Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Al-Hasani was born in Syria in 1966. He worked there as a human rights lawyer. In 2003, Al-Hasani married Khalili, who lived in Morocco. After their son was born, the Syrian government imposed a travel ban on Al-Hasani, preventing him from seeing his family. In 2005, Al-Hasani married fellow Syrian, Jouni. He did not divorce Khalili; Syrian law did not require it. Jouni gave birth to Al-Hasani’s son. In 2009, Al-Hasani was arrested for crimes including “weakening the State’s ‘prestige.’” In 2011, Al-Hasani was released but Wikileaks reported that Al-Hasani had provided human rights information to the U.S. Al-Hasani fled Syria that day, but Jouni stayed in Damascus. Al-Hasani was paroled into the United States in 2011. In 2012, he was granted permanent resident status. Al-Hasani described legal barriers to divorce in Syria and the associated stigma. He eventually divorced Khalili in New Jersey. Al-Hasani contends he never lived in a marital relationship with both women at the same time. Al-Hasani applied for naturalization, describing the circumstances of his two marriages.USCIS denied his application because polygamy is a statutory bar to a finding of "good moral character” required for naturalization, 8 U.S.C. 1427(a). The Third Circuit upheld summary judgment for the government. An individual seeking to naturalize as a U.S. citizen has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence"that he meets all of the requirements. The polygamy bar is not ambiguous as applied to Al-Hasani. View "Al-Hasani v. Secretary United States Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania amended Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 to prohibit harassment and discrimination in the practice of law. Greenberg, a Pennsylvania-licensed attorney, regularly gives continuing legal education presentations about First Amendment protections for offensive speech. His presentations involve quoting offensive language from judicial opinions and discussing arguably controversial topics. Greenberg fears his speech at these presentations will be interpreted as harassment or discrimination under the Rule and alleges the Rule violates the First Amendment and is unconstitutionally vague.The district court enjoined enforcement of the Rule. The Third Circuit reversed. Greenberg lacks standing to bring his challenge. Rule 8.4(g) does not arguably prohibit anything Greenberg plans to do. The Rule covers only knowing or intentional harassment or discrimination against a person. Nothing in Greenberg’s planned speeches comes close to meeting this standard. Rule 8.4(g) does not generally prohibit him from quoting offensive words or expressing controversial ideas, nor will the defendants impose discipline for his planned speech. Any chill to his speech is not objectively reasonable or cannot be fairly traced to the Rule. View "Greenberg v. Lehocky" on Justia Law

Mercado filed weekly fraudulent Pandemic Unemployment Assistance claims, collecting a total of $37,555 in benefits. He pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. His plea agreement endorsed the possibility of a downward adjustment (U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a)) if Mercado could “adequately demonstrate recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility.” At the plea hearing, Mercado apologized. The court continued his bail pending sentencing, including several conditions, requiring that Mercado refrain from using narcotic drugs or other controlled substances, submit to substance abuse testing, complete substance abuse evaluation and treatment if deemed appropriate, and get medical and psychiatric treatment as directed by pretrial services.On the day he pleaded guilty, Mercado tested positive for cocaine. Probation referred him for intensive outpatient treatment, but he never reported. Mercado subsequently admitted to using cocaine again, and two months later, refused to take a drug test. When he finally submitted to testing, he again tested positive. His PSR calculated a Guideline range of 10-16 months’ imprisonment. A two-point downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility would have produced a Guideline range of 6-12 months but the PSR recommended against it. At sentencing, Mercado again expressed remorse. The court declined the two-point adjustment, citing his ongoing drug use, and imposed a 10-month sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed. U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a) does not preclude consideration of post-plea conduct “unrelated” to the pled-out offense. The commentary to this provision lists “appropriate considerations,” several of which expressly reference post-plea conduct. View "United States v. Mercado" on Justia Law

A project labor agreement (PLA) is a collective-bargaining agreement between a project owner, contractors, and unions, setting the terms and conditions of employment for a particular construction project. The terms can include recognizing a union as the workers’ exclusive bargaining representative and paying the workers union wages—even if they are not union members. The plaintiffs claim the project labor agreements violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Sherman Act.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims, citing lack of standing. Concreteness and particularity are two Article III standing requirements but those concrete injuries must also be actual or imminent. The contractor-plaintiffs declared they never have and never will bid on PLA-covered projects, admitting they never experienced and never will experience a compelled association or economic harm. To the extent the contractors’ declarations are a proxy for determining the actuality or imminence of harm to their employees, the contractors indicate they have not and will not bid on PLA-covered projects. The employees did not plead that they did or plan to work on PLA-covered public projects. The mere fact that the contractors claim they are “able and ready” to bid or work on PLA-covered public projects does not cure their failure to bid in the past and admitted refusal to bid. View "Associated Builders & Contractors of Western Pennsylvania v. Community College of Allegheny County" on Justia Law

Officers swarmed a New Jersey hotel room to execute an arrest warrant for Montalvo-Flores in connection with his suspected involvement in a robbery. They found car keys during a search incident to arrest. Although Montalvo-Flores exclaimed that those were his car keys, he did not have a valid driver’s license. Upon locating the car in the parking lot, officers discovered that its registered owner was the Enterprise. Officers called Enterprise’s regional risk manager to obtain permission to search the car, stating that Montalvo-Flores was operating the vehicle while involved in criminal activity. The manager, noting Montalvo-Flores was not listed on the rental agreement (his girlfriend, Pisciotta, was) gave officers consent to search the vehicle. In that search, officers found 304 grams of cocaine inside the trunk.Montalvo-Flores, charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), moved to suppress, arguing that he, with his girlfriend’s permission, lawfully possessed and controlled the car. The district court denied Montalvo-Flores’s motion, holding that he lacked standing because he failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. The Third Circuit reversed. Montalvo-Flores had dominion and control of the car with his girlfriend’s permission and had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. View "United States v. Montalvo-Flores" on Justia Law

Winn-Dixie sued EMMC, its individual farmer members, and certain downstream distributors claiming their price-fixing agreement violated the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. 1. EMMC, a cooperative of mushroom growers, targets the Eastern United States. Initially, EMMC controlled over 90 percent of the supply of fresh Agaricus mushrooms in the relevant market. That share fell to 58% percent by 2005, and 17% percent by 2010. EMMC’s 20-plus initial members shrunk to fewer than five. EMMC’s stated purpose was to establish a “Minimum Pricing Policy,” under which it would “circulat[e] minimum price lists” along with rules requiring the member companies to uniformly charge those prices to all customers. Those minimums were not the price at which growers sold the product, but the price at which EMMC members hoped to coerce downstream distributors to go to market. Certain members were grower-only entities, lacking an exclusive relationship with any distributor. Many members partnered with specific, often legally-related downstream distributors. The precise nature of these relationships varied widely but downstream distributors were prohibited from joining EMMC.The district court instructed the jury to apply the “rule-of-reason” test. The Third Circuit affirmed a verdict in EMMC’s favor. Winn-Dixie argued that the judge should have instructed the jury to presume anticompetitive effects. Because this hybrid scheme involved myriad organizational structures with varying degrees of vertical integration, the court correctly applied the rule of reason. Under that more searching inquiry, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict. View "Winn Dixie Stores v. Eastern Mushroom Marketing Cooperative Inc" on Justia Law

Former employees of Alternatives, a for-profit hospice provider, sued under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, alleging that Alternatives submitted claims for Medicare reimbursement despite inadequate documentation in the patients’ medical records supporting hospice eligibility, under 42 C.F.R. 418.22(b)(2). For a patient to be eligible for Medicare hospice benefits, and for a hospice provider to be entitled to reimbursement, a patient must be certified as “terminally ill.” The district court granted Alternatives summary judgment based on lack of materiality, finding “no evidence” that Alternatives’ insufficiently documented certifications "were material to the Government’s decision to pay.” The court reasoned that “[t]he Government could see what was or was not submitted” yet never refused any of Alternatives’ claims, despite the inadequacy or missing supporting documentation or where compliance was otherwise lacking.The Third Circuit vacated. When a government contractor submits a claim for payment but fails to disclose a statutory, regulatory, or contractual violation, that claim does not automatically trigger liability. The Act requires that the alleged violation be “material” to the government’s decision to pay. The Supreme Court has identified factors to assist courts in evaluating materiality. In this case, the court based its decision principally on the government’s continued payments after being made aware of its deficient documentation, overlooking factors that could have weighed in favor of materiality— and despite an open dispute over the government’s “actual knowledge.” View "Druding v. Care Alternatives" on Justia Law

M.P.N. manufactures radiators in Philadelphia. Mercer worked at M.P.N. from 2015-2017. In 2019, Mercer sued., alleging that M.P.N. concealed blood test results showing that he had dangerously high levels of zinc and lead after he was exposed to lead and cadmium on the job. A physician advised M.P.N. to remove Mercer from work but M.P.N. ignored the advice. As a result, Mercer continued working at M.P.N. and suffered permanent, avoidable brain damage. The Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act is the “exclusive” source of employer liability for suits relating to workplace injuries suffered by employees. Mercer argued that he could recover from M.P.N. under a “fraudulent misrepresentation” exception recognized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.Zenith Insurance sought a declaration that it was not contractually obligated to defend M.P.N., against a workplace liability lawsuit. In a partial summary judgment, the district court declared that Zenith has a duty to defend M.P.N. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal. Because the district court did not rule on all of the claims before it, that order is not final and cannot be appealed under the usual source of jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1291. Zenith argued the court could consider its challenge under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1), which permits appeals from non-final orders that relate to injunctive relief but the Third Circuit rule is that purely declaratory orders are not injunctive and cannot be enforced by contempt. View "Zenith Insurance Co. v. Newell" on Justia Law

Federal Protective Service, within DHS, hires Protective Service Officers for federal property and can secure contracts for private security. FPS contracted with a private security company, to provide security for the Philadelphia Social Security Administration (SSA) office. Smith and Bell were assigned to that office. In 2020, Washington was told that he could deliver certain paperwork to that office. He found the door locked. Bell explained that the office was open, with modified operations because of the coronavirus pandemic. Bell directed Washington to a drop box where he could deposit his paperwork. Washington insisted that he be allowed to visit the person with whom he spoke on the phone and forced his way into the building. Smith and Bell eventually subdued and handcuffed Washington.Washington was charged with two violations of 18 U.S.C. 111. The indictment alleges that Washington “forcibly assaulted, resisted, opposed, impeded, intimidated and interfered with an officer of the United States, as designated in [18 U.S.C. 1114], that is, [the victim], a Protective Services Officer,” while the victim was performing official duties. Weeks before trial, the government stated that Smith and Bell were contract officers but contended that they were designated under section 1114 because they were assisting the FPS in securing the SSA office. The Third Circuit reversed Washington's conviction. The indictment was flawed. It alleged that Washington assaulted federal officers when his victims could be protected only if designated as persons assisting federal officers or employees. The government’s evidence did not prove that modification. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Epsilon, an Ohio corporation with a principal place of business in Texas, entered into Joint Operating Agreements (JOAs) with companies, including Chesapeake, an LLC whose sole member is an Oklahoma citizen, to develop natural gas in Pennsylvania. The JOAs require Chesapeake to “have full control of all operations on the Contract Area.” Chesapeake can be removed as Operator for good cause by a vote of the other JOA parties. The JOAs allow the “Non-Operator parties” to propose new well sites. The others have 30 days to decide whether to participate. The work is then ordinarily performed by Chesapeake. If Chesapeake does not approve the project, the Consenting Parties designate a Consenting Party as Operator. Chesapeake opposed wells proposed by Epsilon, then blocked Epsilon from operating the proposed project unilaterally.Epsilon sought a declaration to drill without Chesapeake’s participation. Chesapeake moved to dismiss the suit for failure to join the other JOA co-signatories. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Third Circuit remanded. The other contracting parties are required (Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)). A declaratory judgment interpreting the JOAs to authorize a single Consenting Party to propose the drilling of a new well would affect all their interests. However, other Absent JOA Parties are citizens of Texas who cannot be feasibly joined without defeating diversity and destroying subject matter jurisdiction. Deciding whether to proceed without them requires findings by the trial judge. View "Epsilon Energy USA Inc. v. Chesapeake Appalachia LLC" on Justia Law