Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Capps was hired in 1989, to operate a mixing machine.Capps suffers with Avascular Necrosis: A “loss of blood flow, severely limiting oxygen and nutrient delivery to the bone and tissues, essentially suffocating and causing death of those cells.” Capps developed arthritis in both hips which necessitated bilateral hip replacement in 2003. He experiences severe pain, sometimes lasting for days or weeks at a time. Capps was continuously recertified for intermittent Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, leave until his employment was terminated in 2014, for violation of a policy concerning dishonesty. Capps purportedly tried to use FMLA leave for DUI court dates. The Third CIrcuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Capps’ claims of interference with and retaliation for exercise of his FMLA rights and violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. An employer’s honest belief that its employee was misusing FMLA leave can defeat an FMLA retaliation claim. While, under certain circumstances, a request for intermittent FMLA leave may also constitute a request for a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, in this case, even if such a request was made, there is no evidence that the employer failed to provide any requested accommodation. View "Capps v. Mondelez Global LLC" on Justia Law

Doe was president and “sole proprietor” of Company A, but a 2008 document purports to memorialize Doe’s sale of all shares to Company B for $10,000. Numerous filings and tax documents suggested that Doe maintained control and ownership of Company A after the transfer. Multiple individuals have sued Doe and his businesses in state courts. Doe and the companies were investigated by a federal grand jury. The government obtained access to Doe’s email. Doe filed an interlocutory appeal to prevent its disclosure. While the appeal was pending, the district court granted permission to present the email to the grand jury, finding that although the email was protected by the work product privilege, the crime-fraud exception applied; in 2016, the grand jury returned an indictment, charging conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. The Third Circuit initially dismissed an interlocutory appeal, but, on rehearing, reversed, concluding that, while the grand jury investigation continues, it retains jurisdiction, and that the crime-fraud exception did not apply. The court stripped an attorney’s work product of confidentiality based on evidence suggesting only that the client had thought about using that product to facilitate fraud, not that the client had actually done so. An actual act to further the fraud is required before attorney work product loses its confidentiality. View "In re: Grand Jury Matter #3" on Justia Law

Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield provides health insurance products and services to approximately 3.7 million members. Two laptop computers, containing sensitive personal information about members, were stolen from Horizon. Four plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and other Horizon customers whose personal information was stored on those laptops, alleging willful and negligent violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681, and numerous violations of state law. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of Article III standing. According to the court, none of the plaintiffs had claimed a cognizable injury because, although their personal information had been stolen, none of them had adequately alleged that the information was actually used to their detriment. The Third Circuit vacated. In light of the congressional decision to create a remedy for the unauthorized transfer of personal information, a violation of FCRA gives rise to an injury sufficient for Article III standing purposes. Even without evidence that the plaintiffs’ information was in fact used improperly, the alleged disclosure of their personal information created a de facto injury. View "In re: Horizon Healthcare Inc. Data Breach Litigation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs used ocean common carriers to transport vehicles between foreign countries and the United States. Direct purchaser plaintiffs made arrangements with and received vehicles directly from the carriers, while indirect purchaser plaintiffs obtained the benefit of the carrier services by ultimately receiving vehicles transported from abroad. In 2012, law enforcement raided the offices of Defendants, ocean common carriers, in connection with antitrust investigations. Several Defendants pleaded pleaded guilty to antitrust violations based on price-fixing, allocating customers, and rigging bids for vehicle carrier services. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that Defendants entered into agreements to fix prices and reduce capacity in violation of federal antitrust laws and state laws. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the case. Defendants allegedly engaged in acts prohibited by the Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. 40101, which both precludes private plaintiffs from seeking relief under the federal antitrust laws for such conduct and preempts the state law claims under circumstances like those at issue. The Act responds to “the need to foster a regulatory environment in which U.S.-flag liner operators are not placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis their foreign-flag competitors.” The Federal Maritime Commission has regulatory authority displacing private suits. View "In re: Vehicle Carrier Services Antitrust Litigations" on Justia Law

Park, a citizen of South Korea, was ordered removed in 2009, in part for submitting fraudulent documents in support of his visa application. He claims that he subsequently became eligible for a “section 212(i)” waiver of inadmissibility. Because of the passage of time, the Board of Immigration Appeals could only reopen his removal proceedings through 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(a), the “sua sponte” reopening provision. The BIA employs that provision only in extraordinary circumstances; its discretion is broad. Park argued that the BIA has consistently reopened sua sponte for aliens who have become eligible for relief from removal after their cases have ended, thus establishing a “settled course of adjudication” that it is now bound to follow. The Third Circuit dismissed Park’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. Park neither showed nor established a reasonable inference that the BIA has constrained its discretion in a way that would allow judicial review of its decision denying sua sponte reopening. View "Park v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2008, PGW, which manufactures auto glass, engaged in reductions in force (RIFs). Individual directors had broad discretion in selecting whom to terminate. PGW did not: train directors, employ written guidelines, conduct disparate-impact analysis, nor document why any particular employee was terminated. Plaintiffs, terminated in a March 2009 RIF, were each over 50 years old. After filing charges with the EEOC, plaintiffs brought an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) collective action, asserting disparate treatment, disparate impact, and retaliation. The district court ruled that ADEA subgroups are cognizable, and conditionally certified a collective action of terminated employees who were at least 50 years old. After the case was transferred, another district judge concluded that the action should be decertified because the opt-in plaintiffs’ claims were factually dissimilar from those of the named plaintiffs. The court also excluded: statistical evidence in favor of plaintiffs’ disparate-impact claim; an expert opinion on “reasonable” human-resources RIF practices; and testimony concerning age-related implicit-bias studies. The court granted held that the 50-and-older disparate-impact claim was not cognizable under the ADEA and granted summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ disparate-treatment claims. The Third Circuit vacated in part. The ADEA prohibits disparate impacts based on age, not 40-and-older identity. A rule that disallowed subgroups would ignore genuine statistical disparities that could otherwise be actionable under the plain text of the statute. The court vacated the exclusion of testimony by plaintiffs’ statistics expert and remanded for Daubert proceedings. View "Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works LLC" on Justia Law

Coleman was tried with others for his involvement in a 1989 gang-related shooting in a restaurant. The trial included 76 prosecution witnesses, only one of whom testified as to Coleman’s involvement. Coleman was convicted of first-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of a crime, but acquitted of violating the Pennsylvania Corrupt Organizations Act (PCOA). Two years after Coleman’s convictions became final, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held (Besch) that PCOA did not apply to an individual’s participation in a wholly illegitimate enterprise. Under Besch. Coleman could not have been charged with a PCOA violation because the gang was wholly illegitimate. Coleman failed to raise Besch when he twice, unsuccessfully, sought state post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2014, Coleman sought federal habeas relief, arguing that he was denied due process because the evidence introduced against his codefendants was unfairly imputed to him. He asserted that his claim should be considered under the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to the time limit imposed by the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and principles of equitable tolling. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. Coleman cannot satisfy the actual innocence requirement of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to AEDPA View "Coleman v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law

In 1996, Gardner and others were convicted of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, conspiracy to commit murder, murder in aid of racketeering, carjacking resulting in death, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence causing death. Gardner was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment on each count and 120 months on Count 4. The Fourth Circuit affirmed on direct appeal and, later, denial of his petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2014, Gardner sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, citing the Supreme Court’s intervening “Alleyne” holding that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the [mandatory minimum] penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” The district court dismissed, finding that Gardner’s claims should have been raised in a section 2255 motion in the court that sentenced him. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting section 2241’s limited scope. Alleyne simply extended the logic of Apprendi to mandatory minimums for criminal sentences; neither makes previously criminal conduct noncriminal. Because section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective to raise an Apprendi argument, it is not inadequate or ineffective to raise an Alleyne argument. View "Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP" on Justia Law

Mateo-Medina, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was deported in 2012 after serving five months for unlawfully obtaining a U.S. passport. Shortly after his deportation, his common-law wife, Rasuk, a U.S. citizen with whom Mateo-Medina had lived for 15 years, was diagnosed with terminal cancer. Rasuk had two adult sons from a prior marriage, both drug addicts. One lived with the couple; the couple was raising the young child (Angel) of her other son. When Mateo-Medina learned of the diagnosis, he returned to the U.S. to care for Rasuk, who died in 2014. Mateo-Medina became Angel’s sole caretaker. Rasuk’s son reported Mateo-Medina to immigration authorities. He pled guilty to reentry after removal, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a); (b)(2). Mateo-Medina’s PSR calculated a sentence of eight-to-14 months’ imprisonment. Mateo-Medina had a 2000 DUI conviction, the 2012 fraudulent passport conviction, and six arrests that did not lead to conviction. The PSR did not contain any information about the conduct underlying those arrests. The court departed downward one level; the prosecutor and the defense argued for a sentence of time served (six months), the lower end of the Guidelines range. The court sentenced Mateo-Medina to 12 months plus one day. The Third Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the court mischaracterized Mateo-Medina’s criminal history in a way that affected his sentence. View "United States v. Mateo-Medina" on Justia Law

Maliandi alleges that she began working for Montclair State University (MSU) in 2007 and took medical leave for breast cancer treatment in 2013. Despite having complied with all policies and procedures for taking such leave, Maliandi allegedly was denied her original position when she returned and instead was offered an inferior position, which she declined. She was subsequently terminated. Maliandi then filed suit against MSU, citing the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601 and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. 10:5-1 to -49. The district court denied a motion dismiss, determining that MSU is not the state’s alter ego for purpose of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Third Circuit reversed, applying a balancing test to the “close case” and concluding that MSU is an arm of the state. While the funding factor counsels against immunity the status under state law and autonomy factors weigh in favor of extending MSU immunity from suit. In analyzing the funding factor, the court considered the state’s legal obligation to pay a money judgment entered against MSU; alternative sources of funding from which MSU could pay such judgments; and specific statutory provisions that immunize the state from liability for money judgments. View "Maliandi v. Montclair State University" on Justia Law