Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Shkembi, a citizen of Albania, attempted to enter this country by representing that he was a national of a country that is a participant in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), 8 U.S.C. 1187, although Albania is not a VWP participant. His ruse was detected at the airport where he was deemed inadmissible. The VWP precludes contesting removability except by seeking asylum. After denial of his application seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, Shkembi succeeded in reopening his asylum proceeding. Despite the VWP’s limitation to asylum-only proceedings, Shkembi applied for a marriage-based adjustment of status (AOS) and withdrew his asylum application before the IJ. His file was returned to the Department of Homeland Security, but his AOS application was not adjudicated. After being taken into custody, he filed an unsuccessful emergency motion to reopen his asylum proceedings.The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The terms of the VWP apply to an alien who is from a non-VWP-participant country, who attempts to enter the U.S. by using the passport of a national of a VWP-participant country. Such an alien, despite his ineligibility for the VWP, is subject to the terms of the VWP. Shkembi has never had a right to seek AOS. The court also rejected an argument that the denial of his emergency motion to reopen deprived him of due process. View "Shkembi v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Manivannan asserts he is one of the leading materials scientists in the United States. He was hired by the federal Department of Energy (DOE) in 2005 and assigned to the National Energy Technology Laboratory. “Conflict best defined Manivannan’s time at the DOE”. He resigned following allegations of disturbing actions taken against an intern, with whom Manivannan allegedly had a sexual relationship. The allegations prompted an internal investigation and a state criminal prosecution for stalking.Manivannan has since filed several lawsuits relating to those events, including this action under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) and 2671–80, based on the agency’s disclosure of records to state prosecutors, its alleged negligence in conducting the internal investigation, and its refusal to return his personal property. A Magistrate dismissed those claims as precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. 1101 because they arose in the context of Manivannan’s federal employment. The Third Circuit reversed in part; a narrower inquiry is required. Under this inquiry, much of the conduct challenged by Manivannan, such as the internal investigation, still falls within the CSRA’s broad purview, but some conduct, such as the refusal to return property and cooperation in the state prosecution, does not. View "Manivannan v. United States Department of Energy" on Justia Law

Fischer, a Pennsylvania resident and former FedEx security specialist, brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Fischer alleged FedEx misclassified her and other security specialists as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime rule and underpaid them. Two former FedEx employees, Saunders, from Maryland, and Rakowsky, from New York, submitted notices of consent, seeking to join Fischer’s collective action. Saunders and Rakowsky both worked for FedEx in their home states but, other than FedEx’s allegedly uniform nationwide employment practices, have no connection to Pennsylvania related to their claims. The district court did not allow these opt-in plaintiffs to join the suit, reasoning that, as would be true for a state court, the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over FedEx with respect to their’ claims.On interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit noted a division among the circuits and held that in an FLSA collective action in federal court where the court lacks general personal jurisdiction over the defendant, all opt-in plaintiffs must establish specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to their individual claims. In this way, the specific personal jurisdiction analysis for an FLSA collective action in federal court operates the same as it would for an FLSA collective action, or any other traditional in personam suit, in state court. The out-of-state opt-in plaintiffs here cannot demonstrate their claims arise out of or relate to FedEx’s contacts with Pennsylvania. View "Fischer v. Federal Express Corp" on Justia Law

IImerys sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in response to mounting asbestos and talc personal injury claims. Many of the claimants who will suffer harm from asbestos exposure traceable to the debtor will not manifest those injuries until long after the reorganization process has concluded. Cases involving asbestos liability, therefore, use trusts designed to compensate present and future asbestos claimants, coupled with an injunction against future asbestos liability to allow the debtor to emerge from bankruptcy without the uncertainty of future asbestos liabilities while ensuring claimants would not be prejudiced just because they had not yet manifested injuries at the time of the bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. 524(g), The provision requires the appointment of a legal representative (FCR) to protect the rights of future claimants. The FCR participates in the negotiation of the reorganization plan and objects to terms that unfairly disadvantage future claimants.A group of insurance companies appealed the appointment of an FCR in the Ilmerys bankruptcy, arguing that the FCR had a conflict of interest because the FCR’s law firm also represented two of the insurance companies in a separate asbestos-related coverage dispute. The Third Circuit affirmed the appointment. The Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in appointing the FCR. it gave due consideration to the purported conflict and correctly determined that the interests of both the insurance companies and the future claimants were adequately protected. View "In re: Imerys Talc America, Inc" on Justia Law

The Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. 5311, and its implementing regulations require certain individuals with foreign financial interests to file annual disclosures, subject to penalties. In 2008, Bedrosian filed an inaccurate Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), omitting from the report the larger of his two Swiss bank accounts. If this omission was accidental, the IRS could fine Bedrosian up to $10,000; if he willfully filed an inaccurate FBAR, the penalty was the greater of $100,000 or half the balance of the undisclosed account at the time of the violation. Believing Bedrosian’s omission was willful, the IRS imposed a $975,789.17 penalty—by its calculation, half the balance of Bedrosian’s undisclosed account. Following Bedrosian’s refusal to pay the full penalty, the IRS filed a claim in federal court.The Third Circuit affirmed the district court in finding Bedrosian’s omission willful and ordering him to pay the IRS penalty in full. While the IRS failed to provide sufficient evidence at trial showing its $975,789.17 penalty was no greater than half his account balance, Bedrosian admitted this fact during opening statements and thus relieved the government of its burden of proof. View "Bedrosian v. United States Department of the Treasury" on Justia Law

The then-president’s 2018 decision, following the resignation of Jeff Sessions, to rely on his authority under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. 3345-3349d, to bypass the Department of Justice’s order of succession and to select an employee (Whitaker) rather than a Presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed officer to oversee the Department of Justice raised significant and largely unresolved constitutional and statutory questions. Kajmowicz sued Whitaker; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the Director of ATF, the United States of America, and the Attorney General of the United States, contending that Whitaker’s unlawful service as Acting Attorney General rendered a rule he promulgated concerning the scope of the term “machinegun” under the Gun Control Act of 1968 invalid.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit without addressing the legality of Whitaker’s designation as Acting Attorney General. Attorney General William Barr ratified the rule at issue; as long as he did so effectively, the rule may stand even if Whitaker served in violation of the Vacancies Reform Act or the Appointments Clause. The ratification forecloses Kajmowicz’s challenge. View "Kajmowicz v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Attorney Avenatti rose to public prominence in 2018 by representing “Stormy Daniels,” with whom then-President Trump had allegedly had an extra-marital affair. His subsequent arrest received extensive media coverage, including by Fox News and its individual employees. Avenatti sued Fox and several individuals in Delaware Superior Court. His initial complain described allegedly defamatory statements made by Hunt but did not name Hunt as a Defendant.Days later, Fox removed the case to federal court claiming complete diversity. Avenatti filed an amended complaint in the district court. Because the amended complaint was entered within 21 days, Avenatti did not require leave of court or the opposing parties, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). The amended complaint named Hunt—a California resident, as was Avenatti—as a Defendant and alleged that Hunt had published an article online about Avenatti’s arrest which included the same defamatory accusations previously attributed to the other Defendants. Avenatti moved to remand the case back to state court, citing Hunt’s shared California citizenship as destroying diversity.The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the remand motion, citing the court’s discretionary authority under Rule 21 to drop Hunt from the litigation to restore complete diversity. The court employed “an open-ended balancing test" for considering post-removal amendments that add nondiverse parties and found that Hunt had been joined to defeat diversity and Avenatti would not be prejudiced by Hunt’s excision. View "Avenatti v. Fox News Network LLC" on Justia Law

Adam saw advertisements for free samples of beauty products, which implied that she need only pay for shipping and handling. Adam ordered two free samples and purchased another item. She was charged $9.94 for shipping and $14.99 for the purchased item. Soon thereafter, Adam was unexpectedly charged $92.94, which resulted in an overdraft of her checking account. A company representative told Adam that “she had agreed" to pay the full amount if she kept the "free samples" and that Adam would need to return the items before refunds could be issued. Adam, not trusting the company, refused to return the items, then called her bank, which temporarily reversed the charge but ultimately reinstated it. Adam contends that her bank was misled by the “false-front scheme” and that the charge would have been reversed but for the defendants’ misrepresentations.Adam filed a putative class-action suit, alleging violations of (or conspiracy to violate or aiding and abetting violation of): multiple California laws; the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. 1693–1693r; the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961–1968; and consumer laws. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. Adam has standing; she was not made whole by the refund offer; she has neither received a refund nor accepted any alternative. Defendants’ conduct could provide but-for causation for Adam’s financial harm and a restitution order would redress that harm. View "Adam v. Barone" on Justia Law

Four defendants, who have multiple ties to organized crime, were convicted for their roles in the unlawful takeover and looting of FirstPlus Financial, a publicly traded mortgage loan company. Their scheme began with the defendants’ and their co-conspirators’ extortion of FirstPlus’s board of directors and its chairman, using lies and threats to gain control of the company. Once they forced the old leadership out, the defendants drained the company of its value by causing it to enter into expensive consulting and legal-services agreements with themselves, causing it to acquire (at vastly inflated prices) shell companies they personally owned, and using bogus trusts to funnel FirstPlus’s assets into their own accounts. They ultimately bankrupted FirstPlus, leaving its shareholders with worthless stock.Each defendant was convicted of more than 20 counts of criminal behavior and given a substantial prison sentence. In a consolidated appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the investigation, the charges and evidence against them, the pretrial process, the government’s compliance with its disclosure obligations, the trial, the forfeiture proceedings, and their sentences. The government conceded that the district court’s assessment of one defendant’s forfeiture obligations was improper under a Supreme Court decision handed down during the pendency of this appeal and remanded that assessment. View "United States v. Scarfo" on Justia Law

Rodriguez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin and possession with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of heroin and more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment, based on a 262–327-month Sentencing Guidelines range that reflects sentence enhancements for being the organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants and for maintaining premises for distributing drugs.The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court found that Rodriguez “set the prices,” “issue[d] edicts,” “dictated to whom and for how much the drugs were to be sold,” and provided drugs to his co-conspirators for distribution and did not clearly err by applying the “leader” sentence enhancement. The court also upheld the application of the “premises” enhancement. Rodriguez directed the activities at the premises in question and those premises were one of the “places where essential parts of drug operation[s] were conducted.” The ownership of premises was not dispositive. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law