Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2002, at a New Jersey wedding reception, Nguyen shot another guest eight times, killing him. Nguyen shot at another guest, but missed. The bullet lodged in the wall. Several eye witnesses, each of whom knew Nguyen, identified him to the police as the shooter and stated that Nguyen fled the scene in a 1996 Honda with Alabama license plates. They provided Nguyen’s Brooklyn address. When officers arrived at his residence, Nguyen barricaded himself inside with his two-year-old son, and stated that he would shoot his son and the officers if they attempted to enter. After a four-hour standoff, Nguyen was taken into custody. Nguyen pleaded guilty to New York indictments and was sentenced to five-to-15 years. A gun found hidden in Nguyen’s car was confirmed to be the weapon used in the wedding shootings. A New Jersey grand jury indicted him for the shootings. After extensive motion practice and three years pursuing an insanity defense, he pleaded guilty, in 2009, to aggravated manslaughter and attempted murder. Nguyen was sentenced to 20 years, to run concurrently with his New York sentence from the date of his New Jersey guilty pleas. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of his habeas petition, in which Nguyen argued ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation and concerning the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of his post-arrest statements. Counsel had, in fact, raised the speedy trial issue. View "Nguyen v. Att'y Gen. of NJ" on Justia Law

At the request of the Lackawanna County Drug Task Force, federal agents assisted in the search for an elusive heroin dealer. Using confidential sources, physical surveillance, undercover purchases, body wires, and a pole camera, the agents concluded that a hip-hop radio station and recording studio, Hood Promo, was the Scranton hub of a heroin ring. Agents identified Stevenson as a member of the distribution ring. Agents obtained a warrant to search five properties, including Stevenson’s residence, where they found hundreds of glassine baggies of heroin, a loaded handgun (found in Stevenson’s room and later confirmed to be stolen), fraudulent driver’s licenses and credit cards, and other inculpatory items and documents. Eight individuals were arrested in connection with the conspiracy. Only Stevenson did not plead guilty. The prosecution conceded that Stevenson’s Speedy Trial Act rights were violated. The district court dismissed the indictment without prejudice. After trial on a third superseding indictment, Stevenson was convicted and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in dismissing the first indictment without prejudice, in denying Stevenson’s motion to dismiss the false identification count, in denying his suppression motions, in making a statement obviously geared toward pacifying an emotional witness at trial, or in sentencing Stevenson. View "United States v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board certified a collective-bargaining unit comprised of FedEx Freight drivers at FedEx’s South Brunswick Terminal in Monmouth Junction, New Jersey. To test the appropriateness of the unit, FedEx refused to bargain with its certified bargaining representative, contending the terminal’s dockworkers must also be included in the unit. The Regional Director issued an unfair labor practices order. The NLRB granted summary judgment in favor of the union. The Third Circuit granted a petition for enforcement of the NLRB order to bargain, rejecting FedEx’s argument that the NLRB applied a unit-determination standard that violated its own precedent, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Board’s interpretation of the legal standard to apply in unit-determination cases was reasonable and the Board properly applied “the overwhelming-community-of-interest test” in this case. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Fedex Freight Inc" on Justia Law

In 1956, the New Kensington Eagles donated to Valley High School a six-foot granite monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments, an eagle, an American flag, the Star of David, the Chi-Rho symbol, a Masonic eye, and Hebrew and Phoenician lettering. It is near the gymnasium entrance, which is accessible from the student parking area. In 2012, FFRF, an organization dedicated to promoting separation of church and state, unsuccessfully requested the monument's removal. Schaub saw a story on television and contacted FFRF. Schaub had visited Valley and seen the monument while taking her daughter to a karate event, picking the girl up from the swimming pool, and dropping off her sister, whose child attends Valley. Schaub’s daughter was to attend Valley beginning in August 2014. Schaub views the monument as “commanding” students and visitors to worship “thy God,” brands her as “an outsider because [she] do[es] not follow the particular religion or god that the monument endorses,” and makes her “stomach turn.” She wishes to raise her daughter without religion. While a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was pending, Schaub’s daughter began attending a different high school. The district court granted the District summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed. Schaub has standing to seek nominal damages and injunctive relief, and her request for injunctive relief was not moot. With respect to FFRF’s claims, the court remanded for consideration of whether Schaub was an FFRF member when the complaint was filed. View "Freedom From Religion Found. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Transco, which operates the 10,000-mile Transcontinental pipeline, extending from South Texas to New York City, sought federal approval to expand a portion of the pipeline, called the Leidy Line, which connects gas wells in Central Pennsylvania with the main pipeline. Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, the Pennsylvania and New Jersey Departments of Environmental Protection (PADEP; NJDEP) reviewed the proposal for potential water quality impacts and issued permits. Environmental groups challenged the approvals. The Third Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the petitions and that NJDEP and PADEP did not act arbitrarily in issuing the permits. To bar review of PADEP’s actions in permitting an interstate natural gas facility pursuant to the Natural Gas Act and the Clean Water Act would frustrate the purpose of Congress’s grant of jurisdiction and render superfluous the explicit exception from federal judicial review of the Coastal Zone Management Act. The court also rejected NJDEP’s arguments that the court had no jurisdiction over the Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permits or the Water Quality Certifications, and even if it had jurisdiction over those authorizations, it could not reach issues regarding aspects of Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permits that concern transition areas and threatened and endangered species, Letters of Interpretation, or Flood Hazard Area Individual Permits. View "Dela. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Rengifo pled guilty to heroin offenses, which carried a Guidelines sentencing range, adjusted for acceptance of responsibility, of 15-21 months. Because Rengifo had two controlled substance convictions, the government sought application of the career offender provisions, to increase Rengifo’s sentencing range to 151-188 months. Because Rengifo’s 1999 conviction was more than 10 and fewer than 15 years old, it would count as a prior felony conviction if its sentence of imprisonment exceeded one year and one month. The Pennsylvania court had initially sentenced Rengifo to “time served to 12 months.” Rengifo served 71 days and was paroled. His parole was revoked; he was sentenced to the remaining 294 days. He served another 120 days, was paroled, and again his parole was revoked. He was sentenced to the remaining 174 days. The revocations triggered Guidelines section 4A1.2(k): “[i]n the case of a prior revocation of probation ... add the original term of imprisonment to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation.” The phrase “term of imprisonment,” is not defined . Rengifo argued that his term of imprisonment for the 1999 conviction was 365 days: 71 days served prior to parole and 294 days served after his revocations. The government argued that it was 659 days: the initial 365-day maximum sentence plus the 294 days sentenced for the parole violations. The district court agreed with the government, granted a downward variance, and sentenced Rengifo to 120 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, interpreting “term of imprisonment” as synonymous with “sentence of imprisonment.” View "United States v. Rengifo" on Justia Law

In 2009, Javier, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. In 2014 Javier was convicted, in Pennsylvania, for carrying a firearm in public and for making terroristic threats. An IJ concluded that Javier was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) as an alien convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude” based on his conviction for terroristic threats and also removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C) as an alien convicted of a “firearm offense.” The BIA affirmed, based solely on Javier’s terroristic threats conviction, stating that the offense defined by 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2706(a)(1) involves “an intentional action whose goal is to inflict [] psychological distress [that follows an invasion of the victim’s sense of personal security which] violates the norms of society to such a degree as to constitute moral turpitude.” The BIA concluded that it “need not address” the firearms conviction. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal. A threat communicated with a specific intent to terrorize is an act “accompanied by a vicious motive or a corrupt mind” so as to be categorically morally turpitudinous. View "Javier v. Attorney Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Sunday, a citizen of Nigeria, was admitted to the U.S. in 1995 with permission to remain for a year. He overstayed and, in 2013, was charged as removable for overstaying and for committing certain crimes. An IJ held Sunday was removable based on his overstaying and on a bail jumping conviction. To avoid removal, Sunday applied for a U visa and petitioned USCIS for a waiver of inadmissibility, which was denied based on his criminal record. Sunday then applied for a waiver of inadmissibility from an IJ, under the Department of Justice, who determined that she lacked jurisdiction to consider Sunday’s request. The BIA affirmed, concluding that waivers regarding U visas are exclusively within the authority of USCIS, under the Department of Homeland Security, and cannot be granted by an IJ, and declining to consider a claim that removal constituted unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review, noting that the Supreme Court has consistently held that removal is not punishment. View "Sunday v. Attorney Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), 114 Stat. 202, requires the government, if it seizes property that someone else purports to own, to file a complaint for judicial forfeiture within 90 days or return the property, 18 U.S.C. 983(a)(3)(A). The government has a heightened burden of proof. The Langbords purportedly found, in their father’s safe deposit box, 10 double eagle $20 gold coins, minted in 1933, allegedly “the most valuable ounce of gold in the world.” President Roosevelt issued an executive order in 1933 removing gold coins from circulation. In 2004, the Langbords made the coins available to the government for authentication. When the Langbords requested their return, the Mint responded: “they already are, and always have been, property belonging to the United States; this makes forfeiture proceedings entirely unnecessary.” Langbords submitted a “seized asset claim,” demanding return of the coins or institution of civil forfeiture. The Mint refused to take action. The Langbords filed suit. The Third Circuit intially found that the Langbords were entitled to the coins, but, on rehearing, en banc, held that they were always the property of the government. The evidence demonstrated overwhelmingly that no 1933 Double Eagle ever left the Mint through authorized channels. The district court did not err when it ordered the government to pursue judicial forfeiture; certain errors were committed at trial, but did not affect the outcome. View "Langbord v. United States Dep't of the Treasury" on Justia Law

In 2009 the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) suspected that Dr. Melgen, a Florida-based ophthalmologist​, had overbilled Medicare for $8.9 million by engaging in “multi-dosing.” Before CMS began formal proceedings, U.S. Senator Menendez (New Jersey) began to advocate on behalf of the doctor. In 2015, a 22-count indictment charged that Menendez solicited and accepted numerous gifts from Melgen; used the power of his office to influence the CMS enforcement action and to encourage the State Department and U.S. Customs to intervene on Melgen’s behalf in a multimillion dollar contract dispute with the Dominican Republic. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of motions to dismiss the Indictment, finding that the senator is not protected from prosecution under the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, section 6, cl. 1, which states that Members of Congress “shall not be questioned in any other Place” for “any Speech or Debate in either House.” The charged actions were not protected "legislative acts." The court rejected a separation of powers challenge to the Ethics in Government Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 4, 101-11; 18 U.S.C. 1001, and noted the Supreme Court’s statement “that Members [of Congress] are not to be ‘super-citizens’ immune from criminal liability or process.” View "United States v. Menendez" on Justia Law