Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Chesapeake, as “Lessee,” entered into oil and gas leases with northeastern Pennsylvania landowners. The Leases indicate that they were “prepared by” Chesapeake and include a provision, stating that, in the event of a disagreement between “Lessor” and “Lessee” concerning “this Lease,” performance “thereunder,” or damages caused by “Lessee’s” operations, “all such disputes” shall be resolved by arbitration “in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.” In 2013, Scout purchased several leases and began receiving royalties from Chesapeake. In 2014, Scout filed an arbitration demand on behalf of itself and similarly situated lessors, alleging that Chesapeake paid insufficient royalties. Chesapeake objected to class arbitration and sought a declaratory judgment, arguing that “[it] did not agree to resolve disputes arising out of the leases at issue in ‘class arbitration,’ nor did Chesapeake agree to submit the question of class arbitrability ... to an arbitrator.” The district court and Third Circuit ruled in favor of Chesapeake, finding that the issue of arbitrability is a question for the court. Based on the language of the Leases, the nature and contents of the AAA rules, and existing case law, the Leases did not “clearly and unmistakably” delegate the question of class arbitrability to the arbitrators. View "Chesapeake Appalachia LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC" on Justia Law

Moreno was involved in a mortgage-fraud scheme as an appraiser who supplied inflated appraisals to other members of the scheme in exchange for money. He was also involved as broker, buyer, or seller, in other fraudulent transactions. Moreno was found guilty of five counts of wire fraud and two counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and sentenced to 96 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence. The court rejected claims of violation of the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule, based on the testimony of a cooperating witness, who read statements of a non-testifying U.S. Secret Service Special Agent into the record. The court also upheld a finding that there were more than 50 victims and a resulting application of a four-level enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court erred in permitting the prosecutor, during Moreno’s sentencing allocution and without leave of court, to engage in a vigorous cross-examination of Moreno. View "United States v. Moreno" on Justia Law

St. Peter’s, a non-profit healthcare entity, runs a hospital, and employs over 2,800 people. It is not a church, but has ties to a New Jersey Roman Catholic Diocese. The Bishop appoints most members of its Board of Governors and retains veto authority over Board actions. The hospital has daily Mass and Catholic devotional pictures and statues throughout the building. In 1974, St. Peter’s established a non-contributory defined benefit retirement plan; operated the plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA); and represented that it was complying with ERISA. In 2006 St. Peter’s filed an IRS application, seeking a church plan exemption from ERISA, 26 U.S.C. 414(e); 29 U.S.C. 1002(33), continuing to pay ERISA-mandated insurance premiums while the application was pending. In 2013, Kaplan, who worked for St. Peter’s until 1999, filed a putative class action alleging that St. Peter’s did not provide ERISA-compliant summary plan descriptions or pension benefits statements, and that, as of 2011, the plan was underfunded by more than $70 million. While the lawsuit was pending, St. Peter’s received an IRS private letter ruling. affirming the plan’s status as an exempt church plan for tax purposes. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss, concluding that St. Peter’s could not establish an exempt church plan because it is not a church. View "Kaplan v. Saint Peter's Healthcare Sys." on Justia Law

Willis worked as a Neonatal Nurse Practitioner at Children’s from August 1993 until her termination in January 2012. From 2001 until 2011, Willis served as co-lead NNP. Lamouree, the nurse manager for the newborn intensive care unit was Willis’s supervisor. Lamouree’s supervisors were Valenta and Hupp. Starting in August 2011, Children’s issued Willis disciplinary warnings for three distinct incidents, all involving communications Willis was 61 years old at the time of her termination. After the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission closed Willis’s case, Willis sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, stating that Willis was unable to provide specifics to establish that this other employee was in fact not disciplined, and if so, any reason why she was not disciplined. In the pretext context, this type of second-hand, general rumor regarding a single substantially younger employee is insufficient as a matter of law to show pretext. While evidence demonstrating that a single member of a non-protected group received more favorable treatment can be relevant, “[a] decision adversely affecting an older employee does not become a discriminatory decision merely because one younger employee is treated differently.” View "Willis v. Childrens Hosp. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

Officer Grenier was notified by radio of multiple calls reporting shots fired near the intersection of East 23rd and Crosby Streets, a well-known drug trafficking location. The dispatcher reported that there was a white vehicle heading east on East 23rd Street toward Madison Street. The dispatcher did not further describe the vehicle, its passengers, the identity of the callers, or when the shooting reportedly occurred, but Grenier interpreted the dispatcher’s use of priority tone to indicate that the shooting was in progress. Driving on Madison Street in his marked police car, Grenier observed a white vehicle, driven by West, coming from the location of the reported shooting. Grenier stopped the car. West unsuccessfully moved to suppress a firearm found during a subsequent search. The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, finding the stop constitutional. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

Michtavi, a prisoner, had an operation to treat his prostate performed by Dr. Chopra, who is not a Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee. After surgery, Michtavi noticed that the quantity of his ejaculate had reduced. He was diagnosed with retrograde ejaculation. Dr. Chopra advised that Psuedofel be prescribed to close the hole that was opened during the laser surgery, to prevent ejaculate from leaking into the bladder. Michtavi was concerned that without treatment, he might become impotent. The BOP did not provide the medication because “[i]t is the Bureau of Prison’s position that the treatment of a sexual dysfunction is not medically necessary, and . . . medical providers are not to talk to inmates about ejaculation, since it is a prohibited sexual act.” The district court stated that “prisoners retain a fundamental right to preserve their procreative abilities for use following release from custody” and, because Michtavi had alleged that retrograde ejaculation could make him sterile, held that his Eighth Amendment claims should survive summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because a prisoner’s right to treatment of retrograde ejaculation, infertility, or erectile dysfunction is not clearly established. View "Michtavi v. Scism" on Justia Law

Bare Exposure operates “Atlantic City’s Only All Nude Entertainment.” HMS, a private corporation, leases expressway service plazas from the South Jersey Transportation and New Jersey Turnpike Authorities to operate restaurants and convenience stores. The Authorities are not involved in day-to-day operations or management, but only perform long-term maintenance to parking areas, building exteriors, and lobbies. HMS entered into a contract, allowing CTM to install and service brochure display racks in plaza lobbies. HMS “must approve all brochures or publications” before placement. The Authorities were not a party to the CTM contract. HMS discovered a Bare Exposure brochure in a CTM display rack. HMS instructed CTM to remove all Bare Exposure brochures. HMS did not consult with or receive any direction from the Authorities and did not consider the New Jersey Administrative Code. The Authorities never directed HMS to take any actions regarding the brochures. Bare Exposure contends that the Authorities placed government signs and photographs in lobbies and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that HMS violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of HMS. HMS did act not “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State,” absent direct involvement by state authorities either in the decision to remove the brochures or in general plaza operations. View "P.R.B.A. Corp. v. HMS Host Toll Roads, Inc." on Justia Law

The members of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PPUC) and Core Communications, Inc., appealed a District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AT&T Corp. Core billed AT&T for terminating phone calls from AT&T’s customers to Core’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) customers from 2004 to 2009. When AT&T refused to pay, Core filed a complaint with the PPUC, which ruled in Core’s favor. AT&T then filed suit in federal court seeking an injunction on the ground that the PPUC lacked jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic because such traffic is the exclusive province of the Federal Communications Commission. After review of the matter, the Third Circuit found that the FCC’s jurisdiction over local ISP-bound traffic was not exclusive and the PPUC orders did not conflict with federal law. As such, the Court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded this case for entry of judgment in favor of Core and the members of the PPUC. View "AT&T Corp v. Core Communications Inc" on Justia Law

This putative class action was brought by Sandra Babcock, a corrections officer at the Butler County Prison in Butler, Pennsylvania. Babcock claimed that Butler County failed to properly compensate her and those similarly situated for overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). At issue in this appeal was whether a portion of time for the Butler County Prison corrections officers’ meal periods was compensable under the FLSA. The Third Circuit concluded there was no provision of the FLSA that directly addressed this issue. Two tests were suggested by other courts of appeal: one looked to whether the employee had been relieved from all duties during the mealtime; the other (more generally adopted) looked to the party to which the “predominant benefit” of the mealtime belongs. The District Court noted that the Third Circuit had not yet established a test to determine whether a meal period is compensable under the FLSA. After its review of this case, the Court adopted the “predominant benefit test” and affirmed the District Court. View "Babcock v. Butler County" on Justia Law

Appellant Matthew Faush was an employee of a temporary staffing agency. He was assigned to Tuesday Morning, Inc., where he claimed he was subjected to slurs and accusations based on his race. Ultimately he was terminated. Appellant filed suit against Tuesday Morning, claiming violations of Title VII of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Tuesday Morning on the ground that because appellant was not Tuesday Morning’s employee, Tuesday Morning was not liable for employment discrimination. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that a rational jury, applying the factors announced by the Supreme Court in “Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,” could have found on these facts that appellant was Tuesday Morning’s employee for purposes of Title VII and the Human Relations Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc." on Justia Law