Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Coleman was convicted for supervising a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to life imprisonment before the Supreme Court’s 2000 “Apprendi” decision. The court did not specify which provision of section 841(b) grounded his conviction and sentence. After unsuccessfully seeking habeas relief and a sentence reduction under Sentencing Guidelines amendments, Coleman sought a reduced sentence under the 2018 First Step Act, claiming he had been sentenced for a “dual-object conspiracy involving both crack and powder cocaine.” The district court denied Coleman’s motion, finding that he was not convicted of an offense involving crack cocaine.The Third Circuit vacated. The conspiracy trafficked in crack; the court discussed Coleman’s responsibility for crack-related activities at sentencing; and the parties sparred on direct appeal over the amount of crack attributable to Coleman. If, on remand, the court reaffirms what may have been its implicit factual determination, it should acknowledge those crack references and explain why Coleman was not convicted of a crack offense. The Guidelines required the court to determine whether the drugs involved in the conspiracy were powder cocaine, crack, or both, and the amount of each, “regardless of whether the judge believed that [Coleman’s] crack-related conduct was part of the ‘offense of conviction,’” which could explain how Coleman could be found responsible for crack cocaine yet not be convicted of a crack offense. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Doyduk came to the U.S. from Turkey on a visa that expired in 2010. Still in the country a year later, he participated in a night of heavy drinking with his then-girlfriend Filipova (also in the country without authorization). Filipova was stabbed in the stomach, suffering a serious injury. Doyduk’s boss, Coskun, called 911. Doyduk was charged with aggravated assault, possessing an instrument of crime, possessing a prohibited offensive weapon, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person. All the charges were withdrawn after Filipova and Coskun refused to testify. The charging documents were discarded under a Pennsylvania law that requires expungement after 18 months pass without action.In 2011 removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) for having overstayed his visa, Doyduk sought an adjustment of status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. At a 2017 hearing, the officer who arrested Doyduk testified about the stabbing. The IJ also considered the Philadelphia police report and heard testimony from Doyduk, his citizen-wife, and others attesting to Doyduk’s character. The IJ denied relief, finding that the evidence strongly suggested that Doyduk committed the crime. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The Immigration and Nationality Act allows IJs to consider facts underlying expunged charges. View "Doyduk v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Weichsel's Chase credit card member agreement discloses an “Annual Membership Fee” to be added to his billing statement and that Weichsel may request an additional card for an authorized user. A “Rates and Fees Table” discloses the annual membership fee as $450 plus $75 for each additional card. Weichsel included one additional user. Weichsel alleges that his December 2019 billing statement included a renewal notice, stating that Weichsel’s annual $525.00 membership fee would be billed on 02/01/2020, how the fee would be charged, and how Weichsel could avoid it. The notice did not specify the breakdown: $450 for the primary cardholder and $75 for the additional user. The fee appeared as separate items on Weichsel’s February 2020 billing statement: a $450 charge and another for $75. Weichsel paid $525 but claims that “[h]ad [he] been aware” he could retain his credit card for $450, he would have paid only that amount. Weichsel filed a putative class action, alleging that Chase’s failure to itemize each component of the renewal fee in the December 2019 renewal notice violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601, and Regulation Z.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Weichsel had standing; he suffered an economic injury based on his assertion that he would not have paid the full $525 if he had known it included the additional card fee. However, neither TILA nor Regulation Z expressly mandates disclosure of each individual component of the total annual fee in a renewal notice. Regulation Z requires itemization of fees on other disclosures but lacks such a requirement for renewal notices. View "Weichsel v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA" on Justia Law

Ahmed was President of Aspen Construction, which failed to pay the IRS federal income, Social Security, and Medicare taxes withheld from employees' wages, 26 U.S.C. 7501, 3102(a), 3402(a). Aspen owed more than $600,000 in withheld taxes. Without recourse against Aspen’s individual employees (who were credited with withheld taxes when their net wages were paid), the IRS shifted liability to Ahmed, 26 U.S.C. 6672. Whether Ahmed received notification of proposed penalties is unclear. The IRS assessed the penalties and later filed liens against Ahmed’s property to secure the penalties. Ahmed immediately sought a Collection Due Process review with the IRS Independent Office of Appeals.While Ahmed’s petition was pending, he sent the IRS $625,000, with instructions that it be treated as a “deposit” to freeze the running of interest on his disputed penalties. The IRS instead applied the money as a direct payment to the tax bill, thereby ending the matter. Without any remaining tax liability to dispute, the Tax Court dismissed Ahmed’s petition. The Third Circuit vacated. Ahmed’s petition was moot only if the IRS properly treated his remittance as a payment, which depends on whether he sent money to the IRS after it validly assessed his penalties. There is ambiguity in the record on that issue. View "Ahmed v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed suit asserting federal securities claims. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants The district court subsequently performed a Federal Rule 11 inquiry mandated by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) and determined that the plaintiffs violated Rule 11 but did not award attorneys’ fees or impose any other sanctions.The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs violated Rule 11 in bringing their federal securities claims by filing for an improper purpose. The plaintiffs expressly stated that their “strategy was to file these complaints to force a settlement.” In addition, their Unregistered Securities and Misrepresentation Claims lacked factual support in violation of Rule 11(b)(3). The plaintiffs had a reasonable basis for their Rule 10b-5 Securities Fraud Claim. The court vacated in part. The PSLRA creates a presumption in favor of awarding attorneys’ fees when a complaint constitutes a “substantial failure” to comply with Rule 11 but the district court did not err in finding that the Rule 11 violations were not substantial. Nonetheless, the PSLRA makes the imposition of sanctions mandatory after a court determines that a party violated Rule 11, so the court abused its discretion in declining to impose any form of sanctions. View "Scott v. Vantage Corp" on Justia Law

The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program requires gasoline and diesel fuel refiners, blenders, and importers to ensure that a certain portion of their annual transportation fuel production consists of renewable fuels, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)). United, a small Pennsylvania refinery, has periodically received hardship exemptions from those requirements, including in the 2017 and 2018 compliance years. In 2019, United sought an exemption. Rather than accepting United's data at face value—as in previous years—EPA asked how United had accounted for the financial benefit of its 2018 RFS exemption. United's amended financial statement explained that revenue from selling its renewable fuel credits (RINS) generated in a particular year was included in net revenues for that year, even if the RINs actually were sold in a later calendar year. United’s amended figures showed a three-year refining margin that was higher than the margin in United’s original submission and higher than the industry average. The Department of Energy (DOE) evaluated United’s submission and initially recommended that United not receive an exemption. DOE later changed its recommendation to account for the effects of COVID-19 and suggested a 50 percent exemption for 2019.EPA denied United any exemption, declining to consider events “that did not emerge until 2020, the year after the petition in question.” The Third Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting United’s argument that EPA arbitrarily relied on an “accounting trick” that artificially inflated United’s running average net refining margin. View "United Refining Co v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

In 2005-2013, Nocito, president and CEO of AHS, characterized his personal expenses as deductible AHS business expenses and “shuffled” AHS’s untaxed profits between shell companies he owned that “performed no significant business purpose.” In 2013, Sundo, AHS’s secretary and CFO, provided documents to government investigators under a cooperation agreement, including Exhibit J, later determined by the court to be a privileged document in which Sundo conveyed legal advice to Nocito.After his indictment for tax fraud (18 U.S.C. 371), Nocito moved for pre-trial discovery of all the documents provided by Sundo to support a possible motion to suppress based on government misconduct. The court denied the motion, concluding that Exhibit J did not offer a “colorable basis” for his governmental misconduct claim. A subsequent motion to intervene, brought by the shell companies, attached a Federal Rule 41(g) motion for the return of property, in an attempt to prevent the government from using Exhibit J in future proceedings.The court permitted the companies to intervene but denied their Rule 41(g) motion. It found the Intervenors—even assuming they could establish Exhibit J’s privilege was “a property interest” of which they were deprived—were attempting to use Rule 41(g) improperly to suppress Exhibit J from the evidence against Nocito. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Rule 41(g) motion was part of an ongoing criminal process; its denial did not constitute a final order. View "United States v. Nocito" on Justia Law

In 2014, National Park Service (NPS) entered a contract with Perini to perform work on Ellis Island and hired Jacobs to provide contract management services on that contract. Jacobs assigned Weber to the project. Weber observed what he believed to be discrepancies between Perini’s work and its billing practices and disclosed those discrepancies to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), which concluded that there was no misconduct. In 2015, the NPS informed Jacobs that it would not extend its contract, purportedly because there was not enough work. Weber told OIG that he believed NPS’s decision was due to his reports and that he feared Jacobs would not retain him. Jacobs ultimately discharged Weber, who filed an OIG complaint in December 2015. In April 2016, Weber agreed to, an extension of OIG’s 180-day statutory deadline to complete its investigation. In February 2017, beyond the 360-day extended deadline, OIG completed and transmitted its report, with redacted copies to Weber and Jacobs. More than three years later, Jacobs asserted that it had never received the report.Jacobs subsequently declined to respond, asserting that the report was issued after the statutory deadline, 41 U.S.C. 4712, and that OIG lacked jurisdiction. The final determination and order were issued in December 2021, well beyond the 30-day deadline, and concluded that Jacobs had engaged in a prohibited reprisal against Weber. The Third Circuit denied an appeal, holding that the deadlines are not jurisdictional. View "Jacobs Project Management Co v. United States Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Henderson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing fentanyl, 18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iv), without a plea agreement. The district court applied the career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on findings that Henderson’s 2015 Pennsylvania conviction for possession with intent to deliver heroin qualified as a “controlled substance offense,” and Henderson’s 2005 Pennsylvania conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery qualified as a “crime of violence.” The enhancement increased the applicable Guideline range from 70-87 months’ imprisonment to 188-235 months. Henderson did not challenge the PSR Guideline calculations and was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment, with the court noting Henderson’s “mental health issues.” The Third Circuit stayed Henderson's appeal. In the meantime, the Supreme Court (Borden, 2021) found that crimes that can be committed with recklessness do not qualify as “violent felonies” under ACCA.The Third Circuit vacated Henderson's sentence, noting that its precedents had previously dictated different sentencing outcomes for defendants convicted of conspiracy and other inchoate offenses but that Borden resolved the conflict. Under Pennsylvania law, conspiracy to commit robbery does not constitute a “crime of violence” for purposes of the career offender enhancement. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Liposomal bupivacaine is a nonopioid pain medication that Pacira manufactures under the name EXPAREL; it is a local anesthetic administered at the time of surgery to control post-surgical pain. As of 2020, EXPAREL sales represented nearly all of Pacira’s total revenue. Pacira complains that the defendants, the American Society of Anesthesiologists, its journal, its editor, and authors published statements in a variety of forms, conveying their view that EXPAREL is “not superior” to standard analgesics or provides “inferior” pain relief.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Pacira’s suit for trade libel. Opinion statements are generally nonactionable. A “fair and natural” reading of the statements at issue shows that these are nonactionable subjective expressions. Pacira’s allegations boil down to disagreements about the reliability of the methodology and data underlying the statements; “a scientific conclusion based on nonfraudulent data in an academic publication is not a ‘fact’ that can be proven false through litigation.” Pacira failed to identify any aspect of the Articles, a Continuing Medical Education program, or a Podcast that “bring their conclusions outside the protected realm of scientific opinion.” View "Pacira Biosciences Inc v. American Society of Anesthesiologists Inc" on Justia Law