Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hamilton Park, a long-term care facility, belonged to a multi-employer bargaining group, Tuchman. Tuchman and the employees' union agreed to a CBA beginning in 2008 and extending through February 28, 2013, giving the union the option to reopen negotiations in November 2011 to bargain for new terms for the CBA’s last year and to submit any unresolved items to binding interest arbitration, and allowing the arbitrator to “determine his jurisdiction” and grant “all appropriate remedies.” In 2011, the union invoked its right to reopen negotiations. The parties agreed to arbitrate unresolved issues, including the cost to maintain the existing health benefits. The arbitrator, Scheinman, suggested a multi-year award to spread increased contributions over a longer period. Scheinman claims that “[b]oth sides [orally] agreed my jurisdiction permitted a multi-year Award, at my discretion.” In 2012, Scheinman issued an award that extended through June 2016, dealing with wages and health benefits contributions, and allowing the union to reopen negotiations for the contract’s last year. Scheinman did not address why he included a second generation interest arbitration provision, nor did he claim that the parties consented. Hamilton Park petitioned to vacate the award, arguing that Scheinman exceeded his authority. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Hamilton Park agreed to expand Scheinman’s jurisdiction to a multi-year award, but did not agree to inclusion of a second generation interest arbitration provision. View "Hamilton Park Health Care Ctr., Ltd.v. 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers E." on Justia Law

Hamilton Park, a long-term care facility, belonged to a multi-employer bargaining group, Tuchman. Tuchman and the employees' union agreed to a CBA beginning in 2008 and extending through February 28, 2013, giving the union the option to reopen negotiations in November 2011 to bargain for new terms for the CBA’s last year and to submit any unresolved items to binding interest arbitration, and allowing the arbitrator to “determine his jurisdiction” and grant “all appropriate remedies.” In 2011, the union invoked its right to reopen negotiations. The parties agreed to arbitrate unresolved issues, including the cost to maintain the existing health benefits. The arbitrator, Scheinman, suggested a multi-year award to spread increased contributions over a longer period. Scheinman claims that “[b]oth sides [orally] agreed my jurisdiction permitted a multi-year Award, at my discretion.” In 2012, Scheinman issued an award that extended through June 2016, dealing with wages and health benefits contributions, and allowing the union to reopen negotiations for the contract’s last year. Scheinman did not address why he included a second generation interest arbitration provision, nor did he claim that the parties consented. Hamilton Park petitioned to vacate the award, arguing that Scheinman exceeded his authority. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Hamilton Park agreed to expand Scheinman’s jurisdiction to a multi-year award, but did not agree to inclusion of a second generation interest arbitration provision. View "Hamilton Park Health Care Ctr., Ltd.v. 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers E." on Justia Law

Orozco-Velasquez, a Guatemalan citizen, arrived in the U.S. in 1998-1999 without being admitted or paroled. In 2008, he was served with a notice to appear (NTA) before an IJ, noting that the date and time of removal proceedings were “to be set.” In 2010, he received another NTA, sent to correct the address. Five days later, April 12, 2010, he was served with a Notice announcing the date and time of removal proceedings. On May 14, 2010, Orozco-Velasquez sought cancellation of removal on the ground that his removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his mother, and moved to terminate removal proceedings, arguing that the 2010 NTA effectively superseded the 2008 NTA, so that he did not receive proper notice until after he had resided in the U.S. for a continuous ten-year period, 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). The IJ ordered him removed. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Third Circuit vacated. In requiring that an “alien [be] served a notice to appear under section 1229(a)” to suspend his accrual of continuous residency, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1) compels government compliance with each of section 1229(a)(1)’s NTA requirements. The government may amend and supplement its initial NTA; but to cut off an alien’s eligibility for cancellation of removal, it must do so within the 10 years of continuous residence. View "Orozco-Velasquez v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

S.B., a minor, was allegedly injured at a daycare center when another child tore a hair braid from her scalp. Her mother, Muwwakkil, filed a negligence complaint against KinderCare in Pennsylvania state court. After removal to federal court, Muwwakkil retained new counsel, who moved for voluntary dismissal without prejudice under FRCP 41, stating the lawsuit was prematurely filed because S.B., a four-year-old, was too young to articulate details about the incident and how it affected her. KinderCare opposed the motion. The court dismissed the case without prejudice, imposing conditions on the right to refile the case: payment of KinderCare's reasonable attorneys’ fees, as determined by the court upon receiving an affidavit of costs and refiling by June 24, 2019, with the possibility of extending that deadline by a showing of good cause. Instead of submitting an objection to KinderCare’s affidavit of costs, and before the district court entered a final order, S.B. and Muwwakkil filed an appeal challenging the imposition of these conditions on their right to refile. The Third Circuit dismissed, stating itsvjurisdiction is limited generally to reviewing the “final decisions” of district courts. 28 U.S.C. 1291. View "S. B. v. Kindercare Learning Ctrs., LLC" on Justia Law

Goldenstein, obtained a $1,000 online loan from a company owned by Chippewa Indians, incorporated under Chippewa tribal law, and authorized to issue loans secured by vehicles at interest rates greater than permitted under Pennsylvania law. Goldenstein pledged his car and was charged 250 percent interest. The company, after deducting a $50 transfer fee and wiring $950 to Goldenstein, withdrew installments of $207.90 from Goldenstein’s bank account in June and July. Goldenstein removed funds from the account because he did not recognize the activity on his bank statements. When the company attempted to collect the August installment, it was rejected for insufficient funds. Repossessors took Goldenstein’s car. Goldenstein was told that his payment would not be accepted, nor his car returned unless he signed releases. Goldenstein paid $2,393 ($2,143 for the loan and $250 in repossession fees), signed the releases, then filed suit, claiming violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692–1692p; Pennsylvania’s Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act and Uniform Commercial Code; and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). The Third Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the RICO and state law claims, but affirmed as to the FDCPA claim. Forfeiture of collateral can amount to “collection of unlawful debt” under RICO, but defendants had a right to possession and did not violate the FDCPA by repossessing the car. View "Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc." on Justia Law

An informant told a Pennsylvania State Trooper that Steiner, a convicted felon, was staying on the informant’s property, was “on the run,” and had a sawed-off shotgun, which Steiner called a “cop killer,” in a camper on the property. The officer obtained a search warrant for the camper, paid the informant $100, and told the informant to drive Steiner to a gas station, where officers would arrest Steiner on a warrant that had issued for Steiner’s failure to appear at a hearing on an unrelated sexual assault charge. Executing the warrant, police seized a sawed-off shotgun, .32 and .38 caliber ammunition, and shotgun ammunition. The informant stated that he had seen missing pieces of the shotgun at a home that Steiner supposedly owned; police obtained another warrant for that home, where they found those parts and various types of ammunition. Steiner was indicted as a felon-in-possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). He was convicted of felony possession of ammunition and sentenced to an 87-month prison term. The Third Circuit affirmed, upholding admission of the evidence related to the sexual assault warrant and the court’s failure to instruct the jury that it was required to reach a unanimous verdict. View "United States v. Steiner" on Justia Law

Mammaro filed a civil rights suit, claiming that the temporary removal of her child from her custody by the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency was a violation of her substantive due process right as a parent. The removal, following a domestic violence incident between Mammaro and her husband, was based on allegations of neglect by Mammaro’s husband and brother-in-law, supplemented by two positive drug tests of Mammaro, and Mammaro’s decision to take the child from supervised housing, The district court held that several individual caseworkers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed, finding there was no clearly established law, so that a reasonable caseworker would have understood that temporarily removing a child in these circumstances would violate substantive due process. View "Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs obtained residential mortgage loans from M&T to finance the purchase of their homes and, because the loans exceeded 80% of the value of the residences, agreed to pay for private mortgage insurance. As is customary, M&T selected the insurers who, in turn, reinsured the insurance policy with M&T Reinsurance, M&T’s captive reinsurer. Beginning in 2011, counsel sent letters to Plaintiffs advising that they were investigating claims concerning M&T’s captive mortgage reinsurance. Plaintiffs agreed to be part of a lawsuit against M&T and filed a putative class action complaint alleging violations of the anti-kickback and anti-fee-splitting provisions of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2607, and unjust enrichment. After discovery, the court granted M&T summary judgment, finding the claims time-barred and that Plaintiffs could not equitably toll the limitations period because none of them had exercised reasonable diligence in investigating any potential claims under RESPA. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the one-year statute of limitations runs “from the date of the occurrence of the violation,” View "Cunningham v. M&T Bank Corp." on Justia Law

Ramara engaged Sentry as a general contractor to perform work at its Philadelphia parking garage. Sentry engaged a subcontractor, Fortress, to install concrete and steel components. As required by its agreement with Sentry, Fortress obtained a general liability insurance policy from Westfield naming Ramara as an additional insured. In April 2012, Axe, a Fortress employee, was injured in an accident. Axe filed a tort action against Ramara and Sentry but did not include Fortress as a defendant as it was immune from actions by its employees if they were entitled to compensation for their injuries under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act. Ramara tendered its defense to Westfield, which declined to defend, claiming that Axe’s complaint did not include allegations imposing that obligation under its policy. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Ramara, and later entered a second order, a quantified judgment against Westfield for Ramara’s counsel fees and costs incurred to date. The Third Circuit first held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to alter its first order with respect to the aspects of that order already on appeal. The court affirmed that Westfield has a duty to defend Ramara in the underlying Axe action. View "Ramara Inc v. Westfield Ins. Co" on Justia Law

Galanter, an MCPc senior solutions architect, was designing and implementing a call center at the company’s Buffalo locations. MCPc’s director of engineering visited regularly and took available employees out to lunch. On February 24, 2011, lunch included Galanter; another solutions architect; and two engineers. They discussed an engineer shortage. Galanter stated that he was working too many hours, urged the director to hire additional engineers, and stated that MCPc could hire several additional engineers with the $400,000 salary MCPc was paying a recently hired executive. CEO Trebilcock was informed of Galanter’s comments and requested an investigation. He was informed that Galanter had obtained global access privileges and could view confidential files normally restricted to human resources personnel. Galanter attributed his knowledge to what he had found on the Internet, to “water cooler” conversation, and to comments by sales representatives. Trebilcock concluded that Galanter was lying and terminated his employment. The NLRB issued a complaint alleging violation of 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), by discharging Galanter for complaining about working conditions, a protected concerted activity. The Third Circuit agreed with the Board that Galanter engaged in protected concerted activity during the February 24th lunch, but vacated and remanded for the Board to consider whether that activity or MCPc’s belief that Galanter engaged in misconduct or dishonesty formed the basis for his discharge. View "MCPc, Inc v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law