Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A former inmate claimed that correctional officers violated her constitutional rights when, without proper authorization, they took her from one place of confinement to another where they denied her potable water, clothing, and sanitary napkins and related medications and subjected her to an unlawful body cavity search. The district court granted three defendants summary judgment and dismissed remaining claims against the other defendants, finding that she did not demonstrate that there were issues of material fact and that the complaint did not allege facts constituting a cause of action. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the former New Jersey Attorney General, New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections, and a Correctional Sergeant, but reversed dismissal of cruel and unusual punishment claims against unnamed defendants with respect to: the alleged denial of potable water and sanitary napkins and related medications; the inmate being required to go to the shower or otherwise be exposed while naked in the presence of male prison personnel and inmates; body cavity search claims. View "Chavarriaga v. NJ Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Hanover Realty contracted with Wegmans to develop a supermarket on its New Jersey property, requiring Hanover to secure necessary permits and approvals before breaking ground. ShopRite and its development subsidiary filed administrative and court challenges to Hanover’s applications. Believing these filings were baseless and intended only to frustrate the entry of a competitor, Hanover sued for antitrust violations. The district court dismissed, holding that Hanover did not have standing because it was not a competitor, consumer, or participant in the restrained markets and did not sustain the type of injury the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. The Third Circuit vacated with respect to the claim for attempted monopolization of the market for full-service supermarkets. Hanover can establish that its injury was “inextricably intertwined” with defendants’ anti-competitive conduct. Hanover sufficiently alleged that the petitioning activity at issue was undertaken without regard to the merits of the claims and for the purpose of using the governmental process to restrain trade, so that defendants are not protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity because their conduct falls within the exception for sham litigation. The court affirmed as to the claim for attempted monopolization of the rental space market; there was no standing because Hanover does not compete with defendants in that market. View "Hanover 3201 Realty LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that defendants, who run internet advertising businesses, placed tracking cookies on the plaintiffs’ web browsers in contravention of their browsers’ cookie blockers and defendant Google’s own public statements. Essentially they claimed that the defendants acquired the plaintiffs’ internet history information when, in the course of requesting webpage advertising content at the direction of the visited website, the plaintiffs’ browsers sent that information directly to the defendants’ servers. They cited the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510; the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C 2701; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030; and, against Google, violation of the privacy right conferred by the California Constitution, intrusion upon seclusion, the state Unfair Competition Law, the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, the California Invasion of Privacy Act, and the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the federal claims, stating that fraud or deceit does not amount to wiretapping; the alleged conduct implicated no protected “facility” under the Stored Communications Act; and the plaintiffs alleged no damages under the Fraud Act. The court vacated dismissal of the state law claims against Google. View "In Re: Google Inc Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig." on Justia Law

Singh, a citizen of India, was granted asylum in 1993, and adjusted to lawful permanent resident status in 1994. In 2000, Singh was convicted of conspiracy to counterfeit passports, counterfeiting and using visas, and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371; unlawful possession of forged, counterfeited, altered, and falsely-made non-immigrant U.S. visas, 18 U.S.C. 1546. Singh departed the U.S. and re-entered in 2003. In 2009, he applied for admission as a lawful permanent resident. He was instead detained and served with a notice of removal charging him as inadmissible because he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude: his 2000 counterfeiting conviction. Singh appeared before the Immigration Court, acknowledged proper service, admitted all of the factual allegations, and conceded the sole charge of removability. Singh sought cancellation of removal, and indicated that he would not be seeking any alternative forms of relief. The IJ denied Singh’s application because Singh had not accrued the requisite seven years of continuous residence required by 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Singh’s continuous residency clock stopped in 2000 when he committed his crime involving moral turpitude and could never re-start. View "Singh v. Attorney Gen., United States" on Justia Law

Whether a third-party payer (TPP) will cover the cost of a member’s prescription depends on whether that drug is listed in the TPP’s formulary. Pharmacy Benefit Managers prepare TPPs’ formularies of drugs approved for use by TPP members by analyzing research regarding a drug’s cost effectiveness, safety and efficacy. In 1999, the FDA approved Avandia as a prescription for type II diabetes. TPPs included Avandia in their formularies and covered Avandia prescriptions at a favorable rate. GSK downplayed concerns about Avandia’s heart-related side effects. In 2010, the FDA restricted access to Avandia in response to increasing evidence of its cardiovascular risks. TPPs (union health and welfare funds) sued GSK on behalf of themselves and similarly situated TPPs. asserting that GSK’s failure to disclose Avandia’s significant heart-related risks violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act based on predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, tampering with witnesses, and use of interstate facilities to conduct unlawful activity. They also claimed unjust enrichment and violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law and other states’ consumer protection laws. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the TPPs adequately alleged the elements of standing. View "In Re: Avandia Mktg.,Sales Practices & Prod. Liab." on Justia Law

In 2012 Navajo Nation sued for trademark infringement, alleging that Urban Outfitters “advertised, promoted, and sold goods under the ‘Navaho’ and ‘Navajo’ names and marks” on the Internet and in retail stores “[s]ince at least March 16, 2009.” Urban Outfitters tendered the complaint to its insurers. OneBeacon provided commercial general and umbrella liability coverage to Urban Outfitters until July 7, 2010, with “personal and advertising injury” coverage. On July 7, 2010, Hanover became the responsible insurer under a “fronting policy.” On July 7, 2011 Hanover issued separate commercial general liability and umbrella liability policies to Urban Outfitters. The “fronting policy” and Hanover-issued policies excluded coverage for “personal and advertising injury” liability “arising out of oral or written publication of material whose first publication took place before the beginning of the policy period.” After providing a reservation of rights letter, informing Urban Outfitters of Hanover and OneBeacon’s joint retention of defense counsel, Hanover obtained a judicial a declaration that it was not responsible for defense or indemnification. The Third Circuit affirmed.The “prior publication” exclusion of liability insurance contracts prevents a company from obtaining ongoing insurance coverage for a continuing course of tortious conduct. Urban Outfitters engaged in similar liability-triggering behavior both before and during Hanover’s coverage period. View "Hanover Ins. Co v. Urban Outfitters Inc" on Justia Law

Day’s company, Forever Green, sells artificial turf playing fields. It sued its competitor, ProGreen, for $5 million for diversion of corporate assets (Bucks County Action). Dawson, an owner of ProGreen and a former Forever Green sales representative, would be liable if damages are awarded. Dawson sued Forever Green for unpaid commissions and wages (Louisiana Action). Years later, the Louisiana court entered a consent judgment ( about $300,000) in favor of Dawson, which was not paid. Meanwhile, the Bucks County parties agreed to arbitrate. Weeks after the consent judgment entered, ProGreen moved to terminate arbitration, arguing that Forever Green was insolvent and that Day lacked “ability or desire to pay the Arbitrator’s fees and expenses.” Dawson obtained a writ of execution against the arbitrator. Recognizing that he was adverse to Dawson, the arbitrator suspended the arbitration until the fee issue was resolved. Forever Green sued to reinstate the arbitration. Dawson and a law firm that was owed $206,000 from Forever Green, filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against Forever Green, which satisfied the statutory criteria, 11 U.S.C. 303(b). The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the filing as being in bad faith. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that bad faith provides a basis for dismissal independent of the statutory criteria for filing. View "Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc. v. Dawson" on Justia Law

In 2001, Furnival and its insurer agreed to a Pollution and Remediation Legal Liability Policy, detailing $10 million in liability protection; a 10-year coverage period; and insurance coverage for 12 Furnival locations, including the Elizabethtown Landfill Site, which Furnival was obligated to clean up under a consent decree with the federal government. Insurer knew about the consent decree when the Policy issued. The Policy Endorsements list five reasons for which insurer may “refuse to offer a renewal extension of coverage,” and states that insurer “shall not cancel nor non-renew this Policy except for the reasons stated above.” None of the listed reasons for non-renewal occurred. In 2006, the parties increased the Policy’s limit to $14 million. After the term expired, insurer sent Furnival’s insurance broker its version of a renewal offer, providing $5 million of coverage over a one-year term, omitting coverage for Elizabethtown, the only previously insured site for which Furnival had made a claim, refusing to renew the same terms. The Third Circuit vacated a ruling in favor of insurer, holding that, for a contract to be considered a renewal, it must contain the same, or nearly the same, terms as the original contract. View "Indian Harbor Ins. Co v. F&M Equip., Ltd" on Justia Law

Leyse filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, after receiving a prerecorded telemarketing call on the landline he shares with his roommate. Leyse was not the intended recipient of the call— his roommate was. The district court dismissed for lack of statutory standing. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that Leyse has statutory standing. His status as a regular user of the phone line and occupant of the residence that was called brings him within the language of the Act and the zone of interests it protects. View "Leyse v. Bank of America NA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claim that, since January 2002, the New York City Police Department has conducted a secret program “to monitor the lives of Muslims, their businesses, houses of worship, organizations, and schools in New York City and surrounding states, particularly New Jersey.”.The claim that NYPD mounts remotely-controlled surveillance cameras on light poles, aimed at mosques and sends “undercover officers” into mosques, student organizations, businesses, and neighborhoods that “it believes to be heavily Muslim.” Plaintiffs allege that the program is based on the false and stigmatizing premise that Muslim religious identity “is a permissible proxy for criminality, and that Muslim individuals, businesses, and institutions can therefore be subject to pervasive surveillance not visited upon individuals, businesses, and institutions of any other religious faith or the public at large.” The district court dismissed their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The Third Circuit reversed. The allegations “tell a story in which there is standing to complain and which present constitutional concerns that must be addressed and, if true, redressed.” The court analogized the situation to that faced by Jewish-Americans during the Red Scare, African-Americans during the Civil Rights Movement, and Japanese-Americans during World War II. View "Hassan v. City of New York" on Justia Law