Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Lewis was convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana under N.J. Stat. 2C:35-5. In 2020, Lewis pleaded guilty in federal court to unlawful possession of a firearm 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Section 922(g) carries an increased base offense level for a defendant convicted of a prior “controlled substance offense,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), under federal or state law. Lewis argued that only a conviction related to a substance listed in the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801, qualified as a “controlled substance offense.” The CSA at the time of Lewis’s federal sentencing defined marijuana more narrowly than did New Jersey law at the time of his state conviction. In 2018, Congress amended the CSA’s definition of “marihuana” to exclude hemp. In 2019, New Jersey followed suit. The government argued that substances regulated by state law are controlled substances under the Guidelines, even if they are not regulated by federal law. The district court agreed with Lewis.The Third Circuit vacated. The meaning of “controlled substance” in U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b)’s definition of “controlled substance offense” includes drugs regulated by state law at the time of the predicate state conviction, even if they are not federally regulated or are no longer regulated by the state at the time of the federal sentencing. Marijuana, including hemp, was regulated by New Jersey at the time of Lewis’s predicate state conviction; the district court erred in declining to apply the 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) enhancement. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Saban-Cach grew up in Sacatepéquez, Guatemala. He is of indigenous ethnicity. A local gang associated with MS-13 harassed Saban-Cach. Because of this abuse, Saban-Cach dropped out of school and fled to San Pedro. The gang still harassed him, including violent physical attacks from which he still has scars, Those attacks and attacks on family members were not reported to the police because the police did not respond to the complaints of indigenous people. After two unsuccessful attempts, in 2015 Saban-Cach entered the United States without inspection or apprehension. After he left Guatemala, the gang kidnapped, beat, and raped his 16-year-old sister, holding her for more than a month. The police allegedly ignored the family’s complaints.DHS encountered Saban-Cach in 2020. After he expressed a reasonable fear of returning to Guatemala, SabanCach was placed in withholding-only proceedings and sought relief under the Convention Against Torture. An IJ found Saban-Cach’s testimony credible but concluded that Saban-Cach did not establish a clear probability of persecution on account of a protected ground. The BIA affirmed the removal order. The Third Circuit vacated. The BIA erred in finding that Saban-Cach by conditioning a finding of past persecution on seeking—or sustaining injuries that require—professional medical care. The BIA failed to appropriately consider the cumulative effects of mistreatment. The IJ overlooked evidence that the harm Saban-Cach suffered was due to his being identified as an indigenous person. There is considerable evidence that government officials are willfully blind to the violence of gang members against indigenous people. View "Saban-Cach v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Millennium's laboratory provides drug testing to healthcare professionals. Mauthe, a private practice MD, used Millennium’s services. On May 2, 2017, Millennium faxed all of its customers a single-page flyer promoting a free educational seminar to “highlight national trends in opioid misuse and abuse . . . and discuss the role of medication monitoring ... during the care of injured workers.” Although Millennium offered urine testing to detect opioids, the fax did not mention that service nor provide any pricing information, discounts, or product images. The seminar did not promote any goods or services for sale but described statistics on opioid abuse and the role of such drugs in chronic pain management. It explained that drug testing could help detect or monitor opioid abuse, and assessed the efficacy of several testing methods. The seminar did not identify providers or prices for any of the drug testing methods it reviewed. After the seminar, Millennium did not follow up with any registrants or attendees.Mauthe who has sued fax senders in more than 10 lawsuits since 2015, seeking damages under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, (b)(3), filed a putative class action against Millennium. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Liability under the TCPA extends only to “unsolicited advertisement[s],” meaning communications that promote the sale of goods, services, or property. Under an objective standard, no reasonable recipient could construe the seminar fax as such an unsolicited advertisement. View "Robert W Mauthe MD PC v. Millennium Health LLC" on Justia Law

Philadelphia officers Kling and Nestel stopped Gallman for running a stop sign and recovered a firearm from Gallman’s passenger. Officer Rosinski moved Gallman to the patrol car. Kling discovered a firearm near Gallman's driver’s seat. Gallman, previously convicted of first-degree robbery, was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, and unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. During the hearing, the government informed the court that there was an open Internal Affairs Division (IAD) investigation about Rosinski’s failure to call a supervisor to a traffic stop. The government also supplied an IAD memorandum regarding a racial profiling complaint against Rosinski and Stout, who was also present at the Gallman stop. That matter was closed before Gallman’s arrest; the allegation was unfounded.Following COVID-19 protocol, Gallman's trial was conducted in one courtroom and video-streamed to another where the public and Gallman’s family were seated. Outside the presence of the jury, the court asked Gallman whether he wanted to stipulate his prior conviction and discussed the pending Rosinski IAD investigation.The Third Circuit affirmed Gallman’s conviction. Closing the video stream during the sessions away from the jury did not constitute reversible error; it was not “clear under current law” that the Sixth Amendment public-trial right applied to those proceedings. The closures here were brief and resulted from pandemic protocol challenges rather than any substantive decision. Some of the topics discussed were also discussed in open court. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Gallman’s prior conviction. View "United States v. Gallman" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs are food service, medical, health and wellness, art, music, and legal businesses in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and Delaware. In March 2020, to curb the spread of COVID-19, the governors of those states issued executive orders closing or restricting the activities of nonessential businesses and urging people to stay home whenever possible. The businesses were forced to close or significantly limit their operations.The businesses filed claims under their commercial property insurance policies. Their insurers universally denied coverage, reasoning that the businesses did not suffer a “physical loss of or damage to” property necessary to trigger coverage or that a “virus exclusion” barred coverage. The businesses argued that their loss of the ability to use their properties for their intended business purposes was a “physical loss of” property and that either the exclusions did not apply or the insurers were estopped from arguing that they do. The district courts all ruled in favor of the insurers. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that the loss of use of a property’s intended business purpose is not a physical loss of property covered by the businesses’ insurance policies. The court did not reach the issue of whether the virus exclusions or any other exclusions apply. View "Wilson v. USI Insurance Services LLC" on Justia Law

O’Brien worked at Forum, a think tank, from 2016-2020. She served as its controller and was responsible for human resources tasks. In 2019, O’Brien sued Forum, its President, and its Director (Roman). She alleged a hostile work environment under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Trial testimony indicated that Roman had made sexual advances toward O’Brien and other female employees. In Title VII cases where no tangible adverse employment action was taken, an employer may escape liability by raising an affirmative defense that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior, and the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective opportunities provided The district court held that O’Brien was not entitled to a jury instruction that this defense is unavailable where the harasser functions as the alter ego or proxy of the employer.The Third Circuit upheld a verdict against O'Brien. Although the affirmative defense is not available in an "alter ego" situation, the district court’s refusal to so instruct the jury here was harmless because the jury found that O’Brien was not subjected to sexual harassment. The existence of an affirmative defense was therefore irrelevant. View "O''Brien v. The Middle East Forum" on Justia Law

Jaludi worked at Citigroup. After he reported company wrongdoing, he was demoted, transferred, and (in 2013) terminated. He claims Citigroup blacklisted him from the financial industry. In 2015, Jaludi sued Citigroup for retaliation under both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and RICO. The district court sent his claims to arbitration. Jaludi appealed the arbitration order. In early 2018, while that appeal was pending, he filed an administrative complaint with the Secretary of Labor, adding one new allegation that, in late 2017, a headhunter had stopped returning his calls. In 2019, the Third Circuit remanded, holding that he was not required to arbitrate his Sarbanes-Oxley claims.On remand, the district court dismissed, finding his administrative complaint untimely. Though Sarbanes-Oxley required an administrative complaint within 180 days of the retaliatory conduct, he had waited more than two years after the last incident. Jaludi argued that the court should have granted him leave to amend because the 2017 allegation that he added in his administrative complaint happened fewer than 180 days before that complaint, making it timely. The Third Circuit affirmed. Although neither filing the administrative complaint after the statute of limitations had run nor suing before exhausting his administrative remedies was jurisdictional under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Jaludi’s delay in filing justified the dismissal. View "Jaludi v. Citigroup & Co." on Justia Law

Heinrich undressed two preschool girls, manipulated them into positions, and took pictures of their genitals. When the girls reported the incident, police found the photos and video of the girls as well as the other child pornography on Heinrich’s electronic devices, although Heinrich had tried to delete the images of the girls. He admitted that he had taken the pictures. Charged with 15 counts of producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), and one count of possessing child pornography, section 2252(a)(4)(B). Heinrich argued that he lacked the mental state required by 2251(a) because he was trying to show beauty and innocence, not “sexually explicit conduct.” Heinrich tried to present an expert psychological report that concluded, his “painful history as a ‘damaged’ child led him to capture on film what he inappropriately saw as images of beauty, purity, and innocence.”The Third Circuit affirmed his convictions. The report is inadmissible because, under the statute, his reason for taking the pictures is irrelevant; punishes those who orchestrate objectively sexually explicit conduct involving a minor in order to take pictures of that conduct. Heinrich did that. Defining the crime that way is constitutional: trying to expose children’s genitals is in itself usually blameworthy. View "United States v. Heinrich" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit in New Jersey state court against German citizens and New Jersey-based defendants, alleging one federal RICO claim and 120 state law claims. Defendant Straub removed the case to federal court with the consent of the other defendants, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1332. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their RICO claim. The district court issued a remand order, explaining that a court must “examine its own subject matter jurisdiction,” the basis for federal-question removal had been “mooted” by the dismissal of the federal claim, diversity jurisdiction was lacking, and one of the defendants was precluded by 28 U.S.C. 1441(b)(2) from removing the case as a forum-defendant. Defendants moved to vacate the remand order. The district court denied that Rule 60(b) motion, explaining that section 1332(a)(2) did not confer diversity jurisdiction, it was not required to explain why it was declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the case had been in federal court for only seven days so judicial economy did not favor retention of the state claims, and there was no apparent forum manipulation. The state court proceeding recommenced; the court granted dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.The Third Circuit affirmed. Federal appellate courts may not review remand orders where remand is based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal, 28 U.S.C. 1447(c)-(d). In this case, remand was proper; vacatur of the remand order is not warranted. View "Dirauf v. Berger" on Justia Law

Kwasnik was an estate-planning attorney who convinced clients to open irrevocable family trusts in order to avoid federal and state taxes and to ensure that they earned interest on the funds. Kwasnik named himself as a trustee, with authority to move assets into and out of the trust accounts. He received the account statements. In reality, Kwasnik moved the funds from his clients’ trust accounts to accounts of entities that he controlled. Within days, the funds were depleted. Clients were defrauded of approximately $13 million.Kwasnik pleaded guilty to money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), then moved to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion and sentenced him. Kwasnik then filed a notice of appeal. He later filed three more post-appeal motions in the district court concerning his guilty plea. The court denied them. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to the denial of the first motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Kwasnik did not have “newly discovered” evidence. The court declined to consider the others. A party must file a new or amended notice of appeal when he seeks appellate review of orders entered by a district court after he filed his original appeal, Fed.R.App.P. 4(b). View "United States v. Kwasnik" on Justia Law