Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves James Peperno, Jr., who was found guilty by a jury of nine counts of conspiracy to commit bribery and wire fraud, among other related charges. Peperno devised a scheme to solicit bribes from Walter Stocki, who was involved in zoning litigation with the borough of Old Forge, Pennsylvania. Peperno, along with Robert Semenza, Jr., the Old Forge Borough Council President, planned to influence the litigation in Stocki's favor in exchange for bribes. Peperno initially approached Stocki in January 2019, asking for a $20,000 upfront payment and a monthly retainer. Stocki recorded their conversations and later contacted the FBI, which led to further recorded interactions and payments facilitated by the FBI.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania presided over the case. At trial, Peperno was found guilty on all counts except for two counts of money laundering. The Presentence Report (PSR) recommended sentencing enhancements for multiple bribes and for the total value of the bribes exceeding $15,000. Peperno objected to these enhancements, but the District Court overruled his objections, finding the recommendations supported by the evidence. The court sentenced Peperno to 72 months’ imprisonment, considering his intent and financial motivations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Peperno appealed, arguing that the District Court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on entrapment and in applying the sentencing enhancements. The Third Circuit held that the District Court correctly denied the entrapment instruction, as Peperno failed to show government inducement or lack of predisposition. The court also upheld the sentencing enhancements, agreeing that the evidence supported the finding of multiple bribes and that the total value of the bribes exceeded $15,000. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment of sentence. View "USA v. Peperno" on Justia Law

Meghan Young was denied a mortgage loan due to an erroneous credit report prepared by Experian Information Solutions, Inc. The report falsely indicated that foreclosure proceedings had been initiated against her, despite her having paid off her mortgage in full. Following this, Young enrolled in a credit monitoring service called CreditWorks, which is affiliated with Experian. The terms of use for CreditWorks included an arbitration agreement covering disputes related to the service.Young sued Experian in the District of New Jersey for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Experian moved to compel arbitration based on the CreditWorks agreement. The District Court denied the motion without prejudice, allowing for limited discovery on the issue of arbitrability. The court applied the summary judgment standard from Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., as the arbitration agreement was not apparent from the face of the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court clarified that discovery is not necessary when there is no factual dispute about the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. Since Young did not dispute the existence of the agreement but only its scope, and because the agreement delegated arbitrability issues to the arbitrator, the court held that the District Court should have granted the motion to compel arbitration without discovery. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Young v. Experian Information Solutions Inc" on Justia Law

Two employees of a publicly traded company raised concerns internally that the company had overstated its earnings by not accounting for slower-than-expected drilling speeds. Subsequently, an article in The Wall Street Journal reported similar allegations, and within three months, the company terminated both employees. The employees then filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, claiming their termination violated whistleblower protections under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). An administrative proceeding resulted in a preliminary order for their reinstatement, which the company ignored.The employees sought to enforce the reinstatement order in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, interpreting the relevant statute as not granting it the power to enforce the preliminary order. The employees appealed this decision.While the appeal was pending, the employees chose to abandon the administrative process and filed a separate civil action in federal court. Consequently, the administrative proceedings were terminated. The company then moved to dismiss the appeal on mootness grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the employees' request to enforce the preliminary reinstatement order no longer satisfied the redressability requirement for Article III standing. The preliminary order was extinguished with the dismissal of the administrative proceedings, and a federal court cannot enforce a non-existent order. Therefore, the employees lost Article III standing during the litigation, and no exception to mootness applied. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it on mootness grounds. View "Gulden v. Exxon Mobil Corp" on Justia Law

Ephriam Rodriquez, a bus operator, was terminated by the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) after accumulating excessive negative attendance points under his union’s Collective Bargaining Agreement. His final absence on June 8, 2018, was due to a migraine headache. Following an informal hearing on June 26, where his discharge was recommended, Rodriquez applied for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and sought medical documentation to support his claim. Despite this, SEPTA held a formal hearing and approved his termination.Rodriquez filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging FMLA retaliation and interference. The jury found in favor of Rodriquez on the interference claim, awarding him $20,000 in economic damages, but ruled in favor of SEPTA on the retaliation claim. SEPTA then moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Rodriquez did not have a “serious health condition” under the FMLA at the time of his absence. The District Court granted SEPTA’s motion, leading to Rodriquez’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, holding that Rodriquez failed to demonstrate that his migraines constituted a “chronic serious health condition” as defined by the FMLA. Specifically, Rodriquez did not provide evidence of periodic visits to a healthcare provider for his migraines before his termination, which is a requirement under the FMLA regulations. The court concluded that there was no legally sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Rodriquez had a qualifying serious health condition at the time of his June 8 absence. View "Rodriquez v. SEPTA" on Justia Law

William Valentin, along with four other men, robbed a jewelry store in New Jersey, during which Valentin pointed a loaded gun at a store employee. The robbers stole nearly $900,000 in jewelry and left behind substantial evidence, including video footage, fingerprints, DNA, and cell phone records. A jury convicted Valentin of Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, use of a firearm during a crime of violence, and conspiracy to use a firearm during a crime of violence. The District Court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment within the applicable sentencing guidelines range.The District Court for the District of New Jersey initially tried Valentin and his cousin Jonathan Arce together, but the jury acquitted Arce and failed to reach a verdict for Valentin, resulting in a mistrial. Valentin was retried a year later, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. The District Court sentenced him as a career offender, calculating the applicable sentencing guidelines range as 360 months to life imprisonment. Valentin did not object to the stated basis for the sentence, and the Court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment, 5 years’ supervised release, and $889,844.33 in restitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Valentin raised several challenges to his convictions and sentence, including the admission of certain identification testimony, the exclusion of other similar testimony, the admission of evidence of a prior criminal relationship, and the reasonableness of his sentence. The Court of Appeals found that any potential errors in the District Court’s evidentiary rulings were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Valentin’s guilt. The Court also held that brandishing a firearm during a robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines. Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence. View "USA v. Valentin" on Justia Law

Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. (GOH) engaged in a scheme to underpay its employees by misappropriating fringe benefits owed under the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act (PWA) and the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA). This led to two class-action lawsuits against GOH. GOH sought coverage under its insurance policy with Twin City Fire Insurance Company (Twin City), which denied coverage and sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to provide coverage. GOH and its Board of Directors counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and seeking a declaration that certain claims in the class actions were covered under the policy.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed GOH's counterclaims, concluding that the claims were not covered under the policy due to a policy exclusion for claims related to "Wage and Hour Violations." The court also granted Twin City's motion for judgment on the pleadings, affirming that Twin City had no duty to defend or indemnify GOH for the class-action claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Third Circuit agreed that the claims in question were not covered under the policy because they were related to wage and hour violations, which were explicitly excluded from coverage. The court emphasized that the exclusion applied broadly to any claims "based upon, arising from, or in any way related to" wage and hour violations, and found that the factual allegations in the class actions were indeed related to such violations. Thus, Twin City had no duty to defend or indemnify GOH under the terms of the policy. View "Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Glenn O. Hawbake, Inc." on Justia Law

A criminal defendant, convicted of aggravated manslaughter and sentenced to thirty years in prison, twice instructed his attorney to file a plenary appeal. However, his intake appellate counsel designated the appeal for the expedited sentence-review track (ESOA). The ESOA panel did not transfer the case to the plenary calendar and affirmed the sentence. The defendant's subsequent post-conviction relief applications in state court, which included claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, were unsuccessful.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the defendant's habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which included claims related to the ESOA designation. The court also denied his Rule 60(b) motion, which specifically challenged the intake appellate counsel's decision to place the appeal on the ESOA calendar.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Rule 60(b) motion was not a second or successive habeas application because it was filed within 28 days of the underlying judgment. However, the court found that the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was procedurally defaulted because it was not exhausted in state court and he could not show the requisite prejudice to overcome the default. The court applied the Strickland standard for prejudice, requiring a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel's errors, rather than the Flores-Ortega standard, which applies when the entirety of direct appellate review is rendered unavailable. The court affirmed the denial of the habeas petition and the Rule 60(b) motion. View "Ross v. Administrator East Jersey State Prison" on Justia Law

William Webb, an inmate at James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (JTVCC) in Delaware, sued prison officials for failing to schedule court-ordered visits with his daughter. A Delaware family court had granted Webb visitation rights in October 2020, but since then, only one visit occurred in 2021, lasting fifteen minutes and concluding without incident. Webb filed a grievance through the prison’s internal process, which was returned unprocessed. He then wrote to three prison officials but received inadequate responses. Webb, representing himself, filed a lawsuit alleging that prison officials violated his constitutional right to reunification with his daughter.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed Webb’s complaint under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B). The court held that Webb failed to exhaust JTVCC’s internal grievance process and did not state a valid constitutional claim. The court also determined that allowing Webb to amend his complaint would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed the timeliness of Webb’s appeal, applying the prison mailbox rule to JTVCC’s electronic filing system. The court held that Webb’s notice of appeal was timely filed when he placed it in the designated mailbox on November 22, 2022. On the merits, the court found that Webb’s complaint did not definitively show a failure to exhaust administrative remedies and plausibly alleged a constitutional claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Webb v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Marla Knudsen and William Dutra, representing a class of similarly situated individuals, filed a class action lawsuit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) against MetLife Group, Inc. They alleged that MetLife, as the administrator and fiduciary of the MetLife Options & Choices Plan, misappropriated $65 million in drug rebates from 2016 to 2021. Plaintiffs claimed this misappropriation led to higher out-of-pocket costs for Plan participants, including increased insurance premiums.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the case for lack of standing. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a concrete and individualized injury. It reasoned that the plaintiffs had no legal right to the general pool of Plan assets and had not shown that they did not receive their promised benefits. The court found the plaintiffs' claims that they paid excessive out-of-pocket costs to be speculative and lacking factual support.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to establish an injury-in-fact, as their allegations of increased out-of-pocket costs were speculative and not supported by concrete facts. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not provide specific allegations showing how the misappropriated drug rebates directly caused their increased costs. The court emphasized that financial harm must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical, to satisfy Article III standing requirements. Consequently, the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their ERISA claims. View "Knudsen v. MetLife Group Inc" on Justia Law

Two commercial fishermen, Raymond Lofstad and Gus Lovgren, challenged the constitutionality of the appointment process for members of the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council. The Council, which oversees fisheries from New York to Virginia, had approved an amendment lowering the catch limits for certain fish species, which the Secretary of Commerce subsequently approved. The fishermen argued that the Council members, who were not appointed by the President or confirmed by the Senate, exercised significant authority and thus should be considered "Officers of the United States" under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey ruled against the fishermen, holding that the Council members did not exercise significant authority and were therefore not officers. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, reasoning that the Council's role was merely advisory and did not involve significant authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo and found that the Council members did exercise significant authority, particularly through their power to veto certain actions by the Secretary of Commerce. The court held that these veto powers made the Council members principal officers who should have been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. To remedy the constitutional violation, the court severed the Council's pocket-veto powers, reducing the members to mere employees who do not require such appointments. The court reversed the District Court's summary judgment for the government and rendered judgment for the fishermen. View "Lofstad v. Secretary United States Department of Commerce" on Justia Law