Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program requires gasoline and diesel fuel refiners, blenders, and importers to ensure that a certain portion of their annual transportation fuel production consists of renewable fuels, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)). United, a small Pennsylvania refinery, has periodically received hardship exemptions from those requirements, including in the 2017 and 2018 compliance years. In 2019, United sought an exemption. Rather than accepting United's data at face value—as in previous years—EPA asked how United had accounted for the financial benefit of its 2018 RFS exemption. United's amended financial statement explained that revenue from selling its renewable fuel credits (RINS) generated in a particular year was included in net revenues for that year, even if the RINs actually were sold in a later calendar year. United’s amended figures showed a three-year refining margin that was higher than the margin in United’s original submission and higher than the industry average. The Department of Energy (DOE) evaluated United’s submission and initially recommended that United not receive an exemption. DOE later changed its recommendation to account for the effects of COVID-19 and suggested a 50 percent exemption for 2019.EPA denied United any exemption, declining to consider events “that did not emerge until 2020, the year after the petition in question.” The Third Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting United’s argument that EPA arbitrarily relied on an “accounting trick” that artificially inflated United’s running average net refining margin. View "United Refining Co v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

In 2005-2013, Nocito, president and CEO of AHS, characterized his personal expenses as deductible AHS business expenses and “shuffled” AHS’s untaxed profits between shell companies he owned that “performed no significant business purpose.” In 2013, Sundo, AHS’s secretary and CFO, provided documents to government investigators under a cooperation agreement, including Exhibit J, later determined by the court to be a privileged document in which Sundo conveyed legal advice to Nocito.After his indictment for tax fraud (18 U.S.C. 371), Nocito moved for pre-trial discovery of all the documents provided by Sundo to support a possible motion to suppress based on government misconduct. The court denied the motion, concluding that Exhibit J did not offer a “colorable basis” for his governmental misconduct claim. A subsequent motion to intervene, brought by the shell companies, attached a Federal Rule 41(g) motion for the return of property, in an attempt to prevent the government from using Exhibit J in future proceedings.The court permitted the companies to intervene but denied their Rule 41(g) motion. It found the Intervenors—even assuming they could establish Exhibit J’s privilege was “a property interest” of which they were deprived—were attempting to use Rule 41(g) improperly to suppress Exhibit J from the evidence against Nocito. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Rule 41(g) motion was part of an ongoing criminal process; its denial did not constitute a final order. View "United States v. Nocito" on Justia Law

In 2014, National Park Service (NPS) entered a contract with Perini to perform work on Ellis Island and hired Jacobs to provide contract management services on that contract. Jacobs assigned Weber to the project. Weber observed what he believed to be discrepancies between Perini’s work and its billing practices and disclosed those discrepancies to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), which concluded that there was no misconduct. In 2015, the NPS informed Jacobs that it would not extend its contract, purportedly because there was not enough work. Weber told OIG that he believed NPS’s decision was due to his reports and that he feared Jacobs would not retain him. Jacobs ultimately discharged Weber, who filed an OIG complaint in December 2015. In April 2016, Weber agreed to, an extension of OIG’s 180-day statutory deadline to complete its investigation. In February 2017, beyond the 360-day extended deadline, OIG completed and transmitted its report, with redacted copies to Weber and Jacobs. More than three years later, Jacobs asserted that it had never received the report.Jacobs subsequently declined to respond, asserting that the report was issued after the statutory deadline, 41 U.S.C. 4712, and that OIG lacked jurisdiction. The final determination and order were issued in December 2021, well beyond the 30-day deadline, and concluded that Jacobs had engaged in a prohibited reprisal against Weber. The Third Circuit denied an appeal, holding that the deadlines are not jurisdictional. View "Jacobs Project Management Co v. United States Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Henderson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing fentanyl, 18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iv), without a plea agreement. The district court applied the career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on findings that Henderson’s 2015 Pennsylvania conviction for possession with intent to deliver heroin qualified as a “controlled substance offense,” and Henderson’s 2005 Pennsylvania conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery qualified as a “crime of violence.” The enhancement increased the applicable Guideline range from 70-87 months’ imprisonment to 188-235 months. Henderson did not challenge the PSR Guideline calculations and was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment, with the court noting Henderson’s “mental health issues.” The Third Circuit stayed Henderson's appeal. In the meantime, the Supreme Court (Borden, 2021) found that crimes that can be committed with recklessness do not qualify as “violent felonies” under ACCA.The Third Circuit vacated Henderson's sentence, noting that its precedents had previously dictated different sentencing outcomes for defendants convicted of conspiracy and other inchoate offenses but that Borden resolved the conflict. Under Pennsylvania law, conspiracy to commit robbery does not constitute a “crime of violence” for purposes of the career offender enhancement. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Liposomal bupivacaine is a nonopioid pain medication that Pacira manufactures under the name EXPAREL; it is a local anesthetic administered at the time of surgery to control post-surgical pain. As of 2020, EXPAREL sales represented nearly all of Pacira’s total revenue. Pacira complains that the defendants, the American Society of Anesthesiologists, its journal, its editor, and authors published statements in a variety of forms, conveying their view that EXPAREL is “not superior” to standard analgesics or provides “inferior” pain relief.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Pacira’s suit for trade libel. Opinion statements are generally nonactionable. A “fair and natural” reading of the statements at issue shows that these are nonactionable subjective expressions. Pacira’s allegations boil down to disagreements about the reliability of the methodology and data underlying the statements; “a scientific conclusion based on nonfraudulent data in an academic publication is not a ‘fact’ that can be proven false through litigation.” Pacira failed to identify any aspect of the Articles, a Continuing Medical Education program, or a Podcast that “bring their conclusions outside the protected realm of scientific opinion.” View "Pacira Biosciences Inc v. American Society of Anesthesiologists Inc" on Justia Law

Perez-Colon was convicted of two counts of production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), one count of distribution, section 2252(a)(2), five counts of attempted distribution, 2252(a)(2), and one count of possession, 2252(a)(4)(B). Eight counts involved “M1,” a female toddler. Perez-Colon was living with M1 and her mother at a motel. He posted a Craigslist advertisement seeking to “share real incest stories fetish stories underage pedo stories” with “real experiences and pictures.” An undercover FBI agent responded. Perez-Colon sent the agent pornographic images and videos of M1. A search of Perez-Colon’s smartphone revealed that he produced these and other similar pictures and videos. Perez-Colon also attempted to distribute an image of a toddler boy's genitals; the boy's mother took the photo and sent it to Perez-Colon to show him the boy’s rash.The Third Circuit affirmed his 55-year sentence. The court rejected Perez-Colon’s objections to his PSR’s treatment of Guideline 3D1.2, which required the court to group closely related counts together when determining Perez-Colon’s number of “units” of counts; to a two-level Guideline 2G2.1(b)(5) enhancement that applies “[i]f the defendant was a parent, relative, or legal guardian of the minor involved in the offense, or if the minor was otherwise in the custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant”; and to a five-level 4B1.5(b) enhancement for “a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct.” View "United States of America v. Perez-Colon" on Justia Law

When Mack was incarcerated, he worked at the prison commissary, where two supervising prison guards singled him out for harassment because of his Muslim faith. When Mack went to the back of the commissary to pray during shift breaks, the guards followed him and interfered with his prayers by making noises, talking loudly, and kicking boxes. Fearing retaliation if he continued to pray at work, Mack stopped doing so. The guards nevertheless engineered his termination from his commissary job. He sued.The district court granted the guards summary judgment on Mack’s lone surviving claim, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, citing qualified immunity. The Third Circuit vacated. While, as a matter of law, qualified immunity can be asserted as a defense under RFRA, the officers have not met their burden of establishing that defense. Framed in the light most favorable to Mack, evidence of the RFRA violation here involved significant, deliberate, repeated, and unjustified interference by prison officials with Mack’s ability to pray as required by his faith. If different facts come out at trial, the officers may again raise qualified immunity. View "Mack v. Yost" on Justia Law

Freeman was convicted, along with Miller and Collier, of second-degree murder. The jury had heard the confession of Miller, a non-testifying codefendant, with redactions that replaced the names of Collier and Freeman, with the substitutes “the first guy” and “the second guy.” The court gave a limiting instruction that the statement was to be considered only as to Miller, not as to the other defendants, in order to protect Freeman’s Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him. Freeman’s objection was overruled and rejected on appeal in state court.The district court concluded that a “Bruton” violation occurred and that the violation was not harmless, and granted Freeman habeas relief. The Third Circuit reversed. A Bruton violation occurred. When a statement is redacted— whether by substituting the codefendant’s name with a neutral pronoun, a blank space, or a symbol—in such a manner that “[a] juror … need only lift his eyes to [the codefendant], sitting at counsel table” to understand who is being implicated, the introduction of that statement is a Sixth Amendment violation. However, there was ample other evidence against Freeman, and the violative statement was largely duplicative of other evidence; there is no “grave doubt about whether [the error] had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” The error was harmless. View "Freeman v. Superintendent Fayette SCI" on Justia Law

Rivera, a Newark police officer from 1993-2018, collected $78,941 in bribes from three brothel owners in exchange for protecting the owners from arrest, using law enforcement resources to assist them, and making things difficult for competing brothels. Rivera did not report the income from the bribes, for which he should have paid $17,408 in federal taxes. He was indicted on 14 counts. Rivera pleaded guilty to accepting corrupt payments with the intent to be influenced and rewarded, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B)–(2), and aiding and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). The government agreed to dismiss the remaining counts if Rivera pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 46 months. The plea agreement included an appellate waiver that Rivera attested he read and fully understood.Nine months after the court “conditionally” accepted his plea, Rivera moved to withdraw his plea, claiming the court had deferred acceptance of it until the sentencing, which had not occurred. He argued Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d) permitted him to withdraw his plea “for any reason or no reason.” The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Rivera’s motion. The district court stated that while it had deferred acceptance of the plea agreement, it had accepted the plea itself, which could not be withdrawn absent “a fair and just reason.” The Third Circuit enforce the waiver of Rivera’s right to appeal. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

To improve a stretch of U.S. Route 22 near Altoona, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) sought two right-of-way easements from for new drainage pipes, covering less than one-tenth of an acre of Merritt's property. PennDOT initiated condemnation and over Merritts’s objections, acquired title to and possession of the easements. With no success in that state-court proceeding, Merritts filed a federal suit, claiming that PennDOT’s acquisition of the easements and the compensation offered for them violated the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania law.The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice, some based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, the remainder under “Burford abstention,” which protects “complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference.” The Third Circuit affirmed in part. The “Ex parte Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity does not allow Merritts’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the PennDOT officials in their official capacities because he does not seek prospective relief from an ongoing violation. Merritts’s section 1983 claims for damages against the PennDOT officials in their individual capacities for allegedly unlawfully acquiring the easements for PennDOT cannot be dismissed under Burford abstention; his claims for damages premised on the allegedly unlawful acquisition of the easements meet the conditions for dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but his claims concerning the denial of just compensation do not. The dismissals on Eleventh Amendment and Rooker-Feldman grounds should have been without prejudice. View "Merritts v. Richards" on Justia Law