Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Somerset County officers were patrolling in response to recent gang-related crimes and shootings. Detective Gambino recognized a vehicle he had seen earlier parked in front of a known meeting place for the Bounty Hunter Bloods. Gambino followed the car, saw it turn without signaling, and radioed his supervisor, Sergeant Brown, to pull the car over for a traffic violation. Brown, driving with two other officers, initiated the traffic stop. Gambino arrived and shined his flashlight by the car's left rear door. Dowdell, whom Gambino knew from prior arrests to be a member of the Bloods, was sitting in the back seat. Gambino opened the left rear car door to “have a conversation.” Gambino saw a bulge in Dowdell’s jacket, ordered Dowdell out of the car, patted him down, and discovered a fully loaded semi-automatic firearm.Dowdell, charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), argued that Gambino violated his Fourth Amendment rights by “physically intruding on” the car door. The Third Circuit affirmed an order granting Dowdell’s motion to suppress evidence, rejecting the government’s arguments that the district court abused its discretion in finding that it had waived any argument that existing precedent should be extended to justify opening the car door and, alternatively, in not excusing the waiver. The government’s sole legal theory was that reasonable suspicion justified opening the door. View "United States v. Dowdell" on Justia Law

Simmons pleaded guilty to Transportation with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity and was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment and a lifetime of supervised release. After beginning his supervised release, Simmons choked, punched, and threatened to throw hot grease at his mother. Simmons held both his mother and his girlfriend against their will as he trashed his mother's apartment and threw hot grease. The next day, Simmons’ mother was at the home of a friend. Simmons arrived wearing a mask and fired a gunshot through the front door into an occupied room. A home security camera captured video and audio, including Simmons stating, “Next time I’m going to kill everybody.” Simmons’ mother told his probation officer that Simmons did not live with her, despite him having listed her address as his own with Pennsylvania’s sex offender registry.The U.S. Probation Office alleged four violations of his supervised release: the two violent incidents, failure to update his address with the sex offender registry, and possession of a firearm. The district court found Simmons violated the terms of his release and sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment followed by a reimposed life term of supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting Simmons’s arguments that the court violated 18 U.S.C. 3583(h) by not subtracting the 21 months from his life term of supervised release and that the imposition of a life term of supervised release was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Energy contracted with Superior for hydraulic fracking services to extract natural gas. In 2007, Energy advised Superior that it believed Superior had damaged some wells. Superior notified its insurance provider, American, which agreed to provide Superior with defense counsel, reserving its right to contest coverage. Energy sued Superior in state court. A jury determined that Superior had damaged 53 wells; the verdict form specified that Superior “fail[ed] to perform its contract" with Energy "in a workman-like manner” and that this “failure” was “a substantial factor in causing damage.”Superior’s policy with American provided coverage for “property damage” arising out of an “occurrence,” defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions[,]” but it did not define the term “accident.” Superior also purchased an “underground resources and equipment coverage” (UREC) endorsement for coverage “against risks associated with well-servicing operations[.]”In a federal court declaratory judgment action seeking indemnification, American argued that damage caused by a failure to perform a contract “in a workman-like manner” is not an “occurrence” under the policy and that, even if the policy covered Superior’s claim, it would involve a single “occurrence” under Pennsylvania law and would be subject to a $2 million per-occurrence limit.The district court granted summary judgment for Superior. The Third Circuit reversed. An accident is “unexpected,” which “implies a degree of fortuity that is not present in a claim for faulty workmanship.” The UREC endorsement does not eliminate the policy’s “occurrence” requirement. View "American Home Assurance Co. v. Superior Well Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Kean University implements New Jersey’s Policy Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace through its Affirmative Action Office, which conducts an investigation and prepares a report. Kean’s Chief of Staff reviews the report and makes a final determination. A final determination by the Chief of Staff may be appealed to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission. In 2016, adjunct professor Borowski was accused of making insensitive in-class statements about gender, immigration status, ethnicity, and religion. The Chief of Staff ruled against her. Borowski’s teaching assignment was terminated.Borowski appealed to the Commission, which recognized that material facts were in dispute, and referred the matter to an ALJ. Before a decision on the ensuing hearing, Kean alerted the ALJ of an intervening Commission decision, holding that adjunct professors were not civil service employees entitled to appeal final determinations of Policy violations. The ALJ dismissed Borowski’s appeal; the Commission affirmed.Instead of appealing in the state-court system, Borowski sued in federal court. The district court relied on Younger abstention to dismiss the case. The Third Circuit vacated. Younger abstention prevents federal court interference with only certain types of state proceedings, such as quasi-criminal civil enforcement actions. An appeal to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission is neither quasi-criminal nor within another category of Younger-eligible proceedings. Another prerequisite for Younger abstention is that the state proceeding must be ongoing; the Commission’s dismissal was final. View "Borowski v. Kean University" on Justia Law

Xi and his wife, Li, immigrated to the U.S. from China in 1989. Xi, an internationally acclaimed expert on thin film superconducting technology, became Chair of the Physics Department at Temple University. On May 21, 2015, Xi answered the door and was confronted by armed FBI agents. Agents held the family at gunpoint and conducted an extensive search before taking Xi to the FBI’s field office. He was interrogated before the agents revealed that Xi had been indicted for providing Chinese entities with sensitive information about a “revolution[ary]” superconductor, the “pocket heater.” Eventually, prosecutors realized that, as the inventor allegedly explained, Xi’s emails did not concern the pocket heater and the pocket heater was not “revolutionary.” The government moved to dismiss the Indictment. The case received widespread media attention. Temple placed Xi on administrative leave; the family suffered emotionally and financially.The district court dismissed Xi's “Bivens” claims alleging equal protection and Fourth Amendment violations, malicious prosecution, and fabrication of evidence, and the family's Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) claims. The court determined that Xi failed to allege “clearly established” constitutional violations and assumed that the same qualified immunity standard applied to the FTCA’s “discretionary function exception.”The Third Circuit affirmed in part, citing Supreme Court precedent declining to extend Bivens into the national security realm and the limited circumstances in which Congress has provided a remedy. The court vacated the dismissal of the FTCA claims. The “clearly established” threshold is inapplicable. The government has no discretion to violate the Constitution; FTCA claims premised on conduct that is plausibly alleged to violate the Constitution may not be dismissed on the basis of the discretionary function exception. View "Xi v. Haugen" on Justia Law

Exchange, an unincorporated association, is a reciprocal insurance exchange under Pennsylvania law, owned by its members, who are subscribers to Erie's insurance plans. Exchange has no independent officers nor a governing body. Indemnity, a Pennsylvania corporation, is the managing agent and attorney-in-fact for Exchange and receives a management fee from Exchange’s funds.Erie subscribers (Stephenson Plaintiffs) sued Indemnity in state court, claiming that Indemnity breached its fiduciary duty by charging an excessive management fee. They brought the case as a class action under Pennsylvania law on behalf of themselves and other “Pennsylvania residents” who subscribed to Erie policies. Invoking federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 119 Stat. 4 (CAFA), Indemnity removed the case to federal court. The Stephenson Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. A month later, Exchange filed another case in state court, alleging that Indemnity breached its fiduciary duty by charging an excessive management fee; the case is not pled as a class action but is pled in Exchange’s name “by” “Individual Plaintiffs,” on behalf of Exchange, “to benefit all members of Exchange.”Indemnity removed the case, again citing CAFA. The district court remanded the case to state court. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court had jurisdiction because the case is a “class action” for purposes of CAFA or that federal jurisdiction exists because this case is a continuation of a previous federal class action against Indemnity involving similar parties and claims. View "Erie Insurance Exchange v. Erie Indemnity Co" on Justia Law

In 2008, Jenkins pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e). He was sentenced to the 15-year mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because he had three prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” including two prior drug convictions and a conviction for aggravated assault under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2702(a)(3). Section 2702(a)(3) applies to one who “attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury” to certain persons “in the performance of duty.”In 2015, the Supreme Court, in “Johnson," held that ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. As a result, Jenkins’s Section 2702(a)(3) conviction for a non-enumerated offense would qualify as a predicate violent felony only if it satisfied the elements clause. Jenkins moved to correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that because Section 2702(a)(3) can be violated without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, it is not a “violent felony” under ACCA’s elements clause. The Third Circuit agreed and granted relief. A violation of Section 2702(a)(3) can be committed by a failure to act. The court acknowledged the “bizarre result” required by the categorical approach in analyzing Pennsylvania’s aggravated assault laws. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 2010, Harris pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e), which typically carries a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. Harris’ PSR concluded that Harris qualified for a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because his criminal record included three predicate offenses: one serious drug conviction and at least two violent felony convictions. Based on this determination, the district court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years.In 2016, Harris moved to correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255) following the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision, claiming the statutes underlying his prior convictions criminalize reckless conduct. In 2021, the Supreme Court (Borden) held crimes that could be committed with a mens rea of recklessness do not qualify as violent felonies under ACCA’s element of force clause. Borden eliminated some of Harris’ prior convictions as predicate offenses.Before the Borden decision, the Third Circuit (Mayo) held a Pennsylvania conviction for first-degree aggravated assault does not require physical force as understood within the context of ACCA. Based on Mayo, the Third Circuit vacated Harris’ sentence; his aggravated assault conviction is stricken as a predicate, and he no longer has the three violent felony convictions necessary to justify the enhancement. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Kosh, a Liberian citizen, arrived in the U.S. in 2001 with a false Portuguese passport and requested entry under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), 8 U.S.C. 1187(a). Like all VWP entrants, Kosh signed waived any right “to contest, other than on the basis of an application for asylum, any action for removal.” Kosh confessed his Portuguese passport was fake and sought asylum. Kosh feared returning to Liberia, which had an ongoing civil war. His father had been murdered and Kosh was arrested before escaping and fleeing to the U.S. The IJ granted Kosh asylum. Kosh married and had four children. He left the U.S. in 2005 using his refugee travel document and apparently re-entered that year.Kosh was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and filing false and fraudulent income tax returns. USCIS denied Kosh’s application to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident. His criminal convictions could make him ineligible for adjustment of status, but DHS can waive inadmissibility “for humanitarian purposes.” An IJ reopened Kosh’s asylum-only proceeding and terminated his asylum status. Kosh argued that DHS, instead of reopening his earlier proceedings, should have filed removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1229a, which would allow him to seek adjustment of status.The Third Circuit granted Kosh’s motion for a stay of removal and vacated. If Kosh re-entered the country as an asylee without signing a new VWP form, he is entitled to complete-jurisdiction proceedings in which he can raise an adjustment-of-status claim. View "Kosh Ishmael v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Nitkin, a Nurse Practitioner, worked in an MLH hospital. During team meetings, the Lead Doctor would sometimes discuss inappropriate sexual topics and his substance misuse and would ask team members about their personal lives, including dating and traumatic experiences. Nitkin also recounted that the Lead Doctor made her feel uncomfortable in private; he never propositioned her for a date or stated that he wanted to have sexual relations with her. Nitkin reduced her work hours and reported his conduct. After an investigation, MLH removed the Lead Doctor from his director role and assigned Dr. Tyson. Nitkin still had to work occasionally with the Lead Doctor.Shortly after telling Tyson that she did not want to work with Lead Doctor, Nitkin received a new job offer and decided to resign. Tyson, however, indicated that Nitkin had divulged confidential information by telling him that she filed a complaint against the Lead Doctor, which was a terminable offense. According to Nitkin, she was told that, if she was terminated for violating policies, her new employer would be informed but that she could avoid that outcome by making her resignation effective immediately. Nitkin did so.Nitkin filed suit, alleging hostile work environment on the basis of sex and retaliation, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted MLH summary judgment on Nitkin’s hostile work environment and wrongful termination claims but denied it on her retaliation claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. Nitkin did not demonstrate that the harassment was severe or pervasive. View "Nitkin v. Main Line Health" on Justia Law