Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Messina filed suit, accusing Coello—who was dating Messina’s former boyfriend— of harassment. Coello pled not guilty and the charge was dismissed. Subsequently, private attorney Estabrooks requested an appointment to prosecute Messina’s complaint. New Jersey Court Rules permit courts to appoint a “private prosecutor to represent the State in cases involving cross-complaints.” This 2007 prosecution did not involve a cross-complaint and Estabrooks did not disclose that she was also representing Messina in custody and other civil actions against Coello’s boyfriend. Without recording any findings as to the need for a private prosecutor or the suitability of Estabrooks, Municipal Judge DiLeo approved her application. Irregularities continued at trial and post-conviction. Without addressing Coello’s lack of representation or her evidence, DiLeo reinstated her jail term based on a letter from Estabrooks.In 2016, a New Jersey state court vacated Coello's harassment conviction. The prosecution, by then familiar with allegations of judicial misconduct against DiLeo, did not oppose the motion. In 2020, Coello filed this federal civil rights action against Estabrooks, DiLeo, and municipal defendants. The district court dismissed most of her claims as untimely, reasoning that at the time of her trial and sentencing, Coello had reason to know of her alleged injuries. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal, citing the special timeliness rules governing her precise claims. Under Heck v. Humphrey, her claims all imply the invalidity of her criminal prosecution; she could not file suit until her conviction was vacated View "Coello v. DiLeo" on Justia Law

The Third Circuit vacated in part the order of the district court denying OptumRX's (Optum) motion to compel arbitration in the underlying action alleging breaches of contract and breaches of duties of good faith and fair dealing and violations of certain state statutes, holding that the district court erroneously applied the incorrect standard in ruling on Optum's motion.More than 400 pharmacies brought suit against Optum, a pharmacy benefits manager responsible for administering prescription drug programs on behalf of health-insurance plans. Optum moved to compel arbitration based on arbitration agreements found in various contracts covering the majority of the pharmacies. The district court denied the motion in full, concluding that compelling the pharmacies to proceed with arbitration would be procedurally unconscionable. The Sixth Circuit vacated the judgment in part, holding that the district court erred by not adhering to Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC, 716 F.3d 764 (3d Cir. 2013). View "Robert D. Mabe, Inc v. OptumRX" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for various child pornography offenses in February 2018. Defendant expressed his intention to represent himself and the district court permitted him to do so, but appointed the Federal Public Defender's Office as standby counsel. However, subsequently, Defendant announced to the court he was invoking his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and largely refused to participate in the proceedings. After holding a hearing, the district court held that Defendant waived and forfeited his right to represent himself and appointed the Federal Public Defender's Office as his attorney. Ultimately, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment.On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's determination that he waived and forfeited his right to represent himself. The court affirmed Defendant's conviction. The court explained "the right to represent oneself is not absolute, however; judges 'may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.'" Here, Defendant stopped communicating with the court, failed to open his legal mail and repeatedly violated court orders. Thus, the Third Circuit held that the district court did not err in concluding that "it would be impossible to conduct a fair trial with a pro se defendant who refused to cooperate or engage at all with the court." View "USA v. Thomas Noble" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former scientist employed by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), pled guilty to a single count of conspiracy to steal trade secrets, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1832(a)(5) based on allegations he stole company documents. At sentencing, the government sought a sentencing enhancement based on the “loss” attributable to Defendant's conduct. However, the district court denied the government's request for an enhancement.On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. The court noted that finding that under the commentary to U.S.S.G. 2B1.1, the definition of “loss” includes losses that the defendants intended. However, here, it was uncontested that GSK did not suffer any actual loss. Further, the court determined that the government failed to prove that Defendant purposely sought to inflict pecuniary harm on GSK. View "USA v. Yu Xue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an emergency medical resident, began working for Crozer Chester Medical Center (“CCMC”). Plaintiff signed an at-will employment agreement with CMCC and an agreement to arbitrate with Prospect Health Access Network (“Prospect”), a company that employs professionals working at hospitals. After Plaintiff was involved in a dispute with a supervisor at CMCC, who also was an employee of Prospect, Plaintiff was terminated. Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against CMCC. CMCC moved to compel arbitration.The district court denied CMCC's motion to compel arbitration and CMCC appealed.On appeal the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiff's agreement to arbitrate any disputes between herself and Prospect did not extend to disputes involving CMCC. View "Dina Abdurahman v. Prospect CCMC LLC" on Justia Law

Shkembi, a citizen of Albania, attempted to enter this country by representing that he was a national of a country that is a participant in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), 8 U.S.C. 1187, although Albania is not a VWP participant. His ruse was detected at the airport where he was deemed inadmissible. The VWP precludes contesting removability except by seeking asylum. After denial of his application seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, Shkembi succeeded in reopening his asylum proceeding. Despite the VWP’s limitation to asylum-only proceedings, Shkembi applied for a marriage-based adjustment of status (AOS) and withdrew his asylum application before the IJ. His file was returned to the Department of Homeland Security, but his AOS application was not adjudicated. After being taken into custody, he filed an unsuccessful emergency motion to reopen his asylum proceedings.The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The terms of the VWP apply to an alien who is from a non-VWP-participant country, who attempts to enter the U.S. by using the passport of a national of a VWP-participant country. Such an alien, despite his ineligibility for the VWP, is subject to the terms of the VWP. Shkembi has never had a right to seek AOS. The court also rejected an argument that the denial of his emergency motion to reopen deprived him of due process. View "Shkembi v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Manivannan asserts he is one of the leading materials scientists in the United States. He was hired by the federal Department of Energy (DOE) in 2005 and assigned to the National Energy Technology Laboratory. “Conflict best defined Manivannan’s time at the DOE”. He resigned following allegations of disturbing actions taken against an intern, with whom Manivannan allegedly had a sexual relationship. The allegations prompted an internal investigation and a state criminal prosecution for stalking.Manivannan has since filed several lawsuits relating to those events, including this action under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) and 2671–80, based on the agency’s disclosure of records to state prosecutors, its alleged negligence in conducting the internal investigation, and its refusal to return his personal property. A Magistrate dismissed those claims as precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. 1101 because they arose in the context of Manivannan’s federal employment. The Third Circuit reversed in part; a narrower inquiry is required. Under this inquiry, much of the conduct challenged by Manivannan, such as the internal investigation, still falls within the CSRA’s broad purview, but some conduct, such as the refusal to return property and cooperation in the state prosecution, does not. View "Manivannan v. United States Department of Energy" on Justia Law

Fischer, a Pennsylvania resident and former FedEx security specialist, brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Fischer alleged FedEx misclassified her and other security specialists as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime rule and underpaid them. Two former FedEx employees, Saunders, from Maryland, and Rakowsky, from New York, submitted notices of consent, seeking to join Fischer’s collective action. Saunders and Rakowsky both worked for FedEx in their home states but, other than FedEx’s allegedly uniform nationwide employment practices, have no connection to Pennsylvania related to their claims. The district court did not allow these opt-in plaintiffs to join the suit, reasoning that, as would be true for a state court, the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over FedEx with respect to their’ claims.On interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit noted a division among the circuits and held that in an FLSA collective action in federal court where the court lacks general personal jurisdiction over the defendant, all opt-in plaintiffs must establish specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to their individual claims. In this way, the specific personal jurisdiction analysis for an FLSA collective action in federal court operates the same as it would for an FLSA collective action, or any other traditional in personam suit, in state court. The out-of-state opt-in plaintiffs here cannot demonstrate their claims arise out of or relate to FedEx’s contacts with Pennsylvania. View "Fischer v. Federal Express Corp" on Justia Law

IImerys sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in response to mounting asbestos and talc personal injury claims. Many of the claimants who will suffer harm from asbestos exposure traceable to the debtor will not manifest those injuries until long after the reorganization process has concluded. Cases involving asbestos liability, therefore, use trusts designed to compensate present and future asbestos claimants, coupled with an injunction against future asbestos liability to allow the debtor to emerge from bankruptcy without the uncertainty of future asbestos liabilities while ensuring claimants would not be prejudiced just because they had not yet manifested injuries at the time of the bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. 524(g), The provision requires the appointment of a legal representative (FCR) to protect the rights of future claimants. The FCR participates in the negotiation of the reorganization plan and objects to terms that unfairly disadvantage future claimants.A group of insurance companies appealed the appointment of an FCR in the Ilmerys bankruptcy, arguing that the FCR had a conflict of interest because the FCR’s law firm also represented two of the insurance companies in a separate asbestos-related coverage dispute. The Third Circuit affirmed the appointment. The Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in appointing the FCR. it gave due consideration to the purported conflict and correctly determined that the interests of both the insurance companies and the future claimants were adequately protected. View "In re: Imerys Talc America, Inc" on Justia Law

The Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. 5311, and its implementing regulations require certain individuals with foreign financial interests to file annual disclosures, subject to penalties. In 2008, Bedrosian filed an inaccurate Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), omitting from the report the larger of his two Swiss bank accounts. If this omission was accidental, the IRS could fine Bedrosian up to $10,000; if he willfully filed an inaccurate FBAR, the penalty was the greater of $100,000 or half the balance of the undisclosed account at the time of the violation. Believing Bedrosian’s omission was willful, the IRS imposed a $975,789.17 penalty—by its calculation, half the balance of Bedrosian’s undisclosed account. Following Bedrosian’s refusal to pay the full penalty, the IRS filed a claim in federal court.The Third Circuit affirmed the district court in finding Bedrosian’s omission willful and ordering him to pay the IRS penalty in full. While the IRS failed to provide sufficient evidence at trial showing its $975,789.17 penalty was no greater than half his account balance, Bedrosian admitted this fact during opening statements and thus relieved the government of its burden of proof. View "Bedrosian v. United States Department of the Treasury" on Justia Law