Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The universities, Pitt and Temple, offer traditional, on-campus educational programs. Temple also offers fully online distance-learning programs, which are separately advertised and priced. Students who enrolled in the Universities’ traditional on-campus programs for the Spring 2020 semester were required to pay tuition and mandatory fees and to sign a Financial Responsibility Agreement (FRA). On March 11, 2020, then-Governor Wolf ordered a temporary closure of all non-life-sustaining businesses, citing the rising number of COVID-19 cases. The Universities closed campus buildings, canceled all on-campus student events, announced that classes would be conducted online for the remainder of the semester, and urged students not to return to campus housing. Neither university offered any reduction in tuition or mandatory fees. Temple issued pro-rata housing and dining refunds. Pitt did so only for students who moved out by April 3, 2020.Students sued for breach of contract, or, alternatively, unjust enrichment, citing the Universities’ “website[s], academic catalogs, student handbooks, marketing materials, and other circulars, bulletins, and publications,” which described the benefits of campus life, and the reduced pricing for online courses.The Third Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissals of both suits. There is no express contract precluding the implied contract or unjust enrichment claims. The FRAs function as promissory notes, not integrated contracts. The students adequately pleaded their implied contract claims as to tuition in exchange for in-person education, Pitt’s mandatory fees, and Temple’s university services fee—but not as to Pitt’s housing and dining fees. The students also adequately pleaded unjust enrichment. View "Hickey v. University of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

MAE and Zaycosky entered an employment contract. They could not agree on when Zaycosky promised to start his employment, so MAE sued in the state court venue prescribed in the contract. Zaycosky removed the case to federal court. MAE moved for remand to enforce the contract’s forum-selection clause. The district court remanded. MAE timely submitted a petition for costs and fees and an affidavit supporting its request for $29,517.25. Zaycosky argued that the court lacked authority under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) to award costs and attorney fees for a remand based on a forum-selection clause, and, alternatively, that a fee award was not warranted because he had an objectively reasonable basis for removal.The Third Circuit vacated the award. Section 1447(c) allows fee shifting only for remands where the removal failed to meet the statutory requirements or where the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed case. A forum-selection clause is not a removal defect and does not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court cannot remand and award attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). View "Medical Associates of Erie v. Zaycosky" on Justia Law

Wolff received a settlement from the other driver, following a car accident. Aetna sought to collect some of the settlement funds to recoup the disability benefits it had paid to Wolff under her employer's disability plan. In a putative class action, Wolff alleged that Aetna had no right to recoupment and that Aetna’s disability plans utilized standard form language without meaningful variation both within and between employers. Wolff sought to certify a nationwide class composed of all employees who had enrolled in an Aetna standard form disability plan, who were allegedly coerced into repaying a portion of their disability payments from injury recoveries. Aetna argued that the language varied from plan to plan, so Wolff could not demonstrate the cohesiveness required for class certification. Federal Rule 23(b)(3) requires that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”The district court certified the class. Aetna did not challenge the order within Rule 23(f)’s 14-day period. Three weeks later, Wolff filed a proposed class notice. Aetna filed objections, including proposed minor modifications to the class definition. After the court revised the definition, Aetna filed a 23(f) petition, which the Third Circuit denied. A modified class certification order triggers a new 23(f) petition period only when the modified order materially alters the original order granting (or denying) class certification. The revision in this case did not effect such a material change. View "Wolff v. Aetna Life Insurance Co" on Justia Law

Porat, the Dean of the Fox School of Business at Temple University, was “almost obsessed with rankings.” To manipulate Fox’s U.S. New and World Report rankings, he submitted false information about students taking the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT), offers of admission, student debt, and average undergraduate GPA. Partly because of these deceptions, With Porat’s knowledge and involvement, Fox aggressively marketed its false high rankings. At trial, former students testified that they chose Fox because of its rankings or that they believed employers hire students from schools with the best “brand” and that Fox’s high rankings would help them “compete in the marketplace.” The government estimated that Fox gained nearly $40 million in tuition from the additional students who enrolled during 2014–2018. In 2018, Porat’s scheme was exposed. Fox administrators disclosed the false GMAT data to U.S. News, which announced Fox’s “misreported data.” As Fox’s rankings fell, its enrollment fell.The Third Circuit affirmed Porat’s convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, and wire fraud, section 1343. The government proved by sufficient evidence that he sought to deprive his victims of money, that he sought to personally obtain money, or that the party he deceived was the same party he defrauded of money (“convergence” View "United States v. Porat" on Justia Law

In 1985, Clark and Devose assaulted and kidnapped a postal worker at gunpoint, stripped him of his uniform, and restrained him in his truck. Disguised in the uniform, Devose gained entry to a banker’s home, where they held the banker’s 85-year-old mother-in-law and 19-year-old daughter at gunpoint and called the banker to demand ransom. Clark raped the girl. They saw police outside and fled. Devose pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against Clark.In 1990, Clark was convicted of two conspiracy offenses, attempted extortion, assault of a postal worker, kidnapping, theft of a postal vehicle, and using a firearm during a crime of violence--kidnapping (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). Clark was sentenced to life imprisonment plus five years for the firearm count, to be served consecutively, as section 924 required. The Sentencing Guidelines did not then apply. Clark filed an unsuccessful appeal and numerous unsuccessful collateral attacks. In 2019, the Supreme Court held that part of section 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” is unconstitutionally vague.In Clark’s successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, the parties agreed that kidnapping does not qualify as a section 924(c) crime of violence. The district court vacated Clark’s 924 conviction but declined to conduct a full resentencing. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. As a matter of first impression, the court held that a certificate of appealability is required for a prisoner in federal custody to appeal a district court’s choice of remedy in a 28 U.S.C. 2255 proceeding. View "Clark v. United States" on Justia Law

Davis, a non-citizen, and Beckford, a U.S. citizen, met when they were children. In 1993, Davis was sentenced to life in prison for nonviolent drug convictions. When his sentence was reduced to 30 years in 2008, the two decided to marry. viewing marriage as an expression of their Christian faith. In 2012, Davis was moved to Moshannon Valley, a private prison that houses low-security alien inmates. The prison’s written policy for allowing marriage had certain behavioral requirements; the prison psychologist and other officials had to approve the request. Davis unsuccessfully challenged the denial of his marriage request through the prison’s administrative process. The Administrator of the Bureau of Prisons Privatization Management Branch informed Davis that marriage requests remained exclusively within the province of Moshannon officials. Davis learned that Moshannon had not approved a single request to marry during its contractual relationship. Davis’s sentence was later reduced to 27 years. He was deported after his release. Although their marriage would not have allowed Davis to challenge his deportation, Davis alleges that marriage to a U.S. citizen could provide a basis for other inmates to challenge their removals. Davis alleged that federal officials directed Moshannon officials to deny all inmate marriage requests to ensure that marriage to a citizen would not interfere with deportations. The district court dismissed claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1, under 42 U.S.C. 1985; and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Third Circuit vacated in part. Davis stated a RFRA claim. View "Davis v. Wigen" on Justia Law

Local 537 scheduled a vote to disaffiliate from UWUA and formed a new union, Independent 537. UWUA learned of the impending vote and declared an emergency trusteeship over Local 537. Ninety percent of Local 537 members who cast ballots voted to disaffiliate and to make Independent their new bargaining representative. UWUA President Langford sent notices of the trusteeship to Local 537’s officers and members, stating that all money, books, and property of the Local must be handed over and that all Local Officers were removed. They did not comply. UWUA sought an injunction. The removed officers entered into a consent order and delivered Local 537’s assets.The NLRB conducted elections and certified Independent 537 as the new bargaining representative. UWUA withdrew its lawsuit, formally lifted the trusteeship, revoked Local 537’s charter, then invoked a section in its constitution permitting forfeiture of assets upon revocation of a local union’s charter and took possession of Local 537’s books, money, and property.Independent 537 sued under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 401, and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 141. The Third Circuit affirmed orders granting Independent 537 equitable distribution of Local 537’s assets but denying attorneys’ fees. UWUA breached the fiduciary duty it owed to former Local 537 members under LMRDA section 501, rendering the forfeiture provision unenforceable. Neither the UWUA constitution nor any statute authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees for its breach. View "Utility Workers United Association Local 537 v. Utility Workers Union of America AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

This consolidated case concerns three appeals from orders entered by magistrate judges in the Western District of Pennsylvania in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983. One case was involuntarily dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute; in the others, magistrates entered summary judgment for all defendants.Under 28 U.S.C. 636, precise limits govern a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction absent parties’ consent. A magistrate judge can oversee pretrial discovery even without the consent of the parties, but he cannot grant summary judgment or involuntarily dismiss a case; those limits dissolve if the parties voluntarily consent to a magistrate judge’s final judgment jurisdiction.The Third Circuit dismissed one appeal for lack of jurisdiction because all parties did not consent and, therefore, the magistrate judge lacked the power to involuntarily dismiss the case. However, the magistrate judges were empowered to enter summary judgment in the other cases because all parties either expressly or impliedly consented. The court then affirmed summary judgment based on the plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Prater v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Shaknitz pleaded guilty to three counts of distribution and attempted distribution of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a), and one count of possession of child pornography. Shaknitz was sentenced to a 170-month term of imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release. During sentencing, the district court orally imposed a condition on Shaknitz’s incarceration, limiting his contact with his five-year-old son to telephone only. In its written judgment, the court did not include its previously-announced condition but recommended that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) impose the telephone-only condition. The judgment did not state that the recommendation superseded the oral pronouncement.The Third Circuit vacated, noting its prior holding that a sentencing court lacks “inherent authority to impose a no-contact order during [a defendant’s] incarceration term.” It is unclear whether the written judgment was intended to replace the mandate with a recommendation; sentencing courts have the authority to recommend to the BOP that defendants’ contact with others be limited where necessary and appropriate. View "United States v. Shaknitz" on Justia Law

Kramer’s then-wife, Terry, found a document on her husband’s computer that led her to believe that Kramer had engaged in sexual conduct with a minor. Later, Terry found photographs on Kramer’s cellphone depicting the victim engaged in sexual acts. Terry met with police, described the sexually explicit photographs, and showed them the document; she emailed the photographs to the police. The victim reported that Kramer had sexually abused her for years and had used his cellphone to take pictures of her engaged in sexual conduct. Kramer admitted to having a sexual relationship with the victim and to taking the photographs. With a warrant, law enforcement searched Kramer’s cellphone and eventually found videos and photographs depicting sexual acts involving the victim.Kramer was charged with sexual exploitation of children, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). While in custody, he sent Terry a letter: “You crossed [the] line and it IS going to cost you,” repeatedly stating that he would have Terry arrested for her purported crimes. Kramer was then charged with attempted witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(1). The Third Circuit affirmed Kramer’s convictions and 350-month sentence, upholding the denial of Kramer’s motion to suppress evidence. Terry conducted a private search of his cellphone and voluntarily provided the evidence to the government; the evidence was admissible without implicating the Fourth Amendment. The court properly denied Kramer’s motion to dismiss the attempted witness tampering charge. View "United States v. Kramer" on Justia Law