Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Heinrich undressed two preschool girls, manipulated them into positions, and took pictures of their genitals. When the girls reported the incident, police found the photos and video of the girls as well as the other child pornography on Heinrich’s electronic devices, although Heinrich had tried to delete the images of the girls. He admitted that he had taken the pictures. Charged with 15 counts of producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), and one count of possessing child pornography, section 2252(a)(4)(B). Heinrich argued that he lacked the mental state required by 2251(a) because he was trying to show beauty and innocence, not “sexually explicit conduct.” Heinrich tried to present an expert psychological report that concluded, his “painful history as a ‘damaged’ child led him to capture on film what he inappropriately saw as images of beauty, purity, and innocence.”The Third Circuit affirmed his convictions. The report is inadmissible because, under the statute, his reason for taking the pictures is irrelevant; punishes those who orchestrate objectively sexually explicit conduct involving a minor in order to take pictures of that conduct. Heinrich did that. Defining the crime that way is constitutional: trying to expose children’s genitals is in itself usually blameworthy. View "United States v. Heinrich" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit in New Jersey state court against German citizens and New Jersey-based defendants, alleging one federal RICO claim and 120 state law claims. Defendant Straub removed the case to federal court with the consent of the other defendants, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1332. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their RICO claim. The district court issued a remand order, explaining that a court must “examine its own subject matter jurisdiction,” the basis for federal-question removal had been “mooted” by the dismissal of the federal claim, diversity jurisdiction was lacking, and one of the defendants was precluded by 28 U.S.C. 1441(b)(2) from removing the case as a forum-defendant. Defendants moved to vacate the remand order. The district court denied that Rule 60(b) motion, explaining that section 1332(a)(2) did not confer diversity jurisdiction, it was not required to explain why it was declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the case had been in federal court for only seven days so judicial economy did not favor retention of the state claims, and there was no apparent forum manipulation. The state court proceeding recommenced; the court granted dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.The Third Circuit affirmed. Federal appellate courts may not review remand orders where remand is based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal, 28 U.S.C. 1447(c)-(d). In this case, remand was proper; vacatur of the remand order is not warranted. View "Dirauf v. Berger" on Justia Law

Kwasnik was an estate-planning attorney who convinced clients to open irrevocable family trusts in order to avoid federal and state taxes and to ensure that they earned interest on the funds. Kwasnik named himself as a trustee, with authority to move assets into and out of the trust accounts. He received the account statements. In reality, Kwasnik moved the funds from his clients’ trust accounts to accounts of entities that he controlled. Within days, the funds were depleted. Clients were defrauded of approximately $13 million.Kwasnik pleaded guilty to money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), then moved to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion and sentenced him. Kwasnik then filed a notice of appeal. He later filed three more post-appeal motions in the district court concerning his guilty plea. The court denied them. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to the denial of the first motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Kwasnik did not have “newly discovered” evidence. The court declined to consider the others. A party must file a new or amended notice of appeal when he seeks appellate review of orders entered by a district court after he filed his original appeal, Fed.R.App.P. 4(b). View "United States v. Kwasnik" on Justia Law

In each of these consolidated petitions for review, an alien’s initial counsel withdrew, and the alien represented himself at the merits hearing on his requests for relief from removal. After denying those requests and ordering the aliens removed, the Immigration Judge informed each alien that he had a right to administratively appeal the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals and that the right could be waived. Each alien waived that right, preferring to be deported rather than remain in custody. Days afterward, each alien filed a pro se notice of appeal. Later, in briefs filed by pro bono counsel, each alien disputed a removal. The BIA dismissed each administrative appeal, finding that the waiver of an administrative appeal was valid. Each alien then filed an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration with the BIA.The Third Circuit denied petitions for review. The administrative record does not compel the conclusion that the waivers were invalid, and the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the alien’s motion to reconsider. Each IJ explained the right to appeal and the meaning of the waiver; the waivers were not involuntary. View "Alexander-Mendoza v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Ascolese, a compliance officer, brought a False Claims Act (FCA) retaliation claim against his former employer, MBP, in connection with a qui tam action involving a federally-funded public housing construction project for the Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA). In 2009–2010, Congress amended the FCA, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(A), to expand the scope of protected conduct shielded from retaliation and the type of notice an employer must have of the protected conduct. The new standard is whether Ascolese showed he engaged in protected conduct in furtherance of an FCA action or other efforts to stop or more violations of the FCA and that he was discriminated against because of his protected conduct. The court believed that the pre-amendment standard was required by the Third Circuit, and concluded that Ascolese failed to show MBP was on notice that he was attempting to stop MBP from violating the FCA and not merely doing his job.The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. The right question is whether Ascolese pled facts that plausibly showed MBP was on notice he tried to stop MBP’s alleged FCA violation. Ascolese sufficiently pled that he engaged in protected conduct when he went outside of his chain of command to report his concerns of fraudulent work to the PHA. View "Ascolese v. Shoemaker Construction Co" on Justia Law

Convicted of wire fraud, for his scheme to defraud Gains Capital, Banks was sentenced to 104 months’ imprisonment. Banks made fraudulent deposits of $324,000 and unsuccessfully executed 70 withdrawals/transfers totaling $264,000. Gain Capital, however, did not transfer any to Banks and suffered no loss.The Third Circuit remanded for resentencing. The district court erred in applying the loss enhancement to the U.S.S.G. fraud guideline. The loss enhancement in the Guideline’s application notes impermissibly expands the word “loss” to include both intended loss and actual loss. The court affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument that the court erred in denying Cross his constitutionally protected right to self-representation. The court predicated its finding that Banks could not understand the risks of self-representation on Banks’s voluminous filings and the court’s own observations of Banks over several years, including his “unrelenting and persistent focus on CIA-managed ‘voice-to-skull’ technology, a construct as to which he admits he has no factual basis to conclude was ever applied to him.” The court properly concluded Banks could not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The court upheld special device-purchase and financial-transactions conditions of supervised release and a requirement that Banks participate in DNA collection. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law

Investigating drug trafficking based on the report of a confidential informant, the police entered the homes of both Alexander and his girlfriend, without search warrants. Officers entered Alexander’s home and secured the premises, then waited to conduct a search until a warrant was issued. At Alexander’s girlfriend’s home, they secured the premises and were applying for a warrant, which was all but certain to issue, when they received what they understood as consent to a search. Alexander was charged with possession with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); possession with intent to distribute cocaine; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Alexander’s motion to suppress, citing the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. There was probable cause to believe Alexander had cocaine and drug-dealing paraphernalia in both houses. Officers had reason to believe that Alexander had been tipped off so that evidence of drug dealing would be imminently destroyed. Exigent circumstances justified the officers entering without a warrant; the search of Alexander’s residence was valid because a warrant was properly issued. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

In 2012, the DEA, the FBI, and the Chester Police Department initiated a joint investigation of a drug trafficking conspiracy (DTG) that employed confidential informants, controlled purchases of narcotics, surveillance, pole cameras, pen registers, and court-authorized wiretaps. To facilitate their drug trafficking, members of the DTG illegally carried guns and stashed both drugs and guns in alleyways and in a playground.Some members pled guilty; the four Appellants, among others, were convicted on drug conspiracy and related charges. The Third Circuit affirmed their convictions and sentences. Any improper expert testimony in violation of Rule of Evidence 704(b) was harmless error in light of the evidence that supports the Appellants’ membership in the conspiracy. The court rejected claims that the district court erred in its instructions and interrogatories to the jury concerning the quantity of drugs for which they were held responsible and erred in admitting evidence of firearms and acts of violence in the vicinity of the DTG’s territory during the period of the conspiracy. The court properly calculated the sentences, considering career offender status, acceptance of responsibility, firearms enhancements, and drug quantities attributable to the Appellants. View "United States v. Womack" on Justia Law

A York, Pennsylvania woman told law enforcement that Dyer had attacked her with a handgun, trafficked women, and sold drugs from his house. They obtained a warrant to search Dyer’s home for “[f]irearms, illegal drugs, [and] cell phones” after a search of his criminal history revealed that Dyer, a felon, may have possessed a firearm. Officers executed the warrant the following day; they found Dyer, who directed them to a firearm that matched the woman's description. They also seized “the Box” containing pills, drug packing materials, and ID” from a shelf in Dyer’s son’s bedroom. ATF Agents obtained another warrant to search Dyer’s residence, garage, and the surrounding curtilage for drugs and drug paraphernalia; they found pentylone capsules (bath salts), and digital scales with cocaine residue.Charged with knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, criminal conspiracy to distribute and possess pentylone with the intent to distribute, and possession of pentylone with the intent to distribute. Dyer moved to suppress all the evidence. The court ultimately refused to exclude the firearm properly seized during the first search and the drugs, digital scales, and packaging seized during the second search. Dyer pled guilty to the felon in possession of a firearm charge, Dyer appealed the admission of the Box. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Box was immaterial to his case and admitting it was at most harmless error. View "United States v. Dyer" on Justia Law

Clark, a JTVCC inmate, was treated for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder at the prison for at least 10 years, a fact of which the prison officials were aware. Despite having few disciplinary “points” on his record and no security classification meriting solitary confinement, Clark remained in the unit for seven months, alone in his cell except for three one-hour intervals per week. Clark was not allowed to work or participate in educational or religious services. He was permitted only four phone calls and four visitors per month. Inmates must “earn their way out” of solitary confinement; while in isolation, Clark would “yell and bang on the door." Prison officials considered these outbursts to be disciplinary incidents. When Clark questioned his confinement, he was put in the “naked room,” an isolation cell where he had only an open smock. Clark's mental illness caused behavior that was punished by conditions that furthered his deterioration. Clark experienced “increased hallucinations, paranoia, self-mutilation, sleeplessness, and nightmares.”Officials failed to abide by a policy requirement to consider his mental illness. Clark alleges they knew of the American Correctional Association study on the effects of solitary confinement on seriously mentally ill inmates. The study singled out JTVCC’s Warden, stating that he is not “open to change in regards to restrictive housing" regarding the mentally ill. The Third Circuit reversed the qualified immunity dismissal of Clark’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. His allegations trigger established Eighth Amendment protection. View "Clark v. Coupe" on Justia Law