Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Graber v. Boresky
Before the 2016 Democratic National Convention, the Secret Service announced that access to certain areas would be restricted. Graber, a paramedic, joined political protests outside the Restricted Area. Protestors breached the gated perimeter. The Philadelphia Police Department apprehended those within the Restricted Area. Graber was one of seven individuals taken into custody; the police did not prepare any arrest paperwork for Graber. Special Agent Boresky was charged with serving as an affiant for a criminal complaint against the arrestees. Another agent e-mailed Boresky a synopsis of the events and photographs. Boresky appeared before a Magistrate and signed an affidavit identifying Graber as having been arrested inside the Restricted Area, based upon his “personal knowledge,” “information developed during the course of this investigation,” and information 'imparted by other officers. Boresky was not present at the arrest, did not view any video evidence, and did not write the affidavit. Graber was detained overnight. Graber’s counsel provided news video clips confirming that Graber never passed through the fence. The charges against Graber were dismissed.Citing “Bivens,” in which the Supreme Court held that a cause of action existed against federal agents who violated the Fourth Amendment, Graber sued Boresky for false arrest, unlawful detention, and false charges. Denying a motion to dismiss, the district court held that a Bivens claim could be brought against Boresky. The court later dismissed Boresky’s qualified immunity summary judgment motion. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction; the Bivens ruling is not a final decision and is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. View "Graber v. Boresky" on Justia Law
Burrell v. Staff
Plaintiffs were held in civil contempt and sentenced to incarceration for not paying child support. They challenged Lackawanna County’s policy of conditioning incarcerated civil contemnor child support debtors’ access to regularly paid work release on first working for half of their sentences sorting through trash at its Recycling Center, in purportedly dangerous and disgusting conditions, for five dollars per day, nominally as “community service.”Because the suit followed state suits in which the plaintiffs were found to be in contempt, the Third Circuit first addressed Rooker-Feldman, issue preclusion, and changed circumstances. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Thirteenth Amendment and Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law claims in full, and of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. 1589, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), 1964(c) claims against the owners of the corporation that owns the recycling center. The court reversed the dismissal of the TVPA claims against the county, the Solid Waste Authority, and the corporation, the RICO claims against the corporation, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1)(c), and Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act claims against the county, the Authority, and the corporation, and their unjust enrichment claims against the county, the Authority, and the corporation. View "Burrell v. Staff" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Home Depot USA Inc v. Lafarge North America Inc
Direct purchasers of drywall—not including Home Depot—sued seven drywall suppliers for conspiring to fix prices. Those cases were centralized in multi-district litigation. Home Depot was a member of the putative class. Georgia-Pacific was not sued. Before class-certification or dispositive motions were filed, a settlement with defendants USG and TIN was certified. Home Depot did not opt-out. Lafarge settled. The court certified a new settlement class; Home Depot opted out. The court later certified a new settlement class with respect to the remaining defendants with terms similar to the USG/TIN settlement—preserving the right of class members to pursue claims against alleged co-conspirators other than the settling defendants. Home Depot remained in the settlement class. The court entered judgment.Home Depot then sued Lafarge. Home Depot never bought drywall from Lafarge, but argued that Lafarge was liable for the overcharges Home Depot paid its suppliers; its expert opined that the pricing behaviors of Lafarge and other suppliers, including USG, CertainTeed, and Georgia-Pacific, were indicative of a conspiracy to fix prices. The court struck the expert report, citing issue preclusion and the law of the case, noting the grant of summary judgment to CertainTeed, that Georgia-Pacific had not previously been sued, and that alleged conspirator USG settled early in the class action.The Third Circuit vacated. Issue preclusion applies only to matters which were actually litigated and decided between the parties or their privies. Home Depot was not a party (or privy) to any of the relevant events. Two of the three events to which it was “bound” were not judicial decisions. The law of the case doctrine applies only to prior decisions made in the same case. View "Home Depot USA Inc v. Lafarge North America Inc" on Justia Law
Doe v. Scalia
Plaintiffs, employees at the Maid-Rite meatpacking plant, were exposed to COVID-19 in 2020. Maid-Rite issued masks and face shields but allegedly forced workers to work shoulder-to-shoulder. Plaintiffs sent OSHA an inspection request on May 19. Two days later, OSHA requested a response from Maid-Rite within a week, treating the inspection request as “non-formal,” so that it initially proceeded through document exchange. On May 27, Plaintiffs asserted that they continued to face an imminent danger of COVID-19; they also contacted OSHA on June 2, requesting Maid-Rite’s response and reasserting that conditions had not changed. They sent OSHA another letter on June 29th. On July 8, OSHA informed Maid-Rite that OSHA would inspect the plant the following day. OSHA acknowledged that advance notice of an inspection was not “typical,” but cited the need “to protect [OSHA’s] employees” from COVID-19. Plaintiffs claimed the notice allowed Maid-Rite to direct its employees to change their conduct and created the appearance of compliance with mitigation guidance. OSHA determined that the plant's conditions did not constitute an imminent danger and did not seek expedited relief.Plaintiffs sued under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 662(d), limited private right of action. While OSHA’s motion to dismiss was pending, OSHA concluded its standard enforcement proceedings and declined to issue a citation. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the Act mandated the dismissal of the claim once enforcement proceedings were complete. View "Doe v. Scalia" on Justia Law
Sanofi Aventis US LLC v. United States Department of Health and Human Services
Drug makers participating in Medicare or Medicaid must offer their drugs at a discount to certain “covered entities,” which typically provide healthcare to low-income and rural individuals, 42 U.S.C. 256b, 1396r-8(a)(1), (5) (Section 340B). Initially, few covered entities had in-house pharmacies. A 1996 HHS guidance stated that covered entities could use one outside contract pharmacy each; a 2010 HHS guidance stated that covered entities could use an unlimited number of contract pharmacies. Drug makers thought that contract pharmacies were driving up duplicate discounting and diversion and adopted policies to limit any covered entity’s use of multiple contract pharmacies. A 2020 HHS Advisory Opinion declared that Section 340B required drug makers to deliver discounted drugs to an unlimited number of contract pharmacies.In 2010, Congress told HHS to establish a process for drug makers and covered entities to resolve Section 340B–related disputes. In 2016, HHS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking and accepted comments on the proposed ADR Rule. HHS subsequently listed the proposed rule as withdrawn. In 2020, HHS stated that it had just “paus[ed] action on the proposed rule,” responded to the four-year-old comments. and issued a final ADR Rule.Drug companies sued. The Third Circuit held that Section 340B does not require drug makers to deliver discounted drugs to an unlimited number of contract pharmacies. HHS did not violate the APA by purporting to withdraw the proposed ADR Rule before later finalizing it. View "Sanofi Aventis US LLC v. United States Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law
In re: LTL Management LLC
“Old Consumer,” a wholly owned subsidiary of J&J, sold healthcare products such as Band-Aid, Tylenol, Aveeno, and Listerine, and produced Johnson’s Baby Powder for over a century. The Powder’s base was talc. Concerns that the talc contained asbestos resulted in lawsuits alleging that it has caused ovarian cancer and mesothelioma. With mounting payouts and litigation costs, Old Consumer, through a series of intercompany transactions, split into LTL, holding Old Consumer’s liabilities relating to talc litigation and a funding support agreement from LTL’s corporate parents, and “New Consumer,” holding virtually all the productive business assets previously held by Old Consumer. J&J’s goal was to isolate the talc liabilities in a new subsidiary that could file for Chapter 11 without subjecting Old Consumer’s entire operating enterprise to bankruptcy proceedings.Talc claimants moved to dismiss LTL’s subsequent bankruptcy case as not filed in good faith. The Bankruptcy Court denied those motions and extended the automatic stay of actions against LTL to hundreds of non-debtors, including J&J and New Consumer. In consolidated appeals, the Third Circuit dismissed the petition. Good intentions— such as to protect the J&J brand or comprehensively resolve litigation—do not suffice. The Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor is intended for debtors in financial distress. LTL was not. Ignoring a parent company’s safety net shielding all foreseen liability would create a legal blind spot. View "In re: LTL Management LLC" on Justia Law
United States v. Lewis
In 2012, Lewis was convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana under N.J. Stat. 2C:35-5. In 2020, Lewis pleaded guilty in federal court to unlawful possession of a firearm 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Section 922(g) carries an increased base offense level for a defendant convicted of a prior “controlled substance offense,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), under federal or state law. Lewis argued that only a conviction related to a substance listed in the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801, qualified as a “controlled substance offense.” The CSA at the time of Lewis’s federal sentencing defined marijuana more narrowly than did New Jersey law at the time of his state conviction. In 2018, Congress amended the CSA’s definition of “marihuana” to exclude hemp. In 2019, New Jersey followed suit. The government argued that substances regulated by state law are controlled substances under the Guidelines, even if they are not regulated by federal law. The district court agreed with Lewis.The Third Circuit vacated. The meaning of “controlled substance” in U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b)’s definition of “controlled substance offense” includes drugs regulated by state law at the time of the predicate state conviction, even if they are not federally regulated or are no longer regulated by the state at the time of the federal sentencing. Marijuana, including hemp, was regulated by New Jersey at the time of Lewis’s predicate state conviction; the district court erred in declining to apply the 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) enhancement. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Saban-Cach v. Attorney General United States
Saban-Cach grew up in Sacatepéquez, Guatemala. He is of indigenous ethnicity. A local gang associated with MS-13 harassed Saban-Cach. Because of this abuse, Saban-Cach dropped out of school and fled to San Pedro. The gang still harassed him, including violent physical attacks from which he still has scars, Those attacks and attacks on family members were not reported to the police because the police did not respond to the complaints of indigenous people. After two unsuccessful attempts, in 2015 Saban-Cach entered the United States without inspection or apprehension. After he left Guatemala, the gang kidnapped, beat, and raped his 16-year-old sister, holding her for more than a month. The police allegedly ignored the family’s complaints.DHS encountered Saban-Cach in 2020. After he expressed a reasonable fear of returning to Guatemala, SabanCach was placed in withholding-only proceedings and sought relief under the Convention Against Torture. An IJ found Saban-Cach’s testimony credible but concluded that Saban-Cach did not establish a clear probability of persecution on account of a protected ground. The BIA affirmed the removal order. The Third Circuit vacated. The BIA erred in finding that Saban-Cach by conditioning a finding of past persecution on seeking—or sustaining injuries that require—professional medical care. The BIA failed to appropriately consider the cumulative effects of mistreatment. The IJ overlooked evidence that the harm Saban-Cach suffered was due to his being identified as an indigenous person. There is considerable evidence that government officials are willfully blind to the violence of gang members against indigenous people. View "Saban-Cach v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Immigration Law
Robert W Mauthe MD PC v. Millennium Health LLC
Millennium's laboratory provides drug testing to healthcare professionals. Mauthe, a private practice MD, used Millennium’s services. On May 2, 2017, Millennium faxed all of its customers a single-page flyer promoting a free educational seminar to “highlight national trends in opioid misuse and abuse . . . and discuss the role of medication monitoring ... during the care of injured workers.” Although Millennium offered urine testing to detect opioids, the fax did not mention that service nor provide any pricing information, discounts, or product images. The seminar did not promote any goods or services for sale but described statistics on opioid abuse and the role of such drugs in chronic pain management. It explained that drug testing could help detect or monitor opioid abuse, and assessed the efficacy of several testing methods. The seminar did not identify providers or prices for any of the drug testing methods it reviewed. After the seminar, Millennium did not follow up with any registrants or attendees.Mauthe who has sued fax senders in more than 10 lawsuits since 2015, seeking damages under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, (b)(3), filed a putative class action against Millennium. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Liability under the TCPA extends only to “unsolicited advertisement[s],” meaning communications that promote the sale of goods, services, or property. Under an objective standard, no reasonable recipient could construe the seminar fax as such an unsolicited advertisement. View "Robert W Mauthe MD PC v. Millennium Health LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Business Law, Communications Law
United States v. Gallman
Philadelphia officers Kling and Nestel stopped Gallman for running a stop sign and recovered a firearm from Gallman’s passenger. Officer Rosinski moved Gallman to the patrol car. Kling discovered a firearm near Gallman's driver’s seat. Gallman, previously convicted of first-degree robbery, was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, and unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. During the hearing, the government informed the court that there was an open Internal Affairs Division (IAD) investigation about Rosinski’s failure to call a supervisor to a traffic stop. The government also supplied an IAD memorandum regarding a racial profiling complaint against Rosinski and Stout, who was also present at the Gallman stop. That matter was closed before Gallman’s arrest; the allegation was unfounded.Following COVID-19 protocol, Gallman's trial was conducted in one courtroom and video-streamed to another where the public and Gallman’s family were seated. Outside the presence of the jury, the court asked Gallman whether he wanted to stipulate his prior conviction and discussed the pending Rosinski IAD investigation.The Third Circuit affirmed Gallman’s conviction. Closing the video stream during the sessions away from the jury did not constitute reversible error; it was not “clear under current law” that the Sixth Amendment public-trial right applied to those proceedings. The closures here were brief and resulted from pandemic protocol challenges rather than any substantive decision. Some of the topics discussed were also discussed in open court. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Gallman’s prior conviction. View "United States v. Gallman" on Justia Law