Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dongarra, incarcerated for bank robbery, was transferred to a new prison and went through the onboarding process, supervised by Officer Smith. Smith gave him an ID card that indicated “Registered Offender,” and a T-shirt “know[n]” to be a “sex offender T-shirt.” The shirt falsely suggested that he had been imprisoned at Terre Haute, “a sex offender prison.” Dongarra stated that he “could be killed” if prisoners mistook him for a sex offender. Smith said he did not care and that he “hope[d] [Dongarra] kn[e]w how to fight.” Dongarra appealed to other staff, who asked Smith for another T-shirt. Smith refused. Frightened, Dongarra skipped meals and lost weight and stopped going out for recreation. Dongarra filed a grievance. Though he never got a response, a few weeks later the prison replaced his ID card and T-shirt.Dongarra sued Smith and two unnamed officers, seeking damages and an injunction, citing “Bivens.” The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 case. Injunctive relief is not available because Dongarra had not sued anyone who could fire or discipline Smith and by the time Dongarra sued, the prison had corrected the error. No court has extended Bivens to cover similar facts; “special factors” bar extending Bivens here. Although the officer violated Dongarra’s rights, the feared risk never materialized. Damages cannot be awarded to compensate him for an assault that never happened. View "Dongarra v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2016, the out-of-state petition circulators challenged Section 2869 of the Pennsylvania Election Code, which requires that any circulator of nomination petitions be “a qualified elector of the Commonwealth, who is duly registered and enrolled as a member of the party designated in said petition.” The district court found that the ban was not facially unconstitutional, but was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs for the 2020 election only. The plaintiffs did not appeal the conclusion that the ban was not facially unconstitutional. The court declined to expand the injunctive relief to cover future elections for the plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals. The Third Circuit held that permanent injunctive relief for all future elections is appropriate for the plaintiff circulators only, not to all similarly situated individuals, and only if the plaintiffs continue to submit to Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction. The request for permanent relief for the plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals goes beyond the specific plaintiffs and circumstances of this litigation and seeks facial relief. A factual record specific to each similarly situated individual circulator will be necessary to determine the appropriate relief in future elections. Each individual circulator will need to demonstrate their willingness to submit to Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction for the purpose of nomination circulation. View "Benezet Consulting LLC v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (BPU) ordered Altice, a cable service provider, to prorate its bills for the month in which a cable customer cancels his service, as required by New Jersey law. In federal court, Altice argued that the Proration Requirement is preempted by the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.The district court granted Altice judgment on the pleadings, concluding that “Younger” abstention was not warranted and that the Proration Requirement was preempted. The Third Circuit vacated. The Younger ruling was incorrect. BPU’s civil enforcement proceeding was quasi-criminal in nature and, thus, the type of proceeding to which Younger applies. BPU commenced the action against Altice by filing a formal complaint, a Show Cause Order with attributes similar to the filing of formal charges, and did so in its sovereign capacity. The proceeding was judicial in nature and ongoing when the federal complaint was filed; the proceeding implicates important state interests; and Altice has an adequate opportunity to raise its federal claims in the state proceeding. View "Altice USA Inc v. New Jersey Board of Public Utilities" on Justia Law

Iredia was admitted to the U.S. in 1997 on a tourist visa, which he overstayed. Later, he was granted advance parole, left the U.S., returned in 2006, and was paroled into the country. The parole was valid until 2007. Iredia overstayed the parole and, in 2011, was charged as inadmissible, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)). An IJ held ordered him removed. Iredia argued that he should have been charged as removable, not inadmissible. He claimed that when he was served with the Notice to Appear, he already had been admitted on a tourist visa, and the visa’s expiration did not affect the fact of his admission. Iredia argued that advance parole did not change his immigration status.The BIA dismissed his appeal. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Because Iredia was paroled into the U.S. in 2006, he is considered an arriving alien regardless of his previous admission. The statute permits parole for “any alien applying for admission” and no other category of alien; when parole ends, the alien’s case is “dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission.” The term “arriving alien: encompasses not only aliens who are actually at the border, but also aliens who are paroled after their arrival. View "Iredia v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Williams and Burton each filed civil rights complaints in the Western District of Pennsylvania against employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Burton alleged that the defendants retaliated against him after he filed a grievance, concerning his use of the law library. Williams alleged that prison staff refused to accommodate his special dietary needs. Both plaintiffs consented to have their cases heard by magistrate judges, who dismissed the cases before the defendants consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction.The Third Circuit vacated. A magistrate judge can acquire jurisdiction to decide a case only by the consent of the parties, 28 U.S.C. 631(c)(1); “consent of the parties” does not mean consent just of the prisoner-plaintiff. The jurisdictional requirement cannot be waived by the parties. If the requirements of Section 636(c)(1) are not satisfied, the “magistrate judge [is deprived] of jurisdiction over the case” and the appellate court is statutorily deprived of appellate jurisdiction over the magistrate judge’s orders. Consent could not be implied in this case and retroactive, post-judgment consent cannot satisfy the statutory requirement. View "Burton v. Schamp" on Justia Law

Agarwal, a contract network engineer, had security credentials that granted him access to the corporate offices and internal networks of telecommunications companies. Agarwal installed key-logging software to obtain employee usernames and passwords and installed unauthorized hardware and computer code that enabled him to surreptitiously transfer information. Agarwal also used a vacant office without authorization. The companies learned of the unauthorized activities and devoted significant resources to investigate and remediate the breaches; compromised accounts and computers were temporarily taken offline. Agarwal monitored the investigations.Agarwal eventually pleaded guilty to aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), and two counts under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) for intentionally accessing a protected computer without authorization and obtaining information valued at more than $5,000, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2); 1030(c)(2)(B)(iii). The statutory maximum sentence was 12 years, five years for each CFAA violation, plus a mandatory consecutive two-year term for identity theft. Agarwal disputed the PSR's loss calculation of over $3,000,000, most of which was for salary expenses for investigating and remediating the breaches. His Guidelines range was 70-87 months’ imprisonment for the CFAA violations. The court sentenced Agarwal to 70 months’ imprisonment for the CFAA violations, plus the mandatory two-year sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument the plea was unknowing because Agarwal could not have reasonably foreseen the losses that would be attributed to his CFAA violations. Agarwal signed the plea agreement aware that the loss amount was disputed and waived the right to appeal his sentence. View "United States v. Agarwal" on Justia Law

June’s son, Brenden, suffers from severe bipolar disorder and is prone to violent outbursts. He has repeatedly been jailed and institutionalized. In 2017, he was involuntarily admitted to Greystone, a New Jersey state-run psychiatric hospital, where Brenden’s condition worsened. He stalked the halls, made an aggressive sexual comment to a staffer, and attacked other patients, sending one to the intensive care unit. Greystone staff encouraged June’s visits as part of Brenden’s treatment. Before one visit, June asked if it was safe to visit Brenden. Though Brenden had severely beaten another patient days earlier, his psychiatrist, Dr. Young, assured her that it was safe. Greystone employees were supposed to supervise all patient meetings but no one was assigned to monitor June’s visit. Initially, Brenden’s head nurse, Oglesby accompanied June, During June’s visit, Oglesby left the room. Brenden then attacked June, who suffered brain trauma, broken ribs, and PTSD.The district court dismissed June’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Sovereign immunity barred the claims against Greystone and state officials in their official capacity. The Third Circuit reversed as to Oglesby, who abandoned June mid-visit. June’s injury was fairly direct as well as foreseeable. Oglesby’s affirmative act endangered June; her departure deprived June of the freedom to avoid an unsupervised visit or to take other precautions. Dr. Young took no affirmative acts. View "Mears v. Connolly" on Justia Law

TitleMax provides vehicle loans at interest rates as high as 180%. The entire process occurs at a TitleMax brick-and-mortar location. The borrower receives “a check drawn on a bank outside of Pennsylvania,” The borrower grants TitleMax a security interest in the vehicle. TitleMax records its lien with the appropriate state authority. Borrowers can make payments from their home states. TitleMax does not have any offices, employees, agents, or brick-and-mortar stores and is not licensed as a lender in Pennsylvania. TitleMax claims that it never solicited Pennsylvania business and does not run television ads within Pennsylvania.Pursuant to the Consumer Discount Company Act and the Loan Interest and Protection Law, Pennsylvania’s Department of Banking and Securities issued a subpoena requesting documents regarding TitleMax’s interactions with Pennsylvania residents. TitleMax then stopped making loans to Pennsylvania residents and asserts that it has lost revenue.The district court held that Younger abstention did not apply and that the Department’s subpoena’s effect was to apply Pennsylvania’s usury laws extraterritorially in violation of the Commerce Clause.The Third Circuit reversed. Applying the Pennsylvania statutes to TitleMax does not violate the extraterritoriality principle. TitleMax receives payments from within Pennsylvania and maintains an actionable security interest in vehicles located in Pennsylvania; its conduct is not “wholly outside” of Pennsylvania. The laws do not discriminate between in-staters and out-of-staters. Pennsylvania has a strong interest in prohibiting usury. Applying Pennsylvania’s usury laws to TitleMax’s loans furthers that interest and any resulting burden on interstate commerce is, at most, incidental. View "TitleMax of Delaware Inc v. Weissmann" on Justia Law

Martin’s state conviction became “final” in April 2002, triggering the one-year limitations period on state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The clock ran for 193 days, until October 21, 2002, when Martin filed a petition for state post-conviction relief (PCR). The clock was paused until June 14, 2004, the last day on which Martin could have appealed (but did not) the trial court’s denial of his petition—and expired 172 days later, on December 3, 2004. In June 2015, Martin filed a petition seeking federal habeas relief. The state appellate court had accepted Martin’s April 2012 motion for leave to appeal “as within time” the denial of his 2002 PCR petition; he argued that the ruling retroactively tolled the limitations period. Martin essentially argued that a “properly filed” PCR petition is “pending” under section 2244(d)(2) for the period between the expiration of time under state law in which a prisoner could have timely appealed the denial of a PCR petition, and the prisoner’s submission of a motion for leave to file a PCR appeal “as within time.”.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition as untimely. Section 4 2244(d)(2)’s tolling mechanism looks forward, not backward, and a state court’s acceptance of an appeal “as within time” does not rewind the one-year clock. View "Martin v. Administrator New Jersey State Prison" on Justia Law

For 20 years, the vendor (SDM) provided food services at Drexel University in Philadelphia. In 2014 the university announced that it would competitively bid the contract for on-campus dining. The same vendor ultimately won that competition but about two years into the contract’s 10-year duration, the vendor sued the university for fraud, multiple breaches of contract, and alternatively for unjust enrichment. The university responded with fraud and breach-of-contract counterclaims. Only a few of the vendor’s breach-of-contract claims and portions of the university’s breach-of-contract claim survived summary judgment. The parties referred the remaining claims and counterclaims to arbitration and jointly moved to dismiss them. The district court granted that motion and entered final judgment, which the parties appealed, primarily to dispute the summary judgment ruling.The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in Drexel’s favor on SDM’s unjust enrichment and punitive damages claims, summary judgment in SDM’s favor on Drexel’s fraudulent inducement claim, and the district court’s decision to deny Drexel’s motion to strike declarations by SDM witnesses under the sham affidavit rule. The court vacated an order granting summary judgment to Drexel on SDM’s claims for fraudulent inducement, breach of contract for failure to renegotiate in good faith, and breach of a supplemental agreement for the Fall 2016 Semester. The surviving claims were remanded to the district court. View "SodexoMAGIC LLC v. Drexel University" on Justia Law