Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant and co-defendants were tried in connection with the armed robbery of a Philadelphia convenience store. The district court instructed the jury that each defendant could be convicted of Hobbs Act robbery under three alternative theories of liability: direct, aiding and abetting, or for participation in a Pinkerton conspiracy. The district court further instructed that defendants could be convicted under Section 924(c) based on either a direct or an aiding and abetting theory. The jury found all parties guilty on all counts in a general verdict, and the district court denied their motions for judgment of acquittal. Appellant argued that his conviction for Hobbs Act robbery must be vacated because the district court failed to charge the jury on those elements, and the Government failed to prove them.   The Third Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly charged the jury on the elements of Hobbs Act Robbery. The court explained the district court did not err in giving this jury instruction, and Appellant concedes that a reasonable jury, following this instruction, could have concluded that he aided and abetted co-defendant’s completed Hobbs Act robbery by intending to “facilitate the taking of the gun from the clerk.” Further, the court held that Appellant committed a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). The court wrote that Appellant indisputably brandished his firearm during co-defendant’s completed Hobbs Act robbery, and while the jury’s general verdict obscures whether Appellant’s Hobbs Act robbery conviction was based on an aiding and abetting or a Pinkerton theory of guilt, under either theory he is liable for committing a crime of violence. View "USA v. Abid Stevens" on Justia Law

The DRBA, a bi-state agency created by an interstate compact between Delaware and New Jersey, hired Minor as its Deputy Executive Director in 2009 and terminated him in 2017. Minor, believing he was fired for his support of then-incoming New Jersey Governor Murphy, sued the DRBA and its Commissioners for violating his First Amendment right to political affiliation. The court rejected the Commissioners’ request for qualified immunity, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Minor’s responsibilities were purely administrative by the time he was dismissed so that the Commissioners were barred potentially by the First Amendment from firing Minor on account of his politics.The Third Circuit vacated. The district court correctly held that the right of certain employees not to be fired based on political affiliation was clearly established. However, there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Minor held such a position. The question of immunity must await the determination of facts at trial. Third Circuit precedent requires the district court to “analyze separately, and state findings with respect to, the specific conduct of each [Commissioner]” to learn more about whether each Commissioner could know that his specific conduct violated clearly established rights. View "Minor v. Delaware River & Bay Authority" on Justia Law

Twelve current and former Philadelphia police officers posted highly offensive Facebook messages that glorified violence and denigrated minority groups. The posts became part of an expose by a national online news organization. The officers, who were disciplined or terminated, alleged First Amendment retaliation.The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of their suit, noting that it did not condone the officers’ conduct and that the city has an interest in protecting the public’s perception of its officers. There were material factual gaps concerning when certain posts were written and by whom and which posts were the basis of the disciplinary actions. With respect to causation, there was unsubstantiated speculation about the impact of the posts, some of which had been public for years. View "Fenico v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

In 1995, Range pleaded guilty to making false statements about his income to obtain $2,458 of food stamp assistance. His conviction was classified as a misdemeanor punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. Range was sentenced to three years’ probation. Three years later, Range attempted to purchase a firearm but was rejected by the instant background check system. Range’s wife subsequently bought him a deer-hunting rifle. Years later Range learned that he was barred from purchasing and possessing firearms because of his welfare fraud conviction. He sold his rifle to a firearms dealer and sought a declaratory judgment that 18 U.S.C. 922(g) violated the Second Amendment as applied to him. The section prohibits firearm ownership by any person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year—the federal definition of a felony.In 2022, the Third Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit, reasoning that “the people” constitutionally entitled to bear arms are “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” and that even if Range fell within “the people,” the government demonstrated that its prohibition is consistent with historical tradition.On rehearing, en banc, the Third Circuit reversed. Despite his false statement conviction, Range remains among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. The government did not carry its burden of showing that the Nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation support disarming Range. View "Range v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Garcia-Vasquez, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, came to the U.S. illegally. In 1999, he was convicted of conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. After serving his prison sentence, he was removed. Garcia-Vasquez returned to the U.S. illegally. He was subsequently convicted in state court for distributing heroin and other drug offenses. New Jersey released him to immigration authorities. Garcia-Vasquez pleaded guilty to reentering the country illegally after having been convicted of an aggravated felony and removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(2). Based on his 1999 cocaine-conspiracy conviction the government advocated a 16-level enhancement under Sentencing Guideline 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). The Guideline’s Application Note 5 extends that enhancement to inchoate crimes like conspiracy. Garcia-Vasquez argued that application notes may not extend the reach of the Guideline’s text and that, under the categorical approach, his federal conspiracy conviction did not count as a generic conspiracy because its elements did not require an overt act.The district court applied the enhancement, sentencing him to 46 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the enhanced range. The Third Circuit affirmed. Garcia-Vasquez argued that his 1999 conviction was only for conspiring to traffic drugs, not actually trafficking them; only Application Note 5 names inchoate crimes expressly. The court rejected the argument. The plain meaning of “drug trafficking offense” includes drug-trafficking conspiracies so it is not necessary to resort to the application notes. View "United States v. Garcia-Vasquez" on Justia Law

Somerset County officers were patrolling in response to recent gang-related crimes and shootings. Detective Gambino recognized a vehicle he had seen earlier parked in front of a known meeting place for the Bounty Hunter Bloods. Gambino followed the car, saw it turn without signaling, and radioed his supervisor, Sergeant Brown, to pull the car over for a traffic violation. Brown, driving with two other officers, initiated the traffic stop. Gambino arrived and shined his flashlight by the car's left rear door. Dowdell, whom Gambino knew from prior arrests to be a member of the Bloods, was sitting in the back seat. Gambino opened the left rear car door to “have a conversation.” Gambino saw a bulge in Dowdell’s jacket, ordered Dowdell out of the car, patted him down, and discovered a fully loaded semi-automatic firearm.Dowdell, charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), argued that Gambino violated his Fourth Amendment rights by “physically intruding on” the car door. The Third Circuit affirmed an order granting Dowdell’s motion to suppress evidence, rejecting the government’s arguments that the district court abused its discretion in finding that it had waived any argument that existing precedent should be extended to justify opening the car door and, alternatively, in not excusing the waiver. The government’s sole legal theory was that reasonable suspicion justified opening the door. View "United States v. Dowdell" on Justia Law

Simmons pleaded guilty to Transportation with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity and was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment and a lifetime of supervised release. After beginning his supervised release, Simmons choked, punched, and threatened to throw hot grease at his mother. Simmons held both his mother and his girlfriend against their will as he trashed his mother's apartment and threw hot grease. The next day, Simmons’ mother was at the home of a friend. Simmons arrived wearing a mask and fired a gunshot through the front door into an occupied room. A home security camera captured video and audio, including Simmons stating, “Next time I’m going to kill everybody.” Simmons’ mother told his probation officer that Simmons did not live with her, despite him having listed her address as his own with Pennsylvania’s sex offender registry.The U.S. Probation Office alleged four violations of his supervised release: the two violent incidents, failure to update his address with the sex offender registry, and possession of a firearm. The district court found Simmons violated the terms of his release and sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment followed by a reimposed life term of supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting Simmons’s arguments that the court violated 18 U.S.C. 3583(h) by not subtracting the 21 months from his life term of supervised release and that the imposition of a life term of supervised release was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Energy contracted with Superior for hydraulic fracking services to extract natural gas. In 2007, Energy advised Superior that it believed Superior had damaged some wells. Superior notified its insurance provider, American, which agreed to provide Superior with defense counsel, reserving its right to contest coverage. Energy sued Superior in state court. A jury determined that Superior had damaged 53 wells; the verdict form specified that Superior “fail[ed] to perform its contract" with Energy "in a workman-like manner” and that this “failure” was “a substantial factor in causing damage.”Superior’s policy with American provided coverage for “property damage” arising out of an “occurrence,” defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions[,]” but it did not define the term “accident.” Superior also purchased an “underground resources and equipment coverage” (UREC) endorsement for coverage “against risks associated with well-servicing operations[.]”In a federal court declaratory judgment action seeking indemnification, American argued that damage caused by a failure to perform a contract “in a workman-like manner” is not an “occurrence” under the policy and that, even if the policy covered Superior’s claim, it would involve a single “occurrence” under Pennsylvania law and would be subject to a $2 million per-occurrence limit.The district court granted summary judgment for Superior. The Third Circuit reversed. An accident is “unexpected,” which “implies a degree of fortuity that is not present in a claim for faulty workmanship.” The UREC endorsement does not eliminate the policy’s “occurrence” requirement. View "American Home Assurance Co. v. Superior Well Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Kean University implements New Jersey’s Policy Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace through its Affirmative Action Office, which conducts an investigation and prepares a report. Kean’s Chief of Staff reviews the report and makes a final determination. A final determination by the Chief of Staff may be appealed to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission. In 2016, adjunct professor Borowski was accused of making insensitive in-class statements about gender, immigration status, ethnicity, and religion. The Chief of Staff ruled against her. Borowski’s teaching assignment was terminated.Borowski appealed to the Commission, which recognized that material facts were in dispute, and referred the matter to an ALJ. Before a decision on the ensuing hearing, Kean alerted the ALJ of an intervening Commission decision, holding that adjunct professors were not civil service employees entitled to appeal final determinations of Policy violations. The ALJ dismissed Borowski’s appeal; the Commission affirmed.Instead of appealing in the state-court system, Borowski sued in federal court. The district court relied on Younger abstention to dismiss the case. The Third Circuit vacated. Younger abstention prevents federal court interference with only certain types of state proceedings, such as quasi-criminal civil enforcement actions. An appeal to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission is neither quasi-criminal nor within another category of Younger-eligible proceedings. Another prerequisite for Younger abstention is that the state proceeding must be ongoing; the Commission’s dismissal was final. View "Borowski v. Kean University" on Justia Law

Xi and his wife, Li, immigrated to the U.S. from China in 1989. Xi, an internationally acclaimed expert on thin film superconducting technology, became Chair of the Physics Department at Temple University. On May 21, 2015, Xi answered the door and was confronted by armed FBI agents. Agents held the family at gunpoint and conducted an extensive search before taking Xi to the FBI’s field office. He was interrogated before the agents revealed that Xi had been indicted for providing Chinese entities with sensitive information about a “revolution[ary]” superconductor, the “pocket heater.” Eventually, prosecutors realized that, as the inventor allegedly explained, Xi’s emails did not concern the pocket heater and the pocket heater was not “revolutionary.” The government moved to dismiss the Indictment. The case received widespread media attention. Temple placed Xi on administrative leave; the family suffered emotionally and financially.The district court dismissed Xi's “Bivens” claims alleging equal protection and Fourth Amendment violations, malicious prosecution, and fabrication of evidence, and the family's Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) claims. The court determined that Xi failed to allege “clearly established” constitutional violations and assumed that the same qualified immunity standard applied to the FTCA’s “discretionary function exception.”The Third Circuit affirmed in part, citing Supreme Court precedent declining to extend Bivens into the national security realm and the limited circumstances in which Congress has provided a remedy. The court vacated the dismissal of the FTCA claims. The “clearly established” threshold is inapplicable. The government has no discretion to violate the Constitution; FTCA claims premised on conduct that is plausibly alleged to violate the Constitution may not be dismissed on the basis of the discretionary function exception. View "Xi v. Haugen" on Justia Law