Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lewis, Shavers, and White committed a 2005 armed robbery of a North Philadelphia “speakeasy,” pointing firearms, ordering people to the floor, and threatening to shoot. They were charged with Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; using and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and attempted witness tampering. The court instructed the jury that Lewis was charged with “using and carrying a firearm during the crime of violence.” The jury found the three guilty. Lewis was sentenced to 57 months on the Hobbs Act counts and 84 months’ incarceration, the mandatory minimum, on the section 924 count, for “brandishing” a firearm. The Supreme Court remanded in light of its decision in Alleyne v. U.S., concerning imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence based upon facts that were never charged or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit initially affirmed, finding harmless error, but subsequently vacated and remanded. Lewis was sentenced for brandishing, but was convicted of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, which has a shorter mandatory minimum sentence. Lewis was never indicted for brandishing. The error contributed to the sentence and was not harmless. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

J.B., age 12, got into a fight and brandished a homemade knife over a neighborhood girl, stating that could kill her. A parent called the state police. J.B. admitted to threatening to break a girl’s arms and to holding the knife. J.B.’s father was told that charges of terroristic threats and summary harassment would be filed. Three weeks later, a juvenile allegation was filed. J.B. was transported to the Lancaster County Youth Intervention Center, processed, and subjected to a strip search pursuant to LYIC policy to look for signs of “injuries, markings, skin conditions, signs of abuse, or further contraband.” J.B. stood behind a curtain so that only the officer conducting the search could observe him, removed his pants and underwear for approximately 90 seconds, and was asked to bend over, spread his buttocks, and cough. J.B. was detained for three days. He ultimately entered into a consent decree with an opportunity to have his record expunged. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, and violations of due process, the Third Circuit concluded that defendants were entitled to partial summary judgment. The Supreme Court holding in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, that all arrestees committed to general population of a detention center may be subject to a close visual inspection while undressed, applies to juvenile offenders admitted to general population in a juvenile detention center. View "J. B. v. Fassnacht" on Justia Law

The U.S. chocolate market is dominated by three companies: Hershey, Mars, and Nestlé USA (the Chocolate Manufacturers). A certified class of direct purchasers of chocolate products and a group of individual plaintiffs alleged that the Chocolate Manufacturers conspired to raise prices on chocolate candy products in the United States three times between 2002 and 2007. They offered evidence of a contemporaneous antitrust conspiracy in Canada. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the Canadian conspiracy evidence was ambiguous and did not support an inference of a U.S. conspiracy because the people involved in and the circumstances surrounding the Canadian conspiracy are different from those involved in and surrounding the purported U.S. conspiracy; evidence that the U.S. Chocolate Manufacturers knew of the unlawful Canadian conspiracy was weak and, in any event, related only to Hershey. Other traditional conspiracy evidence was insufficient to create a reasonable inference of a U.S. price-fixing conspiracy. View "In re: Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

In 2004, an undercover detective made four purchases of cocaine from Ross. Surveillance officers watched Ross leave a Chester residence and drive to the agreed-upon location. The detective arranged another purchase and obtained a warrant to search that residence. Officers arrested Ross as he left the house and found cocaine and a loaded handgun in his car. Searching the residence, they discovered a semi-automatic handgun, and a loaded 9mm pistol with a modified firing pin enabling it to fire continuously. An ATF expert testified that the pistol, as modified, met the definition of a machinegun, 26 U.S.C. 5845(b). Ross was convicted of cocaine distribution, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); carrying a firearm in drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1); possession of a machinegun in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(B)(ii); possession of a machinegun, 18 U.S.C. 922(o); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court did not instruct the jury – and defense counsel failed to object– that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had specific knowledge of the firearm’s characteristics that made it a “machinegun.” The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction. He unsuccessfully moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the jury instruction and the sufficiency of the evidence. Because Ross had not satisfied a threshold requirement of section 2255, the Third Circuit remanded with directions to dismiss. View "United States v. Ross" on Justia Law

LifeCare operated 27 long-term acute care hospitals with about 4,500 employees.Hurricane Katrina destroyed three of its facilities. It had $484 million debt; approximately $355 million was secured. Secured lenders wanted to purchase the company outright and offered to credit $320 million of the debt as LifeCare’s only alternative to liquidation under Chapter 7. The secured lender group, LLC2, put funds in escrow to pay legal and accounting fees. LifeCare filed for bankruptcy one day later, obtained permission to sell assets under 11 U.S.C. 363(b)(1), abd marketed its assets to more than 106 potential parties. LLC2 was selected as the successful bidder. The Committee of Unsecured Creditors and U.S. government—neither of which would recover anything through the sale— objected to the transfer as a “veiled foreclosure.” In exchange for the Committee dropping its objections, LLC2 deposited $3.5 million in trust for general unsecured creditors. The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale. Deeming the administrative fee monies escrowed by LLC2 not to be estate property, the court held that the government had no claim to it. The Third Circuit affirmed. Payments by an 11 U.S.C. 363 purchaser (LLC2) need not be distributed according to the Code’s creditor-payment hierarchy where no cash changed hands other than that deposited in escrow for professional fees and paid directly to the unsecured creditors. The payments neither went into nor came out of the bankruptcy estate. View "In re: ICL Holding Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Saranchak entered open plea of guilty to murdering his grandmother and uncle and was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder following a non-jury degree-of-guilt hearing. A jury found that Saranchak should be sentenced to death for his crimes. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Saranchak’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Saranchak then sought state post-conviction relief, asserting that his attorney, Watkins, had been constitutionally ineffective. The same judge who had presided over both phases of his trial denied relief under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9541–9546, The PCRA court—the same judge who presided over both phases of Saranchak’s trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The district court denied Saranchak’s federal habeas petition. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting an argument that the degree-of-guilt phase of his trial was suffused with prejudice from the cumulative errors arising out of his counsel’s performance at trial. The Third Circuit reversed with respect to the death sentence, finding that the court did not adequately evaluate mitigation evidence concerning Saranchak's childhood and mental health. View "Saranchak v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

NJBSC is a Bergen County neurosurgical medical practice. NJBSC treated three patients who were members of health-care plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, and administered by Aetna. Before surgery, each patient executed an assignment to NJBSC. Following treatment, Aetna allegedly underpaid or refused to pay claims for each of the patients. NJBSC filed suit The district court dismissed NJBSC’s complaint, holding that the assigned rights to payment did not give NJBSC standing to sue under ERISA. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that a patient’s explicit assignment of payment of insurance benefits to her healthcare provider, without direct reference to the right to file suit, is sufficient to give the provider standing to sue for those benefits under ERISA. View "N. Jersey Brain & Spine Ctr., v. Aetna Inc" on Justia Law

E.M. is a student at the Learning Center for Exceptional Children (LCEC), a private school for children with intellectual disabilities. E.M.’s federally-mandated individualized education plan created by her parents, teachers, and local public-school system—says that she should attend LCEC and integrated classes with students from Today’s Learning Center (TLC), a private school for regular-education students that shares classroom space with LCEC. The New Jersey Department of Education asserts that it has not approved LCEC or TLC to teach integrated classes of regular-education students and students with disabilities. The Department directed LCEC to confirm that it would not place its public-school students with disabilities in classrooms with private-school regular-education students. LCEC agreed under protest. E.M.’s parents and LCEC obtained preliminary injunctive relief under the so-called “stay-put” rule of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1412, which allowed her to attend classes with TLC’s regular-education students during the pendency of the case. The Third Circuit remanded with the injunction intact for additional fact finding, including whether other educational alternatives are available to E.M. View "D. M. v. N.J. Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Brand developed Thermablaster, a vent-free heater, to be manufactured by a Chinese company, Reecon. Reecon suggested using Intertek testing to ensure the heaters met U.S. safety standards. Brand spoke with Intertek representatives and visited the company’s website to ensure that Intertek could test to American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. Satisfied that Intertek’s China facility had the necessary expertise, Brand allowed Reecon to use Intertek for testing against the most recent applicable ANSI standard. The $22,000 testing cost was part of the per-unit price. Ace Hardware agreed to pay Brand $467,000 for 3,980 Thermablasters. Brand visited China to monitor production. Reecon gave Brand an Intertek document signed by its engineers, showing that the heaters had passed all relevant tests. Brand bought 5,500 heaters and delivered them to Ace. Ace began selling the heaters in 2011 but halted sales permanently after learning from a competitor that they did not meet ANSI standards. Ace obtained a default judgment of $611,060 against Brand. Brand sued Intertek. Intertek countersued, alleging trademark infringement because Brand had placed Intertek’s testing certification mark on boxes before receiving permission. Intertek bought Ace’s judgment against Brand for $250,000 and aggressively tried to collect before trial. The Third Circuit affirmed a verdict finding Intertek liable to Brand for negligent misrepresentation and awarding Brand $1,045,000 in compensatory and $5 million in punitive damages. View "Brand Mktg. Grp. LLC v. Intertek Testing Servs. NA" on Justia Law

The victim, born in Russia in 1986, was sent to study ballet at the Bolshoi Academy at age 10. When his family became unable to pay his fees, teachers introduced them to Schneider, an American lawyer living in Moscow. Schneider agreed to financially assist the family. His parents agreed to the victim living at Schneider’s apartment. Schneider began engaging in sexual activity with the victim. In 2000, Schneider told the victim that if the school nurse asked about the condition of the victim’s anus, he should say that he had used a solid stick of hemorrhoid medication. Schneider explained that if anyone discovered their sexual activity, Schneider would go to jail and the victim would not achieve his goals. In 2001, the victim and Schneider traveled to Philadelphia, where the victim resided at Schneider’s parents’ home while attending a summer ballet program. Upon their return to Moscow, the sexual activity resumed. When the victim was 16, the two moved to Massachusetts, where the victim attended school and danced professionally. In 2008, the victim filed a civil complaint, which was was stayed when Schneider was charged with traveling in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with another person, 18 U.S.C. 2423(b), and transporting an individual in foreign commerce with intent that such individual engage in a sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, 18 U.S.C. 2421. The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and sentencing. View "United States v. Schneider" on Justia Law