Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act requires any tobacco product not on the market before February 15, 2007, to receive FDA approval, 21 U.S.C. 387j(a)(1)–(2). Only if the FDA concludes that “permitting such tobacco product to be marketed would be appropriate for the protection of the public health” can the product be approved. Manufacturers seeking advance permission to market new products. In 2020, the FDA began taking aggressive action to remove fruit- and dessert-flavored e-cigarettes (electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS)) from the market, leaving aside tobacco- and menthol-flavored ENDS. More recently, based on additional studies and market data, the FDA has denied the applications of importers and manufacturers to market menthol-flavored ENDS.An importer challenged that denial, arguing that it was arbitrary and capricious for the FDA to apply the same regulatory framework to menthol that it used to assess the appropriateness of sweeter flavors, to ultimately reject its applications for its menthol-flavored ENDS to remain on the market, and to do so without granting a transition period. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The FDA applied a regulatory framework consistent with its statutory mandate, provided a reasoned explanation for its denial, and based its decision on scientific judgments that courts may not second-guess. View "Logic Technology Development LLC v. United States Food and Drug Administration" on Justia Law

Huber visited Crozer doctors on four separate occasions, incurring debts to Crozer of $178, $78, $83.50, and $178. Crozer's debt collection agency, SAI, sent a form collection letter, with an “Account Summary” that provided two figures: the specific debt SAI sought to collect, entitled “Amount,” and a second figure, entitled “Various Other Acc[oun]ts Total Balance.” The fourth such letter to Huber informed Huber that she owed an “Amount” of $178, while her “Various Other Accounts Total Balance” was $517.50. Huber testified that she was confused as to how much she owed in total: Was it $695.50 or $517.50. She consulted a financial advisor.Huber filed this putative class action, asserting a “false, deceptive, or misleading” means of collecting a debt and failure to disclose the “amount of the debt” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court held, on summary judgment, that there was no actionable failure to disclose but found the letters “misleading and deceptive,” and certified the class.The Third Circuit affirmed. Huber has standing, but not under the “informational injury doctrine.” Huber did not identify omitted information to which she has entitlement but the financial harm she suffered in reliance on the letter bears a “close relationship” to the harm associated with the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation. The court remanded for determination of whether any of the class members suffered any consequences beyond confusion. View "Huber v. Simons Agency Inc" on Justia Law

Ingram discovered a fraudulent Comcast account in his name for an address where he never lived. Ingram filed a direct dispute with Comcast, which requested several documents, including a notarized FTC fraud and identity theft affidavit. Ingram did not provide that affidavit. Comcast did not decide whether the account was opened fraudulently but referred it to Waypoint for collection. Waypoint then reported the delinquent account to the consumer reporting agency Experian. After the Waypoint account appeared on Ingram’s consumer report, Ingram challenged it in an indirect dispute with Experian, which forwarded notice of the dispute to Waypoint. Waypoint’s employee updated Ingram’s address and confirmed the account name and social security number, but did not further investigate. Waypoint continued to erroneously report that the Comcast account with a balance of $769. Ingram alleges that as a result, his credit score deteriorated and he was denied an apartment rental and loan application. Ingram filed suit under the Fair Credit Reporting and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Acts.The Third Circuit remanded for evaluation of whether Waypoint’s investigation into Ingram’s indirect dispute was reasonable. Furnishers may find that a direct dispute submitted by a consumer is frivolous, and consumer reporting agencies may find that an indirect dispute submitted by a consumer is frivolous but FCRA provides no such discretion to furnishers that receive an indirect dispute second-hand from a consumer reporting agency. View "Ingram v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Since 1992, the Energy Star Program has set energy efficiency standards for categories of products and permitted approved products to bear the Energy Star logo. Three models of Whirlpool top-loading clothes washers were approved to display that logo and did so from 2009-2010. Under one method of measurement, those machines did not meet the Program’s energy- and water-efficiency standards; the washers did satisfy the Program’s standards under another measurement technique, which the Program previously endorsed. Program guidance from July 2010 disapproved of that method.Consumers in several states who had purchased those models commenced a putative class action against Whirlpool and retailers that sold those machines, alleging breach of express warranty and violations of state consumer protection statutes based on the allegedly wrongful display of the Energy Star logo. The district court certified a class action against Whirlpool but declined to certify a class against the retailers. At summary judgment, the court rejected all remaining claims.The Third Circuit affirmed, finding no genuine dispute of material fact. The plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the models were unfit for their intended purpose. A reasonable jury could not find that the retailer defendants were unjustly enriched from selling the washers. Without evidence of a false or misleading statement attributable to Whirlpool or the retailers, the state consumer protection claims failed. View "Dzielak v. Whirlpool Corp" on Justia Law

Packer was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine, and a substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 846. He was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment followed by five years’ supervised release. After Packer’s release from prison, the court modified the conditions of Packer’s supervised release on three occasions in response to Packer's admissions that he continued to abuse methamphetamine. In 2022, Packer’s former girlfriend, Jones, forwarded to a probation officer threatening voicemail messages that Packer had sent to her. The probation office petitioned for revocation of Packer’s supervised release, citing the “crime of terroristic threats,” a first-degree misdemeanor punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment under Pennsylvania law. Packer attempted to justify his behavior and testified that Jones had no reason to believe that he would hurt her.Following the presentation of evidence, the court found that Packer had violated his supervised release and that the U.S.S.G. term was 21-27 months’ imprisonment. Before inviting Packer to speak, the court stated its intention to impose a 24-month sentence. The judge then invited Packer to speak. The Third Circuit affirmed the revocation and sentence, rejecting an argument that the court denied Packer his right of allocution by announcing the sentence it intended to impose before allowing him an opportunity to speak. Neither Packer nor his counsel raised an objection at the sentencing hearing. View "United States v. Packer" on Justia Law

In 1992, Pesikan a six-year-old citizen of Bosnia, along with his mother, fled Bosnia. In 1998, they entered the U.S. as refugees and gained lawful permanent resident status. In 2017, Pesikan caused a car accident. A responding officer found a half-consumed bottle of whiskey on Pesikan’s driver’s seat and marijuana in the door pocket. A blood test of Pesikan revealed the presence of cocaine, marijuana, alprazolam, and a ,054 blood alcohol content. Pesikan was convicted in Pennsylvania of DUI six counts; the court merged the DUI counts into Count 2–for driving while under the influence of marijuana.Pesikan was charged with removability as an alien convicted of violating a law relating to a controlled substance, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which asks whether a noncitizen has been convicted of a violation of any law relating to a federally controlled substance. Pesikan argued that, applying the categorical approach to comparing state and federal crimes, Pennsylvania’s DUI statute is broader than the federal law because it allows for convictions based on the use of substances that are not federally controlled. The IJ held that the Pennsylvania statute is divisible, applied the modified categorical approach, and denied a motion to terminate. The BIA dismissed Pesikan’s appeal. The Third Circuit granted a petition for review. Because the identity of the specific controlled substance is not an element of the Pennsylvania DUI statute, that statute is indivisible and cannot serve as the basis for Pesikan’s removal. View "Pesikan v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Post-Gazette began moving to an all-digital format, which led to the termination of two paperhandlers represented by the Union. The layoffs took place during negotiations for a successor to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which, by its terms, had ended on March 31, 2017; 24 Post-Gazette employees were covered by a provision of the expired CBA that had guaranteed those employees five shifts per week “for the balance of the Agreement, ending March 31, 2017[.]” The Union filed a charge of unfair labor practices.The parties cited Supreme Court precedent interpreting the National Labor Relations Act and holding that an employer commits an unfair labor practice if, after the expiration of a CBA, the employer alters the post-expiration status quo during negotiations for a successor CBA without first negotiating with its employees to an overall impasse and that employers are privileged to make non-bargainable entrepreneurial decisions about the scope and direction of their business without bargaining with the union--the employer need only bargain about the “effects” of the decision once made. The Third Circuit remanded. The court applied “ordinary contract principles” to the expired CBA and held that the five-shift guarantee did not become part of the post-expiration status quo. That provision makes plain the guarantee was to end when the CBA expired. Under its own theory of the case, the Post-Gazette was still precluded from implementing the layoffs unless it engaged in adequate effects bargaining. View "PG Publishing Co Inc v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Durham, a prisoner with lumbar stenosis, received epidural steroid injections for pain and was prescribed a walking cane. In 2020, Durham was sent to a quarantine unit without his cane. For 10 days, Durham repeatedly, unsuccessfully requested his cane because he was in severe pain. His requests to see a doctor and to use a shower chair were ignored. Durham fell in the shower. Durham filed suit, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act (RA).The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Durham’s claims for money damages against the defendants in their capacity as state officials barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; Durham failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim, having failed to plausibly allege that the prison officials were “subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm”; and Durham failed to state ADA and RA claims, having failed to show that he is a qualifying individual with a disability. The Third Circuit vacated. Durham is a “qualified individual” and the provision of showers in prison is an activity that must be made accessible to people with disabilities. Durham sufficiently pleaded that the defendants had knowledge that his federally protected ADA right was substantially likely to be violated. A state program that accepts federal funds waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity to RA claims. Durham adequately alleged deliberate indifference. View "Durham v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Avila, a citizen of Honduras, experienced extreme sexual violence and attempted suicide more than once before fleeing Honduras. She became a lawful permanent resident in 2001. Between 1990-2004, she was convicted of misdemeanor shoplifting; misdemeanor tampering with public records; and petty theft. In 2008, Avila re-entered the U.S. and was charged with removability, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), because her convictions were for “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude” (CIMT). Avila failed to attend her scheduled hearing and was ordered removed in absentia. In 2015, her proceeding was reopened. Avila moved to terminate her removal proceedings, conceding that her petty theft offense was a CIMT but citing the petty offense exception, which applies to a noncitizen “who committed only one crime.” She argued that her misdemeanor shoplifting and tampering with public records convictions did not qualify as “crimes” but were merely disorderly persons offenses.An IJ determined that Avila was not eligible for cancellation of removal, finding that the disorderly persons offenses were CIMTs for immigration purposes. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit agreed that disorderly persons offenses under section 2C:20-4(a) of the New Jersey Statutes constitute convictions of crimes for immigration purposes. The court granted reconsideration of Avila’s asylum claim The BIA failed to consider whether Avila’s particular social group, “Honduran women in a domestic relationship where the male believes that women are to live under male domination,” was cognizable in light of the specific country conditions in Honduras. View "Avila v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Three men joined in a shootout, but only Rogers was convicted of murdering a bystander caught in their crossfire. At his trial, Rogers’s attorney did not object while the trial judge admonished a trial witness (Singleton) about perjury after that witness gave testimony favorable to Rogers. The attorney offered no arguments when Singleton changed his testimony and did not cross-examine Singleton about the change. The Third Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief. Counsel’s failure to object to the trial judge’s admonishment, conduct he “did not think” was problematic, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under “Strickland” as did counsel’s later failure to cross-examine Singleton regarding his changed testimony. Counsel characterized Singleton as “a liar, trying to help his buddy out,” whose testimony would not be “determinative of the outcome of this case,” but Singleton was the only witness to ever claim Rogers shot first—the ultimate issue in the case. Had Rogers’s counsel objected to the trial judge’s admonishment of Singleton and cross-examined Singleton about his changed testimony, “a reasonable probability” exists that “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Without Singleton’s testimony against Rogers, the prosecution’s remaining evidence was negligible. View "Rogers v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law