Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied petitions from energy generators and state utility commissions challenging the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) acceptance of a tariff filed by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. The court held that FERC's constructive acceptance of the tariff was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial evidence in the record. The tariff, filed under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), sought to change the Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) used in interstate capacity auctions. The MOPR is designed to prevent the exercise of monopsony power by net buyers in the market. The new tariff would mitigate offers only where a capacity resource has the ability and incentive to exercise buyer-side market power or where a capacity resource receives state subsidies under a state program that is likely preempted by the FPA. The petitioners argued that the tariff was unjust, unreasonable, and discriminatory. They also argued that the FERC failed to adequately address potential reliance interests and unlawfully discriminates against competitive power suppliers. The court rejected these claims and upheld FERC's acceptance of the tariff. View "PJM Power Providers Group v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

In a consolidated action before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, several parties, including PJM Power Providers Group, Electric Power Supply Association, and Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, challenged a tariff filed by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., concerning energy resources subject to price mitigation in interstate capacity auctions. The revised tariff, which took effect by operation of law in 2021, was the outcome of a deadlock between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) commissioners. The court found that the deadlock was to be treated as an affirmative order by the FERC, allowing for judicial review under Section 205(g) of the Federal Power Act (FPA). The court held that it was required to review the FERC order under the same deferential standards set forth in the FPA and the Administrative Procedure Act. The court’s review included the entire record, including the deadlock commissioners' written statements explaining their reasoning. Upon review, the court denied all three petitions, holding that FERC’s acceptance of PJM’s tariff was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Electric Power Supply Associat v. FERC" on Justia Law

In this consolidated action, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed a case concerning the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) acceptance of a tariff filed by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), which took effect by operation of law in 2021. The tariff was at the center of a dispute over whether state-subsidized energy resources should be subject to price mitigation in interstate capacity auctions. Petitioners – the PJM Power Providers Group (P3), the Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA), and the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission and Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (State Entities) – sought review under Section 205(g) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), a provision allowing for review of FERC's action by inaction. The court held that its review of FERC action, whether actual or constructive, proceeds under the same deferential standards set forth in the FPA and Administrative Procedure Act. The court further held that its review properly encompasses the Commissioners’ statements setting forth their reasons for approving or denying the tariff filing. After reviewing the petitions, the court denied all three, finding FERC’s acceptance of PJM’s tariff was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Pennsylvania Public Utility Co v. FERC" on Justia Law

This case involves the bankruptcy of FTX Trading Ltd., a multibillion-dollar cryptocurrency company that suffered a severe financial collapse. The collapse triggered criminal investigations revealing fraud and embezzlement of customers' funds, leading to the conviction of Samuel Bankman-Fried, FTX's primary owner. Following the financial collapse, the United States Trustee requested the appointment of an examiner to investigate FTX's management as per 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(2). The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, interpreting the appointment of an examiner as discretionary under the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The Appellate Court held that the appointment of an examiner under 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(2) is mandatory when requested by the U.S. Trustee or a party in interest, and if the debtor's total fixed, liquidated, unsecured debt exceeds $5 million. The Court based its decision on the plain text of the statute, ruling that the word "shall" in the statute creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion. The Court also held that the phrase "as is appropriate" in Section 1104(c) refers to the nature of the investigation and not the appointment of the examiner. The case was remanded with instructions to order the appointment of an examiner. View "FTX Trading, Ltd. v. Vara" on Justia Law

In a case involving the Second Amendment rights of 18-to-20-year-olds in Pennsylvania, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that these individuals are included in "the people" whose right to bear arms is protected under the Second Amendment. The plaintiffs, including three individuals who were aged 18 to 20 when the case was filed, along with two gun rights organizations, challenged Pennsylvania's statutory scheme that effectively bans 18-to-20-year-olds from carrying firearms outside their homes during a state of emergency. The Court found that the term "the people" in the Second Amendment presumptively encompasses all adult Americans, including 18-to-20-year-olds, and there was no founding-era law that supported disarming this age group. The Court reversed the District Court's decision dismissing the case and denying the plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunctive relief, and remanded the case with instructions to enter an injunction forbidding the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police from arresting law-abiding 18-to-20-year-olds who openly carry firearms during a state of emergency declared by the Commonwealth. View "Lara v. Commissioner PA State Police" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, a US citizen, Abdoulai Bah, had his life savings of $71,613 seized by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) under suspicion of being the proceeds of illegal activities. The CBP returned the money with interest two-and-a-half years later. Bah then sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), seeking damages for personal injury and property damage, arguing that the seizure of his money prevented him from conducting business, caused him to lose his livelihood, and resulted in health problems.The District Court dismissed Bah's case, asserting that the United States was immune from Bah's claims. The court held that the FTCA did not permit Bah's claims as they were seeking prejudgment interest— a type of relief for which the United States has not waived sovereign immunity.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that the Detention Exception of the FTCA, under which Bah's claim was filed, only waives sovereign immunity for "injury or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property while in the possession of any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer," but it does not waive immunity for personal "injury" or "loss" incurred due to the government's seizure of property. As such, the court concluded that Bah's cash was not injured or lost in the sense meant by the FTCA, and his personal injuries were not covered under the Act. Furthermore, the court determined that Bah's claim of "loss" was really a claim for "loss of use" of his cash, which is not covered under the FTCA. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of Bah's case. View "Bah v. USA" on Justia Law

This case involves Bradley Barlow, Frances Biddiscombe, and others who were members of either the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 668 or the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Council 13. They all signed union membership agreements authorizing the deduction of membership dues from their paychecks. The authorizations were irrevocable, regardless of union membership status, unless they provided written notice of revocation within a specified annual window. After resigning from their respective unions, their membership dues continued to be deducted until the next annual revocation window. They sued, claiming that the continued collection of dues after their resignations constitutes compelled speech, violating their First Amendment rights. They relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, which held that public-sector unions charging fees to nonmembers is a form of coerced speech that violates the First Amendment. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of their complaints, holding that Janus was focused on nonmembers who never elected to join a union, not members who voluntarily join a union and later resign. The court also rejected their due process claims for failure to provide procedures for notice and the ability to object to how their dues were spent, as these procedures were based on avoiding subjecting nonconsenting individuals from subsidizing a political agenda, which was not the case for these appellants. The court also rejected the appellants' contract defenses. View "Barlow v. Service Employees International Union" on Justia Law

Larry Trent Roberts spent 13 years in prison for a murder that he did not commit. After being exonerated, he sued several state actors involved in obtaining his wrongful conviction, including Assistant District Attorney John C. Baer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Baer is not entitled to absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because his actions of seeking a new witness to establish a motive for the murder served an investigatory function, not a prosecutorial one. The court noted that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity when they perform investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer. Baer argued that he was immune from liability as his conduct occurred post-charge and was designed to produce inculpatory evidence for trial. However, the court clarified that the timing of a prosecutor's actions as pre- or post-indictment and the presence or absence of a connection to a judicial proceeding are only "relevant considerations" in determining whether a prosecutor’s action served a prosecutorial function. They are not enough to establish that a prosecutor's post-charge effort to fabricate evidence for trial served a quasi-judicial function. The court affirmed the District Court's decision denying Baer's motion to dismiss. View "Roberts v. Lau" on Justia Law

A group of petitioners, including several municipalities, private individuals, and organizations, challenged the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) approval of a new terminal for the Trenton-Mercer Airport. The petitioners alleged that the FAA’s decision violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to fully consider the environmental impact of the new terminal, among other things. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the FAA had adequately considered the environmental impact of the new terminal and had not violated NEPA. The court found that the FAA reasonably concluded that the new terminal would not induce additional air traffic, and therefore, would not result in increased noise or air pollution. The court also found that the FAA had conducted a reasonable environmental justice analysis and did not need to perform a health risk assessment. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners' request to review the FAA's decision. View "Trenton Threatened Skies Inc v. FAA" on Justia Law

The case involved a dispute between Winn-Dixie Stores and the Eastern Mushroom Marketing Cooperative, Inc. (EMMC), its individual mushroom farmer members, and certain downstream distributors. Winn-Dixie accused the defendants of violating antitrust laws by engaging in a price-fixing agreement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the District Court was correct in applying the rule of reason, rather than a "quick-look" review, in assessing the legality of the defendants' pricing policy under the Sherman Act. The court found that the complex and variable nature of the arrangements within the cooperative, involving both horizontal and vertical components, necessitated a careful analysis to determine anticompetitive effects. The court also held that the jury's verdict, which found that the defendants' pricing policy did not harm competition, was not against the weight of the evidence and did not warrant a new trial. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Winn Dixie Stores v. Eastern Mushroom Marketing Cooperative Inc" on Justia Law