Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pleasant Valley High School wrestling coach Getz allegedly assaulted team member C.M. and discriminated against C.M.’s sister, A.M. based on her gender. Plaintiffs alleged that during practice, C.M. was forced to wrestle a larger student, who threw him through the doors into the hallway and punched him. After Getz prodded C.M. to keep wrestling, an altercation ensued, in which Getz lifted C.M. up and “smash[ed] his head and back into the wall.” C.M., A.M., and their mother sued. The School Defendants asserted that discovery showed that Plaintiffs made numerous false statements in the complaint and amended complaint, and their claims lacked merit and that Plaintiffs’ Rule 56.1 statement contained false statements. The district court denied Defendants’ Rule 11 motions as “meritless,” noting that these Rule 11 motions tax judicial resources and emphasizing that the truth of the allegations in a case of this sort is revealed through discovery and addressed at summary judgment or trial, not via motions for sanctions. On interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. The district court appropriately exercised its wide discretion in concluding the motions lacked merit, and were counterproductive as they relied upon factual discrepancies that did not show the claims were patently frivolous. View "Moeck v. Pleasant Valley School District" on Justia Law

Rivas, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was admitted to the U.S. as a legal permanent resident when he was two years old. In 2013, he was convicted of the purchase of PCP, and sentenced to 18 months’ probation. DHS initiated removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for being convicted of two state law violations relating to a controlled substance. Rivas petitioned under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), arguing that his attorney failed to advise him of the possible immigration consequences of conviction and advised him not to appeal. Rivas’s counsel testified that he advised Rivas of the immigration consequences and that he “probably would have advised” an appeal was “not a winnable case.” The court denied the PCRA petition, vacated the guilty verdicts and placed Rivas on three years' probation under a deferred adjudication agreement. Rivas was required to “stipulate to all of the Commonwealth’s evidence.” The Commonwealth agreed to withdraw the charges if Rivas successfully completed his pretrial probation. Rivas unsuccessfully moved to terminate his removal proceedings. The IJ stated that “probably the only reason for the conviction vacatur” was to “avoid the [i]mmigration consequences.” The BIA agreed, adding that the order still was a “conviction” because Rivas stipulated to the evidence and had his liberty restrained. The Third Circuit granted his petition for review, stating that the Notice of Removal did not specify participation in a deferred adjudication program as a basis for removal. View "Rodriguez v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Two masked gunmen fired shots outside Tuono's Atlantic City home. Tuono and his girlfriend, Tiffany (Galati’s daughter) were present. Tiffany was unharmed. Tuono was struck in his hand, pelvis, and lower back. The gunmen were quickly apprehended and claimed they had been hired by Galati to kill Tuono. They testified at trial that Galati provided information as to where Tuono could be found and promised to pay if he were killed; that Galati telephoned Johnson on the day of the planned murder to tell him that Tuono was in Atlantic City; and that the gunmen drove from Philadelphia to Atlantic City. Galati was convicted of soliciting murder for hire resulting in personal injury, 18 U.S.C. 1958; causing a firearm to be discharged in the commission of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the same, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 924(c); and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 924(o) and 1958. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that using interstate commerce facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire (18 U.S.C. 1958), is not a “crime of violence.” The court examined all of Galati’s contemporaneous convictions in determining that he aided and abetted the discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence. View "United States v. Galati" on Justia Law

Robinson robbed a Subway restaurant with a gun. Later that day, he robbed Anna’s Linens store, using a handgun. Both robberies were recorded by video cameras. The next day, the Subway cashier recognized Robinson on the street and notified police. Robinson was arrested. Suspecting that Robinson might have committed the Anna’s robbery, a Philadelphia detective prepared a photo array. The Anna’s cashier identified Robinson. Charged with two counts of robbery by means of actual and threatened force, violence and fear of injury, by brandishing a handgun (18 U.S.C. 1951(a), Hobbs Act), and two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), Robinson sought to proceed pro se. During a hearing, Robinson changed his mind. Later, following his unsuccessful motion to suppress the photo identification, Robinson orally requested to proceed pro se. The court directed him to file a motion. No motion was filed. Robinson was sentenced as a career offender based on a 1990 Pennsylvania robbery conviction and a 2009 Maryland carjacking conviction. The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction, finding that the Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the “elements clause” of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A) because the two offenses, robbery and brandishing a gun, were tried together and the jury reached a guilty verdict on both. The court upheld the identification and failure to conduct a hearing on Robinson’s motion to proceed pro se, but remanded for determination of whether Robinson was properly sentenced as a career offender. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

After the Polskys attempted to claim the child tax credit for the 2010 and 2011 tax years, the IRS issued a notice disallowing the credit because their daughter was older than 17. They submitted amended returns, specifically requesting that the IRS review whether their permanently disabled daughter qualified for the tax credit. According to the Polskys, the IRS refused to rule on the amended returns because they were substantially the same as the original returns. The Tax Court dismissed their petition because the IRS had not issued a notice of deficiency. In 2014, the Polskys, pro se, filed in the district court, alleging that the IRS erroneously disallowed the credit and violated their due process rights by preventing them from challenging the disallowance in Tax Court. The district court dismissed, holding that the credit is unavailable when the child has attained age 17 and that the Polskys failed to state a due process claim. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that that the tax credit’s definition of “qualifying child,” 26 U.S.C. 24, which has an age cap, incorporates section 152(c), which has no age cap for a person who is permanently disabled and that the second definition of “qualifying child” overrides the age cap in the tax credit. View "Polsky v. United States" on Justia Law

From 2009-2012, the federal government appropriated $150 million annually to the government of the Virgin Islands; Willis was Executive Director of the Legislature for the Virgin Islands, with authority to administer contracts. During Willis’s tenure, the legislature’s main building underwent major renovations. Willis was substantially involved in securing contractors. Three contractors later testified that they gave cash or other items of value to Willis to secure more government work or to ensure payment of their invoices. In 2010, the U.S. Department of the Interior audited the legislature’s administrative section while the renovations were taking place and concluded that the legislature had mismanaged public funds. After an investigation, an indictment issued for Willis’s prosecution on extortion charges (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)) and bribery charges (18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)). The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction and five-year prison term, upholding admission of evidence of Willis’s prior acceptance of bribes. The indictment adequately alleged all required elements of bribery: the parties, the relevant amounts of money exchanged, where the illegal transactions occurred, that Willis used his public position unlawfully, specific details of each transaction, and improper purposes under the federal statutes. The government proved a sufficient nexus between Willis’s conduct or his status as Executive Director and a corresponding effect on federal funds. View "United States v. Willis" on Justia Law

Carroll was hired by the Delaware River Port Authority in 1989 as a police officer. From 1989-2009, he served six years as a Navy corpsman and 10 years in the Pennsylvania National Guard. When not on active military duty, Carroll maintained his Port Authority employment, achieving the rank of corporal in 2004. Carroll was deployed to Iraq in 2009, where he sustained injuries leading to cervical spondylosis, degenerative disk disease, bilateral torn rotator cuffs, brain injury, and high-frequency hearing loss. Carroll was in rehabilitation until his 2013 honorable discharge. Carroll has not worked for the Port Authority since his deployment. In 2010 and 2012, while on active duty but in rehabilitation, Carroll unsuccessfully applied for a promotion. Carroll sued under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301, alleging discrimination based on military service. After discovery, the court certified an interlocutory appeal on the question of whether Carroll must plead and prove that he was objectively qualified for promotion to sergeant in order to sustain his discrimination suit. The Third Circuit stated that plaintiffs need not plead or prove that they are objectively qualified in order to meet their initial burden under USERRA; instead, employers may raise a plaintiff’s lack of qualifications as a nondiscriminatory justification for declining to promote the plaintiff, notwithstanding military service. View "Carroll v. Delaware River Port Authority" on Justia Law

Following a generally favorable result in the district court, Motel 6 appealed, arguing that the district court erred interpreting the Lanham Act’s anticounterfeiting penalties not to reach the use of the Motel 6 mark without permission and in failing to award prejudgment interest to Motel 6. The Third Circuit vacated as to those issues. The lower court interpreted the Lanham Act too narrowly and contrary to the weight of persuasive authority concerning treble damages under 15 U.S.C. 1117(b). On remand the court must determine whether “extenuating circumstances” exist such that treble damages would not be appropriate. While the court was not required to award prejudgment interest once it found the case exceptional for purposes of attorney’s fees and costs under Section 1117(a), it may do so after reconsidering the counterfeiting issue. View "Motel 6 Operating LP v. HI Hotel Group LLC" on Justia Law

Papp alleged that his late wife suffered secondary “take home” asbestos exposure while washing the work clothes of her first husband, Keck. Keck had several jobs that exposed him to asbestos. Papp sued multiple companies in New Jersey. In a deposition, he indicated that the landing gear Keck sandblasted was for a C-47 military cargo plane, built by Boeing’s predecessor. Boeing removed the case, citing the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Boeing asserted that it was entitled to government contractor immunity because the C-47 was produced for, and under the specific supervision of, the U.S. military and that the supervision extended to labels and warnings for all parts of the aircraft, including those parts laden with the asbestos to which Keck would later be exposed. The district court remanded, reasoning that Boeing, as a contractor and not a federal officer, had a “special burden” to demonstrate “that a federal officer or agency directly prohibited Boeing from issuing, or otherwise providing, warnings as to the risks associated with exposure to asbestos contained in products on which third-parties … worked or otherwise provided services.” The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the statute extends to contractors who possess a colorable federal defense and that Boeing made a sufficient showing of such a defense. View "Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co Inc" on Justia Law

In 2009, two groups of Pennsylvania hospital employees claimed they were not properly compensated for work performed during meal breaks. They sought to bring a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The actions were conditionally certified and “opt-in” notices were sent to potential plaintiffs. More than 3,000 individuals joined one collective action and more than 800 opted in to the other. The parties conducted collective action related discovery for nearly two years. Both judges subsequently decertified the collective actions, reasoning that the opt-in plaintiffs were not similarly situated to the named plaintiffs. Their job duties varied significantly; those duties were “highly relevant in terms of how, why and whether the employees were compensated properly for missed or interrupted meal breaks.” More than 300 different individuals supervised the plaintiffs and had individual authority to implement policies. The named plaintiffs successfully moved to voluntarily dismiss their claims with prejudice (FRCP 41(a)). The Third Circuit rejected an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The same law firm then filed new claims against the same defendants, with new named plaintiffs, which were dismissed based on issue preclusion. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that only plaintiffs who had accepted an offer of judgment had been dismissed with prejudice. When the other opt-in plaintiffs were dismissed without prejudice, they did not suffer an adverse judgment on the merits of any claim. View "Halle v. West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc." on Justia Law