Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Henry participated in an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) sponsored by his employer. After the ESOP purchased stock at what Henry believed was an inflated price, Henry filed a lawsuit against the plan’s trustee and executives of his employer, alleging that the defendants breached fiduciary duties to the ESOP imposed by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, and engaged in transactions prohibited by ERISA. The defendants argued that an arbitration provision, added to the ESOP’s plan documents after Henry joined the ESOP, barred Henry from pursuing his claims in federal court. The district court denied their motion to dismiss, reasoning that all parties to an arbitration agreement must manifest assent to the agreement, and Henry did not manifest his assent to the addition of an arbitration provision to the ESOP plan document.The Third Circuit affirmed, first confirming its jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was effectively a motion to compel arbitration, 9 U.S.C. 16(a) provides appellate jurisdiction to review the denial of that motion. The class action waiver (and, by extension, the arbitration provision as a whole) is not enforceable because it requires him to waive statutory rights and remedies guaranteed by ERISA. View "Henry v. Wilmington Trust NA" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Salvadoran native, challenged the order to remove him from this country. In 2016, he fled to the United States. When he arrived, he was charged as inadmissible and put into removal proceedings. He conceded that he was removable but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge denied his requests and ordered him removed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. He petitioned for review.   The Fourth Circuit granted the petition as to his Convention Against Torture claim, vacated the Board’s order, and remanded. But the court denied his petition for asylum and withholding of removal. The court explained that a Convention claimant must satisfy a two-pronged test, showing both that (1) if he returned home, he would be tortured and (2) the government would acquiesce to that torture. The court wrote that here, neither the immigration judge nor the Board followed the court’s instructions. First, at Step 1A, it is not clear that the immigration judge forecasted what harm Petitioner would likely face back in El Salvador. He found only (at Step 1B) that the threats previously made by police did not amount to torture, so future torture was unlikely. Second, rather than separating the two steps and reviewing Step 1B de novo, the Board affirmed the whole Prong 1 analysis as not clearly erroneous. And third, the Board did the same at Prong 2, reviewing the whole thing for clear errors rather than reviewing Step 2B de novo. View "Mauricio Llanes-Quinteros v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Appellant, a fired employee, sued his former employer, alleging a pattern or practice of race discrimination against non-South Asians in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The employee had previously attempted to join another class action against the company, but after that case was stayed, he filed this suit – years after his termination. The employer moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) as untimely. In response, the employee conceded that the relevant statutes of limitations had expired, and instead, he resorted to two forms of tolling: wrong-forum and American Pipe. The district court concluded that American Pipe tolling did not allow the employee to commence a successive class action, and the employee does not contest that ruling. But the district court dismissed the complaint without considering the applicability of wrong-forum tolling.   The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for the district court to consider whether wrong-forum tolling applies and/or whether Appellant has plausibly pleaded a prima facie pattern-or-practice claim. The court explained a class plaintiff’s burden in making out a prima facie case of discrimination is different from that of an individual plaintiff “in that the former need not initially show discrimination against any particular present or prospective employee,” including himself. As a result, Appellant was not required to plead but for causation on an individual basis to avoid dismissal, given the availability of the pattern-or-practice method of proof at later stages of the case. View "Lee Williams v. Tech Mahindra Americas Inc" on Justia Law

Student H.P.-B. resides with her adult cousin Q.T. within the geographical boundaries of Pottsgrove. H.P.-B. enrolled in Pottsgrove during the 2014–2015 school year. Q.T. does not have legal custody of H.P.-B—an August 2008 order grants primary physical and legal custody to H.P.-B.’s grandmother, E.E. Q.T. filed an IDEA due process complaint on H.P.-B’s behalf. The district court held that a straightforward application of C.F.R. 34 Section 300.30 (b)(2) “dictates that Q.T. does not qualify as H.P.-B.’s ‘parent’ for purposes of the IDEA.” Q.T., E.E., and F.P. appealed the district court’s order. Appellants argued that the district court erred by holding that Q.T. does not qualify as H.P.-B.’s parent for purposes of the IDEA and, thus that Q.T. is unable to file a due process complaint on H.P.-B.’s behalf.   The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained the district court erred in finding that Q.T. did not qualify as H.P.-B.’s parent and thus lacked standing to file a due process complaint on H.P.-B.’s behalf. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded with instructions to vacate the hearing officer’s order dismissing Q.T.’s due process complaint. The court explained there is ample evidence in the record that Q.T. was acting in the place of H.P.-B.’s natural parent, satisfying the third definition of “parent.” The record shows Q.T. affirmed that she was supporting H.P.- B. assumed all personal obligations related to school requirements for H.P.-B. and intended to keep and support H.P.-B. continuously, and not merely through the school year. View "Q. T. v. Pottsgrove School District" on Justia Law

A municipal retirement system that had purchased the company’s common stock before the announcement now alleges that the company knew beforehand of problems with its reserves and misled investors about those issues. The retirement system filed a putative class action against the company and three of its corporate executives, alleging securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The insurance company and the executives moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief. They argued that, under the heightened pleading standard for securities-fraud claims, the retirement system’s complaint failed to plausibly allege three necessary elements of its claims: false or misleading statements; loss causation, and scienter. The district court granted that motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.   The Third Circuit partially vacated the district court’s judgment. It remanded the case to the district court to consider, in the first instance, the adequacy of the amended complaint’s allegations of loss causation and scienter concerning the CFO’s statement. The court explained that based on information from a confidential former employee, who qualifies as credible at the pleading stage, the complaint alleged that the insurance company was already contemplating a significant increase in reserves due to negative mortality experience at the time of the CFO’s statements. And the magnitude of the company’s reserve charge and its temporal proximity to the CFO’s statements further undercut the CFO’s assertion that recent mortality experience was within a normal range. Those particularized allegations satisfy the heightened standard for pleading falsity, and they plausibly allege the falsity of the CFO’s statement. View "City of Warren Police and Fire v. Prudential Financial Inc" on Justia Law

Appellant and co-defendants were tried in connection with the armed robbery of a Philadelphia convenience store. The district court instructed the jury that each defendant could be convicted of Hobbs Act robbery under three alternative theories of liability: direct, aiding and abetting, or for participation in a Pinkerton conspiracy. The district court further instructed that defendants could be convicted under Section 924(c) based on either a direct or an aiding and abetting theory. The jury found all parties guilty on all counts in a general verdict, and the district court denied their motions for judgment of acquittal. Appellant argued that his conviction for Hobbs Act robbery must be vacated because the district court failed to charge the jury on those elements, and the Government failed to prove them.   The Third Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly charged the jury on the elements of Hobbs Act Robbery. The court explained the district court did not err in giving this jury instruction, and Appellant concedes that a reasonable jury, following this instruction, could have concluded that he aided and abetted co-defendant’s completed Hobbs Act robbery by intending to “facilitate the taking of the gun from the clerk.” Further, the court held that Appellant committed a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). The court wrote that Appellant indisputably brandished his firearm during co-defendant’s completed Hobbs Act robbery, and while the jury’s general verdict obscures whether Appellant’s Hobbs Act robbery conviction was based on an aiding and abetting or a Pinkerton theory of guilt, under either theory he is liable for committing a crime of violence. View "USA v. Abid Stevens" on Justia Law

The DRBA, a bi-state agency created by an interstate compact between Delaware and New Jersey, hired Minor as its Deputy Executive Director in 2009 and terminated him in 2017. Minor, believing he was fired for his support of then-incoming New Jersey Governor Murphy, sued the DRBA and its Commissioners for violating his First Amendment right to political affiliation. The court rejected the Commissioners’ request for qualified immunity, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Minor’s responsibilities were purely administrative by the time he was dismissed so that the Commissioners were barred potentially by the First Amendment from firing Minor on account of his politics.The Third Circuit vacated. The district court correctly held that the right of certain employees not to be fired based on political affiliation was clearly established. However, there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Minor held such a position. The question of immunity must await the determination of facts at trial. Third Circuit precedent requires the district court to “analyze separately, and state findings with respect to, the specific conduct of each [Commissioner]” to learn more about whether each Commissioner could know that his specific conduct violated clearly established rights. View "Minor v. Delaware River & Bay Authority" on Justia Law

Twelve current and former Philadelphia police officers posted highly offensive Facebook messages that glorified violence and denigrated minority groups. The posts became part of an expose by a national online news organization. The officers, who were disciplined or terminated, alleged First Amendment retaliation.The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of their suit, noting that it did not condone the officers’ conduct and that the city has an interest in protecting the public’s perception of its officers. There were material factual gaps concerning when certain posts were written and by whom and which posts were the basis of the disciplinary actions. With respect to causation, there was unsubstantiated speculation about the impact of the posts, some of which had been public for years. View "Fenico v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

In 1995, Range pleaded guilty to making false statements about his income to obtain $2,458 of food stamp assistance. His conviction was classified as a misdemeanor punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. Range was sentenced to three years’ probation. Three years later, Range attempted to purchase a firearm but was rejected by the instant background check system. Range’s wife subsequently bought him a deer-hunting rifle. Years later Range learned that he was barred from purchasing and possessing firearms because of his welfare fraud conviction. He sold his rifle to a firearms dealer and sought a declaratory judgment that 18 U.S.C. 922(g) violated the Second Amendment as applied to him. The section prohibits firearm ownership by any person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year—the federal definition of a felony.In 2022, the Third Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit, reasoning that “the people” constitutionally entitled to bear arms are “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” and that even if Range fell within “the people,” the government demonstrated that its prohibition is consistent with historical tradition.On rehearing, en banc, the Third Circuit reversed. Despite his false statement conviction, Range remains among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. The government did not carry its burden of showing that the Nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation support disarming Range. View "Range v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Garcia-Vasquez, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, came to the U.S. illegally. In 1999, he was convicted of conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. After serving his prison sentence, he was removed. Garcia-Vasquez returned to the U.S. illegally. He was subsequently convicted in state court for distributing heroin and other drug offenses. New Jersey released him to immigration authorities. Garcia-Vasquez pleaded guilty to reentering the country illegally after having been convicted of an aggravated felony and removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(2). Based on his 1999 cocaine-conspiracy conviction the government advocated a 16-level enhancement under Sentencing Guideline 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). The Guideline’s Application Note 5 extends that enhancement to inchoate crimes like conspiracy. Garcia-Vasquez argued that application notes may not extend the reach of the Guideline’s text and that, under the categorical approach, his federal conspiracy conviction did not count as a generic conspiracy because its elements did not require an overt act.The district court applied the enhancement, sentencing him to 46 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the enhanced range. The Third Circuit affirmed. Garcia-Vasquez argued that his 1999 conviction was only for conspiring to traffic drugs, not actually trafficking them; only Application Note 5 names inchoate crimes expressly. The court rejected the argument. The plain meaning of “drug trafficking offense” includes drug-trafficking conspiracies so it is not necessary to resort to the application notes. View "United States v. Garcia-Vasquez" on Justia Law