Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On October 9, 2009, Lieutenant Fink escorted Robinson to his cell. Removing his handcuffs, Fink allegedly twisted Robinson’s arm “real hard” and said, “since today is my last day, I wanted to leave you with a present.” Robinson submitted a sick call request the next day. He was prescribed medication but continued to experience pain. Under the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Inmate Abuse Allegation Monitoring Policy, an inmate could report abuse verbally or in writing to any staff member; file a grievance under the DOC Grievance Policy; or report in writing to the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). Once an inmate reported abuse, all subsequent procedures were to be conducted at the initiative of the prison administration; the staff member “shall complete” a report to a supervisor and the facility’s Security Office, which “shall” investigate and report to OPR. Robinson submitted Form DC-135A, describing the incident and asking the Unit Manager to investigate. He also filed a Sick Call Request, again describing the incident. Other than confirming that Robinson received an assessment and medication, no staff member followed up on Robinson’s reports. The Third Circuit vacated a finding of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and summary judgment in favor of Fink. The Prison Litigation Reform Act was satisfied by Robinson’s attempts to avail himself of the prison’s administrative processes and the prison’s noncompliance with its own deadline. View "Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI" on Justia Law

Calabretta pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 841(b)(1)(B); 846, and conspiracy to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking activity, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i); 1956(h). Calabretta was subject to a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. The PSR considered multiple prior state convictions, including a 1990 conviction for “Death by Auto” and a 1994 conviction for “Eluding in the Second Degree,” found those two convictions to constitute “crimes of violence” under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2, and designated Calabretta as a “career offender,” increasing Calabretta’s Criminal History Category and his Total Offense Level. With the career offender Guideline, Calabretta’s recommended sentencing range was 188-235 months of imprisonment; without it, his recommended range would have been 108-135 months. The court adopted the PSR’s recommendations, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and imposed a sentence of 120 months. The Third Circuit vacated. In light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, the district court plainly erred in considering the state conviction for eluding to be a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines. The court noted the need to exercise discretion to correct the error because it increased the sentence without the necessary fact finding and affected the integrity of the proceedings. View "United States v. Calabretta" on Justia Law

Napolitan was arrested in 2007 after police discovered nearly a kilogram of cocaine, drug trafficking paraphernalia, and firearms in his Farrell, Pennsylvania home. In 2008, based on facts uncovered as part of the drug bust, Napolitan was convicted of sexual assault and simple assault and was sentenced under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9712, which increased the mandatory minimum sentence for a “crime of violence” when the judge determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the perpetrator possessed a firearm that was used to frighten the victim. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has since ruled that the statute is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s 2013 holding (Alleyne) that whenever the existence of a fact increases a statutory minimum sentence as a matter of law, that fact is an “element” of the underlying crime that must be proven to the fact-finder beyond a reasonable doubt, In 2011, based on the 2007 drug bust, Napolitan was charged possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(B)(ii), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). On remand, the court applied a sentencing enhancement and imposed a 90-month sentence for the drug conviction, consecutive to Napolitan’s state sentence because the state and federal crimes were distinct. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that a defendant may not challenge the reasonableness of his federal sentence on appeal via a collateral attack on a prior state sentence. View "United States v. Napolitan" on Justia Law

Richardson was placed in Lewisburg Penitentiary's Special Management Unit (SMU) program, intended for inmates with histories of violence and individuals who “participated in or had leadership roles in geographical groups/gang related activity." In a purported class action, seeking damages and injunctive relief for “[a]ll persons who are currently or will be imprisoned in the SMU program at USP Lewisburg,” Richardson alleged that through a “pattern, practice or policy,” officials at USP Lewisburg frequently placed inmates with hostile cellmates, unnecessarily increasing the risk of violence and that if an inmate refused to accept a hostile cellmate, he would be placed in painful restraints. Richardson claims that he was subjected to this policy. The district court found Richardson’s class definition “untenable because it [wa]s not objectively, reasonably ascertainable.” Meanwhile, Richardson was transferred out of USP Lewisburg. The Third Circuit remanded, holding that Richardson’s class claims are not moot. When individual claims for relief are acutely susceptible to mootness, a would-be class representative may, in some circumstances, continue to seek certification after losing his personal stake in the case. Richardson may continue to seek class certification based on the Third Circuit’s intervening 2015 holding, in Shelton v. Bledsoe, that ascertainability is not required for Rule 23(b)(2) classes. View "Richardson v. Dir., Fed. Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

In 1984, during the crackdown on the Solidarity movement in Poland, Koszelnik traveled to the U.S. on a nonimmigrant tourist visa, then applied for political asylum. He was assigned an “A-number.” Koszelnik’s asylum application was denied and deportation proceedings were initiated. An IJ denied his application for relief from deportation and granted him voluntary departure. Koszelnik remained in the U.S. The voluntary departure order became a final deportation order. After residing in the U.S. for approximately 10 years, Koszelnik applied for a diversity visa through the lottery program. Koszelnik failed to include his A-number on his application and incorrectly answered questions about deportation proceedings. Unaware of the prior deportation proceedings, the INS issued Koszelnik a new A-number and, in 1995, granted him permanent resident status. Under 8 U.S.C. 1256(a), despite the error, the statute of limitations for re-examining that status adjustment lapsed after five years, in 2000.. In 2012, Koszelnik applied for naturalization, again failing to provide his original A-number and incorrectly answering questions about removal. The government discovered its earlier error and denied his application, finding that failure to disclose his prior removal order and his original A-number meant that he had failed to demonstrate that he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence under 8 U.S.C. 1429 and that he was ineligible for naturalization. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government: Koszelnik failed to meet his burden of showing that he was lawfully admitted and was therefore not eligible for naturalization. View "Koszelnik v. Sec'y, Dept. of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Saliba obtained U.S. Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in 1992 by providing falsified documents indicating that he was a citizen of Lebanon. Saliba was a citizen of Syria, a country whose citizens at that time were not eligible for TPS. In 2001, Saliba was able to adjust his status to that of a legal permanent resident, although his fraudulent procurement of TPS should have rendered him statutorily “inadmissible” under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). When Saliba applied for naturalization in 2006, USCIS discovered the fraud and denied his application for naturalization, stating that Saliba’s apparent fraud precluded a finding that he had been “lawfully admitted” as a permanent resident as required for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1427(a). The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting Saliba's argument that his decision to submit falsified Lebanese documents was involuntary and made under duress, due to his fear of the war-time conditions plaguing the Middle East at the time . Saliba’s fraudulent procurement of TPS in 1992 made him inadmissible for Legal Permanent Resident status, and, because he had not been “lawfully admitted” for permanent residence, he cannot be naturalized. View "Saliba v. Att'y Gen. of United States" on Justia Law

Masha was adopted from Russia by Mancuso when she was five years old. During the following five years, Mancuso sexually abused Masha and documented the abuse in photographs and videos, which he distributed online in exchange for media documenting the sexual abuse of other children. Mancuso pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); the government dropped a charge of possession of material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). Mancuso stipulated that the dismissed count could be considered in imposing sentence and agreed to pay “mandatory restitution” under the Victim-Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663, 3663A and 3664, of $200,000 into a trust for Masha’s benefit. In 2013, 10 years after Mancuso’s conviction, Masha filed suit under 18 U.S.C. 2255 (called Masha’s law) against a purported class of defendants, including Mancuso. The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of the case. A restitution award for a criminal offense does not bar a later-filed civil claim under section 2255 based on that same offense. The interests of Masha and the government were not squarely aligned in the criminal proceeding; she had a limited ability to participate in the determination of her restitution and no right to appeal, so application of collateral estoppel would be inequitable and would offend the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” View "Doe v. Hesketh" on Justia Law

EMTs found three-year-old Jordan not breathing and without a pulse; there were bruises all over Jordan’s body, particularly severe across his ribs. Jordan’s mother, Candice, blamed the bruising on prior falls and horseplay with Jordan’s four-year-old brother, Kamden. A pathologist concluded that the bruises were too severe to have been caused by a four-year-old; he found gray material and bruising, consistent with being bound with duct tape. Candice lived with her three children and Candice’s mother, Lois. Candice was charged with first- and third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of a child. Lois pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of children, regarding the condition of her home. Before trial, Candice told cellmates different stories about what happened to Jordan. Kamden stated to several people, and in a videotaped interview, that “mommy hit [Jordan] and pushed him . . . he fell down and died.” A judge determined that Kamden was competent to testify. For two years, Lois maintained that she did not cause Jordan’s death. Shortly before trial, Lois admitted to an investigator that she had abused Jordan by repeatedly hitting his ribs with a pipe, throwing him against the wall, and restraining him with duct tape. Lois refused to repeat her confession to the prosecutor or to testify at Candice’s trial. The court refused to admit the hearsay confession. There was testimony that Kamden sometimes referred to Lois as “mommy” and that both women abused Jordan. A jury convicted Candice of third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of a child; she was sentenced to 18-40 years imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of violation of Candice’s due process right to present her defense. “Lois’ statements had no indicia of credibility. Lois ... was attempting to have her cake and eat it too.” View "Staruh v. Superintendent, Cambridge Springs SCI" on Justia Law

In 2008 and 2011 Gibson and Thompson separately pled guilty to drug offenses. In each case, the court departed downwards from the Career Offender Guidelines range and sentenced Gibson to 162 months and Thompson to 151 months of imprisonment. The Statement of Reasons indicated that Thompson’s sentence was imposed pursuant to the plea agreement. In 2014, Guidelines Amendment 782 retroactively reduced by two levels the base offense levels assigned to many drug quantities in the Drug Guidelines, including the drug quantities associated with their offenses. They filed unsuccessful motions (18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)) for sentence reduction. The section permits a court to exercise its discretion to reduce a sentence only if: the sentence is “based on” a Guidelines range that has subsequently been lowered and a sentence reduction would be consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. The Third Circuit affirmed the denials. Guidelines Amendment 759 provides that a court may not reduce a sentence under section 3582(c)(2) unless a Guidelines amendment has the “effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” In these cases, pre-departure, pre-variance “applicable guideline ranges” were calculated using the base offense levels for career offenders in Guidelines 4B1.1, which have not been lowered. Amendment 759, although enacted after they were sentenced, is not an ex post facto law. View "United States v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Williams captioned his case as a state habeas action against a prison warden. He alleged claims about the conditions of his confinement, specifically Eighth Amendment claims about the lack of medical care. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action, noting that his claims did not challenge to the fact or duration of his imprisonment, which is the essential purpose of the writ of habeas corpus. Williams’s claims would properly be brought in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, not a habeas petition. When the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff's favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, a civil rights action is appropriate. The court noted that Williams already has a civil rights action pending relating to the same or similar claims and deliberately filed a different type of action. View "Williams v. Warden, Lackawanna County Prison" on Justia Law