Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The employer is a 64-patient-maximum nursing and rehabilitation center in Bound Brook, New Jersey, and employs about 75 nurses in the relevant bargaining unit, A unionization drive began in 2010, when the facility announced that Somerset would be reducing working hours and changing employees’ schedules. The employer claimed that the Department of Health and Senior Services conducted a survey of the facility in December 2009 that resulted in two citations, which “resulted in increased scrutiny on the Somerset nursing department” and led it to begin revamping its operations to improve care. An ALJ later found that explanation to be pretextual. The employer vigorously opposed unionization. Management held meetings, discussing Union activities and how each individual nurse might vote. It also distributed leaflets to employees to dissuade them from voting for the union. After the union was certified, the employer engaged in disciplinary actions that an ALJ found to be retaliatory. The National Labor Relations Board found that the employer had committed several unfair labor practices in violation of 29 U.S.C. 158. The Third Circuit rejected the employer’s appeal and entered an order of enforcement. View "1621 Route 22 West Operating Co., LLC v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Aspiring political parties and their members challenged, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the constitutionality of two provisions of Pennsylvania’s election code: 25 Pa. Stat. 2911(b) and 2937. The provisions, respectively, regulate the number of signatures required to attain a position on the general election ballot and govern the process by which private individuals can sue in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court to challenge the validity of a candidate’s nomination paper or petition. At the summary judgment stage, the district court held that, acting in combination, the two provisions, as applied, violated plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that neither named state official has a sufficient connection to the challenged provisions to be a proper defendant and that the court’s order was “incoherent on its face” The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting the “technical issues” raised by the Commonwealth. Both the Secretary of the Commonwealth and its Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Commissions, Elections, and Legislation had a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the challenged provisions as required under Ex Parte Young. View "Constitution Party of Pa. v. Cortes" on Justia Law

A 2005 Pittsburgh ordinance states that: [n]o person or persons shall knowingly congregate, patrol, picket or demonstrate in a zone extending fifteen (15) feet from any entrance to the hospital and or health care facility," with exceptions for safety personnel and those assisting patients and others. A preamble states: “The exercise of a person’s right to protest or counsel against certain medical procedures is a First Amendment activity that must be balanced against another person’s right to obtain medical counseling and treatment in an unobstructed manner.” Plaintiffs, who engaged in “sidewalk counseling” outside of a Planned Parenthood facility to persuade women to forego abortion services, challenged the ordinance, citing the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in McCullen v. Coakley, which struck down a similar Massachusetts law. The Third Circuit vacated dismissal of the First Amendment claims. Considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, those claims are sufficient to go forward. The speech at issue is core political speech entitled to maximum First Amendment protection; the city cannot burden it without first trying, or at least demonstrating that it has seriously considered, substantially less restrictive alternatives that would achieve its legitimate, substantial, and content-neutral interests. McCullen indicates that the constitutionality of buffer zone laws turns on the factual circumstances giving rise to the law in each case, so dismissal of such challenges is rarely appropriate at the pleading stage. View "Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

After a foreclosure case, Davis filed various claims against an entity that he calls “Wells Fargo U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for the Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust, 2005-11” as the purported holder of Davis’s mortgage. Davis also sued Assurant, believing it to be the provider of insurance on his home. His claims arise from damage that occurred to his house after Wells Fargo locked him out of it, which went unrepaired and worsened into severe structural problems. The district court dismissed Davis’s claims against Wells Fargo, on the grounds that claim preclusion and a statute of limitations barred recovery, and claims against Assurant for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that Davis lacked standing to bring those claims because he sued the wrong corporate entity, namely Assurant, when he should have sued Assurant’s wholly-owned subsidiary, ASIC. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of Wells Fargo, but vacated as to Assurant. Standing is a jurisdictional predicate, but generally focuses on whether the plaintiff is the right party to bring particular claims, not on whether the plaintiff has sued the right party. View "Davis v. Wells Fargo" on Justia Law

Lewisburg Pennsylvania Penitentiary inmate Nerius bit a correctional employee and broke the sprinkler head in his cell, causing a flood. Nerius pled guilty to resisting correctional officers and damaging property, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and 1363. The PSR base offense level was increased to 17 because the section 111(a)(1) charge was deemed a crime of violence that qualified Nerius as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Nerius received a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. With a criminal history category of VI, his Guidelines range was 37-46 months’ imprisonment. Nerius unsuccessfully argued that violation of section 111(a) did not constitute a crime of violence. The court considered Nerius’s long criminal history, acknowledged that Nerius had recently improved his behavior, found “that a sentence at the bottom of the [career offender] guideline range is reasonable, appropriate, and is not greater than necessary to meet sentencing objectives,” and imposed a 37-month sentence. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court found the Armed Career Criminal Act residual clause void for vagueness. At resentencing, the court found “a sentence at the high end of the [non-career offender] guideline range to be reasonable,” and sentenced Nerius to 36 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. The revised sentence did not trigger the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness; the new sentence was lower than the original. View "United States v. Nerius" on Justia Law

Section 202(h) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. 56, requires the Federal Communications Commission to periodically examine its broadcast ownership rules to limit consolidation in the industry. After the Third Circuit reviewed the Commission’s 2002 and 2006 reviews of its ownership rules, “the process broke down.” The 2010 and 2014 reviews are not complete. In 2016, the Third Circuit held that the Commission has unreasonably delayed action on its definition of an “eligible entity,” a term it has attempted to use as a lynchpin for initiatives to promote minority and female broadcast ownership, and ordered mediation. The court speculated that it might be necessary to invalidate FCC rules in the future if the Commission does not act quickly to carry out its legislative mandate. The court vacated a rule based on Commission’s 2014 determination that parties were evading its limits on the number of television stations that an entity can own through the influence exerted by advertising contracts known as joint sales agreements. The rule was procedurally invalid because it was adopted even though the Quadrennial Review cycle was severely backlogged. View "Howard Stirk Holdings LLC v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n" on Justia Law

Whiteside represented the County of Camden in a lawsuit brought by Anderson, which resulted in a jury award paid, in part, by the County’s excess insurer, National. According to National, the County did not notify it of the lawsuit until several months after it was filed. Whiteside initially informed National that the case was meritless and valued it at $50,000. During trial, Whiteside changed her valuation and requested the full $10 million policy limit to settle Anderson’s claims. National conducted an independent review and denied that request. The jury awarded Anderson $31 million, which was remitted to $19 million. Days later, National sought a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to provide coverage because the County had breached the policy contract by failing to timely notify National of the case and by failing to mount an adequate investigation and defense. National also asserted claims against Whiteside for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. The court dismissed those claims because National could not demonstrate that Whiteside’s actions proximately caused it to suffer any damages. The Third Circuit dismissed and appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding National’s notice of appeal untimely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1), View "State Nat'l Ins. Co v. County of Camden" on Justia Law

The drivers worked transporting water to hydraulic fracking sites within Pennsylvania. The lead plaintiff asserts that he and his coworkers often worked more than 40 hours in a week, but were paid overtime only for work performed above 45 hours per week, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a) and Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (PMWA), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 333.104(c). Before trial, the court ordered briefing on whether the employers (trucking companies) were subject to the Motor Carrier Act exemption to the FLSA’s overtime requirements, applicable to certain interstate employment activity that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation. The employers stipulated to a judgment requiring them to pay overtime. The Third Circuit affirmed. While the movement of the fracking wastewater out of state could theoretically be one involving a practical continuity of movement in interstate commerce, depending on the intent of the shipper at the time shipment commenced, the role the drivers played, whether the water is altered during the fracking process, and the steps for water removal and outgoing transportation, the employers produced no evidence concerning these matters and did not meet their burden to “plainly and unmistakably” show that the MCA exemption applies. View "Mazzarella v. Fast Rig Support LLC" on Justia Law

MCA owns 85 acres in Maidencreek Township and hopes to develop into a 600,000 square-foot shopping center. The Township Board of Supervisors has taken the public position that the shopping center is “vital” to the economic well-being of Township residents. MCA and the Board claim that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation’s plan to improve an adjacent highway, State Route 222, will impede the project. The highway improvement will be undertaken by PADOT on behalf of the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration, and fully funded by the federal government. MCA claims that the Project should not proceed because planned traffic circles would not be able to handle all of the traffic expected to be generated by its shopping center. The Project was approved in 2014. PADOT determined, under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321, that the Project qualified a Categorical Exclusion from preparing an Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment. MCA and the Board alleged that the Categorical Exclusion approval was based on inaccurate information supplied by PADOT that had not been adequately studied or investigated, and that the findings and conclusions contained therein were arbitrary and capricious. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding the allegations insufficient to establish violation of NEPA. View "Maiden Creek Assocs. LP v. Pa. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

The National Firearms Act requires ATF permission for manufacture of a firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5822. Separately, the Gun Control Act, prohibits private manufacture of machineguns, with exceptions for government entities and machineguns lawfully possessed before 1986, 18 U.S.C. 922(o). Watson, as sole trustee of the Watson Family Gun Trust, applied to permit an M-16-style machinegun. An ATF examiner mistakenly approved the application. Watson had a machinegun manufactured. Weeks later, ATF informed Watson that the approval was mistaken. Watson argued that the trust was not a “person” under the Act. ATF explained that although a trust is not a “person” under the Act, a trust cannot legally make or hold property, so it considers the individual acting on behalf of the trust. Watson surrendered his gun under protest, then filed suit, claiming that the provisions are a de facto ban on an entire class of arms in violation of the Commerce Clause and the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments; due process violations; equal protection violations; and detrimental reliance. The government initiated a forfeiture action. The district court held that Watson had standing, but failed to state a claim. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machineguns; a trust is not exempt from Section 922(o) because a trust is not an entity distinct from its trustees and cannot own property. View "United States v. One Palmetto State Armory PA 15 Machinegun" on Justia Law