Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Groff, whose religious beliefs prohibit working on Sunday, began working for the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) in 2012. In 2013, USPS contracted with Amazon to deliver packages, including on Sundays. The Quarryville Postmaster initially exempted Groff from Sunday work. After a union agreement went into effect, Groff was required to work Sundays during the peak season. Groff transferred to Holtwood, a smaller station. Holtwood then began Amazon Sunday deliveries. The Holtwood Postmaster offered to adjust Groff’s schedule to permit him to attend religious services on Sunday morning and report to work afterward and later sought others to cover Groff’s Sunday shifts. Because Groff did not work when scheduled on Sundays, he faced progressive discipline. Groff requested a transfer to a position that did not require Sunday work. No such position was available. The Holtwood Postmaster continued attempting to find coverage and was, himself, forced to make Sunday deliveries. Groff’s refusal to report on Sundays created a “tense atmosphere” and resentment; another employee filed a grievance. Groff received additional discipline and submitted EEO complaints, then resigned,Groff sued, alleging religious discrimination under Title VII, disparate treatment, and failure to accommodate. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for USPS. Because the shift swaps USPS offered to Groff did not eliminate the conflict between his religious practice and his work obligations, USPS did not provide Groff with a reasonable accommodation but the accommodation Groff sought would cause an undue hardship on USPS. View "Groff v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

Century issued insurance to BSA and purchased reinsurance. After BSA made claims related to sexual abuse litigation, Century sought to collect on those policies and hired the Sidley’s Insurance Group. The representation did not extend to the underlying direct insurance; BSA was not a party to the reinsurance disputes. BSA later retained Sidley to explore restructuring; the engagement letter specified that Sidley would not “advis[e] [BSA] on insurance coverage.” Sidley filed BSA’s bankruptcy petition.Through Haynes, its insurance counsel, BSA engaged in substantive discussions with its insurers, including Century. Sidley attorneys were present at some meetings. Century did not object. When Century later objected, Sidley implemented a formal ethics screen between its restructuring team and its reinsurance team. Ultimately, the Bankruptcy Court recognized Sidley’s withdrawal. Century is separately pursuing its grievances about Sidley’s representation in arbitration.The Bankruptcy Court concluded that while Sidley may have received confidential information in the reinsurance matter relevant to BSA’s bankruptcy, no privileged or confidential information was shared between the Sidley's legal teams; it approved Sidley’s retention nunc pro tunc, finding no violation of 11 U.S.C. 372(a). The district court and Third Circuit affirmed. Century continued to have standing and the matter is not moot. Because Sidley’s representation of BSA did not prejudice Century, but disqualifying it would have been a significant detriment to BSA, it was well within the Court’s discretion to determine that the drastic remedy of disqualification was unnecessary. View "In re: Boy Scouts of America" on Justia Law

Argueta-Orellana, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the U.S. illegally and was charged with unlawful presence. Assisted by counsel, he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. An IJ ordered him removed. Still represented by counsel, Argueta-Orellana appealed. The Board of Immigration Appeal’s standard Notice of Appeal asks whether the appellant intends to file an optional written brief or statement, advising: WARNING: If you mark “Yes” . . . , you will be expected to file a written brief or statement after you receive a briefing schedule from the Board. The Board may summarily dismiss your appeal if you do not file a brief or statement within the time set in the briefing schedule. Argueta-Orellana’s counsel marked “Yes.” The Board issued a briefing schedule that repeated the warning. The Board later sent Argueta-Orellana a signed copy of the judge’s decision, along with a reminder of the briefing schedule containing the identical caution. Argueta-Orellana filed nothing.Exercising its discretion, the Board dismissed his appeal. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The Board’s decision was neither arbitrary nor irrational and a court cannot consider new arguments raised for the first time on appeal. View "Argueta-Orellana v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Federalist, a right-leaning internet magazine, publishes commentary, including on labor issues. In June 2019, media outlets reported that unionized employees of Vox, a left-leaning digital media company, walked off the job during union contract negotiations. Domenech, The Federalist's publisher, posted a tweet from his personal Twitter account: “FYI @fdrlst first one of you tries to unionize I swear I’ll send you back to the salt mine.” The “@fdrlst” tag refers to The Federalist’s official Twitter account. The Federalist had just seven employees. At least one employee viewed the tweet, but apparently, no employee expressed concern. Fleming, having no connection to The Federalist, filed an unfair labor practice charge, citing Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act. The NLRB’s Regional Office issued an unfair labor practice complaint, alleging that Domenech’s tweet “threatened employees with reprisals and implicitly threatened employees with loss of their jobs if they formed or supported a union.” The Federalist objected to personal jurisdiction. The ALJ declined to revisit that issue. Citing concerns that calling witnesses would waive its jurisdictional objection, The Federalist submitted affidavits from Domenech and two employees explaining that the tweet was satire.The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision, entered a cease-and-desist order, and ordered that Domenech delete his tweet. The Third Circuit set aside the order. The Board spent its resources investigating a company with seven employees "because of a facetious and sarcastic tweet." View "FDRLST Media LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Wholesale pharmaceutical distributors sued two private entities, OptumRx and National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of constitutional and federal law. They claim that their due process rights were violated when OptumRx announced that its network pharmacies would purchase only from distributors accredited under the Association’s “Verified Accredited Wholesale Distributor” program. The plaintiffs’ applications for VAWD accreditation were canceled with little explanation and no opportunity to challenge the result. Because the criteria for VAWD accreditation were more stringent than the federal Drug Supply Chain Security Act’s requirements, they alleged violations of the Act and the Supremacy Clause.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Most constitutional amendments protect only against wrongs caused by the states or the federal government; section 1983, the main cause of action for seeking damages for constitutional violations, contains a “state actor” requirement, allowing suit only against those who can be fairly said to be acting for the state itself. There is no "state actor" in this case. View "Matrix Distributors Inc v. National Association of Boards of Pharmacy" on Justia Law

In 1979-1980, Lesko went on a multi-day “Kill for Thrill” spree with his friend, Travaglia, ending the lives of four individuals in Western Pennsylvania. For the killing of a 21-year-old police officer, Lesko was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Lesko proceeded through many levels of the Pennsylvania state courts and two rounds of federal habeas proceedings. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of his latest petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, which challenged both his 1981 guilt-phase trial and his 1995 resentencing. The court rejected claims that the prosecution violated Lesko’s Brady rights by suppressing an agreement between a prosecution witness who was found in possession of Lesko’s gun (Montgomery) and the prosecution; a January 1980 police report; and information from the juvenile file of another prosecution witness, Rutherford. Lesko’s counsel did not perform ineffectively by violating his right to testify; Lesko was not prejudiced by any ineffectiveness in failing to properly investigate and present mitigating evidence at resentencing. View "Lesko v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Ford, a Haitian national, became involved in Haitian national politics by joining PPD in 2012; he believed the ruling political party, PHTK, was corrupt and involved in human rights abuses. Ford received anonymous threatening telephone calls; in 2014, armed men encircled Ford’s home, shot into it, and burned it down. Ford reported the attack to Haitian authorities and fled Haiti. The United States began removal proceedings.Ford hired an attorney, who submitted a Form I-589 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Ford and the attorney subsequently had little contact. Ford stated the attorney “never prepared me for my final hearing.” The attorney provided scant documentary evidence to support Ford’s application and did not submit any documents about the PPD. The IJ denied relief, finding that Ford was credible but had “submitted no objective evidence” to help meet his burden in proving that he was harassed or persecuted on account of his political opinion or that Ford’s fear of persecution upon his return to Haiti was reasonable. Ford retained new counsel. The BIA affirmed and denied a motion to reopen Ford’s case based on ineffective assistance.The Third Circuit vacated. Ford presents a meritorious ineffective-assistance claim; his lawyer failed to present important and easily available evidence going to the heart of Ford’s claims. View "Saint Ford v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Gaines served as the “muscle” in a drug house. Thompson came to the house to buy drugs. Williams, a visitor, told Thompson that the house was “closed,” denied him entry, and told him to leave. Thompson kept knocking and asking to come in. Eventually, Gaines walked outside and an argument ensued. Williams joined them. Gaines ultimately stabbed Thompson multiple times. Williams pulled Gaines off of Thompson. Stab wounds resulted in hemorrhaging that caused Thompson’s death. Gaines was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of first-degree murder in Pennsylvania,Gaines sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted his petition, holding that Gaines’s trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the omission of a jury instruction that no adverse inference could be drawn from Gaines’s election not to testify in his own defense. The Third Circuit reversed. Gaines’s trial counsel made a reasonable tactical choice when he did not object. Counsel testified he was aware that the court failed to give the requested no-adverse-inference instruction, but that he decided not to object because he “was concerned that throwing [the instruction] in at the end" may have drawn undue attention to the fact that Gaines did not testify. He testified that he was satisfied with the charge as it stood because it placed the burden of proof squarely on the Commonwealth and exhaustively detailed the law of self-defense. View "zGaines v. Superintendent Benner Township" on Justia Law

The Debtors filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. The IRS filed a proof of claim for unpaid taxes and interest, including a $927.00 shared responsibility payment the Debtors owed for failing to maintain health insurance in 2018 as required by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) “Individual Mandate,” 26 U.S.C. 5000A(a). The IRS’s proof of claim characterized the payment as an “EXCISE” tax entitled to priority. The Debtors argued that the shared responsibility payment was a penalty not entitled to priority. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Debtors’ repayment plan and subsequently held that the shared responsibility payment is a tax, not a penalty, for bankruptcy purposes and is entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(8), as either an income or an excise tax.The district court and Third Circuit affirmed. The shared responsibility payment is a tax “measured . . . by income” entitled to priority under Section 507(a)(8)(A). The court noted that the statute describes the payment as a “penalty,” but it is collected by the IRS along with one’s federal income tax return. In 2012, the Supreme Court held that the shared responsibility payment is a tax for constitutional purposes but is not a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. View "In re: Szczyporski" on Justia Law

In 2020, Abreu pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). His PSR calculated his Guidelines range applying the enhancement for a defendant who “committed any part of the instant offense” after a felony conviction for either a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4). The enhancement was predicated on his prior conviction for conspiracy to commit second-degree aggravated assault under New Jersey law, The district court applied the enhancement and sentenced Abreu to 56 months’ imprisonment.Following a 2019 Supreme Court case, Kisor v. Wilkie, the Third Circuit reexamined 4B1.2 and concluded that the text of the “controlled substance offense” prong unambiguously excluded inchoate crimes and overruled its “Hightower” precedent. The Third Circuit then vacated Abreu’s sentence, citing the Guidelines’ text and recent Supreme Court precedent and declining to defer to the commentary to 2K2.1, which purports to define the term “crime of violence” to encompass conspiracy crimes. View "United States v. Abreu" on Justia Law