Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Teamsters Local 384 filed a representation petition with National Labor Relations Board Regional Director Walsh, seeking to represent workers at Advanced’s facilities. The proposed unit consisted of approximately 120 full-time and regular part-time drivers, helpers, and mechanics. The Union and Advanced entered into a Stipulated Election Agreement. Secret ballot elections were held at Advanced’s facilities, with 60 voters supporting unionization and 58 opposing it. Advanced challenged the outcome. A hearing officer and a three-member NLRB panel overruled all of Advanced’s objections. To preserve its right to appeal, Advanced refused to bargain with the certified bargaining unit. Director Walsh filed a Complaint and a three-member NLRB panel issued a Decision and Order, concluding that Advanced had violated 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) by refusing “to bargain collectively with the representatives of [its] employees.” The Third Circuit affirmed and ordered enforcement, rejecting a claim that, because Walsh was appointed at a time when the Board lacked a valid quorum, his actions were ultra vires. Advanced did not lose the ability to challenge Walsh’s authority by failing to raise this issue during the representation proceeding, nor did the Stipulated Election Agreement constitute an implied accession to his authority. Walsh and the Board properly ratified their previously unauthorized actions. View "Advanced Disposal Servs. E., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

WI buys furniture wholesale. OEC provided WI with non-vessel-operating common carrier transportation services. WI signed an Application for Credit that granted a security interest in WI property in OEC’s possession, custody or control or en route. As required by federal law, OEC also publishes a tariff with the Federal Maritime Commission, which provides for a Carrier’s lien. WI filed voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions. OEC sought relief from the automatic stay, arguing that it was a secured creditor with a possessory maritime lien. OEC documented debts of $458,251 for freight and related charges due on containers in OEC’s possession and $994,705 for freight and related charges on goods for which OEC had previously provided services. The estimated value of WIs’ goods in OEC’s possession was $1,926,363. WI filed an adversary proceeding, seeking release of the goods. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of WI, citing 11 U.S.C. 542. The district court affirmed, holding that OEC did not possess a valid maritime lien on Pre-petition Goods. The Third Circuit reversed, noting the strong presumption that OEC did not waive its maritime liens on the Prepetition Goods, the clear documentation that the parties intended such liens to survive delivery, the familiar principle that a maritime lien may attach to property substituted for the original object of the lien, and the parties’ general freedom to modify or extend existing liens by contract. View "In re: World Imports LTD" on Justia Law

The sole issue at his trial on a charge of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) was whether Lopez possessed a gun. The jury heard from Lopez and from arresting officers Martinez and Ramos, who testified that they found a gun in Lopez’s pocket after encountering him leaving the scene of a reported burglary-in-progress. Lopez’s credibility was crucial to his defense. He admitted that when he was taken to the precinct, he gave officers his brother’s name rather than his own and that he had prior felony convictions. During cross-examination and closing arguments, the prosecution emphasized that Lopez did not say that he had been framed by the police or complain about alleged excessive force until he testified at trial. The Third Circuit vacated Lopez’s conviction, based on the government’s use of his post-Miranda silence to impeach him. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The Textron Lycoming engine, manufactured in 1969, was installed on a Cessna aircraft in 1998. It was overhauled in 2004, with a carburetor in accordance with Lycoming’s type-certificated design. Sikkelee was piloting the aircraft when it crashed shortly after taking off. Sikkelee died. His estate sued, claiming that the aircraft lost power as a result of a malfunction or defect in the carburetor. The court held that Sikkelee’s claims, which were premised on state law standards of care, fell within the preempted “field of air safety.” An amended complaint incorporated federal standards of care by alleging violations of FAA regulations. Before trial, the court concluded that the federal standard of care was established in the type certificate. Reasoning that the FAA issues a type certificate based on its determination of compliance with pertinent regulations, it held that the FAA’s issuance of a type certificate for the engine meant that the federal standard of care had been satisfied as a matter of law. The court granted Lycoming partial summary judgment and certified an immediate appeal. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that federal statutes and FAA regulations reflect that Congress did not intend to categorically preempt aircraft products liability claims. Subject to traditional principles of conflict preemption, including concerning specifications included in a type certificate, aircraft products liability cases may proceed using a state standard of care. View "Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp" on Justia Law

In 2011, former professional football players sued the NFL and Riddell, Inc., claiming that the NFL failed to take reasonable actions to protect them from the chronic risks of head injuries in football, and that Riddell, an equipment manufacturer, should be liable for the defective design of helmets. In 2012, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which, in 2014, approved a class action settlement that covered over 20,000 retired players and released all concussion-related claims against the NFL. There were 202 opt-outs. Objectors argued that class certification was improper and that the settlement was unfair. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating: “This settlement will provide nearly $1 billion in value to the class of retired players. It is a testament to the players, researchers, and advocates who have worked to expose the true human costs of a sport so many love. Though not perfect, it is fair.” View "In re: NFL Players Concussion Injury Litig." on Justia Law

In 2012, Dellavecchia was convicted of first-degree murder, criminal attempt (homicide), three counts of recklessly endangering another person, and weapons-related offenses. At trial, Ridley Township Lieutenant Willoughby testified that Dellavecchia made an incriminating statement immediately following a bedside arraignment conducted while he was hospitalized for a self-inflicted head injury on the day following his arrest for the commission of the offenses. Dellavecchia made his statement without counsel present and without having been given Miranda warnings; he had not waived the right to counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of his petition for habeas relief, concluding that Willoughby did not deliberately elicit Dellavecchia’s statement and consequently did not violate Dellavecchia’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court noted that the evidence, even disregarding Dellavecchia’s statement, overwhelmingly supported his convictions, so that any error when Willoughby recounted the statement at trial would have been harmless. View "Dellavecchia v. Sec'y Penn. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

In 2012, Dellavecchia was convicted of first-degree murder, criminal attempt (homicide), three counts of recklessly endangering another person, and weapons-related offenses. At trial, Ridley Township Lieutenant Willoughby testified that Dellavecchia made an incriminating statement immediately following a bedside arraignment conducted while he was hospitalized for a self-inflicted head injury on the day following his arrest for the commission of the offenses. Dellavecchia made his statement without counsel present and without having been given Miranda warnings; he had not waived the right to counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of his petition for habeas relief, concluding that Willoughby did not deliberately elicit Dellavecchia’s statement and consequently did not violate Dellavecchia’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court noted that the evidence, even disregarding Dellavecchia’s statement, overwhelmingly supported his convictions, so that any error when Willoughby recounted the statement at trial would have been harmless. View "Dellavecchia v. Sec'y Penn. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

An Automated Maritime Telecommunications System (AMTS) is a U.S. communication service between land and vessels in navigable waterways, existing on specific broadcast frequencies. Advances in technology have greatly expanded the potential uses of AMTSs. Under the original site-based system, small geographic regions were defined by location and the waterway served and the FCC provided licenses at no cost to the first applicant. In 2000, the FCC stopped issuing site-based licenses and began issuing licenses by competitive bidding; it divided the U.S. into 10 regions and, at public auctions, sold “geographic” licenses for two blocks of AMTS frequencies in each region. Although geographic licensees may generally place stations anywhere within their region, they may not interfere with the functioning of existing site-based stations, so the location of a site-based station creates a gap in a geographic licensee’s coverage area. Plaintiffs obtained geographic licenses in areas overlaying pre-existing site-based licenses. Site-based operators refused to provide plaintiffs with the operating contours for their site-based locations within plaintiffs’ geographic locations. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violation of the Federal Communications Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the FCA claims and a determination that no antitrust conspiracy existed. Plaintiffs did not identify particular actions that were determined by the FCC to be unreasonable or unjust and, therefore, do not possess a private right of action. View "Havens v. Mobex Network Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Based on the 2000 shooting death of Clement, Mills was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted robbery, and two weapons offenses. The district court for the Virgin Islands and the Third Circuit affirmed his convictions. While the prosecutors engaged in serious misconduct by repeated suggestions that the jurors could not be safe in their homes if Mills was free, repeated references to the possibility that the gun Mills discarded would endanger schoolchildren and the community, and the display throughout closing argument of a gruesome crime-scene photo of the victim’s corpse. this misconduct did not render his trial fundamentally unfair. The courts also rejected arguments that the self-defense jury instructions were improper. Mills’s ineffective assistance claim was rejected because the record was not sufficiently developed. View "Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Mills" on Justia Law

Weitzner, a Brooklyn, New York doctor, filed a putative class action against Sanofi and Vaxserve, alleging that they transmitted more than 10,000 facsimiles to members of the class without the prior express invitation or permission, violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. Before a motion for class certification was filed, defendants made offers of judgment under FRCP 682 to both Weitzner and his professional corporation: $1,500 for each facsimile advertisement sent to Plaintiff “understood to be eleven (11) facsimile transmissions.” Defendants also offered to pay costs and to stop sending any facsimile advertisements in violation of the TCPA. Plaintiffs did not respond to the offers. More than 14 days after defendants made their offers, defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, contending their unaccepted offers mooted the case. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss, stating that plaintiffs had not engaged in “undue delay” in failing to file their motion for class certification and a successful class certification motion would “‘relate . . . back to the filing of the class complaint.’” The Supreme Court’s 2016 decision, Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez, held that an unaccepted offer does not make such a case moot. View "Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc" on Justia Law