunity shields officers unless it is clear to a reasonable officer that their conduct was unlawful. The court concluded that Sokso's actions did not rise to the level of an obvious constitutional violation and that the District Court had defined the right too abstractly. Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's denial of summary judgment on the remaining claims, granting Sokso qualified immunity. View "Urda v. Sokso" on Justia Law

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Lynell Guyton was convicted by a jury of nine drug-trafficking, firearm, and money-laundering offenses. His criminal activities included ordering large quantities of fentanyl analogues from China, using Skype to communicate with suppliers, and making payments through MoneyGram. Law enforcement intercepted a package containing fentanyl analogues addressed to a pseudonym used by Guyton, leading to his arrest. Subsequent investigations revealed Guyton's continued involvement in drug trafficking and possession of firearms.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied Guyton's motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to 360 months' imprisonment on the primary drug charges, with concurrent sentences on the remaining counts. The court also applied recidivist enhancements based on Guyton's prior state conviction. Guyton appealed, raising several arguments, including instructional errors, constructive amendment of the indictment, and improper application of recidivist enhancements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the District Court erred in denying Guyton's motion for judgment of acquittal on one of the firearm possession charges (Count 3) due to insufficient evidence of constructive possession. The court vacated this conviction and remanded for a judgment of acquittal on that count. However, the court affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions, the alleged constructive amendment, or the application of recidivist enhancements. The court concluded that the instructional errors did not affect Guyton's substantial rights and that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the remaining convictions. View "United States v. Guyton" on Justia Law

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Axalta Coating Systems LLC ("Axalta") provided a can of flammable paint to FedEx for air shipment. The paint spilled during transit due to a loose lid. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) filed an administrative complaint alleging Axalta failed to package the paint according to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Axalta in violation and imposed a $1,900 penalty, which the FAA Administrator affirmed. Axalta petitioned for review, arguing the administrative adjudication violated the Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Jarkesy.The ALJ denied Axalta's motion to dismiss the complaint and a motion to disqualify the ALJ. After a hearing, the ALJ concluded Axalta violated 49 C.F.R. § 171.2(e) and 49 C.F.R. § 173.24(b)(1), assessing a $1,900 penalty. Axalta appealed, and the FAA cross-appealed for a higher penalty. The Administrator affirmed the ALJ's decision. Axalta then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for review.The Third Circuit held that the administrative adjudication did not violate the Seventh Amendment. The court distinguished the case from Jarkesy, noting that the HMR's technical standards were not derived from common law, unlike the securities fraud provisions in Jarkesy. The court concluded that the FAA's enforcement action was a public right that could be adjudicated administratively without a jury. The court also rejected Axalta's additional arguments, including claims of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, improper ALJ appointment, statute of limitations issues, and due process violations. The petition for review was denied. View "Axalta Coating Systems LLC v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law

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Mohammad M. Qatanani, a Palestinian and citizen of Jordan, was admitted to the United States in 1996 on a work visa. In 1999, he applied to adjust his status to that of a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR). An Immigration Judge (IJ) twice granted his application, in 2008 and 2020, after finding in his favor on fact and credibility determinations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed the 2008 order, leading the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to vacate and remand the case. The IJ's 2020 order became final when DHS did not appeal within 30 days.The BIA later invoked an agency regulation to self-certify an appeal of the IJ’s 2020 order eleven months after it was issued, ultimately reversing the IJ’s decision and ordering Qatanani removed from the United States. Qatanani petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for review of the BIA’s decision.The Third Circuit held that the BIA exceeded its authority by using an agency regulation to undo Qatanani’s adjustment to LPR status in a manner inconsistent with the procedures set out by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The court emphasized that once the 30-day appeal period lapsed without an appeal, Qatanani’s adjustment to LPR status became final by operation of law. The court vacated the BIA’s order, reaffirming that the Attorney General must follow the statutory recission process if seeking to revoke LPR status. The court granted Qatanani’s petition for review and vacated the BIA’s order of removal. View "Qatanani v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Erik Harris, a frequent marijuana user, purchased three pistols over a short period. Each time, he falsely stated on federal forms that he was not an unlawful user of marijuana. After losing one of the guns while intoxicated, Harris reported it stolen and bought a replacement. When the missing gun was found with a felon, Harris admitted to regular marijuana use during police questioning.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied Harris's motion to dismiss the charges, which included three counts under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) for possessing guns as an unlawful drug user and three counts under §922(a)(6) for lying to obtain the guns. The court concluded that §922(g)(3) was constitutional as applied to Harris, using means-end scrutiny. Harris then pleaded guilty to all counts but preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that history and tradition justify §922(g)(3)’s restrictions on those who pose a special danger of misusing firearms due to frequent drug use. However, the court found insufficient facts to determine whether the law's restrictions are constitutional as applied to Harris. The court affirmed the statute's constitutionality in general but vacated Harris's conviction under §922(g)(3) and remanded the case for further fact-finding. The court also held that §922(g)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Harris and upheld his convictions under §922(a)(6) for lying on the federal forms. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

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Kevin Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder in 1986 for the killing of Lyndon "Cowboy" Morris, a drug dealer in Philadelphia. Four witnesses identified Johnson as the shooter, with three positively identifying him and one expressing doubts. Johnson claimed mistaken identity and presented an alibi, but his testimony conflicted with his alibi witnesses. The jury convicted him, and he was sentenced to life in prison. The Superior Court affirmed his conviction and sentence.Johnson sought post-conviction relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and presenting new evidence of witness recantations. The PCRA court denied his petition, but the Superior Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing. After the hearing, the state courts dismissed his petition, and the dismissal was affirmed. Johnson then filed a federal habeas petition, which was pending when new evidence emerged, leading to additional PCRA petitions that were ultimately dismissed as time-barred.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reviewed Johnson's federal habeas petition. Johnson and the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office attempted to settle the case by waiving procedural defenses, but the District Court rejected the procedural-default waiver. The court found that Johnson's Brady claims, based on witness recantations and arrest photos, were not material and did not warrant habeas relief. The court also rejected Johnson's ineffective assistance of counsel claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the District Court had discretion to reject the procedural-default waiver and that Johnson failed to show cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the default. The court also found that Johnson did not qualify for an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) and that his remaining Brady and ineffective assistance claims lacked merit. View "Johnson v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2015, product liability cases involving the blood-pressure medication Olmesartan were consolidated into a multidistrict litigation (MDL) in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Adam Slater and his law firm, Mazie Slater Katz & Freeman, LLC, represented over 200 plaintiffs, and the case settled for over $300 million. Subsequently, Anthony Martino, a plaintiff in the MDL, filed a class action in New Jersey state court against his former lawyers, alleging they received contingent fees in violation of New Jersey court rules. The case was removed to federal court and dismissed, with the dismissal affirmed on appeal.Following this, twenty-one individuals represented by the same defendants in the MDL filed a similar action in New Jersey state court, alleging breach of contract, legal malpractice, conversion, and unjust enrichment. Defendants removed the case to the District Court, citing diversity and federal-question jurisdiction. The District Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand, asserting ancillary enforcement jurisdiction, and granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, applying issue preclusion. The court also dismissed the parties' motions for sanctions as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that ancillary enforcement jurisdiction does not confer original jurisdiction sufficient for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The court also found that the plaintiffs' state-law claims did not necessarily raise a federal issue to establish federal-question jurisdiction. The court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case to determine if the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 for diversity jurisdiction. Additionally, the court vacated the order dismissing the motions for sanctions as moot, instructing the District Court to consider the merits of each motion. View "Johnson v. Mazie" on Justia Law