Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Before filing for bankruptcy, the Debtors provided general contracting services for large construction projects, including many projects for departments of the federal government. To enter into contracts with the United States, contractors are generally required to post both a performance bond and a payment bond signed by the contractor and a qualified surety (such as ICSP), 40 U.S.C. 3131. When the Debtors defaulted on the contract at issue, ICSP stepped in to make sure that the work was completed. ICSP claims that it is subrogated to the United States’ rights to set off a tax refund (owed to one or more of the Debtors) against the losses that ICSP covered. However, to settle various claims in the Debtors’ Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, the United States and the Trustee agreed that the United States would waive its setoff rights.The Bankruptcy Court, district court, and Third Circuit held that ICSP is not entitled to the tax refund. The United States had not yet been “paid in full,” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 509(c), when the Bankruptcy Court approved the settlement, so ICSP’s subrogation rights were subordinate to the remaining and superior claims of the United States at the time of the settlement. The United States was entitled to waive its setoff rights in order to settle its remaining and superior claims; the waiver of its setoff rights extinguished ICSP’s ability to be subrogated to those rights. View "Insurance Co of the State of Pennsylania v. Giuliano" on Justia Law

For many years, a 265-acre tract in Robinson Township, Pennsylvania hosted a gun range with over 800 members. In 2008, the range’s then-owner pleaded guilty to possessing weapons as a convicted felon, and the Club closed for about a decade. In 2017, Drummond leased the property for the retail sale of firearms and a shooting range. The Township then permitted "Shooting Ranges" in Industrial and Special Conservation zoning districts; Interchange Business Districts (IBD) could host “Sportsman’s Clubs.” Residents complained that renewed “use of high power rifles” at the Club would pose a “nuisance” and a “danger.” The Board amended the IBD rules, covering Drummond's property, limiting Clubs to “pistol range, skeet shoot, trap and skeet, and rimfire rifle[]” practice; defining a “Sportsman’s Club” as a “nonprofit entity formed for conservation of wildlife or game, and to provide members with opportunities for hunting, fishing or shooting”; and switching Clubs to a “conditional use.”Drummond sued, alleging that the rules restrict his customers’ efforts to acquire firearms and maintain proficiency and were facially unconstitutional. The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal of the complaint. In identifying which rules invade the Second Amendment, courts identify historical outliers—laws that lack traditional counterparts. In applying heightened scrutiny, courts look for laws with few parallels in contemporary practice. The more “exceptional” a rule, the more likely the government has overlooked less burdensome “options that could serve its interests.” The challenged zoning rules constitute outliers, and the pleading-stage materials fail to justify their anomalous features. View "Drummond v. Robinson Township" on Justia Law

Trinh sued Fineman, who had been appointed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County as a receiver in a case involving the dissolution of Trinh’s beauty school. She alleged that Fineman did not give her a proper accounting of the escrow account related to that case and accused him of theft. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, explaining that Trinh had not raised “any claims arising under federal law or [alleged] that the parties are citizens of different states.” The Third Circuit remanded to allow Trinh to amend her complaint. Her amended complaint asserted that Fineman, as the receiver, was “abusing his state power.”The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Although Trinh’s complaint arguably raised a section 1983 claim, Fineman, as a court-appointed receiver, is entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity from suit when acting with the authority of the court. Erroneous, controversial, and even unfair decisions do not divest a judge of immunity. Fineman was duly appointed by the state court and the transcript of that court's hearing reflects that the judge was aware of, and approved of, all of his expenditures. View "Trinh v. Fineman" on Justia Law

Lozano, a former Marine, was discharged for medical reasons and suffers from severe asthma, impaired airway, limited motion in his knees and ankle, and total blindness in one eye. Lozano has a handicapped parking permit and a permit for tinted windows on his car. Lozano’s car was parked partly within a handicapped parking space when Sergeant Dorilus arrived. Dorilus could not see the handicapped placard on the dashboard and required Lozano to provide his license and registration, and his permits for handicapped parking and tinted windows. Dorilus claims that Lozano “reeked of alcohol.” Lozano denied having consumed any alcohol and refused to submit to the field sobriety test, claiming he was physically unable to do so. Dorilus arrested Lozano. Officer Hernandez was “present” throughout these events. At the station, Hernandez helped process Lozano. Other officers gave Lozano two breathalyzer tests, but could not provide a sufficient breath sample. During a third breathalyzer test, Lozano had an asthma attack and had to be taken to the hospital. Dorilus charged Lozano with DUI and refusal to take a breath test, After Lozano provided medical records, the charges were dismissed.Lozano subsequently sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act The district court denied the officers’ qualified immunity summary judgment motions. The Third Circuit reversed as to Officer Hernandez, who was not involved in arresting or charging Lozano and therefore is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Lozano v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

In 1992, Grant was convicted of homicide and other crimes that he had committed while he was a juvenile. He was sentenced to life imprisonment under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. Parole is unavailable to those convicted of federal crimes, so the sentence effectively condemned Grant to die in prison. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court held (Miller v. Alabama) that the Eighth Amendment permits a life-without-parole (LWOP) sentence for a juvenile homicide offender only if the sentencer could have imposed a lesser punishment based on the offender’s youth at the time of the offense.At Miller’s resentencing, the judge recognized that youth can impair judgment and thereby mitigate culpability, stated that a life sentence for Grant would be too harsh, given his juvenile offender status and individual circumstances, and sentenced Grant to a term of 60 years on his homicide-related convictions with an undisturbed five-year consecutive sentence, Grant argued that his 65-year sentence violates Miller because it incarcerates him to his life expectancy, thereby amounting to a de facto LWOP sentence. Grant contends that Miller forbids such a sentence for a juvenile homicide offender unless he or she is incorrigible, which Grant is not. The Third Circuit affirmed. Miller only entitled Grant to a sentencing hearing at which the district court had the discretion to impose a sentence less than LWOP in view of Grant’s youth at the time of his offenses; that is what he received. View "United States v. Grant" on Justia Law

On various dates between March and July 2020, the Governor and Secretary of Health of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania entered orders to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs, Pennsylvania citizens, elected officials, and businesses, challenged three pairs of directives: stay-at-home orders, business closure orders, and orders setting congregation limits in secular settings. The district court concluded that the orders violated the U.S. Constitution. While the appeal was pending, circumstances changed: more than 60% of Pennsylvanians have received a COVID vaccine. An amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution and a concurrent resolution of the Commonwealth’s General Assembly now restricts the Governor’s authority to enter the same orders. In addition, the challenged orders have expired by their own terms. The Third Circuit vacated the judgment and dismissed an appeal as moot. No exception to the mootness doctrine applies View "County of Butler v. Governor of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Jacobs, in Cumberland County Jail awaiting trial for a weapons charge, got into a fight with Hanby, another inmate. Less than 30 seconds after the fight ended, corrections officers entered the dorm and identified Hanby as one of the fighters. The officers removed Hanby and took him to the medical unit. About 15 minutes later, officers returned for Jacobs. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Jacobs claims that as the officers removed him from his cell, they violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force amounting to punishment.The officers moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. After reviewing the record, including a security video, the district court denied the motion, finding that a reasonable jury could find that the officers used gratuitous force and that any reasonable officer would have known that such force was unlawful. The Third Circuit affirmed, first noting the objective standard used in analyzing claims by pretrial detainees. The Supreme Court has made clear that officers may not expose inmates to gratuitous force divorced from any legitimate penological purpose. Here, reasonable jurors could conclude that the officers were not facing a disturbance or any threat to jail security. When they returned for Jacobs they found the inmates orderly and compliant. Jacobs posed no threat throughout the encounter. View "Jacobs v. Cumberland County" on Justia Law

Travers served in the Naval Reserve. He also works for FedEx and fulfilled his Reserve duties during his leaves from work. Travers received no compensation from FedEx for those absences because the company does not pay employees for military leave. FedEx does pay employees who are absent for other reasons, like jury duty, illness, and bereavement. Relying on the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), Travers challenged FedEx’s decision; 38 U.S.C. 4316(b)(1) entitles employees taking military leave to the “other rights and benefits” their employers give to employees taking similar kinds of leave. The district court dismissed Travers’s complaint, concluding that paid leave was not a “right and benefit” under USERRA.The Third Circuit vacated. USERRA directs employers to provide the benefit of compensation when they choose to pay other employees for comparable forms of leave. USERRA describes a process for evaluating an employer's alleged disparate treatment of service members on military leave. It does not create a class of rights and benefits. This is not a dispute about whether USERRA guarantees paid military leave; it concerns whether section 4316(b)(1) allows Travers to allege that FedEx extends a right and benefit in the form of pay to employees who miss work for non-military reasons, but then denies pay to those absent for military service. View "Travers v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

America Can! Cars for Kids and Kars 4 Kids are charities that sell donated vehicles to fund children’s programs. America began receiving donations in the late 1980s and, in the early 1990s, began using the mark “Cars for Kids” in advertising campaigns. Kars first used flyers and bumper stickers, then distributed nationwide mailers. In the early 2000s, Kars began other advertising. In 2003, America noticed Kars’ advertisements in Texas and sent a cease and desist letter. America did not notice Kars’ advertisements in Texas for several years. Kars, however, kept advertising, including in Texas, and procured the URL www.carsforkids.com. In 2013, America sent Kars another cease and desist letter. Kars sued in 2014, bringing federal and state trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution claims, and seeking equitable relief. America filed suit in 2015, asserting the same claims and seeking cancelation of Kars’ trademark for 1-877- KARS-4-KIDS under 15 U.S.C. 1119, financial compensation, and a nationwide injunction prohibiting Kars from using the mark.The Third Circuit held that America did not preserve its challenge to the denial of summary judgment on its trademark cancelation claims; America was first to use its mark in Texas and Kars waived any challenge to the validity of America’s marks; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award enhanced monetary relief or prejudgment interest. The court remanded for reexamination of the court’s conclusions on laches and disgorgement. View "Kars 4 Kids Inc. v. America Can! Cars For Kids." on Justia Law

Three decades ago, Vogt and McClearn were part of a group who took Landry to a quarry, forced Landry off a cliff into the water, then rolled a “huge rock” in behind him. Landry suffered blunt force trauma and drowned. McClearn pleaded guilty to third-degree murder. McClearn’s testimony linked Vogt to Landry’s death. A jury convicted Vogt of first-degree murder. He was sentenced to life without parole. McClearn sent a letter to Vogt dated October 2016, recanting his testimony. McClearn wrote that he had a different partner in crime that night; Vogt was “passed out in the car” and did not have “anything to do with” Landry’s murder. The prison’s policy is to reject mail lacking a return address, so it rejected the letter. Six months later, Vogt contacted a Postal Service reclamation center looking for a different mailing. The Post Office returned several items, including McClearn’s letter. By then, McClearn was dead.Vogt filed a grievance about the letter’s rejection. The prison denied it as untimely. In Pennsylvania post-conviction proceedings, he challenged his guilty verdict and argued the letter supported his actual innocence. The court dismissed his petition as untimely. In a subsequent pro se federal complaint, Vogt claimed the rejection of the mail without notice violated his right to procedural due process and claimed his First Amendment right to access the courts was violated. He sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Meanwhile, the state court vacated the dismissal of Vogt’s post-conviction petition. The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal of Vogt’s section 1983 complaint. Under Supreme Court precedent, prisons must notify inmates when their incoming mail is rejected. View "Vogt v. Wetzel" on Justia Law